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UKICLE: A Self-Supporting Entity
The University of Kentucky Office of Continuing Legal Education (UK/CLE) is an
income-based office of the University of Kentucky College of Law. As such, it is
separately budgeted and financially self-supporting. UK/CLE operations are similar
to not-far-profit organizations, paying all direct expenses, salaries and overhead
solely from revenues. No public funds or tax dollars are allocated to its budget.
Revenues are obtained from registrant enrollment fees, and the sale of publications.
Our sole function is to provide professional development services. In the event surplus funds become available, they are utilized to offset deficits or retained in our
budget to improve the quality and variety of services we provide.
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KENTUCKY GENERAL ASSEMBLY UPDATE
New Kentucky Legislative Enactments
I.
Introduction. The materials included in this summary were accumulated as of April 4,
2001 and based upon bills introduced in the Kentucky 2001 General Session. The bills
summarized here include issues of particular importance to financial institutions doing business
in Kentucky. Detailed information will be provided to financial institutions next month in a
booklet produced by the Kentucky Bankers Association entitled 2001 Session in Summary.
Most 0 f the b ills summarized a re inc luded with these materials. Bills no t inc luded m ay b e
obtained through the LRC Website at www.lrc.state.ky.us/or by contacting Debra Stamper at
502-582-2453.
II.
First Annual Session-2001 marked the first annual session of the Kentucky General
Assembly. Prior to 2001, Kentucky's legislature met only on even numbered years for 60
business days. A measure was passed during the 2000 Regular Session which allowed
Kentuckians to vote on annual sessions, which would maintain the existing calendar during even
numbered years and include a short, 30-day session in odd numbered years. That passed during
the November 2000 vote. This first annual session was difficult in that the rules were not clearly
established until just before the session began. It was also difficult to pass any significant bills,
if they raised discussion or controversy, because of the limited time available for consideration
and the political split in the legislative houses. In summary, very little passed out of the General
Assembly this year. It is significant, therefore, that several bills passed out which are of interest
to the banking industry.
III.
BranchinglDe Novo AcquisitionlFHLB Letters of Credit (SB 22-signed by the
Governor March 5). During the 2000 Session two bills were passed with conflicting language.
This bill clarifies the confusion that resulted.
Branching-State banks now have the express authority to branch without regard to
geographic limitations. Prior to the 2000 session state banks were limited to single
county branching or by acquisition. After the 2000 session state banks began branching
across county lines, by means of parity as other institutions within Kentucky and in other
states have the authority to branch across county lines. KRS 287.180.
De Novo Acquisition-The five year existence rule (prior to acquisition of a majority of
shares) is now removed. Prior to the 2000 session acquisition of a bank in Kentucky
could only be obtained after the bank had been in existence for five years. During the
2000 session all references to that five-year requirement were removed, except that
contained in 287.900 (2). That section is now removed.
FHLB Letters of Credit-During the 1998 and 2000 sessions, several changes were made
to expand the allowable categories of collateral on public deposits made to an institution
in excess of the FDIC coverage limits. One category added were Federal Home Loan
Bank Letters of Credit, which are widely used by institutions in Kentucky. For some
reason, certain agencies have refused to recognize these LaC's as acceptable collateral.
Debra Stamper
Kentucky Bankers Association

A·l

Therefore, a new section (5) to KRS 41.240 has been added to require the acceptance of
these LOC's as collateral.
IV.
Actions relating to Securities (SB 134-signed by the Governor March 20). Specifies
that the three-year statute of limitations on securities actions arising under KRS 292.480 runs
from when the occurrence was discovered or should have been discovered.

V.

Mortgage Loan Companies (HB 102-signed by the Governor March 15). KRS Chapter
294 deals with the regulatory structure of mortgage loan companies and brokers. Atnong the
changes included in this bill are:
•

•

•

•

KRS 294.020. Increases the exemption list (those entities exempt from the
chapter) to include any entity that is regularly examined by the primary financial
institution regulators or which is wholly owned by an exempted entity.
KRS 294.020. Requires a disclosure to be signed by borrower and maintained by
lender, in the form included in the statute, in each instance where a natural person
is making a loan with his own funds without intent to resell. This shall not apply
if the natural person lender is making less than 5 mortgage loans a year.
KRS 294.030. Provides that exempt lenders (who are required to file an
exemption, but fail to file) or natural person lenders (who are required to comply
with disclosure requirements, but do not) operating in violation of these
requirements will lose the right to collect or retain any interest or charges on the
loan contract.
KRS 294.220. Prohibits mortgage companies or brokers operating under the
Chapter to charge for an initial payoff or payment history per calendar quarter.

VI.
Trusts and Estates (HB 113-signed by the Governor March 15). Deletes the annual
fiduciary settlement publication requirement on accounts that are not more than $2500 and are
set up to limit access except by order of the court.

VII.

Security Interest Issues (HB 133-signed by the Governor March 15).
Manufactured homes-The title lien on a manufactured home shall remain effective for
30 years or until discharged (increased from 14 years). KRS 186A.190.
Debtor name change-The substantial changes made to Article 9 of the VCC during the
200 session, included a requirement that an amendment be filed to reflect a debtor name
change, in order to continue the security interest. This change requires the amendment
only upon written notice by the debtor to the secured party of the name change. KRS
355.9-507

VIII. Safe Deposit Boxes (HB 148). This bill places into law a procedure that many financial
institutions are already following as a result in a change of policy implemented by the Kentucky
Revenue Cabinet in 1999. During that year the Revenue Cabinet notified financial institutions
that it. would discontinue the practice of sending an agent to inventory a safe deposit box upon
the death of an own~r. That was often the only safe 1Jlethod available for a bank to- allow family
Debra Stamper
Kentucky Bankers Association

A·2
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members access to a safe deposit box for the purpose of determining if a will was in the box.
This bill adds a new section to KRS Chapter 286, which requires a financial institution to allow
certain "interested persons," upon proper proof of death and the safe deposit box key, access to
the box for the sole purpose of determining if a will or burial instructions are in the box. The
access and search must be done in the presence of an employee of the financial institution. If the
sought after documents are found, the employee will give the original to the interested party and
place a copy back in the box.
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S822 (BR 215) - T. Buford
AN ACT relating to banks.
Amend KRS 287.180 to permit a bank to establish a branch within any state, the
District of Columbia, or a territory of the United States.

SCS - Retain the original provisions; amend KRS 287.900 to delete restriction on
acquisition of greater than fifty percent of the voting securities of a bank if the bank was
chartered after July 13, 1984 and was in existence less than five years at the time of
acquisition.
SFA (1, T. Buford) - Retain provisions of original; require the State Treasurer to
accept letters of credit issued by federal home loan banks as collateral.
HFA (1, J. Stacy) - Prohibit a bank located in a county of 29,000 or fewer persons
from opening a branch in another county; prohibit banks from establishing a branch in a
county of 29,000 or fewer persons.
HFA (2, J. Stacy) - Amend KRS 287.102 to provide that banking activity does not
include branch banking or the establishment of branch banks.
Jan 2-introduced in Senate
Jan 5-to Banking and Insurance (S)
Feb 15-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Consent Calendar with Committee
Substitute
Feb 16-2nd reading, to Rules
Feb 19-posted for passage in the Consent Orders of the Day for Tuesday, February
20, 2001; taken from the Consent Orders of the Day, placed in the Regular Orders of
the Day; floor amendment (1) filed to Committee Substitute
Feb 20-3rd reading, passed 37-0 with Committee Substitute, floor amendment (1)
Feb 21-received in House
Feb 22-to Banking and Insurance (H)
Feb 23-posted in committee
Feb 28-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Calendar
Mar 1-2nd reading, to Rules
Mar 5-posted for passage in the Regular Orders of the Day for Tuesday, March 6,
2001
Mar 6-f1oor amendments (1) and (2) filed
Mar 7-3rd reading, passed 95-4; received in Senate
Mar 8-enrolled, signed by each presiding officer, delivered to Governor
Mar 15-signed by Governor (Acts ch. 112)

r

r

,

r

A -5

UNOFFICIAL COPY AS OF 04/04/01

01 REG. SESS.

01 RS SB 22/GA

AN ACT relating to banks.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
Section 1. KRS 287.180 is amended to read as follows:
(1)

Banks authorized under the laws of this state may, except as provided in subsections
(2) or (3) of this section, exercise, only at their principal office, powers necessary to
carry on the business of banking by discounting and negotiating notes, drafts, bills
of exchange, and other evidences of debt, and by purchasing bonds, receiving
deposits and allowing interest on these items, buying and selling exchange, coin,
and bullion, and lending money on personal or real security.

(2)

A bank may establish within any state, the District of Columbia, or a territory of

the United States a branch[ in a county in which its principal office or aa

~xisting

branch is located] and may exercise all of the powers conferred in subsection (I) of
this section at the branch. A bank, except for a bank that the commissiOner may
designate by the promulgation of administrative regulations, shall apply to the
commissioner for permission to establish a branch. Before the commissioner shall
approve or disapprove any application made under this subsection the commissioner
shall ascertain and determine that the public convenience and advantage wiil be
served and promoted and that there is reasonable probability of the successful
operation of the branch based upon the financial and managerial impact of the
branch on the bank establishing the branch. The following conditions shall apply to
applications for branches:
(a)

The permission to open a branch shall lapse one (1) year

aft~r

the

commissioner has rendered a final order as defined in KRS l3B.OlO, unless it
shall have been opened and business actually begun in good faith. If, for
reasons beyond the control of the applicant, the branch is not opened within
this time period, permission to open the branch may, with the apprpva.l of the
commissioner, be extended for any period oftime the commissioner deems to
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r
r

(b)

application, except for the financial condition of the bank proposing to
establish a branch office, which condition shall be subject to review until an
order ruling on the application is made.
(3)

r
r
r

Any corporation which on January 1, 1966, was engaged in operating an agency or
branch bank may continue to retain and operate the agency or branch bank under the
general banking laws, and the requirements set forth in this section in respect to
capital shall not apply to any existing agency or branch bank but only as to those
agencies or branch banks which may be established in the future in accordance with
the terms of this section.

(4)

The provisions of this section shall not be construed to prohibit the merger of banks
in the same county and the operation by the merged corporation of the banks, nor to
prohibit the sale of any bank to, and the purchase by, any other bank in the same
county and the operation of the bank by the purchasing bank as a branch, provided

r
r
r
r
r

An application to establish a branch office shall be approved or disapproved

by the commissioner based upon the facts existing at the date of filing of the

r
r
r
r

01 RS SB 22/GA

be necessary; and

r

r
r
r

01 REG. SESS.

the commissioner shall determine that the public convenience and necessity will be
served by the operation. The bank which does not survive the merger shall surrender
its charter.
(5)

Any national banking association or any state bank member of the Federal Reserve
system whose principal office is located in this state may do all things and perform
all acts which state banks are permitted to do or perform under this section, subject
to the conditions and restrictions provided for banks as to exercise of these powers.

(6)

When a branch or agency bank has once been established any operation of the
branch or agency bank shall not be discontinued, and the branch or agency bank
shall not be closed until after ninety (9q) days' notice in writing to the
commissioner. In t he discretion of the commissioner the branch or agency bank

A- 7
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proposing to discontinue operation may be required to give notice of the date when
its operation will cease.

,

Section 2. KRS 287.900 is amended to read as follows:
(1)

For purposes of this section and KRS 287.905:
(a)

"Bank" means any institution organized under this chapter, the banking laws
of another state, or the National Bank Act, as amended, to do a banking
business;

(b)

"Bank holding company," "company," and "control" have the meanings
accorded them in the Federal Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as
amended (12 U.S.C. secs. 1841 et seq.). "Control" may be acquired by
acquisition of voting securities, by purchase of assets, by merger or
consolidation, by contract, or otherwise;

(c)

"Individual" means a natural person, partnership, association, business trust,
voting trust, or similar organization. "Individual" does not include a
corporation; and

(d)

"Deposit" has the meaning accorded it in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act,
as amended, and regulations promulgated thereunder; excluded, however,
from deposits are all interbank deposits and all deposits in foreign branches
and international banking facilities, as shown in the reports made by all
federally insured depository institutions to their respective supervisory
authorities.

1
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of business in this state if the bank Vias chartered after JuI)' 13, 1984, and if, at the
time of the acquisition, the bank has been in existence less than fi'/e (5) )tears. The

r

pro'lisions of this subsection shall not prohibit the organization of a one (1) bank
holding company for the purpose of acquiring control of a bank e¥en if the bank

r

'liaS chartered after July 13, 1984, and has been in existence less than fi'le (5) )tears
at the time of the acquisition.
~

No individual or bank holding company wherever located may acquire control of
any bank or bank holding company if, upon the acquisition, the individual or bank
holding company would control banks in this state holding more than fifteen
percent (15%) of the total deposits and member accounts in the offices of all

r

r

r
r
r
r

l

r
r

r
r!

r

federally insured depository institutions in this state as reported in the most recent
June 30 qua rterly report made b y t he ins titutions tot heir respective supervisory
authorities which are available at the time of the acquisition.
m~

The limitations set forth in this section or any other provision of this chapter

or any administrative regulation promulgated thereunder, as now in effect or
amended after July 13, 1984, shall not apply to the acquisition of a bank if, in his or
her discretion, the commissioner, if the bank is organized under the laws of this
state, or the comptroller of the currency, if the bank is a national bank, detennines
that an emergency exists and the acquisition is appropriate in order to prevent the
probable failure of the bank which is closed or is in danger of closing.
l.1l~

The provisions of this section shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict the

merger or consolidation of banks or bank holding companies having their principal
places of business in the same county and the operation by the merged or
consolidated corporation of the banks, nor to prohibit the sale of any bank or bank
holding company to, and the purchase thereof by, any other bank or bank holding
comp.any with its principal place of business in the same county and the operation
of the bank

as

a branch so long as the provisions of KRS 287.180(4) have been

A· 9
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satisfied.
Section 3. KRS 41.240 is amended to read as follows:
(1)

(a)

Before any bank shall be named as a state depository to receive public funds,
it shall either pledge or provide to the State Treasurer, as collateral, securities
or other obligations having an aggregate current face value or current quoted
market value at least equal to the deposits or provide to the State Treasurer a
surety bond or surety bonds in favor of the State Treasurer in an amount at
least equal to the deposits, provided, however, that amounts insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation need not be so collateralized. The president or cashier
of each depository bank shall submit to the Treasurer and the State Investment
Commission a statement subscribed and sworn to by him showing:
1.

The face value or current quoted market value of the securities or other
obligations pledged or provided as of the time the securities or other
obligations are offered as collateral; and

2.

The value of surety bonds provided as of the time such surety bonds are
provided as collateral.

The valuation of all pledged or provided collateral and the face amount of all
surety bonds provided as collateral shall be reported to the State Treasurer and
State Investment Commission upon receipt of deposit and within ten (10) days
of the close of each quarter after the quarter beginning December 31. Such
value with respect to pledged collateral other than surety bonds shall be as of
the end of the quarter or the preceding business day and, as to market values,
shall be obtained from a reputable bond pricing service. The State Treasurer
and Governor may from time to time call for additional collateral to
adequately secure the deposits as aggregate face or current market values may
require.

A·I0
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(b)

whichever is less. Deposits will be valued at the end of each business day.
(2)

(a)

State Treasurer, as collateral, securities or other obligations having an
aggregate face value or a current quoted market value or provide to the State
Treasurer a surety bond or surety bonds in an amount equal to eighty percent

rt

(80%) of the value of the state deposit including demand and time accounts, if
the depository is determined by the State Investment Commission to have very

r
r

strong credit with little or no credit risk at any maturity level and the
likelihood of short-term unexpected problems of significance is minimal or
not of a serious or long-term nature. The value of the state deposit will be
determined at the end of the business day of deposit and as of the end of
business on the last day of each quarter that funds are so deposited.
(b)

Valuation of all pledged or provided collateral and the face amount of surety
bonds provided shall be reported to the State Treasurer and the State

r

Investment Commission upon receipt of the state deposit and within ten (10)

!

I

As an alternative to paragraph (l)(a) of this section, a Kentucky depository
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation may either pledge to the

r

r
r

No deposit of state collected demand and time funds shall collectively exceed

surplus or ten percent (10%) of the total deposits of any particular depository,

r

r,
r

01 RS SB 22/GA

at any time the depository's sum of capital, reserves, undivided profits and

r

r

01 REG. SESS.

days of the close of each quarter after the quarter beginning December 31.
(c)

Depositories designated as qualified for reduced pledging shall be so recorded
in the executive journal.

!

r
r

r
r

(d)

The State Investment Commission shall determine eligibility for the reduced
pledging option based on totally objective and quantifiable measures of
financial intermediary performance. The

inform~tion

for such eligibility shall

be obtained from publicly available documents. The State Investment
Commission shall promulgate the particular criteria of eligibility by

A-ll
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regulations issued pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A.
(3)

Depositories which do not qualify or do not choose to qualify under subsection (1)
or (2) of this section shall not receive state deposits in excess of amounts that are
insured by an instrumentality of the United States.

(4)

Only the following securities and other obligations may be accepted by the State
Treasurer as collateral under this section:
(a)

Bonds, notes, letters of credit or other obligations of or issued or guaranteed
by t he United States, or those for which the credit of the United States is
pledged for the payment of the principal and interest thereof, and any bonds,
notes, debentures, letters of credit, or any other obligations issued or
guaranteed by any federal governmental agency or instrumentality, presently
or in the future established by an Act of Congress, as amended or
supplemented from time to time, including, without limitation, the United
States government corporations listed in KRS 66.480(1)(c);

(b)

Obligations of the Commonwealth of Kentucky including revenue bonds
issued by its statutory authorities, commissions or agencies;

(c)

Revenue bonds issued by educational institutions of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky as authorized by KRS 162.340 to 162.380;

(d)

Obligations of any city of the first, second, and third classes of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, or any county, for the payment of principal and
interest on which the full faith and credit of the issuing body is pledged;

(e)

School improvement bonds issued in accordance with the authority granted
under KRS 162.080 to 162.100;

(f)

School building revenue bonds issued in accordance with the authority
granted under KRS 162.120 to 162.300, provided that the issuance of such
bonds is approved·by the Kentucky Board of Education; and

(g)

Surety bonds issued by sureties rated in orie
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(5)

The State Treasurer shall accept letters of credit issued by federal home loan
banks as collateral under this section.
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S8 134 (BR 1234) - R. Stivers
AN ACT relating to securities.
Amend KRS 292.480 to define the limitations period as three (3) years after the date
the occurrence was discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been
discovered, and to be applied retroactively to any actions accruing from the date of
January 1, 1990.
sa~~-AMENDMENTS

HCS - Move reasonable discovery language after language of the occurrence of the
act, omission, or transaction constituting the violation of the chapter.
HFA (1, G. Lindsay) - Delete previous Section 2 and insert a new Section 2 in lieu
thereof which expresses legislative intent and provides that the Act shall be
retroactively applied to any actions, other than those given res jUdicata effect by a court
of competent jurisdiction, which in the exercise of reasonable care should have been
discovered as having accrued in the ten years immediately preceding the effective date
of the Act.
Feb 12-introduced in Senate
Feb 13-to Judiciary (S)
Feb 21-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Calendar
Feb 22-2nd reading, to Rules; posted for passage in the Regular Orders of the Day
for Monday, February 26,2001
Feb 26-3rd reading, passed 37-0
Feb 27-received in House
Feb 28-to Judiciary (H); posting waived; posted in committee
Mar 1-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Calendar with Committee Substitute
Mar 2-2nd reading, to Rules
Mar 6-posted for passage in the Regular Orders of the Day for Wednesday, March
7,2001; floor amendment (1) filed to Committee Substitute
Mar 8-3rd reading, passed 95-1 with Committee Substitute, floor amendment (1) ;
received in Senate; posted for passage for concurrence in House Committee
Substitute, floor amendment (1) ; passed over and retained in the Orders of the Day;
Senate concurred in House Committee Substitute, floor amendment (1) ; passed 36-0
Mar 9-enrolled, signed by each presiding officer, delivered to Governor
Mar 20-signed by Governor (Acts ch. 129)
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AN ACT relating to securities.
Be it ellacted by the Gelleral Assembly ofthe Commollwealth ofKelltucky:
Section 1. KRS 292.480 is amended to read as follows:
(1)

Any person, who offers or sells a security in violation of this chapter or of any rules
or orders promulgated hereunder or offers or sells a security by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made in the light of the circumstances

und~r

which

they are made not misleading (the buyer not knowing of the untruth or omission)
and who does not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or omission is
liable to the person buying the security from him, who may sue either at law or in
equity to recover the consideration paid for the security, together with interest at the
legal rate from the date of payment costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, less the
amount of any income received on the security, upon the tender of the security, or
for damages if he no longer owns the security. Damages are the amount that would
be recoverable upon a tender less:

(2)

(a)

The value of the security when the buyer is disposed of it; and

(b)

Interest at the legal rate per annum from the date of disposition.

Any person who purchases a security in violation of this chapter or of any
administrative regulations or orders promulgated under this chapter or who
purchases a security by means of any untrue statement of a material factor any
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made in
light of the circumstances under which they are made not misleading, the seller not
knowing of the untruth or omission, and who does not sustain the burden of proof
that he did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known of
the untruth or omission is liable to the person selling the security to him, who may
sue either at law or in equity for:

A·16
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A return of the security, together with any income received by the purchaser
on the security, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees, upon a tender of the full
amount of the consideration received for the security; or

(b)

If the purchaser no longer owns the security, the difference between the fair
value of the security at the date of the transaction and the consideration
received for the security, together with interest on the difference at the legal
rate compounded annually from the date of the transaction, and costs and
reasonable attorney's fees.

(3)

For purposes of paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section, when the purchaser
no longer owns the security, if a seller seeking relief under paragraph (b) of
subsection (2) of this section offers and presents admissible evidence of the highest
intern1ediate value of the subject security as of some specific date occurring within
a reasonable period of time after the date of the sale of the security but no later than
the date an action under paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section is filed, or of
the total consideration received by the purchaser in a subsequent sale of that
security, it shall be presumed until rebutted by a preponderance of evidence to the
contrary that the value or sale price, as applicable, is the fair value of the security at
the date of the transaction as those terms are used in paragraph (b) of subsection (2)
of this section to measure damages. For purposes of subsections (l) and (2) of this
section and all other provisions of this chapter, statements and omissions may be
either oral or written.

(4)

Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or purchaser liable under
subsection (1) or (2) of this section, every partner, officer, or director (or person
occupying a similar status or performing similar functions) or employee of a seller
or purchaser who materially aids in the sale or purchase, and every broker-dealer or
agent who materially aids in the sale or purchase is also liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as the seller or purchaser, unless the nonseller or
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nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains the burden of proof that he did not know, and
in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the
facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. There is contribution as in
cases of contract among the several persons so liable.
(5)

Any tender specified in this section may be made at any time before entry of
judgment. Every cause of action under this statute survives the death of any person
who might have been a plaintiff or defendant. No person may sue under this section
more than three (3) years after the date the occurrence of the act, omission, or
transaction constituting a violation of this chapter was discovered, or ill the
exercise of reasonable care should have beell discovered. No person may sue
under this section:
(a)

If the buyer received a written offer, before suit and at a time when he owned
the security, to refund the consideration paid together with interest at the legal
rate from the date of payment, less the amount of any income received on the
security, and he failed to accept the offer within thirty (30) days of its receipt;

(b)

If the buyer received an offer before suit and at a time when he did not own
the security, unless he rejected the offer in writing within thirty (30) days of its
receipt; or

(c)

If paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section applies, and if the seller
received a written offer before suit equal to the difference between the greater
of the highest intennediate value of the security or the consideration received
by the purchaser upon disposal of the security and the consideration received
by the seller for the security, together with interest on the difference at the
legal rate from the date of the transaction; or if paragraph (a) of subsection (2)
of this section applies, and if the seller received a written offer to return the
security together with any income received by the purchaser on the security;
and in either case he failed to accept the offer within thirty (30) days of its
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(6)

any purported right under any contract with knowledge of the facts by reason of
which its making or perfonnance was in violation, may base any suit on the
contract. Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any
security to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or any rule or order

•
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r

r

r
r
r

No person who has made or engaged in the perfonnance of any contract in violation
of any provision of this chapter or any rule or order hereunder, or who has acquired

r

r

hereunder is void.
(7)

The rights and remedies provided by this section are in addition to any other rights
or remedies that may exist at law or in equity.
Section 2.

In the past ten years an inordinately high number of the citizens of the

Commonwealth have invested the hard earned proceeds of their work in securities,
individually and through employer sponsored plans, and as the number of investments in
the securities market have so increased so too have the instances of fraud in that market.
Even though the number of participants in the securities market has increased, a
commensurate increase in the knowledge of a reasonable participant in the securities
market has not closely followed. Therefore, the amendments contained in Section 1 of
this Act shall be retroactively applied to any actions, other than those actions given res
judicata effect by a court of competent jurisdiction, which in the exercise of reasonable
care would have been discovered as having accrued in the ten (10) years immediately
preceding the effective date ofthis Act.
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HB 102 (BR 280) - R. Damron
AN ACT relating to mortgage loan companies and brokers.
Create a new section of KRS Chapter 294 to require a mortgage loan company to
maintain a minimum net worth of $20,000; amend KRS 294.020 to exempt certain
lenders from KRS Chapter 294; permit certain exempLed persons relief from having to
file a claim of exemption; amend KRS 294.220 to make it unlawful for a mortgage loan
company to charge a fee for the issuance of an initial written loan payoff amount or
payment history for each calendar quarter; prohibit any person who engages in the
business regulated by KRS Chapter 294 without a license to collect any principal,
charges, or recompense.
HB102-AMENDMENTS
HCS - Retain the original provisions; delete the requirement of a minimum net
worth; provide an exemption for any mortgage loan involving housing initially
transferred by certificate of title under KRS Chapter 186A; require any natural person
making a loan with his or her own funds for the person's own investment to provide a
disclosure statement; delete penalty for acting as mortgage loan company without a
license or exemption and replace it with a provision that a person who engages in such
action shall not collect interest or charges but the unpaid principal balance of the loan
must be paid in full.
HFA (1, R. Damron) - Provide that the requirement of a disclosure by natural
persons not apply to persons making less than 5 mortgage loans per year; make
penalty for transacting mortgage loan business without a license or that the exemption
apply to persons willfully transacting business without a license or exemption.
SFA (1, R. Sanders Jr) - Create a new section of KRS Chapter 367 to provide that
inquiries made by a motor vehicle insurance company or a motor vehicle dealer to a
consumer reporting agency about the credit history of a consumer within a 90 day
period shall be treated by the consumer reporting agency as 1 inquiry for purposes of
determining the credit score of the consumer.
SFA (2/Title, R. Sanders Jr) - Make title amendment.
Jan 4-introduced in House
Jan 5-to Banking and Insurance (H); posted in committee
Feb 14-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Calendar with Committee Substitute
Feb 15-2nd reading, to Rules; floor amendment (1) filed to Committee Substitute
Feb 20-posted for passage in the Regular Orders of the Day for Wednesday,
February 21, 2001
Feb 21-3rd reading, passed 94-1 with Committee Substitute, floor amendment (1)
Feb 22-received in Senate
Feb 27-to Banking and Insurance (S)
Mar 1-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Calendar; floor amendments (1) and (2title) filed
Mar 2-2nd reading, to Rules
Mar 7-posted for passage in the Regular Orders of the Day for Wednesday, March
7,2001; 3rd reading; floor amendments (1) and (2-title) withdrawn; passed 33-0
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Mar 8-received in House; enrolled, signed by each presiding officer, delivered to
Governor
Mar 15-signed by Governor (Acts ch. 98)
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AN ACT relating to mortgage loan companies and brokers.
Be it ellacted b)' tI,e Gelleral Asseillbly oftI,e COllllllOIIJVealtl, ofKelltllcky:

r
r

Section 1. KRS 294.020 is amended to read as follo\vs:
(1)

The follo\ving shall be exempt from this chapter:
(a)

Any person dilly licellsed, cllartered, or otl,erJv;se subject to regillar

,..

e.:\:anlillatioll at least Ollce every tJVO (2) years by a state or federal fillallcial

f

illstitlltioll reglllatoD' agellcv[doing business] under the la\vs of this state or

r

any otller state or the United States as a ballk[relating to banlcs], ballk holding

,,.

COlllpaI1V[coHlpanies],

savIngs

and

loan

trust C0I11paI1v[companies],
associatioll[associations],

credit lillioll[unions],
servIce

corporation

,..

sllbsidiary[subsidiaries] of savings and loan associations, consumer loall or

f

finance COlllpaI1V[colllpanies], industrial loan cOlllpal,y[companies], insurance

r

cOlllpallV[COHlpanies],f-ef} real estate investment trllst[tR1stS] as defined in 26

f

U.S.C. sec. 856[ and tIle affiliates of such cOlllpanies],f-efj an institution of
the fann credit system organized under the Farm Credit Act of 1971 as

,.

anlended, or lvllolly olvlled sllbsidiary of al'y illstitlltioll listed ill this
paragrapll if tI,e illStitlltiol1 IllaintaillS a place ofbllsilless ill Kelltllcky;

t

r

(b)

r

,,.

engaged in the business of negotiating nlortgage loans, when the person
renders services in the course of his practice as an attorney-at-law;
(c)

Any person doing any act under order of any court;

(d)

TIle United States of America, the Common\vealth of Kentucky, or any other
state, and any Kentucky city, county, or other political subdivision, and any

r
l-

r

r
,.
+

An attonley-at-Iaw licensed to practice law in Kentucky who is not principally

agency, division, or corporate instrumentality of any of the foregoing;
(e)

The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), ··and the Govemnlent National Mortgage'
Association (GNMA);

A·23

---'llDR

up,

•

0') .

I

.,
I

UNOFFICIAL COpy AS OF 04/04/01

(f)

01 REG. SESS.

01 RS HB 102/GA

With the approval of the commissioner, an independent contractor that solicits
mortgage loans for only one (1) licensed mortgage loan company or licensed
mortgage loan broker may be exempted from obtaining a license under this

-..
!

."

!

chapter if:
1.

The licensed mortgage loan company or licensed mortgage loan broker
notifies the department that it will assume legal responsibility for the
actions of the independent contractor in complying with the provisions
ofKRS Chapter 294; and

2.

The licensed mortgage loan company or licensed mortgage loan broker
provides the department with proof that its bond will cover the

-

-

independent contractorz:
(g)

All!, mortgage loall illvolvillg hOliSillg illitially trallsferred by certificate of
title lIllder KRS Chapter 186A.

(2)

The following shall be exempt from all the provisions of this chapter except that

-

they shall be subject to the examination or investigation provisions of KRS
294.170(4), (5), and (6), 294.180, and 294.190 if it appears on grounds satisfactory
to the commissioner, on written complaint, that an examination or investigation is
necessary, and they shall be subject to the prohibited acts provisions of KRS

(a)

)

294.220:
Mortgage loan companies or mortgage loan brokers regulated by the

-

i

Department of Housing and Urban Development;
(b)

Any natural person making a mortgage loan with his or her own funds for the

,

.I

person's own investment without intent to resell the mortgage loan;
(c)

Any person doing business under the laws of this state or the United States
relating to any broker-dealer, agent, or investment adviser duly registered with '
the Department of Financial Institutions;

(d)

Any person licensed in this state as a real estate broker or real estate sales

A·24

-';

I

--

r

UNOFFICIAL COpy AS OF 04/04/01

r

01 REG. SESS.

01 RS HB 102/GA

associate, not actively engaged in the business of negotiating loans secured by

r

real property, when the person renders the services in the course of his or her

r

practice as a real estate broker or real estate associate; and
(e)

r

(3)

Any person making less than five (5) mortgage loans per year.

Any person relying upon an exemption under subsection (2)(c) or (d) of this section
shall file with the commissioner a claim of exemption. The commissioner shall

r
,

thereafter determine the availability of the claimed exemption and he shall not

r

disallow an exemption that is validly claimed.

(4)

r
r

ATlY persoTl listed iTl subsection (l)(a), (b). (c). (d), or (e) of this section shallTlot
be required to file with the commissioTler a claim ofexemption.

(5)

(a)

shall make the following disclosure, on a separate sheet of paper in

r

minimum eighteen

Department ofFin aTlcia I ITlstitutions.
(Name o(leTlder) is making this mortgage 10aTl with his or her own fUTlds. (or the
person's own iTlvestment. without intent to resell the mortgage loan.

r

(The phone number and address of the KeTltucky DepartmeTlt of FiTlaTlcial

r

Institutions).
(b)

r
r
r

point tvpe. to the borrower:

(Name aTld address of lender) is not licensed or regulated bv the Kentucky

r

r

(18)

DISCLOSURE

r

r

ATlv natural person making a 10aTl under subsection (2)(b) of this section

A copy ofthe disclosure. sigTled by the borrower, shall be maiTltaiTled bv the
Tlatural person (or a period not to exceed three (3) years after the date the
mortgage loan is paid in full.

(c)

This subsection shall not apply to a natural person under subsectioTl (2)(b)
ofthis section makiTlg less t!tan five (5) mortgage 10aTls per veal'.

."

:

Section 2. KRS 294.030 is amendf?d to read as follows:
(1)

{f!1

It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this state, either directly or
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indirectly, as a mortgage loan company or mortgage loan broker if he is not
licensed under this chapter, unless thatfstiffij person is exempt under KRS

294.020 alld. if required bI' subsectioll (3) ofSectioll 1 of this Act to file a
claim of exemptioll. has filed a claim of exemptioll and the filed claim of
exemptioll has beell allowed by the commissioller.
(b)

It is ulllawful for allY lIatural persoll to make a loall under subsectiolt (2)(b)
of Sectioll 1 of this Act without makillg the disclosure required by
subsection (5) ofSectioll 1 ofthis Act.

(2)

Neither the fact that a license has been issued nor the fact that any person, businessJ,
or company is effectively registered, constitutes a finding by the commissioner that
any document filed under this chapter is true, complete, and not misleading. Nor
does such fact directly or indirectly imply approval of the registrant by the
commissioner or the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It is unlawful to make or cause
to be made to any prospective customer or client any representation inconsistent
with this subsection.

(3)

AliI' persoll who willfullv trallsacts busilless ill this state ill violatioll ofsubsectiol1

0) of this sectioll shall have 110 right to collect. receive. or retaill allY illterest or
charges whatsoever Oil a loall

COil tract.

but the ullpaid prillcipal ofthe lonll shall

be paid ill full.
Section 3. KRS 294.220 is amended to read as follows:
(1)

It shall be unlawful for any person to make or cause to be made, in any document

filed with the commissioner or in any proceeding under this chapter, any statement
which is, at the time and in light of the circumstances under which it is made, false
or misleading in any material respect.
(2)

It shall be unlawful for any mortgage loan company or mortgage loan broker, in

connection with the operation of a mortgage loan business or the management or
servicing of mortgage contracts, directly or indirectly:
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(a)

To employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;

(b)

To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would

(c)

To fail to disburse funds in accordance with a loan commitment;

(d)

To delay closing of any mortgage loan for the purpose of increasing interest,
costs, fees, or charges payable by the borrower;

r

(e)

business days the issuance of a payment history; or

r

m

To charge a fee for the issuance ofan initial written loan payoff amount or
payment history (or each calendar quarter as set out in paragraph (e) ofthis

r

r
r
r

Upon receipt of a customer's written request, to delay beyond two (2) business
days the issuance of a written loan payoff amount or to delay beyond ten (10)

r

r

subsection.
(3)

Unless exempted by KRS 294.020, and, if required by subsection (3) ofSection 1

of this Act to file a claim of exemption, has filed a claim of exemption and the
filed claim of exemption has been allowed by the commissioner, it shall be
unlawful for any person to transact any mortgage loan business in this state unless
it:
(a)

Qualifies to do business in Kentucky as required by KRS Chapter 271B; and

(b)

Complies with the provisions of this chapter.

r
r
r
!

r
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operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person;

r
r

r
r
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HB 113 (BR 274) - B. Heleringer
AN ACT relating to trusts and estates.
Amend KRS 395.625 to delete the annual fiduciary settlement publication
requirement for blocked accounts of not more than $1,500.
HB113-AMENDMENTS
HFA (1 , B. Heleringer) - Increase specified amount from $1,500 to $2,500.
Jan 5-introduced in House
Feb 6-to Judiciary (H)
Feb 12-posted in committee
Feb 15-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Calendar
Feb 16-2nd reading, to Rules; posted for passage in the Regular Orders of the Day
for Monday, February 19, 2001
Feb 19-floor amendment (1) filed
Feb 20-3rd reading, passed 100-0 with floor amendment (1)
Feb 21-received in Senate
Feb 26-to Judiciary (S)
Mar 5-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Consent Calendar
Mar 6-2nd reading, to Rules
Mar 7-posted for passage in the Consent Orders of the Day for Wednesday, March
7,2001; 3rd reading, passed 38-0; received in House
Mar 8-enrolled, signed by each presiding officer, delivered to Governor
Mar 15-signed by Governor (Acts ch. 21)
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AN ACT relating to trusts and estates.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
Section 1. KRS 395.625 is amended to read as follows:
Not less than ten (10) days prior to the date of hearing, the clerk shall cause notice of the
filing of a settlement to be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, stating the name of
the fiduciary, the trust, the nature of the account and the date of hearing, with a statement
that exceptions must be filed before that time; except that with the court's approval the
fiduciary may, in lieu of such publication, send a written notice thereof to all unpaid
creditors and distributees, which notice shall be mailed at least ten (10) days before said
date of hearing. The fiduciary in such cases shall file his affidavit that such notice has
been mailed. The actual cost of the notice, or the proportionate part thereof, if tlf0re than
one (1) settlement, shall be taxed as costs. l{the vallie o{the trust or estate is 1I0t more
tItan two thollsand five hllndred dollars ($2,500) and the assets ofthe trust or estate are
held in all account that mal' be accessed onlv IIpon order o(the COllrt, the provisions of
this section shall not apply to settlements involving that trllst or estate.
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HB 133/LM (BR 425) - J. Bruce, K. Upchurch
AN ACT relating to security interests.
Amend KRS 186A.190 to provide that the notation of a security interest on a
certificate of title for a manufactured home shall remain effective for a period of 30
years rather than 14 years; amend KRS 355.9-507 to provide that a debtor's name
change which makes a financing statement seriously misleading shall be effective to
perfect a security interest in the collateral acquired by the debtor before the change, or
within 4 months after the debtor notifies the secured party in writing of the change; the
financing statement is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by
the debtor more than 4 months after the debtor notifies the secured party in writing of
the change unless an amendment to the financing statement which renders the
financing statement not seriously misleading is filed within 4 months after the change;
effective July 1,2001.
Jan 5-introduced in House
Feb 6-to Banking and Insurance (H)
Feb 7-posted in committee
Feb 14-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Calendar
Feb 15-2nd reading, to Rules
Feb 16-posted for passage in the Regular Orders of the Day for Monday, February
19,2001
Feb 19-3rd reading, passed 92-2
Feb 20-received in Senate
Feb 23-to Judiciary (S)
Mar 1-reassigned to Banking and Insurance (S); reported favorably, 1st reading, to
Consent Calendar
Mar 2-2nd reading, to Rules
Mar 5-posted for passage in the Consent Orders of the Day for Tuesday, March 6,
2001; taken from the Consent Orders of the Day, placed in the Regular Orders of the
Day
Mar 7-3rd reading, passed 36-0; received in House; enrolled, signed by each
presiding officer, delivered to Governor
Mar 15-signed by Governor (Acts ch. 65)
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I

I
AN ACT relating to security interests.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
Section 1. KRS 186A.190 is amended to read as follows:
(1)

Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, the perfection and discharge of
a security interest in any property for which has been issued a Kentucky certificate
of title shall be by notation on the certificate of title. The notation of the security
interest on the certificate of title shall be in accordance with this chapter and shall
remain effective from the date on which the security interest is noted'on the
certificate of title for a period of seven (7) ye:ars, or, in the case of a manufactured
home, for a period of thirty (30)[fouFteen (14)] years, or until discharged under this
chapter and KRS Chapter 186. The filing of a continuation statement within the six
(6) months preceding the expiration of the initial period of a notation's effectiveness
extends the expiration date for seven (7) additional years.

(2)

Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, the notation of security interests
relating to property required to be titled in Kentucky through the county clerk shall
be done in the office of the county clerk of the county in which the debtor resides. If
the debtor is other than a natural person, the following provisions govern the
detemlination of the county of the debtor's residence:
(a)

A partnership shall be deemed a resident of the county in which its principal
place of business in this state is located. If the debtor does not have a place of
business in this state, then the debtor shall be deemed a nonresident for
purposes of filing in this state;

(b)

A limited partnership organized under KRS Chapter 362 shall be deemed a
resident of the county in which its office is located, as set forth in its
certificate of limited partnership or most recent amendment thereto filed
pursuant to KRS Chapter 362. If such office is not located in this state, the
debtor shall be deemed a nonresident for purposes of filing in this state;
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(c)

the designation or most recent amendment thereto filed with the Secretary of
State of the Commonwealth of Kentucky;
(d)

resident of the county in which its registered office is located, as set forth in
its most recent corporate filing with the Secretary of State which officially
designates its current registered office;
(e)

a limited liability company not organized under the laws of this state, but
authorized to transact business in this state under KRS Chapter 275, shall be
deemed a resident of the county in which its registered office is located, as set
forth in its most recent filing with the Secretary of State which officially

r

designates its current registered office;
(f)

transacted, as set forth in its articles of incorporation or most recent
amendment thereto filed with the Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky;
(g)

A cooperative corporation organized under KRS Chapter 279 shall be deemed
a resident of the county in which its principal office is located, as set forth in

r
r

A cooperative corporation or association organized under KRS Chapter 272
shall be deemed a resident of the county in which its principal business is

r
r

A corporation not organized under the laws of this state, but authorized to
transact or do business in this state under KRS Chapter 271B, 273, or 274, or

r
r

r

A corporation organized under KRS Chapter 271B, 273, or 274 or a limited
liability company organized under KRS Chapter 275 shall be deemed a

r

r
r

A limited partnership not organized under the laws of this state and authorized

of the county in which the office of its process agent is located, as set forth in

r

r
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to do business in this state under KRS Chapter 362 shall be deemed a resident

r
r

r

01 REG. SESS.

its articles of incorporation or most recent amendment thereto filed with the
Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of Kentucky;
(h)

A business trust organized under KRS Chapter 386 shall be deemed a resident
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of the county in which its principal place of business is located, as evidenced
by the recordation of its declaration of trust in that county pursuant to KRS
Chapter 386;
(i)

A credit union organized under KRS Chapter 290 shall be deemed a resident
of the county in which its principal place of business is located, as set forth in
its articles of incorporation or most recent amendment thereto filed with the
Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of Kentucky; and

(j)

Any other organization (defined in KRS 355.1-201) shall be deemed a
resident of the county in which its principal place of business in this state is
located, except that any limited partnership or corporation not organized under
the laws of this state and not authorized to transact or do business in this state
shall be deemed a nonresident for purposes of filing in this state. If the
organization does not have a place of business in this state, then it shall be
deemed a nonresident for purposes of filing in this state.

If the debtor does not reside in the Commonwealth, the notation of the security
interest shall be done in the office of the county clerk in which the propeliy is
principally situated or operated. Notwithstanding the existence of any filed
financing statement under the provisions of KRS Chapter 355 relating to any
property registered or titled in Kentucky, the sole means of perfecting and
discharging a security interest in property for which a certificate of title is required
by this chapter is by notation on such property's certificate of title. In other respects
the security interest is governed by the provisions ofKRS Chapter 355.
(3)

Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, before ownership of property
subject to a lien evidenced by notation on the certificate of title may be transferred,
the transferor shall obtain the release of the prior liens in his name against the

.

property being trapsferred. Once a security interest has been noted"on the owner's
title, no subsequent title may be issued by any county clerk free of such notation
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unless the owner's title is presented to the clerk and it has been noted thereon, that
the security interest has been discharged. If this requirement is met, information
relating to any security interest shown on the title as having been discharged may be
omitted from the title to be issued by the clerk.
(4)

Notwithstanding subsections (1), (2), and (3) of this section, a county clerk shall,
following inspection of the vehicle by the sheriff, to determine that the vehicle has
not been stolen, issue a new title to a vehicle, clear of all prior liens, to a person
after he provides to the county clerk an affidavit devised by the Transportation
Cabinet and completed by the person. In the affidavit, the person shall attest that:
(a)

He possesses the vehicle;

(b)

A debt on the vehicle was owed him for more than thirty (30) days before he
provided the notices required by paragraphs (c) and (d) of this subsection;

(c)

More than fourteen (14) days before presenting the affidavit to the county
clerk, the person attempted to notify the owner of the vehicle and all known
lienholders, including those noted on the title, by certified mail, return receipt

r

r
r
r
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requested, of his name, address, and telephone number as well as his intention
to obtain a new title, clear of all prior liens, unless the owner or a lienholder
objected in writing;
(d)

More than fourteen (14) days before presenting the affidavit to the county
clerk, the person had published a legal notice stating his intention to obtain
title to the vehicle. The legal notice appeared at least twice in a seven (7) day
period in a newspaper published, and with a statewide circulation, in
Kentucky. The legal notice stated:
1.

The person's name, address, and telephone number;

2.

The owner's name;

3.

The names of all known lienholders, including those noted on the title;

4.

The vehicle's make, model, and year;. and
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The person's intention to obtain title to the vehicle unless the owner or a
lienholder objects in writing within fourteen (14) days after the last
publication of the legal notice; and

(e)

Neither the owner nor a lienholder has objected in writing to the person's right
to obtain title to the vehicle.

(5)

No more than two (2) active security interests may be noted upon a certificate of
title.

(6)

In noting a security interest upon a certificate of title, the county clerk shall ensure
that the certificate oftitIe bears the lienholder's name, mailing address and zip code,
the date the lien was noted, the notation number, and the county in which the
security interest was noted. The clerk shall obtain the information required by this
subsection for notation upon the certificate of title from the title lien statement
described in KRS 186A.195 to be provided to the county clerk by the secured party.

(7)

For all the costs incurred in the notation and discharge of a security interest on the
certificate of title, the county clerk shall receive the fee prescribed by KRS 64.012.
The fee prescribed by this subsection shall be paid at the time of submittal of the
title lien statement described in KRS 186A.195.

(8)

A copy of the application, certified by the county clerk, indicating the lien will be
noted on the certificate of title shall be forwarded to the lienholder.
Section 2. KRS 355.9-507 is amended to read as follows:

(1)

A filed financing statement remains effective with respect to collateral that is sold,
exchanged, leased, licensed, or otherwise disposed of and in which a security
interest or agricultural lien continues, even if the secured party knows of or consents
to the disposition.

(2)

Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section and KRS 355.9-508, a
- financing statement is not rendered ineffective if, after the financing statement is
filed,the inforination provided in the financing statement becomes seriously
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misleading under KRS 355.9-506.
(3)

If a debtor so changes its name that a filed financing statement becomes seriously
misleading under KRS 355.9-506:
(a)

The financing statement is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral
acquired by the debtor before the change, or within four (4) months after the
debtor notifies the secured party in writing o!f;1 the change; and

(b)

The financing statement is not effective to perfect a security interest

III

collateral acquired by the debtor more than four (4) months after the debtor
llotifies the secured partv ill writillg of the change, unless an amendment to
the financing statement which renders the financing statement not seriously
misleading is filed within four (4) months after the change.
Section 3. This Act takes effect July 1, 2001.
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HB 148 (BR 946) - D. Ford
AN ACT relating to safe deposit boxes.
Create new sections of KRS Chapter 286 to authorize the lessor of a safe deposit
box to permit access to certain persons to conduct a will search or to obtain any
document purporting to be a deed to a burial plot or to give funeral or burial
instructions; describe the duties of the employee of the lessor if a will is found or if a
deed to a burial plot or funeral or burial instructions are found in the safe deposit box.
HB148-AMENDMENTS
HCA (1, D. Ford) - Change the definition of "interested person" to delete "adult
descendant of the lessee."
HCA (2, D. Ford) - Require the interested person to have a key before lessor
permits opening of the safe deposit box.
SFA (1, K. Stine) - Amend to permit an adult child to qualify as an "interested
person" who may gain access to a safe deposit box upon the death of that adult child's
parent who has been leasing the safe deposit box.
Feb 6-introduced in House
Feb 7-to Banking and Insurance (H)
Feb 12-posted in committee; posting waived
Feb 14-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Calendar with committee amendments (1)
and (2)
Feb 15-2nd reading, to Rules; posted for passage in the Regular Orders of the Day
for Friday, February 16, 2001
Feb 16-3rd reading, passed 97-1 with committee amendments (1) and (2)
Feb 19-received in Senate
Feb 22-to Judiciary (S)
Feb 28-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Calendar; floor amendment (1) filed
Mar 1-2nd reading, to Rules
Mar 5-posted for passage in the Regular Orders of the Day for Tuesday, March 6,
2001
Mar 7-3rd reading, passed 37-0 with floor amendment (1) ; received in House;
posted for passage for concurrence in Senate floor amendment (1)
Mar 8-House concurred in Senate floor amendment (1) ; passed 95-1
Mar 9-enrolled, signed by each presiding officer, delivered to Governor
Mar 20-signed by Governor (Acts ch. 141)

.!S.!2-'1tUG.~ll!2.flislature

Home Page I Record Front

A·39

Pa9-~

UNOFFICIAL COPY AS OF 04/04/01

01 REG. SESS.

01 RS HBJ48fEN

AN ACT relating to safe deposit boxes.

Be it enacted by tlte General Assembly oftlte Commonwealtlt ofKentucky:
SECTION 1.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 286 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:

As used ill Sectiolls 1 to 2 oftlzis Act, unless the cOlltext requires otherwise:
(1)

"Finallcial illstitution" mealls a state or natiollal balik, trust compalll', savillgs
alld loall association, or credit ullion,'

(2)

"Illterested persoll" mealls tlte survivillg spouse of the lessee, an adult cltild of
tlte lessee, a parellt of tlte lessee, a persoll Ilamed as tlte persollal represemative
ill a copl' ofa purported will produced by suclt persoll, a person desigllated by tlte
lessee ill writing acceptable to tlte lessor tltat is filed witlt tlte lessor before death
oftlte lessee, or a persoll Ilamed ill a court order to examille tlte cOlltentso(a safe
deposit box for a purpose listed ill subsection

(3)

(1)

ofSection 2 oftltis Act;

"Lessee" mealls a person wlto contracts with a lessor for tlte use ofa safe deposit
box;

(4)

"Lessor" mealls a fillallcial illstitutioll or safe deposit compall" tltat rellts safe
deposit facilities,' and

(5)

"Safe deposit box" means a safe deposit box, vault, or other safe deposit
receptacle mailltained by a lessor tltat may be used for tlte safekeepillg and
storage ofproperty alld documellts.
SECTION 2.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 286 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1)

If satisfactory proof of tlte death of tlte lessee is presented and tlte interested
persoll possesses a kel' to tlte lessee's safe deposit box, a lessor shall permit all
interested persoll to opell alld examille the cOlltellts ofa safe deposit box leased
by a

decedell~in

the presellce pfaff i!mplo"ee oftlte lessor for Olle

the following purposes:
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(2)

r

(a)

To cOllduct a will search,' alld

(b)

To obtain all!' documellt purportillg to be a deed to a burial plot or to give

If the safe deposit box is opened for the purpose of conductbIg a will search, an
employee of the lessor shall remove any document that appears to be a will and
make a true and correct machille copy thereof. replace the copy in the box, alld
tlten deliver the origillal tltereo(to the persoll requesting tlte search.

(3)

If the safe deposit box is opened for the purpose of obtaining any documellt
purporting to be a deed to a burial plot or to give funeral or burial instructions,

r
r
r

the employee of the lessor shall make a true and correct machine cop!' thereof.
replace tlte cop!' in the box, and tlten deliver the original thereof to tlte persoll
requestillg the search.
(4)

No cOlltellts ofa safe deposit box other thall a will and a documellt purporting to
be a deed to a burial plot or to give funeral or burial instructions ma!' be removed
ullder this section.
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funeral or burial instructions.
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This outline is designed to provide general information on the subject matters covered. It
is not intended to provide either a complete survey of all possible developments or a
comprehensive explanation or analysis of those developments mentioned. Readers should
consult the original source materials referenced. Furthermore, this outline is not intended
nor should it be used as a substitute for specific legal advice or opinion. Finally, this outline
is published with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal
service.
Note: The author is currently, or in the future may be, engaged in representing clients in
lawsuits and other proceedings which directly involve some or all of the materials set forth
in this outline. No statements contained herein or any statements made by the author
during his presentation should be construed as the position of those clients for purposes
of those proceedings. Nor should such statements be construed as precluding the author
from advocating any position on behalf of those or other clients.

21st Annual Conference On
Legal Issues For Financial Institutions
April 20-21, 2001

M. THURMAN SENN
Morgan & Pottinger, P.S.C.
601 W. Main Street
Louisville, KY 40202
(502) 589-2780
mts@morganandpottinger.com

©2001 M: Thurman Senn
All rights reserved

r

r

r

Significant Judicial Developments
Affecting Financial Institutions:
A List From A To Z

r

r
r

r
r

r
r
r

r
r,

r

I.

Action Loan Co. Consent Decree

B-1

2.

Arbitration

B-1

3.

Bank Premises -- Slip And Fall · · · · · ·

B-2

4.

Board of Director's Standard Of Care

B-2

5.

Check Kiting

B-3

6.

Collecting Bank's Duty Of Care

B-4

7.

Consumer Records. · · · · · · · · · · · . · · ·

B-4

8.

Deeds

B-4

9.

Discovery - Document Requests · · · · · · ·

B-4

10.

Exemptions. · · · · · · · · . · · · · · · · ·

B-5

1I.

Fair Credit Reporting Act

B-5

12.

Fraud -- Aiding And Abetting

B-5

13.

Garnishment · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-6

14.

Guaranty Agreements

B-6

15.

Integration And No-Modification Clauses In Contracts

B-6
B-7

r
r

16.

Kentucky Consumer Protection Act

17·

Marshaling Of Assets · · · · · · · · · · · · · · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-7

i

018.

Materialman~s Lien And Mortgages ··

..

r
r

SECTIONB

0•••••••••••••••••••••••

a-7

19.

Paralegals And The Attorney-client And Work-Product Privileges

B-7

20.

Punitive Damages

B-7

2 I.

Real Estate Closings And The Unauthorized Practice Of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-8

22.

Tax Liens

23.

Usury

B-8

24.

Wills - Abatement Of Bequests To Pay Estate's Debts And Taxes

B-9

. . . . . . . . B-8

Appendix: An1erican Bankers Association's "Status Of In1portant
Banking Cases" (4/1/01)
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Significant Ju~icial Developments
For Financial Institutions: 2000-2001
1.

Action Loan Co. Consent Decree. United States of America v. Action Loan Co.,
U.S. District Court, Western District of Kentucky, No. 3:00CV-511-H (8/24/00).

r

a.

Action Loan Company, Inc., of Louisville, Kentucky, and its owner and
president, Gus Goldsmith, agreed to pay a $350,000 civil penalty and up to
a total of $37,000 in consumer redress as part of a joint settlement with the
Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development resolving allegations that they violated various federal lending
and consumer protection laws when making loans secured by real or
personal property to consumers. The consent decree also contained a
number of recordkeeping and reporting requirements to assist the FTC in
monitoring the defendants' compliance with the terms of the settlement.

b.

The FTC and HUD charged the defendants with violating:
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2.

The federal Truth In Lending Act and Regulation Z by failing to include
the cost of accident and health insurance in their disclosure of the
finance charge and annual percentage rate of a consumer loan;

ii.

Section 5 of the FTC Act by misrepresenting that consumers were
purchasing only credit life insurance, when in fact they were also
purchasing accident and health insurance;

iii.

The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair Credit Reporting Act by
failing to provide consumers with required adverse action notices; and

iv.

The FTC's Credit Practices Rule by routinely including "waiver of
exemption" and "homestead exemption waiverll provisions in their
credit contracts.

v.

The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act by receiving illegal
kickbacks for the referral of loans.

Arbitration.

a.

Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 121 S.Ct. 513 (12/11/00). Claims
alleging violations of the federal Truth In Lending Act may be the subject of
arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in a manufactured
home retail i.nstallment sales con~ract. The arbitration agreement was
enforceable ~ven. though it was silent as to the costs of arbitration where the
.party 'opposing art>itrati·on presen.ted no evide~c~ that the arbitration would
be prohibitiveiy.expensive.
.~
·

b.

Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 2001 WL 245727 (11 th Cir. 3/13/01).

r

r
r

i.

B· 1

On remand from United States Supreme, Court, the Eleventh Circuitconsidered the issue of whether the arbitration agreement was unenforceable
on the alternative ground that the agreement precluded the Plaintiff from
bringing the claim as a class action. The arbitration agreement was silent on
the issue of class arbitration, but ,Plaintiff had previously taken the position
that the applicable rule is that where an arbitration clause does not expressly
authorize class arbitration, no class arbitration is allowed. The Eleventh
Circuit held that Congress did not create a non-waivable right to bring TILA
claims in the form of a class action, so non-class arbitration was required.

3.

c.

Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S.Ct. 1302 (3/21/01). A provision in
a Circuit City employment application contained an arbitration clause
requiring all employment disputes to be settled by arbitration. The Supreme
Court held that the exclusion in 9 U.S.C~ §1 of "contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce" is to be narrowly construed and interpreted
in light of the understanding of Congress' commerce clause authority when
the Federal Arbitration Act was enacted. Thus, the exclusion only applies to
contracts of employment of transportation workers but not to other
employment contracts.

d.

Arbitration provisions in application for employment was unenforceable for
lack of mutuality of consideration where the arbitration forum was "fatally
indefinite." The employment application stated that the arbitration forum had
"unfettered discretion in choosing the nature of that forum" and the arbitration
forum appeared to be a for-profit entity with ties to the employer. Floss v.
Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6 th Cir. 5/1/00).

Bank Premises -- Slip And Fall. PNC Bank, Kentucky, Inc. v. Green, Ky., 30
S.W.3d 185 (10/26/00). Bank customer slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk outside
the bank branch. The Bank's intermittent efforts to spread a melting agent on the
sidewalk did not make the Bank a guarantor of the customer's safety where the
measures were "reasonably prudent measures to increase the safety of the
premises" and did not "heighten or conceal the nature of the dangerous condition."
Nor did the Bank have a duty to warn the customer of the "obvious natural
condition" caused by the icy weather.

4.

Board Of Director's Standard Of Care. McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6 th Gir.
2/13/01 ).
,

a.

Shareholder derivative action brought against the directors of Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corporation alleging that the directors wrongfully failed to take
action to prevent and stop alleged. systematic Medicare and Medicaid billing

fraud.'
b.

.

Among',otherdefenses, the directors telied upon thefollowin-g provision ofthe
company's Articles of Incorp'oration:
·
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"TWELFTH: A director of the Corporation shall not be
personally liable to the Corporation or its stockholders
for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a
director; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not
eliminate or limit the liability of a director (i) for any
breach of a director's duty of loyalty to the Corporation
or its stockholders, (ii) for acts or omissions not in good
faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law, (iii) under Section 174 of the
General Corporation Law of Delaware, or (iv) for any
transaction from which the director derived an improper
personal benefit."

r
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c.

Court rejected director's arguments that this provision exempted them from
all but "intentional" misconduct. Rather, the Court held that "to the extent that
recklessness involves a conscious disregard of a known risk, it could be
argued that such an approach is not one taken in good faith and thus could
not be liability [which is permitted to be] exempted."

d.

Remember the rules are likely to be somewhat different in the bank context:

r
r
r

i.

"Each director shall exercise such ordinary care and diligence
as necessary and reasonable to administer the affairs of the
bank in a safe and sound manner."

r

r

ii.

12 U.S.C. §1821(k):
"A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be
held personally liable for monetary damages in any civil action
by, on behalf of, or at the request or direction of the
Corporation, which action is prosecuted wholly or partially for
the benefit of the Corporation . . . for gross negligence,
including any similar conduct or conduct that demonstrates a
greater disregard of a duty 'of care (than gross negligence)
including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms are
defined and determined under applicable State law. Nothing
in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the
Corporation under other applicable law."

r
r

r
r
r
r
r

KRS 287.065(2):

5.

Check Kiting. In re: Cannon, 237 F.3d 716 (6th eire 1/17/01). Under UCC §4210(a)(1), a collecting ban.khas a security interest in an item and any accompanying-documentsorthe proceeds of either in case of an item deposited in
an account to the extent to which credit given for the item -has1Jeen 'withdrawn or
applied. Because of this security interest, a bank which gave credit on checks
ultimately paid as part of a check kiting scheme was protected from the avoidable
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preference provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, at least as long as the bank acted
in the ordinary course and without knowledge of the check kiting scheme.

6.

Collecting Bank's Duty Of Care. Thiagarajar Mills. Ltd. v. Thornton. et aI., 242
F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 3/13/01).

a.

United States seller of cotton defrauded purchaser located in India by
intentionally shipping non-conforming low quality cotton. Purchaser then sued
collecting bank alleging that the collecting bank failed to act in good faith and
breached its duties of care. The collecting bank's role was to receive
shipping documents from the seller (a bill of lading, invoice and sight draft),
forward the documents to the purchaser's bank, and then remit funds
received from purchaser's bank to seller. Purchaser sought to hold collecting
bank liable on the theory that the collecting bank knew or should have known,
from its prior transactions with the seller, that seller had previously defrauded
other buyers.

b.

Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in collecting bank's favor based
upon unrefuted testimony from the bank's officers that the bank had no
knowledge of prior fraudulent activity. Furthermore, liability could not be
imposed upon the colJecting bank based upon inferences to be drawn from
the commercial terms used in the shipping documents since under either
UCC Article 4 or the Uniform Rules for Collections, a collecting bank is "not
responsible for the 'form, sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness, falsification, or
legal effect of any documents' reflecting the underlying agreement between
the seller and buyer."

Customer Records.

7.

Ousley v. First Commonwealth Bank of Prestonsburg,
Ky.App., 8 S.W.3d 45 (2/12/99). Bank's implied duty of good faith obligates a bank
to provide its former customer with records of its accounts if the records remain in
the bank's custody and if the customer is willing to pay the cost of retrieving the
records.

8.

Deeds. Hoheimer v. Hoheimer, Ky., 30 S.W.3d 176 (10/26/00). Series of deeds
from parents to their daughter, conveying various undivided fee interests in their
farm and without reservation and with no language reserving a life estate or
otherwise limiting the conveyance, were unambiguous. Thus, extrinsic evidence
could not be used by the parents to demonstrate that the parents did not intend to
give up control of the farm while they were still alive. Preserving the integrity of the
recorded deed system required that parol evidence not be available to attack an
unambiguous deed.

9.

Discovery -- Document Requests. Wal-Mart Stores.. Inc. v. Dickinson, Ky., 29
S.W.3d 796 (9/28/00). "A person -- regardless of whether that person is opposing
counsel- signing ~ resP9"se to a request.for pro~uction, 'which is made pursuant
to CR 34.01, h~lds him or tiers~lf out as having person~l knowledge .of.the answers
given .andis subject todeposition'for 1he<timitedl'urpose of exp10ring -hisOT -her
actual knowledge of the answers given includi,ng, but not limited to, the methods
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employed to search for the documents requested and the scope of that search."
10.

Exemptions. J.G. Wentworth v. Jones, Ky.App., 28 S.W.3d 309 (4/14/00). First
$350/month of annuity which was purchased to fund structured settlement was
exempt from garnishment pursuant to KRS 304.14-330. Sums in excess of
$350/month could only be executed against with court approval, and the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to authorize execution.

11.

Fair Credit Reporting Act. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, United States Supreme Court,
Docket No. 00-1045.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review a
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the two-year
statute of limitations for violation of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act begins to
run from the date the consumer knew or should have known that she was injured
by the credit reporting agency's alleged disclosure of inaccurate information. The
Ninth Circuit rejected the reporting agency's position that the statute of limitations
began to run on the date of the disclosure.

12.

Fraud - Aiding And Abetting.

r
r
r
r

a.

Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Leahey Construction Co., 219 F.3d 519 (6 th
Cir. 7/13/00). Bank could be potentially liable for aiding and abetting the
scheme of a construction company to obtain construction bonds by
defrauding the insurance company as to the amount of assets of the
construction company. Specifically, the construction company obtained a
four-day loan of $275,000 from the Key Bank and during the period the loan
proceeds were held by the construction company, the construction company
provided a bank statement to the insurance company showing these funds
on deposit. In reliance upon its belief that the construction company had
improved its asset position, the insurance company issues construction
bonds ultimately causing it to incur over $2.5 million in losses.

b.

Applying the test of Restatement, Second, of Torts §876(b), the Sixth Circuit
held that the evidence supported the jury's verdict that Key Bank had actual
knowledge that the loan was being used to deceive the insurance company,
and therefore could be liable for aiding and abetting its customer's fraudulent
scheme under the following standard:

r
r
r
r

r

"Ordinarily, a bank does not have an obligation to investigate or
question its customers' facially legal transactions~ A bank,
however, is not immune from civil aiding and abetting claims,
and to the extent that its knowledge or the primary party's
tortious conduct can be proven, either by director or
circumstantial evidence, liability will attach if.the other elements
We stress that the requirement 'is actual .
are present.
knowledge, and therefore e.vidence establish negligence, i.e.~
that a bank 'should have known' will not suffice.

r
i

r
r
r

r

.

c.

tJ

.

The other elements include "substantial assistance or encouragement to the
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primary party in carrying out the tortious act."
d.

13.

14.

Because the insurance company's agent arguably knew of the scheme, Key
Bank argued that the insurance company was charged with the agent's
knowledge and therefore could not show that it had been deceived. The
Sixth Circuit agreed that the trial court instructions to the jury on this point
were incorrect, and that a new trial on this point was required.

Garnishment. McMahan & Co. v. Po Folks. Inc., 206 F.3d 627 (6 th Cir. 3/8/00).
a.

Bank improperly responded to creditor's garnishment by stating that it did not
hold property belonging to, nor was it indebted to, the judgment debtor. The
evidence indicated that when the garnishments were served, the Bank
checked its computer screens which showed the end of day balances for the
prior day and did not reflect any deposits received on the actual day the
garnishment was received.

b.

The Sixth Circuit rejected the District Court's ruling that the Bank was entitled
to use its "ordinary course of business" procedures for checking account
balances. Rather, the Sixth Circuit held that the Bank could place a "hold" on
the account on the day it received the garnishment in order to check available
funds and comply with the "snapshot" requirement of Kentucky's garnishment
statute, KRS 425.501.

c.

The Sixth Circuit also held that the District Court improperly dismissed the
judgment creditor's claim that the Bank intentionally manipulated the
judgment debtor's accounts to avoid garnishment by implementing the
judgment debtor's request (after the first two garnishments were received) to .
create a "zero balance" account structure. The judgment creditor was entitled
to litigate its claim that the Bank violated a "duty to refrain from conduct that
would obstruct enforcement of the judgment."

d.

Finally, the Sixth Circuit directed that the Bank pay the judgment creditor's
attorneys' fees and the expenses of a court appointed expert based upon the
Bank's civil contempt in violating a garnishment order.

Guaranty Agreements. Wallace Hardware Co. v. Abrams, 223 F.3d 382 (6 th Cir.
7/27/00). In an action against a Kentucky guarantor, Sixth Circuit enforced a
Tennessee choice of law provision in a guaranty agreement that would have been
invalid if Kentucky law (KRS 371.065) applied. Factors favoring enforcement were
that it was a commercial transaction in· which the parties were represented by
counsel, counsel for the guarantor specifically review the guaranty, and the guaranty
did generally refer to types of debts being guaranteed.

15.

Integration And No-Modification C,la~ses In Contracts. Cook v. Little Caesar
Enterprises. Inc., Np.99-1163 (6th eire 4/44/00). Franchiseel?recluded from alleging
that hewa.s 'promised franchi~e1erritories beyond the teiriforiesrecited jn' written
franchise agreeme'nts. The Court relied heaVily upon the fact that the franchise
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agreements contained a merger clause and a clause prohibiting modifications other
than in a writing signed by the parties.
16.

r

r
r
r

r
r

r

b.

Craig v. Keene, Ky.App., 32 S.W.3d 90 (6/16/00). The KCPA does not apply
to real estate transactions by an individual homeowner. Thus, homeowners
could not assert a claim under the KCPA against a builder for alleged
problems with the construction of their home. Jury found in favor of the
builder on the plaintiffs fraud and breach of implied warranty of habitability
claims but found a violation of the KCPA. However, the jury did not award
any compensatory damages. Trial court awarded attorney's fees to plaintiff's
counsel. Court of Appeals reversed.

18.

Materialman's Lien and Mortgages. Metal Sales Mfg. Corp. v. Newton, Ky.App.,
12 S.W.3d 691 (4/23/99). Construction lender recorded mortgage prior to date
materialmen filed their lien statement. Thus, under KRS 376.010(2), the lender's
mortgage would be superior to the materialmen's liens so long as the mortgage was
given "for value without notice." Court of Appeals held that the "for value"
requirement was not satisfied where the mortgage loan was a "roll over" of three
prior bridge loans. The lender could not rely upon the future advances protection
granted by KRS 382.520 because this statute provides superior priority only against
"liens of encumbrances ... created after recordation." In this case, the Court of
Appeals held that the materialman's lien was created before recordation b~cause
a materialman's lien exists from the time materials are first provided.

19.

Paralegals And The Attorney-Client And Work-Product Privileges. Wal-Mart
Stores. Inc. v. Dickinson, Ky., 29 S.W.3d 796 (9/28/00). Paralegal in Wal-Mart's inhouse legal department was protected by the attorney-client and work-product
'privileges to the same extent as the in-house counsel with wh·ich sh,e worked.

r
r

Alexander v. S&M Motors. Inc., Ky., 28 S.W.3d 303 (6/15/00). An award of
attorneys fees under the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act to a party
successfully making a claim under the KCPA is optional and not mandatory.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion is denying attorneys fee award where
the attorneys fees requested were less than the amount of punitive damages
awarded to the plaintiff as part of its relief under the KCPA.

Marshaling Of Assets. In re Technologies International Holdings. Inc., 256 B.R.
476 (Bkrtcy.E.D. Ky. 12/28/00). Guarantor under absolute and unconditional
guaranty agreement could not invoke the equitable doctrine of "marshaling of
assets" to avoid the express provisions of the guaranty which waived any
requirement to first proceed against the borrower or to realize or exhaust any
collateral. In addition, marshaling is a remedy which can be invoked only by a
secured creditor, and the guarantor was not a secured creditor.

r
r
r
r

a.

17.

r
r

r

Kentucky Consumer Protection Act.

·20.

Punitive Damages. Commonwealth v. Vinson, Ky.,

30S.W.~d

162 (1"0120100).
Punitive damages may be awarded against a defendant that commits an intentional
B-7

tort willfully and without justification even though the plaintiff is not awarded
compensatory damages by the jury.
21.

Real Estate Closings And The Unauthorized Practice Of Law -- KBA U-58.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al. v. Kentucky Bar Association, Kentucky
Supreme Court, No. 2000-SC-00206. On March 16, 2001, the Kentucky Supreme
Court heard oral arguments on the issue of whether the Kentucky Bar Association
unauthorized practice of law opinion U-58 establishes the correct standards forwhat
activities non-lawyers may perform in connection with the closing of a consumer real
estate closing. The Bar Association promulgated U-58 to address the growing
practice of lay title insurance agencies closing such loans. The Kentucky Bankers
Association is participating in the action to preserve the existing standards of U-31
which permit a bank's lay employees to perform the ministerial acts of conducting
a loan closing in which it is the mortgagee.

22.

23.

Tax Liens.
a.

Blachy v. Butcher, 221 F.3d 896 (6 th Cir. 7/21/00). Under Michigan law, a
constructive trust in favor of a creditor does not arise until the court's
judgment is entered, and therefore the constructive trust cannot be applied
retroactively to defeat a federal tax lien that is filed prior to the date of the
judgment. Even if Michigan law would generally allow a constructive trust to
be applied retroactively to the date of the wrongdoing, federal law governs the
priority of a federal tax lien against competing claims, and federal law would
not permit such a retroactive application of a constructive trust to defeat a
properly filed federal tax lien.

b.

Hensley v. Harbin, No. 98-6569 (6 th Cir. 11/9/00). Federal judgment was
inferior to a federal tax lien where the tax lien was filed before the amount of
the judgment was finally established in the federal court action. The fact that
the issue of liability was established prior to the filing of the tax lien did not
give judgment creditor priority.

Usury.

a.

Commonwealth v. Kentucky Title Loan, Inc., Ky.App., 16 S.W.3d 312
(6/11/99). Motor vehicle title loan company could not rely upon the usury
limits available to "pawnbrokers" under KRS Chapter 226 because it did not
take actual physical custody of the motor vehicles. In order to exceed the
general lending limit of KRS 360.010, the company was required to be
licensed as a petty loan company under KRS Chapter 288.

b.

Begala v. PNC Bank, Ohio, N.A., 214 F.3d 776 (6th Cir. 617/00). National
bank's "payment holiday" program ~id not violate either the Truth In Lending
Act, RICO, or the appUcable usu~. rate under the N·ational Bank Act. In
determining the applicable maximum ihterest.rate: the Sixth Circuit noted that
underthe ~MostFavoredLender" rules ,of12 U~.S.c.-§85, national bank could
borrow the rates permitted to Ohio savings bank. ~ecause Ohio law permits
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savings banks to charge unlimited fines, interest and premiums on loans, the
borrower could not complain about the interest rate. Is there any maximum
interest rate under Kentucky law in light of these Ohio rules, the doctrine of
interest rate exporting under the National Bank Act, and "super parity" under
KRS 287.1 02(2)(a)?

24.

Wills - Abatement of Bequests To Pay Estate's Debts And Taxes. Houghland
v. Lampton, Ky.App., 33 S.W.3d 536 (12/15/00). Where residuary estate was not
sufficient to pay all of the debts, taxes and costs of administration, general rule is
that all nonresiduary legacies are required to abate proportionally in the absence of
a specific direction otherwise in the will. Will at issue did not provide the requisite
"specific direction" in order to protect trust established under will from abatement.

r
r
r

r
r

r
r
r
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NE\\' THIS MONTH:

(1 8) .

*

Maryland court reverses order compelling arbitration.

*

First Union settles Signet penSion plan case. (,. 23)

•

Supreme Court upholds employment arbitration cIause.

*

.Alabama Supreme COUIt upholds arbitration clause signed by illiterate.

*

Internet gambling RICO case dismissed.

(f 3)
<1 6)

C' 15)

r
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r
r
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New .~ and ~ in which there have ~ sigQifi~ developments s~ the last
lilQnthly· report are 111Irked,:*_ .
,
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ANTITRUST

1.
In Re: Visa CheckfMaster Money Arititrust Litigation (2d Cir. No. 00-7699).
Wal-Mart, other large ret.a.ilers and several trade associations of the retail industry filed suit
claiming (among other things) that Visa and Mastereard rules requiring all merchants who accept
Visa and Mastercard credit cards to accept also the debit cards of those two associations
constituted an illegal tie-in in violation of the antitrust laws. The plaintiffs sought to have the suit
certified as a class action on behalf of about three million merchants who accept the cards. The
District court certified the class and the defendants appealed. On August 24, 2000, ABA and
three cosponsors filed an amici curiae brief supporting Visa. and Mastercard. The brief argues
that the court mis-read Supreme Court precedent that does not allow a trial court to make
preljminary determinations as to the merits of a case before dec~ding whether to certify it as a
class action. Here, the lower court relied only upon the affidavit of a plaintiff witness that the
class would be manageable and disregarded the opposing affidavit of a defense witness.
Choosing bet\veen the testimony of the two wimesses, the brief contends, would not coDStirote a
preliminary determination of the merits, but rather was necessary to determine the threshold
question of the class's manageabilitj·. Otal argument held February S.
.2.·
United States v. Visa, U.S.A. (S.D.N.Y. No. 98-CIV.. 7076). On OCtober 7,
1998 t Justice Department filed antitrust suit ~gainst Visa and Mastercard challenging the "rules"
of both networks prohibiting their respective member banks .from offering credit cards that
compete with those 1\\'0. The rules allegedly have the effect of eliminating real competition
between Visa and Mastercard and hampering competition or potential competition from other
networks. Trial has been completed; a verdict is pending.

ARBITRAnON
•
3.
Circuit City Stores v. Adams (S. Ct. No. 99-1379). On May 22_ 2000, Supreme
Court granted certiorari in a case inVolving mandatory arbitration clauses to which employees of
. a retail establishment agree as a condition of their emplo)'D1eItt. Oral argument case held
November 6. On March 21, 2001, Coun upheld the arbitration clause. resolving a conflict
among the ciralits over whether employment agreements were all exempt from the reach of the
Federal Arbitration Act. The exemption that appears in Section 1 of th~ Act is, according to the
~ limited· to the employment contracts of workers acmally engaged in the interstate
transpOrtation business. On March 26, the Court vacated three other Ninth Circuit decisions
against Circuit City on the same issue, amI" granted certiorari in EEOC v. Waffle House (No. 991823). Having just held that employ~ can be bound by their agreement to arbitrate. the Coun
will now decide whether EEOC; ~«:t'A!1g on behalf of employees, is likewise bound by the
employees' agreement to arbitrate. The circuits are split on that question.

4.
Baron v. Best Buy (11th Cir. No. 99-14028). In this case that cballenges the
~s and reasonableness of the arbitral forum chosen by a mandatory arbitration clause in a
~ finarice .contract, a federal COUl.1 ~C:!1 a motion to compel arbitration on September
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30, 1999 ( S. D. Fla. No. 99-1297-CN-JORDAN)., and the lender appealed to the Ele\'enth
Circuit On December 13, 1999, ABA and two cosponsors filed supporting amici brief.

5.
Betts v. Advance America (M.D. Fla. No. 6:99-S93-CIV-QRL-99C). Putative
class action suit was filed against pay day lender claiming violation of usury laws. On April 27,
20<X>, plaintiff filed "Motion for Protective Order" directed at the lender's practice, since March,
1999 t of requiring customers to agree to mandatory binding arbitration of any disputes arising
between the parties to the pay day tOOl) arrangemem. Plaintiff (who was herself never a party to
any mandatory arbitration agreement with the lender) alleges that the arbitration clauses at issue
would unlawfully djmjnish the size of the class she seeks to represent in that it infringes upon the
counts duty to protect the interests of potential class members and interferes \Vith the court's
authority to effectuate the policies of the federal class action rule.

*

6. Johnnie's Homes v. Holt (5. Ct. A~ No. 1991404). Alabama residents purchased a
mobile borne manufactured in Georgia from an Alabama dealer. The sales contract contained a
mandatory arbitration clause which the buyers did not read because they were illiterate. They did
not disclose their inability to read to the sellers and the sellers took no special pains to point out
or explain the arbitration clause or. for that matter any other of the boilerplate provisions of the
contract. On January 12, 2001~ sUite: Sl1preme Conn held that the transaction was covered by the
t

Federal Arbitration Act because there was sufficient ~volvement of interstate commerce, and that

the clause would be enforced despite the buyers' illiteracy in the absence of fraud. deceit or
misrepresentation.
7.
Crawford v. CaYalier Homes (S. Ct. Ga. No. SOOCl820). A state trial court
refused to compel arbitration of a dispute between a consumer and his mobile bome
manufacturer t • seller and lender t even though the consumer had signed a boilerplate contract in
vlhich he agreed to rcolve all disputes by arbitration. The court held that the arbitration clause
lacked mutualityt was unconscionable due to a disparity in bargaining power and that the
defendants had failed to disclose the costs associated with arbitration. The Georgia Court of
Appeals reversed on June 30. 2000, finding no unconscionability under either Georgia law or
applicable Alabama law. Consumer appealed and Georgia Supreme Court agreed to entenain the
case. Opening briefs filed November 10, 2CXX>. On FebruaIy S, 2001, ABA t Georgia Bankers

Association and other co-sponsors filed amici brief supporting lender.
•
8.
WeDs v. Cheyy Chase Bank. FSB. (Ct. App. Md. No. 22). Credit card agreement
contained "change oftcrms w clause. pursuant to which Bank added a mandatory arbitration clause
and changed other terms as well. Class action plaintiffs filed suit challenging legitimacy of
several of the other changes and Bank filed motion to compel arbitration. On August 16, 1999,
court grante8 motion holding that p1aimi1fs had been properly notified of the change in tenns
adopting the arbitration agreement.
accordance with applicable Maryland law J that arbitration
agreement was not an uneDforceable waiver of jury trial, was notuoconscionable did not impose
exte§Sive .or Chilling fees on the plaintiffs and. did not deprive them of any substantive remedy
,(BattO. City Cir. Cl No. 24-G-~). The plaintiff ~ the grant of the motion to
Compel arD~on and· the baIik filed amotion lO.dimrissthe "appeal.far.Jack of jurisdietiO!1- On

=
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March 8, 2001, Court of Appeals held that an order to compel arbitration was a final and
appealable order under Maryland procedural law, even though it might not have been so under
federal procedural law. The Federal Arbitration Act does ·not preempt state· procedural law
unless such law singles out arbitration clauses for special and unfavorable treatment. Maryland
law does not. On the merits, the Court held that the parties had never agreed to mandatory
arbitration. The contract between them Caned for mediation or arbitration "at the request of the
claiming party. n Here, the "cla.iJning F~," the plaintiffs, had never requested any such thing..
Oddly enough, no panicipam in the case bad advanced that argument to the coun.

BAATKRUPTCY

9.
First Tennessee Bank v. Stevenson (Ip re Cannon). (6th Cir. No. 99-6446). Upon
collapse of his check-kiting scheme, debtor declared bankruptcy:' Less than 90 days beforehand,
he had made a deposit in the bank which the bank: applied to reimburse itself for prior bounced
checks the debtor had written. Bankruptcy court held that Trustee was entitled to recover those
deposits as avoidable preferences and on August 27, 1999, District Conn affirmed. holding that
the Bank's starotory security interest in items deposited into an account applied only to "valueless
paper checks," thereby making the bank essentially an unsecured creditor (W.O. Tenn. No. 982507-GlBre). The case was appealed to the Sixth Circuit. On January 17. 2001, the court
reversed, holding that kited checks were not "valueless" and indeed were worth every penny of
their face value for the period during which the bank extended provisional credit, and tha.t the
bank had a valid seenrity interest in those checks.. To hold otherwise "would wreck Article 4 s
(VeC) system of conditional credits."
t

CONSill.ffiR PROTECTION

10.

National Home Equity Mongage Association v. Face. (4th Cit.. No. 99-2331) In
the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, Congress granted housing creditors
(even those not federally chanered) the authority ~ make alternative mortgages in accordance
with OTS regulations notwithstanding contrary state law. States were permitted to "opt out" of
this statute at any time before October. 1995. Virginia did not do so. In 1996, OTS "clarified"
that the statute preempted state prohibitions against or limitations upon prepayment penalty

clauses. Virginia Bureau of FiDaDcial Institutions nevertheless announced that it would enforce
state's limitations on prepayment penalties. Trade association for home equity lenders tiled suit.
On September 10, 1999, court granted ~ summaIy judgment holding that Congress had not
imposed any tcmporallimitation upon when OTS had to act in order for regulations to be granted
preemptive effect (B.D. Va. No. 3:00cv398). Decision was appealed to the FoUIth Circuit. On
Febnwy 7. 2001. decision \VaS affirmed. OTS and the Comptroller of the Currency derive their
authority to make roles regarclliJg prepayment penalties imposed by federally chartered
institutions from HOLA and the National Bank Act. not from the Parity Act.
11. . HeatDn v. Monogram Credit Card' Bank (5th Cir. No. 99-31341). Under Section
of Federal Deposit·I8suranceA~ ...~ ~. can cbargc ii1tefest (and tliings like late fees) ~.
at tates ·autb~ by law of state Wheie the bank is·1ocated. Among other things. a state bank is
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defined as one engaged in the business of receiving deposits. Louisiana resident challenged a late
fee that was legal in Georgia (where the bank was located) but allegedly not legal in Louisiana.
She contended that Monogram was not a "s~te bank" in that its only deposits were a few decadeold contributions from out-of-state affiliates of Monogram and that did not constinne being
engaged in the business of receiving deposits. The Eastem District of Louisiana agreed (Ci\il
AaioD No. 98-1823, Nov. 23. 1m) and the lender appealed. On March 29, American
Financial Services Association, ABA. and Consumer Bankers Association filed supporting amici
brief arguing that FDIC had necessarily determined. a dozen years ago, that Monogram was
engaged in the business of receiving deposits as a predicate to its having granted deposit
insurance to the bank. Only FDIC can change that determination, which is conclusive, and it is
not subject to collateral attack by private pany litigation. On November 2, 2000, Fifth Circuit
held that the district court order was unreviewable as a "remand" to the state courts for lack of
federal jurisdiction. A petition for rehearing and rehearing en bane was denied on January 5,
2001, and on the same day the Eastern District of Louisiana again determined that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case and remanded it to the Civil District Coun for the Parish of Orleans.

12.
Turner v. Beneficial Corporation (11th Cir. No. 99-23381-F). CODSumer filed
Truth in Lending Act case as pnrponed class action. District Court refused to certify a class,
holding that there cannot be a class action for actual damages under the Act because questions of
each "class" member's actual reliance upon alleged misstatements would predominate over
common questions of law or· fact. Consumer filed interlocutory appeal, which the Eleventh
Circuit accepted. arguing that actual reliance is not required. Appellant's brief filed October 25,
1999. On December 6~ 1999. American Financial Services Association, ABA and Consumer
Bankers filed amici brief supporting lender. pointing out that legislative history of Troth in
Lending Act made clear Congressional intent to require reliance. On December 21. 2000. a 3judge panel of the court opined that the plain language of the smtute requires a shOWing of
detrimental reliance. but that an~ p~el of the court, earlier in 2CXX)~ had reached the opposite
conclusion (Jones v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, 212 F.3d 1356) and that the Turner panel was bound
by that until a different decision is reached by an en bane decision of the court or by the Supreme
Coun. In January, 2001, on its own motion, the Eleventh Circuit vacated that opinion and
granted an en bane hearing in the case. On February 22 t the en bane court upheld District
Counts refasal to certify the class, concluding that the statutory language pertaining to actual
damages "as a result or a faulty disclosure. together with the legislative history of the 1974
amendments to the Act sho'Wed an intent of Corigress to require proof of reliance. The court
explicitly overruled lODeS v. Bill Heard to the extent that decision is inconsistent.
A case raising the same issue under the Consumer Leasing Act, Andry v. GMAC (E.D.
La. No. 97-CV-2SS2), was accepted for interlocutory appeal by the Fifth Circuit (Case No. 99..
309S8). on January 20, 2000, American f'inancial Services Association, ABA and Consumer
Bankers Association filed amici brief arguing that the same legislative history descnOcd above
was applicable to Consumer Leasing Act. On November 2, 2000, the Fifth Circuit held that
. detrimental reJiaDce was indeed an element to any claim for actual damages under Truth in
lending or the CoDsuInef Leasing Act (PeiJODeV. GMAC, 23~ F. 3d 433). Onlanuary 31~
;lOO1..lhat ~ was petitioned to·the Supreme CoUrt (Case No. (x)'l2S1)."
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13.
Bank of America v. San Francisco (9th eir. Nos. 00-16355, 00-16394). City
Council of Santa Monica and voters of San Francisco. by referendum, barred imposition of bank
ATM fees upon non-customers of owuer banks. Two national banks and the California Bankers
Association filed suit on November 3. 1999 alleging.that municipal ordinances were preempted
with respect to national banks by the National Bank Act as construed by the Comptroller of the
Currency and that the ordinances could not be "severed" so as to be applied to state chartered
banks only. On November IS, coun granted a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs. Cities
filed notice of appeal. On March 3. 2000, ABA and two co-sponsors filed amici brief arguing
that the preliminary injunction should be upheld as contributing to the public interest. Ninth
Circuit affirmed on March 31 (Nos. 99-17590. 17591). District coun entered pennanent
injunction on June 30. Notices of Appeal filed. July 14 (Santa Monica) and July 18 (San
Francisco). Banks' briefs filed December 13. ABA and two co:-sponsors filed supponing amici
brief a week later.
14.
Phanco v. Dollar Financial Group (C.D. Cal. No. 99-CV-1281); Wirdzek \'.
Monetary Management of California. (B.D. Cal. No. F-99 5415 REC UO). Phanco was filed on
February 8, 1999; Wirdzek was originally filed in California state coun but removed to federal
court Qn March 30, 1999. Both cases allege that the rate of interest c~ged on so-called "pay
day" loans (Customer writes personal check for principal and interest, receives principal on the
spot, lender agrees not to deposit check for 14 days) exceed California legal limits and are
offered without compliance with state disclosure laws. At issue in the cases is whether an out-ofstate national bank (in a jurisdiction in which there are no or very high usury ceilings) is the true
lender in these instances or whether the local check casher has engaged in a "rent-a-bank" scheme
to evade the law.

*

15.
In re Mastercard Internatiooallntemet Gambling Litigation (B.D. La.• MDL Nos.
1321, 1322). Internet gamblers used their respective credit cards to fund their activities and then
became distressed when issuing banks actually expected them to pay their credit card bills.
Assorted suits were filed against issuing banks and credit card associations charging RICO
violations, seeking treble damages, attorneys fees and costs. Thirty-three such suits \\'ere
transferred to the Eastem District of Louisiana by the 1udicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
On February 23, 2001. court disD1issed the two of those that had been designated the "test cases. "
The court held that internet gambling. except for gambling on "sporting events" rather than on
games of Cb(U'M%, was DOt a violation of any federal statute·and ~ not a violation of important
enough state sl1ll11teS. For violation of a state statute to constitute a "predicate offense" for RICO
purposes, it mnst be punishable by at least one year in prison. Here, the applicable state

gambling statutes were civil in natnre. There thus being no "predicate offenses,· there could be
no RICO violation and no cause of action. (2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2407).
Cason v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Com. (M.D. Tenn. No. 3-98-0223). Auto
feC!mically make 1~ to customers. then j~iately assign such loans to
Nissan ~ .Nb$an sets a .•buy~ rate,· the lowest _~ ~_which it will take a
dealer orlgiuated 1oaD. .The dealer is free "to ~1oaDs· at ahi~ rate tban that, wj.th the·
16.

. dealers originate aDd
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dealer and Nissan then splitting the difference. African-American borrowers alleged disparate
treatment by a particular dealer in Nashville in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in
that African-Americans ended up payitlg disproportionately greater discretionary finaDce charges
and higher rates that otherwise identically situated white borrowers. Nissan. though it did not

i

r

originate or make the loans. was also named as a defendant. On May 31, 2000. it filed a motion
for summary judgment, claiming that only the dealer could be liable under the circumstances.
On July 31, the Justice Department Civil Rights Division filed an amicus curiae brief opposing
that motion, claiming that Nissan had a non-delegable duty to assure that loans it took by
assignment from its dealers complied with ECOA.
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17.
.AstIyan v. Union Bank of California (Cal. Super. ~.A.] No. Be 212605). On
June 25, 1999, class action suit was filed against six banks for allegedly selling confidential data
concerning their credit card customers to. telemarketing :firms and others. Doing so was said to
violate the state constitution's ri~i [0 privacy and provisions of the state Business and
Professions Code. A similar case, Hatch v. US Bank National Association (0. Minn.), settled
on June 30 with the bank agreeing to allow customers to "opt out" of ha\'ing their information
shared with third parties. A private class action lawsuit t purporting to ~resent consumers in all
17 states where US Bank does business, was filed on June 11 (I(o·rn v. U.S. Bank t No. Cv 99893 MJD/IGL (D. Minn.», Litigation was tiled against Zions Bank ~ its affiliate, Digital
Signature Trust. in U.S. District Court in Utah on August 10, 1999 (Arcanvs v. Zions First
National B~ No. 2·99CV616C) alleging riUsuse by Zions of confidential information supplied
by a loan applicant to the competitive benefit of Digital Signature. Eight days later, the Tenth
Circuit voided FCC regulations that seriously limited the ability of telecommunications prOViders
to use consumer proprietary network information. The court held that the regulations violated
the right of the providers to engage in -commercial speech protected by the First Amendment.
The providers also contended that customer information belonged to the provider that such
information was a valuable property right, and that they could DOt be deprived of that right
without due process under the Fifth Amendment. The court did not reach that issue. ru.S. West
v. Federal Communications Commission, No. 98-9518).
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.American Bankers Association v. National Credit Union Administration (D.C.
No. OO-Sl9S). On lamwy 8. 1999, ~A sued to enjoin implementation of NeUA's new
"field of membership" rules, alle&=6 tbal. in "numerous respects the rule exceeds the limits on
membership that Congress left in the law when it amended the Federal Credit Union Act in
August, 1998. CUNA aDd NAFCU filed petitions to intervene on lanuary 12. ICBA did so as
well on January 15. On" March 4, a small upstate New York federal credit union intervened in
the case as a plaintiff, complaining of illegal competitive injury to the credit union as a result of
NeUA's bias in favor of ever-larger FCUs. On March 10, court denied a motion for a
preJirniMry injunction. With respect to most of the issues raised by the motiOD, the court found
~ insufficient likeliboo<l of success ~ the merits; with respect to the one issue upon which there
w~a" ~_ likelihood
~~ the ~on~ ~ de:Dicd on th~ ~~ of ~ure to show
iIrepa:rlble in.tmY~ ··ABA filed amended complaint on.ApP11· aSserting specificinstaDces where

eir.

t

of
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agency implementation of its rules violated the statute. NCUA and intervening trade associations
filed motions for partial summaIY jud~ent or dismissal on April 15, 1999. On March 30. 2000,
court granted motions. essentially disposing of all but a single count of the complaint in favor of
the defendants (D:D.C. No. 99-42). The parties stipulated to the dismissal of that count as well.
On May 24, 2000, ABA filed Notice of Appeal. Opening briefs due May 23; oral argument
September S 2001.
t

ENfORCEMENT
19. Murphv v. Beck (S. Ct. No. 0Cl-46). In 1942,. Supreme Court held, in the D'Oench
Duhme case, as a matter of federal common law that the FDIC as receiver was not subject to
suit over the misdeeds or breaches of contract of a failed 'institution that was not apparent on the
books and records of the institution. Subsequent legislation in 1950 and in 1989 codified at least
some of the DtQench Duhme doctrine, and two subsequent Supreme Conn decisions (Athenon
and O'Melveny & Myers elliptically called into question the continuing validity of the "common
law" rule. The circuits are split over whether any part of the common law rule remains or has
been entirely superceded by legislation. The Supreme COW1 granted certiorari in October t 2000
t

to resolve the conflict. Oral argument held January 17, 2001.

PRODUCTS &. SERVICES
20.
Association of Banks in Insurance v. Duryee. (6th eir. No. 99-3917). On
November 6, 1998, ABI, ABA In..~J14nce ~-\ssociation, Ohio BanKers Association and Huntington
National Bank sued state Superintendent of Insurance for declaratory judgment and injunction
against enforcement of state's "controlled business" statutes that do not allow licensing of banks
as title insurance agents and place limitations upon the market that may be served by a banks'
offering of other typeS of insurance. With respect to national banks located and doing business in
places with a population not excereding S,OCO, those state laws are preempted by federal law.
The Independent Insurance Agents of America and a coalition of other industry trade associations
intervened in the case as defendants. On June 18, 1999, District Court granted. ~laratory
judgment and permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiffs on all issues. The court held that (1)
even a concession by the Insurance Commissioner that title insurance prohibitions were
preempted did not prevent issuance of an injunction in light of Commissioner's history of
obstructing bank insurance efforts; and (2) both the "controlled business" statutes and "principal
purposew statutes in effect in Ohio significantly interfered with the business of national banks in
violation of the SUpreme Court's Barnett standard (S.D. Ohio No 0,-98-1120). On July 19,
intervenor insurance trade associations filed a Notice of Appeal. The Commissioner did not
appeal. Appellants' brief filed September 27; appellees' brief filed October 27. Oral argument
held August 2. 2000. . Subsequently t the parties were permitted to file additional briefs
responding to questions from the panel as to the possible effect upon the outcome that the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act would have. That Act had not been passed as of the time the original
briefs were prepared.
'
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21.
Individual Reference Services GToup v. Federal Trade Commission (D.D.C. No.
I :OOCV01828). Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act regulates the disclosure and redisclosure of certain "nonpublic personal information,• which it goes on to define as "personally
identifiable financial information.· The FTC, SEC and the five federal depository institution

regulators have adopted implementing rules that are scheduled to go into effect on November'13,
2000. The rules further define "personally identifiable financial information" as any information
a consumer provides in order to obtain a financial product or service or any other information a
regulated institution obtains about a consumer in connection with providing such a product or
service to the consumer. On July 28, 2000, a trade association representing consmner reporting
agencies filed suit to enjoin the roles, contending that the rules exceed the statutory authorization
by regulating the disclosure and re-disciosure of information (such as. e.g., names, addresses and

phone numbers) that is clearly not -financial" information. ~e consumer reporting agencies
claim that they v.ill no longer be able to acquire such information from financial institutions nor
repackage and sell such information as they are allowed to do under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (which Gramm-Leach-BliIey specifically preserves) and under the First Amendment to the
Constitution. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in November t 2000.

TAX
22.
Mellon v. United States. (Fed. eir. No. 01-5015). Section 67 of the Internal
Revenue Code allows taxpayers a dechlCtion °for certain miscellaneous expenses to the extent that
those expenses exceed 2 % of adjusted gross income. In the case of trusts and estates. a full
deduction is permitted for costs that would Dot have been incurred if the property were not held
in tnlSt or in an estate. Mellon. as trustee or executor for numerous trusts and estates, contends
that investment advice and management fees necessarily paid by the trusts and estates is entitled
to a full deduction; the IRS contends that those fees are subject to the 2 % limit because similarly
situated taxpayers that are not trusts or estates could (though they need' not) choose to incur the
same expenses. On April 13, 2<XX>. ABA filed amicus brief supporting Mellon and contending
that, if the IRS position were co~ then the special provision for estates and trusts would be
essentially meaningless. On July 17 court denied cross-motions for SllDlmary judgment. It held
that the- expenses incurred are potentially covered by the 2% role, i.e.• not exempt from it as a
matter of law, but that there had 10· be a finding of fact concerning which expenses would or
would not" aetua11y have been incurred if the property were not held in trust. When Mellon
thereafter declined to present "evidence" on what it believed to be a pure question of law, the
court entered judgment for the IRS. (Ct. fed. 0. No. 97·151 T and 20 consolidated cases).
Mellon appealed to' the Federal Circuit on October 18. The bank and the ABA as amicus cwiae
filed briefs on December 21, 2000.
t

TRUST
Franklin v. First Union. (B.D. Va. No. 3:99CV344). On May S, 1999~ class
action complaint ~ filed on ~f of former Signet Bank employees who .had participated in
•

23.

~loyer's401~ plaD. ~ plan ~ .UJJiOD.~ ~ merge into. its ~1(k) pro~ for
.~ ~lO}'CCS lJ.P01l·lhe acquisition ~Signet ~ by First Union. The plaintiffs allege that the
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"merger" violated requirements of the Signet plan, was done without necessary notice to
participants or opportunity ·extended to them.·10 make other arrangements, violated ERISA,
deprived participants of vested rights and breached fiduciary duties owed to the participants. On

September 7, 1999. a second suit (also captioned Franklin v. First Union) was filed in the same
coun by a putative class of pre-existing First Union employees alleging various misuseS of the
401(k) plan of those employees for the bank's benefit rather than the eD1ployees' benefit, such as
limiting investment choices to mutual funds operated by a bank sub where performance was
allegedly mediocre and fees allegedly high. The litigation was settled in late March, 2001. News
reports indicate that the bank agreed to pay $16 million to over 150,000 employees, past and
present. Pleadings in both cases are posted on the internet. Sec www.firstunionsuit.com

MISCELLANEOUS
24.
Louisiana Federal Land Bank Association v. Farm Credit Administration (D.O.C.
No. 1:OOCV01582). Farm Credit Administration has historically carved up the nation into
exclusive territories for its various ·System institutions. It bad allowed such institutions to
purchase participation interests in loans originated outside their territories if they provided notice
or acquired the consent of the sister institution in whose territol)' the loan did originate. On
April 25, peA abolished this requirement. On June 30, 2CXXl t the F~ Credit Bank of Texas
and five affiliated Land Bank Asscc:::ions sued. It seems that in 1988 a different Farm Credit
Bank failed and was sold to FCB-Texas. One of the terms and conditions of the purchase and
assumption t:ran.saetion was that FeB·Texas \\'ould acquire permanent territorial service rights
over the territory of the failed institutio~ a deal later ratified by explicit federal legislation. The
new rule is alleged to violate the Farm Credit Act as amended.
25.
Waters v. Mellon Bank Com. (B.D. Pa. No. 99 CV 2825). Blind customers and
potential customers of bank filed suit on June 3. 1999, under Title m of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. The complaint alleges that the bank's A TM machines are not sufficiently
accessible to the visnal1y impaired and that the bank should be compelled to install "voice
guidance technology" in each such ATM. A sin1ilar suit was filed at the same time against PNC
in the Western District of Pennsylvania. The PNC litigation was settled out of court in January.
2001. On May 24, 2C.XX>, a third suit was filed in U.s. District Court for the District of

Columbia (Hational Federation of the Blind v. Chevy Chase Bank. FSB. No. 1:00cvOl167)
along with a cornpanion suit against an ATM manufacturer and a dnlg store chain where ~
ATMs are located' (RiteAi1). (National Fedemtion of the Blind v. Diebold, Inc., No.
l:00cvOll68).

26.· Guitard v. Gorham Sayings Bank (Cumberland County [Maine] Superior Conn
No. CV-OO-326). Depositors in mutual savings bank filed class action lawsuit OD lune 8 2000,
seeking a -dividend- from. the Bank for the class that was equal to the amount of the Bank's
undistributed profits in excess (af 'the amount needed for the bank to qualify as a •wellCJlPitaJizM- institution UDder ~ and state standards. Plaintiffs contend that the Bank's Total
Capital ratio is . 23.43S whereas lOS is.asmuch as~ ~ needs to 4"be regarded as wellt
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capitalized. Failure to distribute the difference to the "owners," i.e. the depositors, is said to be
a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the Trustees of the Bank.

CALENDAR
May 23

ABA brief due in ABA v. NCUA

June 22

NCUAICUNA briefs due in ABA v. NeUA

July 6

ABA reply brief due in ABA v. NellA

September 5

Oral argument in ABA v. NCUA
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Introduction

In the past year, the federal financial institution regulatory agencies have issued one final
and one proposed regulation as well as guidelines affecting financial institutions'
customer information practices and disclosures. We no\v have a final regulation
governing privacy disclosures and regulatory Guidelines on protecting the security of
customer information. The proposed regulation implementing the affiliate sharing
provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (UFCRA")' generated so much comment that
the regulators were not able to issue a final regulation in time for the new FCRA
disclosures to be included in the privacy disclosure statements being mailed before JU,ly
1,2001.

While there are currently a number of privacy bills in state legislatures, none passed in
the recent legislative sessions in Kentucky, Ohio or Indiana.
This presentation focuses on the new federal Regulation and Guidelines. Regulatory
publications designed to assist financial institutions in complying with the Regulation and
Guidelines are located at the end of the vnitten materials.
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C. 1

REGULATION IMPLEMENTING TITLE V OF
THE GRArvtM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT
(Pub., L 106-102) (HGLB")
In May, 2000, the federal financial institution regulatory agencies ("Agencies") issued
the final version of the privacy regulation (URegulation") implementing Title V of GLB.
The following is a Section-by-Section analysis of the Regulation.

Section

.2 RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

The Regulation contains additional examples as well as sample disclosure clauses to
illustrate the level of disclosure detail the Agencies believe appropriate (but not type size,
margin width, or the like). A financial institution using the sample clauses must be
.certain they reflect the institution's practices. Further, if the institution uses statutory
terms, such as "nonaffiliated third party" or "nonpublic personal information," that are set
out in the sample disclosures, the institution "must provide sufficient information to
enable consumers to understand what the terms mean in the context of the institution's
notices."
The Regulation provides that (i) the examples are not exclusive, and (ii) compliance with
the examples constitutes compliance with the Regulation.

-
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Section

.3 DEFINITIONS

((Clear and Conspicuous" (Section _.3(b))
A "clear and conspicuous notice" is "reasonably understandable and designed to call
attention to the nature and significance of information in the notice" (Section
_.3(b)(I)).

Examples of "reasonably understandable" (Section _.3(b)(2)(i))
• clear, concise sentences, paragraphs, and sections;
• short explanatory sentences or bullet lists where possible;
• definite, concrete, everyday words and active voice whenever possible;
• avoidance of multiple negatives;
• avoidance wherever possible of legal and highly technical business tenns;
• Avoidance of imprecise explanations.
Examples ofUdesigned to call attention" (Section _.3(b)(2)(ii))
• Plain-language heading;
• Easy to read typeface and type size;
• Wide margins and ample line spacing;
• Bold face or italics for key words;
• Where form contains other information besides notice, use of distinctive type size,
graphic devices (e.g.., shading or sidebars).

Note: A financial institution may call attention to disclosure on its web site by:
• using text or visual cues to encourage scrolling down page if necessary to view entire
notice;
• ensuring that other elements on web site, such as text, graphics and hyperlinks, do not
distract from notice; and either
(a) placing notice on screen consumers frequently access, such as page where
transactions are conducted; or
(b) placing a link on a screen that consumers frequently access that connects
directly to the notice and conveys importance, nature and relevance of the notice.

"Collect" (Section _.3(c))
The Regulation provides that "collect" means "to obtain information that the bank
organizes or can retrieve by the name- of an individual or by identifying number, symbol,
or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, irrespective of the source of the
underlying information."

r

r

C-3

"Consumer" I "Customer" (Section _.3(e) and Section _.3(h))
Consumers are entitled to privacy notices only if the institution intends to disclose
nonpublic personal information about them to an unaffiliated third party for purposes not
covered by the statutory exceptions set out in Section 502( e) of GLB. hCustomers" are
entitled to the privacy notices "at the time of establishing a customer relationship" and
annuall y thereafter.
The Regulation defines "consumer" as an individual who obtains or has obtained from a
financial institution a financial product or service that is to be used primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes, or that individual's legal representative (Section _.3
(e)(l».
Examples where an individual ~ a bank's consumer:
applicant for credit, regardless ofv/hether credit is extended;
(ii)
individual providing nonpublic personal information so bank may determine
whether the individual may qualify for a loan, whether or not loan is extended;
(iii)
individual who provides nonpublic personal information in connection with
seeking to obtain investment, financial, or economic advisory services;
(iv)
person who has a loan in which the bank holds an ownership interest or
setvicing rights even if these interests or rights are held in conjunction \vith
one or more other institutions and even if the bank hires an agent to collect on
the loan.

•

(i)

Examples where an individual is not a bank's consumer if these are the only
relationships with the bank:
(i)
an individual is a consumer of another financial institution for which the bank
acts as agent or provides processing or other services;
an individual has designated the bank as trustee for a trust;
(ii)
(iii)
an individual is a beneficiary of a trust for which the bank is trustee;
an individual is a participant in an employee benefits plan sponsored by the
(iv)
bank or for which the bank acts as trustee or fiduciary.

..

"Customer" I "Customer Relationship" (Section _.3(h) and Section _.3(i))
The Regulation defines "customer" as a consumer \vho has a "customer relationship"
with a financial institution (Section _.3(h)).
A "customer relationship" is a "continuing relationship" bet\veen a consumer and a
financial institution under \vhich the institution provides one or more "financial products
or services" to be used primarily for personal family or household purposes.
Exampl~s wh~re

•
~

(i)
(ii)

a consumer has a "cust.ooler relationship":

deposit or investment account;
.. loan from the institution;

C-4
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(iii)
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(iv)
(v)

(vi)

r

(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
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(x)
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Joan where institution o\vns servicing rights;
purchase of an insurance product;
purchase of an investment product, e.g., bank acts as IRA custodian;
agreement or understanding \vhere institution agrees to arrange or broker a
home mortgage loan;
lease of personal property;
provision of financial, investment or economic advisory services for a fee;
a debt collector has purchased the consumer's account and has been able to
locate the consumer and begin to collect the account;
an aggregator has received information necessary to provide access to all of
the consumer's on-line financial accounts at its \veb site

Examples where a consumer does not have a "customer relationship":
(i)
isolated transactions, such as use of bank's ATM to withdraw cash from
another institution, purchase of a cashier's check or money order, or wire
transfer;
(ii)
sale of loan without retention of servicing rights;
(iii)
isolated sales of airline tickets, travel insurance, traveler's checks;
(iv)
one-time provision of real estate or personal property appraisal;
(v)
one purchase of personal checks from a check printer.

Note: A consumer ceases to be a customer entitled to privacy disclosures when a deposit
account becomes "inactive" or a closed-end loan is paid, charged off: or sold without
retention of servicing rights (see discussion on Section _.5(b)( 1) "Tennination of
Customer Relationship").

"Financial Institution"
The definition of financial institution is important for two reasons: (i) "financial
institutions" are required to make privacy disclosures and (ii) disclosures pursuant to joint
marketing agreements with "financial institutions" are not subject to opt out.
The Regulation defines "financial institution" as any institution the business of which is
engaging in activities that are "financial in nature or incidental to such financial activities
as described in Section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956."
•

Examples of "financial institutions":
Banks, savings and loans, credit unions;
Insurance companies;
Securities brokers, underwriters, and distributors;
Investment companies (mutual funds).

The FTC define$ "financial institution" as an entity "significantly engaged" in financial
activity_ The business must sell to 'or perf0rtr.services for individuals (not bU$inesses) to
be included:

C-5

•

FTC Examples of "financial institutions":
Retailer extending credit through a proprietary card;
Personal property or real estate appraisals;
*Internet company that compiles, or aggregates, an individual's on-line accounts
at that company's web site;
Hardware and software manufacturers that sell to individuals;
Automobile dealership to the extent that it regularly leases automobiles on a
nonoperating basis for longer than 90 days (as to its leasing business);
Career counselor for positions in financial services industry;
Check printer that sells directly to consumers;
Business that wires money to and from consumers;
Check cashing business;
Accountant or tax preparation service;
Travel agency where travel business is operated in conjunction with a traditional
financial service (e.g., sale of travelers checks, insurance, etc.);
Real estate settlement service company;
Mortgage broker;
Investment advisory company and credit counseling service;
Debt collectors.

tlNonpublic Personal Information" / "Publicly Available Information" (Section _.3(n)
and Section _e3(p)).
Section 509(4)(A) ofGLB defines "nonpublic personal information" as "personally
identifiable financial information" (i) provided by a consumer to a financial institution;
(ii) resulting from any transaction with the consumer or any service performed for a
consumer; or (iii) othenvise obtained by a financial institution except for "publicly
available information" derived without using nonpublic personal information. Bank
customer lists are always classified as "nonpublic." For practical purposes, nearly all
information a financial institution has about its consumer customers must be treated as
nonpublic personal information.
The Regulation defines "nonpublic personal information" as:
(i) personally identifiable financial information; and
(ii) any list, description, or other grouping of consumers (and publicly available
information pertaining to them) that is derived using any personally identifiable
financial information that is not publicly available (Section _.3(n)(i)).
Nonpublic personal information does not include:
(i) publicly available information, except for certain customer lists derived using
nonpublic information;
(ii) lists of consumers derived \vithout using nonpublic personally identifiable
~nancial information (e.g., list of subscribers to a magazine).
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Examples of customer lists derived using nonpublic information:
• List of deposit account holders.
Example of customer list derived using only public information:
• List of mortgage loan customers where mortgages are matter of public record.

,.

"Personally Identifiable Financial Information" (Section _.3(0))
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Personally identifiable financial information is information:
a consumer provides to obtain a financial product or service;
(ii)
about a consumer resulting from any transaction involving a financial product
or service between a financial institution and a consumer;
(iii)
otherwise obtained about a consumer "in connection with providing a
financial product or service to that consumer" (Section _.3(0)(1 )).
(i)

Examples of personally identifiable information:
(i)
application data;
(ii)
transaction data (balance, payment history, overdraft history, debit or credit
card purchase information);
(iii)
fact that individual is or was a customer;
(iv)
other information if disclosed in a manner that indicates a customer
relationship;
(v)
information provided or otherwise obtained in connection with loan collection
or servicing;
(vi)
any information collected through an internet "cookie";
(vii) consumer report information.

Note: Aggregate or blind data without personal identifiers such as account numbers,
names or addresses is NOT personally identifiable information.

"Publicly Available Information" (Section _.3(p)}
Publicly available information is information a financial institution "has a reasonable
basis to believe" is lawfully availabl.e to the general public from:
(i)
government records (e.g., real estate or security interest filings);
(ii)
widely distributed media (e.g., telephone book, web site);
(iii)
disclosures required to be made by law (Section _.3(p)( 1)).
•

Examples of reasonable basis for belief information is public:
(i)
information is included in mortgage in a jurisdiction \vhere mortgages are
public record;
(ii)
financial institution has verified that telephone nunlber is listed or consumer
has said number is not u'nlisted (Section _.3(p)(3)).

r
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SUB P...\.RTA
PRIVACY AND OPT OUT NOTICES

Section

.4 INITIAL PRIVACY NOTICE

•

Time of providing notice:
To customer - in most cases, not later than when financial institution "establishes
a customer relationship;"
To consumer - before financial institution discloses nonpublic personal
information, except pursuant to an exception set out in Section _.14 or Section
.15..

•

Examples of "establishing customer relationships:"
(i)
opening a credit card account;
(ii)
signing deposit account agreement, obtaining credit, purchasing insurance;
(iii)
agreeing to obtain financial or investment advice for a fee;
(iv)
becoming a client for credit counseling or tax preparation.

Note: Special rules for loans:
• A customer relationship is established when a financial institution originates a loan or
purchases loan servicing rights;
•

A customer relationship is terminated when a loan or loan servicing rights are sold;

•

A new privacy notice is not required for each new product;

Initial notices may be delivered "within a reasonable time after" the relationship is
established if:
(i)
customer has no choice;
Examples: bank buys deposits or servicing rights
(ii)
providing notice when account is established would "substantially delay
transaction" and customer agrees to receive notice at a later time;
Examples:
• account opened by telephone
• student loan account where loans are disbursed without prior
communication between bank and customer
• Initial notice where customer relationship is established on web:
If a customer relationship is established on a web site, the customer must receive the
initial privacy notice at the time the relationship is established. The notice may be
provided at the same time the financial institution provides notices required by other
consumer protection statutes, such as Truth in Lending.
•

. Note: Trade association.or regulatory "best practices" may require a financial institution
to postJts pnvacy notices on its web sites, even if customer relationships are not

e-g
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established via the web. Topics such as web site security and the use of "cookies" are
often mentioned as appropriately included in a web site privacy statement.

r

•

Joint accounts: Bank may provide one notice to account holders jointly.
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Section _.5

.~NNUAL PRI\'.-\CY

NOTICE

The Regulation provides that:

•

Customers must receive an annual privacy notice. "Annual" means "once in any 12
consecutive month period," which may be defined as a calendar year.

Example: Customer opens account on August 1, 2001. Customer must get an "annual
notice" some time before 12/31/2002 and at the same time each year thereafter.
•

A consumer is a "former customer," not entitled to receive an annual notice when:
the customer's deposit account becomes "inactive" under the bank's policies;
the customer's closed-end loan is paid in full, charged on: or sold \vithout
retention of servicing rights;
(iii)
customer receives no statements or notices on an open-end credit account or
account is sold without retention of servicing rights;
(iv)
customer has received no communication for 12 consecutive months except
for annual privacy notices or promotional material.
(i)
(ii)
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Section _.6 CONTENT OF INITI.-\L AND ANNUAL PRJ\'ACY NOTICES

Initial, annual, and revised privacy notices must include at least the following
information:
(1) Categories ofnonpublic personal information collected.
Examples:
information from the consumer;
information about the consumer's transactions with the financial institution or its
affiliates;
information about the consumer's transactions with nonaffiliated third parties;
information from a consumer reporting agency.
(2) The categories of nonpublic personal information the institution discloses (or reserves
the right to disclose). The categories listed for information collection may be used with
few examples for each category;

{3) The categories of affiliates and nonaffiliated third parties to which the institutions
discloses (or reserves the right to disclose) information, except pursuant to the statutory
exceptions set out in Section _.14 and Section _.15. The following categories may
be used with a few illustrative examples of each:
financial service providers
non financial companies
others
(4) Categories of nonpublic personal information disclosed about former customers and

categories of affiliates and nonaffiliated third parties to whom disclosed, except pursuant
to statutory exception;

r

(5) If a financial institution discloses information to a nonaffiliated service provider or
financial institution joint marketing partner and no other statutory exception applies, a
separate statement of the categories of information disclosed and the categories of third
parties with whom the bank has contracted;

r,

Examples:

I
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list categories of information disclosed, using same categories and examples used
under (2);
state whether third party is a service provider performing marketing services on
behalf of bank or bank and another financial institution; or
state that disclosure is to another financial institution with whon1 bank has a joint
marketing agreement.
(6) An explanation of consumer's right to opt out of disclosures to nonaffiliated third

part.ies, including opt out methods;
(7)F~ir

Credit Reporting Act affiliate sharing notice and opt but;

C ·11

Note: Last fail, the Agencies issued for comment a proposed regulation implenlenting
the affiliate sharing provisions of the FCRA. Because a final regulation \vould have
been issued too late for the FCRA disclosures to have been included in the initial
privacy disclosure mailings, the Agencies have stated that the final FCRA rule will
not apply to disclosures sent before the later of January 1, 2002 and the effective date
of the FCRA rule.
(8) Policies and practices with respect to protecting the confidentiality and security of
nonpublic personal information;

Examples:
description in general tenns of who has access to information;
state that financial institution has security practices and procedures in place to ensure
the confidentiality of the information in accordance \vith the bank's policy.
(9) General statement about disclosure pursuant to statutory exceptions, which may be
~atisfied by a statement that the financial institution "makes disclosures to other
nonaffiliated third parties as permitted by law;"
• A financial institution may use a short form initial notice that says that the institution
policies are available on request by, for example, a toll-free telephone number, if it
intends to disclose nonpublic personal information about non-customer consumers. The
financial institution must still provide the Section _.7 third party sharing opt out notice.

• If a financial institution does not disclose, and does not wish to reserve the right to
disclose, nonpublic personal information about customers or former customers either to
affiliates or nonaffiliated third parties except as authorized by Sections _.14 and
_.15, the financial institution may provide a simplified disclosure statement that sets
out:
1. The categories of nonpublic personal information collected (Section _.6(a)(1));
2. The fact that the institution does not disclose nonpublic personal information

about customers or former customers to affiliates or nonaffiliated third parties
except as permitted by law; and
3. the bank's polices and practices with respect to protecting the confidentiality and
security of nonpublic personal information.
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Section _.7 FORlv1 OF OPT OUT NOTlCE; OPT OUT 1\lETRODS

• Form of Opt Out Notice:
The notice must be clear and conspicuous and accurately explain the right to opt out of
disclosures to nonaffiliated third parties. The notice must state:
(i)
that the financial institution reserves the right to disclose nonpublic personal
information about a consumer to a nonaffiliated third party;
(ii)
that the consumer has the right to opt out of the disclosure;
(iii)
a "reasonable means" to opt out.

•

r
r

Elements of an Adequate Opt Out Notice:
(i)
categories of non public personal information disclosed or which nlay be
disclosed;
(ii)
categories of nonaffiliated third parties to which information may be
disclosed;
(iii)
statement of opt out right;
(iv)
identification of products or services to which opt out would apply.

j

• "Reasonable" Opt Out means:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

,.

check off boxes on form with opt out notice;
reply form with opt out notice (prepaid postage not required);
electronic means (e.g., e-mail, web site process);
toll-free telephone number.
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•

"Unreasonable" Opt Out means:
(i)
only opt out is by consumer writing a letter;
(ii)
only opt out is by check ofT provided with original but not subsequent notice.

• Financial institution may specify "reasonable" opt out method and not honor opt outs
by other means.
• Opt out notice may be provided with initial notice or at a later time \vith a copy of the
initial notice.

•

Joint Account Notice and Opt Out Methods:
• Financial institutions may send one notice per account or notices to each account
owner, but the notices must explain effect of opt out;
• If a financial institution sends one notice to address of primary account o\vner, the
bank must accept opt out direction from either account owner;
• A financial institution may:
(i)
treat an opt out by either account o\vner as applying to both parties to the
account; or
(ii)
permit account owners to make different opt out choices but in this case,
bank must:
{a) Permit account o\vnersto opt out for each other;
(b) If'both opt out, they must be able to d'o. so \vith one telephone call or

C· 13

one response form~
(c) If only one opts out, bank may not disclose information about that
party or information about that party jointly \vith another party.
Other Opt Out Rules
• Financial institution must process an opt out as soon as "reasonably practical after
receipt.
• Consumer may opt out at any time.
• An opt out is good until consumer revokes it in writing or electronically, if consumer
agrees.
• For terminated account, opt out continues for all information collected prior to
termi nation.
II
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Section _.8 REVISED PRIVACY NOTICES
If financial institution changes its nonaffiliated third party disclosure policy, it must
provide a revised disclosure statement and opt out and give customers a reasonable
opportunity to exercise the opt out before disclosure.

J
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Examples of revised policy triggers:
disclosure of new category of information;
disclosure to a new category of third party;
disclosure about a former customer who did not get previous notice and opt out.
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Section _.9 DELI\'ERY OF PRl\'.4CY

A~D

OPT OUT NOTICES

Financial institutions must deliver notices so that each consumer can "reasonably expect"
to receive notice in writing, or if the consumer agrees, electronically.
Examples of permissible delivery:
hand deliver a printed copy to consumer;
mail printed copy to consumer's last known address;
for consumer who banks electronically, post notice on the electronic site and require
consumer to acknowledge receipt of notice as a necessary step to obtain a product or
servIce;
for an isolated transaction, such as an ATM transaction, post notice on the ATM
screen and require consumer to acknowledge receipt of the notice as a necessary step
to completing transaction.
Examples of impermissible delivery:
only post branch office sign or publish advertisement;
.: send notice via e-mail to consumer who does not bank electronically;
oral notice - either in person or by telephone.
• Annual notice delivery may be accomplished by posting notice on web site for those
customers who bank by web and agree to receive notices on web site. Notice must be
continuously posted.
• No annual notice need be sent to a customer who has requested "no contact,"
provided annual notice is available on request.

•

Customers must be able to retain notice or obtain notice in writing at a later time.

• Joint Notice with Other Financial Institutions:
A financial notice may provide a joint notice from it and one or more of its affiliates or
other financial institutions, as identified in the notice by name, so long as the notice is
accurate for all institutions named.

I• •
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LIIVIITS ON DISCLOSURES

Section _.10 LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE OF NONPUBLIC PERSONAL
INFORl\'IATION TO NONAFFILIATED THIRD PARTIES
Except pursuant to one of the statutory exceptions set out in Sections _.13, _.14, and
_.15, a financial institution may not disclose nonpublic personal information unless:
•
•
•

•

the institution has provided the Section _.4 initial notice;
the institution has provided the Section _.7 opt out notice~
the institution gives the consumer a reasonable opportunity to opt out (at least 30 days
from date notice is mailed or received electronically if the consumer consents to
electronic receipt);
the consumer has not opted out.

J
For an isolated transaction, such as purchase of a cashiers check, the bank may
require the consumer to decide on opt out before the transaction is completed;

• Opt out applies to all information collected about the consumer, whether collected
before or after opt out is exercised;
• Partial opt outs are permitted. A financial institution may permit a consumer to select
the items of information or nonaffiliated third parties to which the opt out will apply.
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Section

.11 Lll\'lITS ON REDISCLOSURE AND REUSE OF INFORl\lATION

The revised Regulation sets out the follov,'ing redisclosure and reuse limits:
• Ifa financial institution receives nonpublic personal information pursuant to a
statutory exception (Section _ ' 14 and Section _,15), the financial institution may:
(i)
disclose information to affiliates of the disclosing institution;
(ii)
disclose information to its own affiliates, who in turn are subject to disclosure
restrictions:
(iii)
disclose the information only pursuant to a Section _.14 or Section _.15
statutory exception in the ordinary course of business to carry out the activity
covered by the exception under which the financial information received the
information.
Example: If a bank gets the customer list of another institution in order to provide
account processing services, the bank may disclose the data in response to a properly
authorized subpoena, but the bank could NOT use the data for its own marketing
purposes.
.
• Credit Bureau Sale of Header Information
The FTC has taken the position that if a credit bureau receives information from a
financial institution pursuant to the credit bureau disclosure exception (Section
_.15(a)(5)), the credit bureau many not sell the "header information" to direct
marketers or individual reference services. The credit bureaus have challenged the FTC's
position.
• If a financial institution receives nonpublic personal information outside a Section
_,14 or Section _.15 statutory exception, the financial institution may disclose the
information to:
(i)
affiliates of the disclosing institution;
(ii)
its own affiliates, subject to disclosure limitations;
(iii)
to any other person, if disclosure would have been lawful by the disclosing
institution,
Example: Ifa bank receives a customer list outside a Section _,14 or Section
_,15 exception, the bank (subject to any contract limitations) could use the list for
its own purposes, disclose the list to a third party if disclosure would have been
permitted under the disclosing bank's privacy policy, (assuming custonler on the list
had not opted out), and disclose the list pursuant to a Section _ . 14 or Section
_.15 exception. Similarly, if a bank could be persuaded to disclose in its privacy
policy that it shares customer information \vith credit bureaus for purposes other than
credit reports so that the customer would have an opt out to such disclosure, the credit
bureau receiving the information could sell it to direct marketers.

• If a financial institution discloses nonpublic personal information pursuant to a
Section_._: 14 or Secti"on_-,15 ~tatutol}' exception, the third party may disclose the
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information to:

(ii)

the disclosing financial institution's affiliates;
its own affiliates. subject to disclosure restrictions;

(iii)

pursuant to a Section _ . 14 or Section _.15 exception in the ordinary course of

(i)

business to carry out the activity covered by the exception under which it received

the information.

• If a financial institution discloses information outside a Section
. 14 or Section
_.15 statutory exception. (unless otherwise limited by contract), the third party may
disclose the information to:

(i)
(ii)
(iii)

the disclosing institution's affiliates;
its own affiliates, subject to disclosure restrictions;
any other person. if disclosure would have been lawful by the disclosing
institution.
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Section 12 LllVlITS ON SHARING ACCOUNT NUr\IBERS FOR i\'IARKETING
PURPOSES

The Regulation contains a general prohibition against disclosing transaction account
numbers or access codes to nonaffiliated third parties for marketing purposes but
provides for the following exceptions:
• Disclosure of the account number or access code may be made to a financial
institution's service provider solely in order to perform marketing of the institution's own
products and services so long as the agent or service provider is not authorized to directly
initiate charges to the consumerts account.
Disclosure of the account number or access code is permitted to a participant in a
private label credit card program or an affinity or similar program \vhere progranl
participants are identified to the consumer when the consumer enters the program.
• Disclosure of an encrypted account number or access code is permitted so long as the
-recipient does not receive the means to decode the account number or access code.
Encrypted numbers are generally used only for tracking purposes.
• A transaction account does not include a closed-end account to which third parties
cannot initiate charges. (Mortgage loan accounts are not exempted if third parties can
initiate charges to the account t such as for insurance products.)
Note: there is no restriction on disclosing account numbers to companies providing
services pursuant to a Section _ . 14 or Section _ . 15 statutory exception.
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Section __ 13 EXCEPTION TO OPT OUT FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS AND
JOINT MARKETING
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Despite industry requests to treat all service providers under the general statutory
exceptions of Section _.14 or Section _.15, the Regulation requires special
disclosures for marketing service providers similar to those for third party financial
institution joint marketing partners.
• A financial institution may disclose nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated
third party that performs marketing or market research services for or functions on the
institution's behalfifthe financial institution (i) provides the consumer with the Section
_.4 initial privacy notice; and (ii) enters into a contract that prohibits the third party
from disclosing or using the information other than for the purposes for which the
information was disclosed Qr under a Section _.14 or Section _.15 exception to carry
out the purpose of disclosure.
• The services may include marketing of produets or services offered jointly with
another financial institution.
• A joint agreement means a written contract to jointly offer, endorse, or sponsor a
financial product or service.
•

Some suggested clauses are located in the Appendix.
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SUBPART C
EXCEPTIONS

Section
.13 EXCEPTION TO OPT OUT FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS AND
JOINT MARKETING

Despite industry requests to treat all service providers under the general statutory
exceptions of Section _.14 or Section _.15, the Regulation requires special
disclosures for marketing service providers similar to those for third party financial
institution joint marketing partners.
• A financial institution may disclose nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated
third party that performs marketing or market research services for or functions on the
institution's behalfifthe financial institution (i) provides the consumer with the Section
_.4 initial privacy notice; and (ii) enters into a contract that prohibits the third party
from disclosing or using the information other than for the purposes for which the
information was disclosed Qr under a Section _.14 or Section _.15 exception to carry
out the purpose of disclosure.
• The services may include marketing of products or services offered jointly with
another financial institution.
• A joint agreement means a written contract to jointly ofTer, endorse, or sponsor a
financial product or service.
•

Some suggested clauses are located in the Appendix.
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Section
.15 OTHER EXCEPTIOr\S TO NOTICE AND OPT OUT
REQUlREl\lENTS

One of the most important Section _.15 exceptions is "consent." The Regulation does
not specify a consent format, however, the Agencies note that "any financial institution
that obtains the consent of a consumer to disclose nonpublic personal information should
take steps to ensure that the limits of the consent are well understood by both the
financial institution and the consumer." Consent is not required for disclosure in the
ordinary course of business to effect a transaction, for example, to permit verification of
funds or disclosures to or by appraisers, flood insurers, attorneys, insurance agents, or
mortgage brokers. The Section _.15 statutory exceptions are listed in belo\v.
(1)

With the consent or at the direction of the consumer.

(2)

(i)
(ii)

(iii)
(iv)
(v)

(3) To provide information to insurance rate advisory organizations, guaranty funds,
bank rating agencies, persons assessing compliance with industry standards, the
institution's attorneys, accountants, and auditors.
(4) To the extent pennitted or required by law and in accordance with the federal Right
to Financial Privacy Act to law enforcement agencies, functional regulators, state
insurance authorities, the FTC, self-regulatory organizations, investigation in a matter
related to public safety.
(5) (i)
(ii)

r
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To protect confidentiality or security of bank's records;
To protect against or prevent actual fraud, unauthorized claims, or other
liability;
For required institutional risk control or for resolving customer disputes or
inquiries;
To persons holding a legal or beneficial interest relating to the consumer;
To persons acting in a fiduciary or representative capacity for the consumer.

To a consumer reporting agency in accordance with the FCRA;
From a consumer report by a consumer reporting agency.

(6) In connection with proposed or actual sale, merger, transfer, or exchange of ail or
part of a business unit.

(7) (i)
(ii)
(iii)

To comply with Federal, state, or local laVIS, rules or other applicable legal
requirements.
To comply with "properly authorized" civil, criminal, or regulatory
investigation, or subpoena or summons by Federal, state or local authorities.
To respond to judicial process or government regulatory authorities having
jurisdiction over a financial institution for examination, compliance, or other
purposes as authorized by la\v.
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SUBPART D
RELATION TO OTHER LA \VS & EFFECTIVE DATE

Section __ 16 PROTECTION OF THE fAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT

The Regulation does not limit the ability of affiliated companies to share customer
information as permitted by the FCRA so long as customers receive the FCRA disclosure
and opt out notice.
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Section _.17 RELATION TO STATE LA"'S
State laws granting greater privacy protections are NOT pre-empted. The FTC, in
consultation with the OCC, will determine if a state law provides greater protection.
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Section _.18 EFFECTIVE DATE; TRANSITION RULE

• The effective date of the Regulation ·"vas November 13,2000 but full compliance is
not required until July 1, 2001.
• By July 1, 2001 financial institutions must have provided the Section _.4 initial
privacy notice to all consumers who are customers on July 1, 2001.

Note: Notices must go out by May if the institution wishes to continue sharing
information with nonaffiliated third parties on an uninterrupted basis so that custon1ers
will have a sufficient time to exercise an opt out.
• Marketing service agreements and joint marketing agreements entered into prior to
July 1, 2000 must be modified to meet the Section _.13 requirements by July 1, 2002.

-
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Interagency Guidelines Est~blishing Standards
For Safeguarding Customer Information

In compliance with Sections SOland 505(b) of the Gramm-Leach-BliJey Act ("GLB"),
on February 1, 2001 the federal financial institution regulatory agencies ("Agencies")
published final guidelines establishing standards for the safeguarding of eO/lsumer
eus/omer information ("Guidelines") I. The Guidelines are effective July 1 2001, but
service provider agreements entered into after March 3, 2001 (thirty days after
publication of the Guidelines) must have specific language requiring the service provider
to implement policies and procedures designed to achieve the regulatory objectives of the
Guidelines (see, Section II). For the most part, the Guidelines afford compliance
flexibility and are consistent with security-related supervisory guidance previously issued
by the Agencies and the FFIEC.
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Secti.on 5Q 1 of GLB requires the Agencies to establish appropriate.standards relating to ad]ninistrati\'c,
and physical safegua.rds to protect the security, confidentiality and irite~ity of customer
information:;Thc S~C hcJdelccted not to issue customer infonnation sccurity guidelines for thc institutions
subject to its jurisdiction.
I

tec~ical
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1.

Objectives of the Guidelines
The Guidelines establish a process for developing and implementing a consumer

customer information security program "designed" to:

II

1.

Ensure the security and confidentiality of customer information;

2.

Protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or
integrity of such information; and

3.

Protect against unauthorized access to or use of such information that
could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.

Process of Implementing the Guidelines
The Guidelines require each financial institution to engage in a five-step process:

A.

B.

Assess Risk
1.

Assess risks to customer information by identifying "reasonably
foreseeable" internal and external threats that could result in
unauthorized disclosure, misuse, alteration, or destruction of
customer information or customer information systems.
"Customer information systems" includes "any methods used to
access, collect, store, use, transmit, protect or dispose of customer
information."

2.

Assess the likelihood of such risks and potential damage, taking
into consideration the "sensitivity" of the information.

3.

·Assess the sufficiency of policies, procedures, customer
information systems and other arrangements to control risks.

Manage and Control Risk

1.

Prepare a comprehensive 'NTitten information security program
("ISP") designed to control the identified risks. The ISP should be
appropriate to the complexity of the institution and the nature and
scope of its activities. The ISP should include, as appropriate,
certain elements, listed in their entirety in Attachment A.
Examples of practices to be considered are: encryption, dual
control, employee background checks and monitoring systems.
Whether a particular risk control element is appropriate \vill
depend on the institution' s assessm~nt of the sensitiv·ity of the
customer information involved and the complexity of the
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institution's activities. For example, account numbers may be
deemed more sensitive than addresses. Housing information on
internet accessible systems may pose greater risk than keeping
paper records locked in a file dra\ver.

r

r
r

2.

Train statTto implement the ISP.

3.

Test the key controls, systems and procedures. The type and
frequency of tests will depend on the risk assessment. Test results
may be reviewed by internal stafT so long as the reviewers are
independent of persons developing or maintaining the ISP,
including management of the information security systems.
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r

c.

The Guidelines include in the definition of "service provider" "any person
or entity that maintains, processes, or is otherwise permitted access to
customer information through its provisions of services directly to the
financial institution." The Agencies acknowledge that the level of
oversight of the variety of persons and entities that provide services to a
financial institution will depend on the institution's analysis of the risks
posed by disclosure of customer information to each such provider. While
part of the due diligence process in selecting a service provider should
include detennining whether the service provider has adequate controls to
ensure that a subservicer will protect customer information in accordance
with the Guidelines, a financial institution is not obligated to have a
contract with the subservi.cer or supervise its activities. The elements in
overseeing service provider arrangements are:

r

r
r
r

r
r
r
r
r
r

r
r

Oversee Service Provider Arrangements

1.

Exercise due diligence in selecting service providers.

2.

Require service providers by contract to implement appropriate
measures designed to meet the objectives of the Guidelines (see,
Section I). Contracts signed prior to thirty days after publication of
the Guidelines need not be amended until July 1, 2003.

3.

D.

Depending on the institution's assessment of the risk presented by
. the service provider, review, as appropriate, audits, test results or
other equivalent evaluations (e.g., SAS 70 reports) of the service
provider.

Adjust the Program
Adjust the ISP in light offactors such as, ~hanges in technology, the
of customer information, and the institution"' s changing
business arrangements, .for e?,ample,.mergers,acquisitions, alliances and

s~nsitivity
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joint ventures, ou~sourcing arrangements and changes to customer
information systems.
E.

Involve the Board of Directors
1.

A financial institution's board of directors, or an appropriate board
committee, must approve the ISP. If the ISP is prepared at the
holding company level, each regulated institution's board (or
designated board committee) must determine the appropriateness
of the ISP for that institution.

2.

Each board (or designated board committee) must "oversee" the
implementation and maintenance of the ISP and, accordingly, must
receive at least annually a report on the institution's compliance
with the Guidelines. The report should discuss matters such as,
risk assessment, risk management, and control decisions, service
provider arrangements, test results, security breaches or violations,
management responses and recommendations for change.

C·30
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ATTACHl\lENT A

Elements of a Securit), Progranl

1.

Access controls on customer information systems, including controls to
authenticate and permit access only to authorized individuals and controls to
prevent employees from providing customer information to unauthorized
individuals \vho may seek to obtain this information through fraudulent means;

2.

Access restrictions at physical locations containing customer information, such as
buildings, computer facilities, and records storage facilities to permit access only
to authorized individuals;

3.

Encryption of electronic customer information, including while in transit or in
storage on networks or systems to which unauthorized individuals may have
access;

4.

r

Procedures designed to ensure that customer information system modifications
are consistent with the bank's information security program;

5.

r

Dual control procedures segregation of duties, and employee background checks
for employees with responsibilities for or access to customer information;

6.

r

Monitoring systems and procedures to detect actual and attempted attacks on or
intrus~ons into customer information systems;

7.

Response programs that specify actions to be taken when the bank suspects or
detects that unauthorized individuals have gained access to customer information
systems, including appropriate reports to regulatory and law enforcement
agencies; and

8.

Measures to protect against destruction, loss, or damage of customer information
due to potential environmental hazards, such as fire and water damage or,
technological failures.

r

r
r
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SOl\lE SUGGESTED CONFIDENTL~LIITPRO\'ISIONS FOR THIRD PARTY
JOINT l\'IARKETING OR SERVICE AGREEr\'IENTS

Section

_e

Confidentiality of Customer Information

1. Company agrees that all information about individuals provided by Bank to

Company, including but not limited to names, addresses, telephone numbers, account
numbers, customer lists, and demographic, financial and transaction information
("Customer Information"), shall be deemed confidential and proprietary to Bank.
Company shall not use the Customer Information for any purpose other than as
required for the performance of Company's obligations under this Agreement, and
Company shall not duplicate or incorporate the Customer Information into its own
records or databases.
2. Company agrees that any dissemination of the Customer Information within

Company's own business entities shall be on a "need to know" basis for the sole
purpose of the perfonnance of Company's obligations hereunder.
3. Company shall not disclose the Customer Information to any third party, including an
affiliate of Company or a pennitted subcontractor, Vlithout prior written consent of
Bank and the written agreement of such third party to be bound by the tenns of this
Section
Unless otherwise prohibited by law, Company shall (i) immediately
notify Bank of any legal process served on Company for the purpose of obtaining
Customer Information and (ii) permit Bank adequate time to exercise its legal options
to prohibit or limit disclosure.
_e

4. Company shall establish and maintain policies and procedures designed to insure the

confidentiality, integrity, and security of the Customer Information.
5. Not later than the earlier of thirty (30) days following tennination of this Agreement
or thirty days following the completion of a project for which the Customer
Information has been provided, Company shall at the Bank's discretion either (i)
return the Customer Information to Bank or (ii) certify in writing to the Bank that
such Customer Information has been destroyed. .,
6. Company shall notify Bank promptly upon the discovery of the loss, unauthorized
disclosure or unauthorized use of the Customer Information.
7. Company shall permit Bank to audit Company's compliance with the provisions of

this Section _ . at any time during Company's regular business hours.
8. In addition to any other rights Bank may have under this Agreement or in law, since
unauthorized use or disclosure of the Customer Information, may result in im.mediatc
and irreparable injury to Bank fO'r which monetary damages may not be adequate, in
the event

C·32
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Company or any officer, director, employee, agent or subcontractor of Company uses
or discloses or in Bank's sole opinion, any such party is likely to use or disclose the
Customer Information in breach of Company's obligations under this Agreement,
Bank shall be entitled to equitable relie( including temporary and permanent
injunctive relief and specific performance. Bank shall also be entitled to the recovery
of any pecuniary gain realized by Company from the unauthorized use or disclosure
of the Customer Information.
9. The provisions of this Section

_ 0

shall survive the termination of this Agreement.
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PRIVACY OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL INFORJ\'lATION
FIL-3-200 I
January 22, 200 I

TO:

CI-I1EF EXECUTIVE OFFICEI~ AND COMPLIANCE OFFICER

SUBJECT:

FDIC Creales Privacy I?ule Handhook 10 Assist Banks IVil" COll1pliance

The ~tt~ch~d Priva~v Rule Handhook \VUS produced hy tht: F~dcral Dc:posil In:,urancc Corporation (FDIC) (0 help
financial institutions comply \vith the tinal rul~ go\'erning the privacy of consunlcr tinanciul infornlLltion and
implement cn~ctiv~ consumer privacy policies.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) cstublished ne\v r~quircments tor financial in$titutio~s to pro\'id~
ne\\' privacy protections to consumers. Sp~cific3I1y. l·itle V of GLBA r~quir~s a financial institution to issue: privacy
notir.es and provide consumers \vilh an oppoI1unity to opt out of certain types of information sh3ring. The FDrC
developed and adopted a final regulation \vith other financial institution re:gulators to imph:m~nt the OLBA privacy
pr9visiof]s. The FDIC's rule, 12 C.F.R. Part 332, \vas distributed to FDIC-supervised banks \vith Financiallnstitution
Letter (FIL) 34-2000. dated June 5. '2000.
Although the privacy rulc's effective date is November 13. 2000, compliance is not mandatory until July 1, 200 1.
Mandatory compliance \vas e~1ended in the final rule ,to provide: banks \vith sufficient time to develop the necessary
notices and procedures to implement the rule. It i.s impcrativc that bank.~ usc this interim period to dC"elop a
privac)' compliance strateg)' to achic\'c full compliance b)' Jul)' 1, 200 l.

This HG",dbook is designed to help banks prepare for the July 1. 2001, deadline. First, the Handbook explains the
basic requirements of the privacy rule. Second, the Handbook provides suggestions for implc:menting the
rt=quirements of the privacy rulc to meet the July 1 deadline. Third, the flal1dbook suggests activities to nlonitor and
maintain compliance over time:. Finally, the Handbook describes in greater detail key terminology in the rule and
provides other helpful resources.

The P~;vacy Rille Handbook docs not impose any nc\\' requir~ments on banks. Rath~r, it provides a summary of the
rule:ts requirements and suggc:~tions to help banks develop and implement ctlt:ctivc consumer privacy policies and
proc~durt:s. l·hc Ilandbook us~s thc term "bank" to mt.:an thos~ financial institutions that must comply \vith Part 332.
For more information about the privacy rule, please contact the FDIC regional onic~ responsible for supcr\'isi~g your
bank, or call Ken Baebel. Assistant Director in the Division of Compliance and Consunlcr Affairs, on (202)
942-3086.

c3n~

Stcpht:n M. Cross
I)ircctor
Attachmt:nt: Privacy Rille Ilanl/h()ok
Distribution: FDIC-Supcrvised Banks (Commercial and Savings)

NOTE: Paper copies of FDIC financial institution Ic:ttcrs may he obtained through tht.: FDIC's Public Infom1:ltion
Ccnt~r, 80 I J 7th Stre~l, N\V, Room 100, \\'ashingtun, 'DC 2043.1 (800-276-6003 or 202-416-(940).
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Section One:

Overview of privacy rule requirements
Th~

privacy rut<.: governs \vhen and ho\v banks may shure nonpublic personal infonnation about consumers \\'ith
nonatliliated third parties.

Tht: rule cmbodi~s t\VO principles-notice and opt out. In sumnlar)':
• All banks must develop initial and annual privacy notices. l'he notices nlust describe in general tc=nn:\ the
bank's information sharing practicc.:s.

• Banks that share nonpubIic personal information about consumers \\'ith nonafiiliuted third partics (outside of
opt out exceptions delint:atcd in the privacy rule) must also provide consumers \\'ith:
o an opt out notice
o a reasonable period of time tor the consumer to opt out

Exceptions to opt out: A conswner cannot opt out of all infonnation sharing. First, the privacy rule does not govern
infonnation sharing among affiliated parties. Second, the rule contains exceptions to a11o\'/ transfers of nonpublic
p~rsc:-l~! infonnation to unaffiliated parties to process and service a consumer's transaction, and to facilitate other
normal business transactions. For example, consumers cannot opt out "'hen nonpublic personal infonnation is shared
\\'ith a nonaffiliated third party to:
•
•
•
•
•
•

market the bank's O\VJ1 financial products or services
market financial products or services on'cred by the bank and another financial institution (joint marketing)
process and service transactions the consumer requests or authorizes
protect against potential fraud or unauthorized transactions
respond to judicial process
comply \vith federal, state, or local legal requirements

Prohihition on sharing account numbers: Th~ privacy rul~ prohihitsa ban.k from disclosing nn account number or
access code for credit card, dt:posit or transaction accounts 10 any nonalliJiatcd third party for us~ in marketing. l'ht:
rule contains t\liO narrQ\\' exceptiof)s to this general prohibition. A bank n~ay' share account nunlbcrs in conjunction
\\"ith marketing its 0\\',0' prod~cts as long as the service provider js nOl3uthorized to directly initia"tc charg.es to the
accounts. r\ bank ma·y also disclos'e ate"ount numbers to n participant in n privafc labet or affinity credit card program
\\'hcn th~ participants are identified to the customer. An account number docs not includc it nunlh.cr or codc in
encr)'pted form a~ long a~ the bank docs not al~o pro"idc a mean~ to decode the number.
9
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Limits on reuse antI redisc/()sure: The privacy rule limits reuse and redisclo5ure of nonpublic personal infonnation
recei\~ed from a nonafiiliated financial institution or di5clo::;ed to a nunaniliah:u third party. The specitic limitations
dt:pc:nd on \vhethc:r the intonnntion \vas received pursuant to or outside.: of th~ notic~ and opt out exceptions.
Stale law: A provision undc:r a State la\\" that provides grt:ah:r consumer protectiun than pruvided under the GLEA
privacy provisions \\'illsupcrcc:dc the Federal privucy rul~. The bank \\'ill be obliguted to comply \vith the provisions
of that State 13\'/ to the extent those provisions provide greater consumcr protcction than the Ft:deral privacy rul~. l·he
Federal Trade Conunission detcnnines \vhethcr a particular State.: la\v provides gn:atcr protection.

Content ofnotices: Thc initial, annual, nnd

r

r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
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revis~d

notict:s include, as applicable:

• categorie~ of information a bank collect.! (all banks)
• categories of information a bank mil)' disclo~c (all banks, except a bank that does not intend to makc any
disclosures or only makes disclosures under the exceptions may simply state that)
• categories of affiliates and nonaffiliates to "'hom a bank discloses nonpuhlic (lcrsonal information (all
banks sharing nonpublic personal infonnalion v.'ith an atliliate or with a nonafliliat~d third party)
.... information sharing practices about formcr customcrs (all banks)
• categories of information disclosed under the sen'ice provider/joint marketing exception (only those
banks relying on this exception)
• consumer's right to opt out (only those banks that disclose outside of exceptions)
• duclosures made under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (only those banks providing the FCRA opt out

notice)
• disclosures about confidentialit)' and securit)' of information (all banks)

A

re\,js~d

notice may be requirc:d \vhen a bank changes its information sharing practices.

The follo",ing table reflects the rulc:'s requirements for delivering initial, annual, and reviscd notices to consumers and
customers.
~rype of nome

WhD geb it

Deliva",

.·

• f'O

w.~~ ~~ (A.I~~')~(

r

r

f.. I(;=icMJ~ip

:$

&.1l4bli,hed

• only if ~o

b:s,,~ :'r,t.~il ~ s:':2nt
~~"'P(Jt.~~ rs"~~')~('J; :~~IS,:,.~i~1\
~hn .." !h. ~nJ')~r ~,,~h (1

Ivttwa! ~QCY notic.

ion ~r.L:.

• ~t 10.:'" :or-I:'" in n''')' ~i.::ad :-1
~~ w;s;1i..... ~~.,,,~I,.. w!..~~ t:'et

~ ovl•..d

• Lcf'.o.r. ~~ b<,nk ~..,,~) ·"r.·"·f"Jt,i:.;

pt'i¥acy C'O'tKc.

1?

r:~r'l,~l i.,lo-;~!~e·~ i~ (')
.~~r~ i~l ~~
tr..:td :'ec"tn! :'W".i:C"'A &llr~".d ~

!t;.1~ ~pr-l-::t~"l

f'r)('J1":'\4W'

",,.=

f~.... t;·.Uf~t ~·r ~(\rl,,;~r

r

r

lat.r than .wly 1, '200 1

Opt Out Notice

Thc. JinaJ rule provides that no opt out notice is 41d~qu~tc if it:
• identifies all th~~alegoric:sofnonpublic per.sonal information!h¢ bank intcnds 10 disclost: to nona11ilintcd third
partic=s
• states the consumer can opt out of th~ di$clO$ur~
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• provides a reasonable method for
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consumer to opt out, such as a toll-free telephone nun1ber

The table belo\\' summarizes the rule's requirements for delivering an opt out notice.
Type of notice

.

DerIVe'"

Who get5 it

The opt out right: [f a bunk intends to share nonpublic pc=rsonul infonnation outside the.: ~:\ccptions, it must also:

• provide consumers v.. ith a reasonahle opportunit)' to opt out. Examples in the priv3CY rule give consumers
30 days to respond to the Opl out nOlice \\'hc:n the.: bank delivers the notic~ by mail or clectronically
• campi)· \vith a consumer's opt out din.:ction as ~oon as rcasonahl)' practicahle \\'hen the direction is received
after the initial opt out period elapses
• compl)· \vilh the opt out direction until rcvoked in \\Titing by the conswner
Delivering notices: Thc initial, annual, revised, and opt out notices may be dc:li\'er~d in \\Titing or, if the consumer
agrees, electronically. An oral dc:scription of th~ notice is not suflicient.

Section Two
Get Ready for July 1 200 I
J

A bank's strategy for achie\ing full compliance by July I, 200 I, \\ill vary depending on the complexity of the bank nnd
the progress it has already made in complying \\ith the requirements of the rule. The level of etlert a bank will eXl'end
depends in large part on:
• the bank's previous efforts to assess or disclose information sharing practices
• the bank's decisions about sharing nonpublic personal information after July I, 2001
• the volumc. if any. of consumers and customers \vho must receive an opportunity to opt out before infonnation
sharing with nonaffiliated third parties can take place.
Nearly all banks. ho\vevcr, can take the follo\\'ing four steps to create a comprehensive and effective privacy
complinnce strategy:
• establish a timelinc for complinnce
• develop privacy policies and notices
• de1ivt..~ notices
• prepare to respond to conswncrs
I. E~tabli~h a timcline for compliance

A timeline designating inlportant checkpoints prior to July I, 2001, is a good place to start and can be instrumental to
ensuring timely compliance.

A bank may want to estabrash timeframes to:
A s.~ ~s o.;,...e·:l~ ."fcrnt-o:i::,n
~bo:,,~,,~ s:t'X!io~

_
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A specific process for certifying completion of the variolls steps idc.:ntitit:d in the bank's privacy compliance strategy
\\-ill help managcrs keep track of progress. \Vhcn establishing due dates for sp~citic activities, build in time to receive
input and f~edback trom ~enior n1anagement and other stakeholders. Evcry bank should considcr:
• In\"oh·ing the Board of Directors: A board-approved privacy policy is nol requirt:d by the rule. but it can be
un etlcctive \\'ay to involve the board of directors in developing a privacy compliance stratc.:gy. A

board-sanctioned privacy policy can bc useful in communicating thl: bank's ovcrall privacy commitnlt:nt and
stratt=gy to the entire organization.
• Involving rcprcsenlati"cs from each hank department: Mosllikely a scnior bank onicer \\'ill oversee
dcvelopment and implementation of the pri vacy compliance strategy. Ncvertheless, participation from each
department in the bank \vill help ensure nothing is ov~rlooked. This approach \vill also help policy mak~rs
identify information sharing practices or consumer privacy issuc5 unique to a specific department or to a
financial product or service.
2. Dc\'clop privac)' policies and notices
Usc this opportunity to cvaluate and establish institutional privacy objt:Clivcs, and communicatc to potcntial customers
Jnd consumers the bank's customer service philosophy.

• Create a comprehensive invc:ntory of information collection and information sharing practices at the bank. The
inventory \vill help ensure practic~s are properly disclos~d in the bank's privacy notices. For every dc.:partn1enl,
r~vie\v:

•
.•
•
•
•

all applications and fonns us~d to collect infonnation about consumers
Hlarkcting practices
vendor contracts
electronic banking and Internet activities
fee income accounts
record retention policies

r
r

r

r
r
r
r

r
r
r

• Assess curr~nt information collection and information sharing practices in light of the privacy rule
obligations and the bank's objectives. Determine \vhich praclicc5 should continue aftcr July I, 200 I. This may
be a good time to involve the bank's Board of Directors_ Consider:
o \vhethcr any current practices \"'ould bc prohibited under the rulc
o \vhich practices must be disclosed in the privacy notices nnd \\'hether opt out rights apply
o v:hethcr account numbers arc shared only as pcnnitted by the rule
o \vht:ther infonnation reccived from other financial institutions is shared only as permitted by the rule's
reuse and redisclosun: limitations
o whether to adopt voluntary privacy standards developed by relevant trade a~sociations. Those
standards could b~ good indicators of industI)' norms nnd consurnt:r expectations
• Draft privQcy "otice(~1. Create a list of information collection and infonnation sharing practices that must be:
disclosed to consumers. This list can help you categorize practiccs per the: rule requirements and dt:cidl: ho\\' to
structure notices. The privacy rule provides a varicty of disclosure options. For cxamplc, hanks may dcvelop:
o one initial privacy notice that covers all the information sharing practices of the bank
o an assortment of initial notices for dincrt:nt customer relationships or din~n:nt types of financial
products or services
o onc initial notice that covcrs thc practices of thc bank along \vith onc or morc of its aOiliales Likc\visc,
the.: opt out notice:: may be structurc:d in a varicty of \vays.
\Vhen drafting pri\"ac)" notices, consider:

• Sample clausc~ provided in Appendix A in the rule. Banks 'may usc
accuratc:ly retlect the bank'~ practicc:s.
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• Fair Credit Reporting Act requirements Clnu informcttion securit~, stanuards. The federal banking
agencies hnv~ issued t\\"o proposed rules that may ul1\:ct th~ conlplianc~ strategy und Ih~ contc.:nt of privacy
notic~s.

Th~

Proposed Security Standards/or Custo",er InjornlQlion dcscrib~ the agcncies' expectations for implementing
and physical safeguards to protect customer infonnution. 7-he Proposed Fair Credit Reporting Regulations
cover the opt out provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
t~chnicat

Both proposals \vill be finalized in the ncar future. When issued. the tinal rules \vill be available on the FDIC's Web
site: \V\\'\\·.fdic.gov. In the meantimc, the proposals arc postc:d on the.: \Vcb site.:.
3. Dclh'cr noticcs

• Idc:ntify consume:rs and custonlers \\'ho must r~cci\'e the initial und opt out notices. It is inlportant to ide.:ntify all
groups of cxistint; customers, consumcrs, and ronn~r customt:rs \\'ho must get the initinl privncy notice and opt
out notification. Some banks may need to coordinate: st:veral databascs and a varict)' of departments to identity
everyone \\'ho must receive a notice.

• Estahlish time/Tames/or mailing or ot1terwis~ delivering notices. Remember:
o All existing bank customers must rcccive an initial pri\'8C)' notice no later than Jul)' 1,2001.
o Existing bank customer" consumers "'ho arc not customers, and formcr bank customcrs have
thc right to opt out if the bank is sharing nonpublic personal information about them 'J.;th nonaffiliated
third parties outside the exceptions.
o lnfonnation sharing subject to opt out cannOl continue after July I, 200 I, untillhe initial and opt out
notices are delivered and a reasonable opt out period has elapsed. Therefore, bonks that inlt:nd to share
nonpublic personal infonnation outsidc thc exception:; after July I, 200 I should deliver notices \\'cll
beforc July I.

·t Prc(larc to rC5Jlond to consumcrs
• Develop opt out procedures. All banks sharing nonpublic personal infonnation outside of the exceptions \vill
need to develop procedures for consumers 10 exercise an opt out, as \,'ell os procedures for proc~$sing and
complying \vith opt out directions. The opt out procedures should include:
o tracking the initial opt out opportunity (e.g., the first 30 days atlcr thc initial notice is delivered)
o recording opt outs reccivcd Irom consumers
o maintaining the opt out nlcchanism(s), such as n toll-fn:e telephone: number, electronic mail. or an opt
out fonn \\'ith boxcs to check
o complying \vith opt out dirc:ctions rcceived ofier the initial opt out opportunity clap~~s
• Respont/ to public inquiries. Customer sen'icc: represt:ntativcs and other bank employees should be prc:parcd
to ans\\'cr qu~stion$ from consumers about the nc\\' privacy notices. Depending on the numbcr of employees
ans\\'cnng consumer phone calls, it nlay be a good idea to provide scripts to help enlplo)'ccs respond to
questions from the public. In addition, it may be helpful to havc extra copies of the privacy notice readily
'-1vaiJable for mailing or handing out to consunlcrs.

Section Three:

Maintaining Compliance Beyond
July 1,2001
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• Develop controls to monitor ongoing compliance. Considc:r mcchanisrns for monitoring:
o dcli\'cry of initial and annual notices to customt:rs
o dc:livcry of initial notice to consunlers \"ho are not customers, if applicahh;
o conlpliance \vith opt out directions, if upplicabl~
o uccuracy of privacy notices. including prior arrrovallor:
• n~\\' nlurketing arrangements
• n~\v or renc\'w'cd vendor contracts
• disclosure of account numbcrs
• affiliate-referral prOb'fams
• reuse of consumer information received from anoth~r financial institution
• Train employees. All employees should understand the: bank's policies and procedures for conlplying \vith th~
privacy rule. Some employees \vill need to be able to e:xplain the bank's privacy policies to customers and to
businc:sses providing services to the bank.
• .~udit for compliance. Periodic audits \vill help management asst:ss risk and vcril)' the en\:ctiven~ss of the
complianc~ program. "rhe Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) \vill n:least: intt:ragency
privacy examination procedures b~rore July I. 200 I. Th~ ~xam proccdur~s \vill be H ust:fullool in dcveloping
a privacy audit progranl.

r

r
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follo\ving activities can h~lp a bank achiev~ and maintain compliance \\'ith the privacy rule.

The interagency exam procedures \"ill be: mailed din:ctly to insured dt:pository institutions as soon as they are
lin~lizcd. The procedures \vill also be available on the FDIC's Web site at \V\\"\\'.fdic.gov \vhc:n complete.

Section Four:
Learn the Lingo

Leaming the lingo \\ill help you understand and comply v,ith the privacy rule. This section provides an ex-planation of
key It..-rrnino 10gy.
Who mU5t compl)' \\'ith the FDIC's pri\'llc)' rule?

The: FDIC's privacy rule refers to financial institutions that must comply \vith th~ rule as "you." For example, \",hen the
rule states that "you must provide a notice" it means all entities subject to this rule must provide a notice. The
following definition of "you" explains the types of entities subject to the rule:
You: The banks that must comply \\Oith the FDIC's rule nrc·
(I) FDIC-supervised banks
(2) insured slate branches of foreign banks

(3) subsidiaries of FDIC-supervised banks and insured state branches of foreign banks, \vith certain exceptions. such
as insurance and securities or brokerage subsidiaries

Allhough the FDIC's rule only applies to certain banks and some of lh~ir suhsidiuri~s, ull tinJncial institutions must
comply \\"ith similar priv~cy rules adopted by their ~urervisory agencies. For example, u1though s~curitic:s subsidiaries
of FD(C-super\'is~dbanks do not have to comply \\'ith the FDIC's privacy rule, thl:Y do ha\'e to conlply \vilh a sinlilar
pri vacy rule adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
\Vho

i~

protected b)' the pri\"ac)' rule?

The privacy rule protects "consumt:rs." All con~unlcrs receivc thc same pri,"a~)' protecti()n~.
lio\\"c\'cr. a subset of consumers dclin~d as customers must n:Gt:ivc certain disclosures, ~uch as nn onnuaf pri\Oacy
.notice. th;lt need not be: provi~:it:d to conswncrs \\"ho are not c~slomc.:r.s.
Thus, it is important to kru,)\\' the distinction bet\vcen consumers and custom~rs to und~rst3nd the di tlt~n:nl disclosure
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requirements under the privacy rule.
Consumer: Any individual \\"ho is seeking to obtain or has obtained a tinancial product or service fronl a bank for
personal, family, or household purposes is a consum~r of that bunk. The d~linition of consum~r includes individuals
\\'ho:

for a financial product or st:rvice (~.g., a loan or a deposit account) for pt:rsonal, fanlily, or houst:hold
purposes
• actually obtain a financial product or s~rvice (c.g., a loun or a deposit account) for personal, fanlily, or
household purposes
•

appl~'

Customer: As the: follo\ving diagram reflects. customers nre a subset of consumers. A cU5tomer is a consumer \vith
\vhom a bank has a continuing relationship. Although th~ rule does not d~line "continuing relationship," it provides
t:~umpl~5 of transactions that are and are not considered continuing relationships. Consumc:rs \vho have a deposit
account, obtain a loan, or obtain 'In investment advisory sc:r\'icc art: con$idc:rcd customers. Sec Section 332.3(i).

Additional guidance regarding the: customer re:lationship can be: found in the Supplemental Infonnation (the preamble:)
of the rule. ".ruch notes that a continuing relationship is established "\vhere a consumer typically \\'ould receive some
measure: of continued service following, or in connection \~ith, a transaction." See page 35168, Federal Register, Vol.
65, No. 106.
'
The ncxt diagram depicts the relationship bcrn'cen all indh'iduals "'ho do business with a bank and those who
meet the regulatory definitions for consumcrs and customers. As the diagram sho\vs, only a portion of the individuals
~'ho conduct business with a bank are consumers under the privacy rule. For example, individuals are not considered
consumers under this rule if they arc commercial clients, grantors or beneficiaries of trusts for \\'hich the bank is
trustee, or participants in an employee benefit plan that tht: banks sponsors.

What type of infonnation is protected by the privacy rulc? The rule identifies three primary categories of infonnation:
• publicly available infonnation
• personally idc:ntili3ble financial infomlation
• nonpublic personal infonnation
Nonpub/ic personal infornlation is the categor)' of information protected h)· the pri\'ac)' rule. The definitions for
publicly available infonnation and personally idcntifiable: financial intonnation \'.'ork tog~lher to d~scribe and dctine
nonpublic personal infonnation.
• Publicly available information is any infonnation a bank rc:usonably h~li~\'e:s is lu\\-fully puhlicly availabl~.
The nature of the infonnation. not the sou rcc of the informatiQn. dClcnnines \\'hclhcr it is publicly available:
infonnation tor purposes o[~c privacy rule. For example" c\'cn if~ hank qbtains customers' le:h:phonc
numbers or the asscs....;ed value of their residences directly from the consumers. this informntion \\'ill be
considered publicly 3vailable ifthe"bank has- a rcason3blc b3$ls to believe the infonnation could h~vc been
13\\fully obtained from a public source. A reasonable: bclief cxists if a bunk has dctcnnincd th3t (3) the
i:1.fonnation is of the type: that is generally avnilabl~ [0 the public and (b) the individual has not blocked such
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information from public disclosure. This mt:ans. for example, that a bank can consider a customer's phone
nwnbcr to be publicly available, but onl)· if the bank lakes steps to dctc:nnine the phone number is not
unlisted.
• PersonaLJ>' identifiablefinancial ;n!ornlat;on is any infonnation a bank collects about a consumer in
conjunction \vith providing a financial product or s~rvicc. This includ~s:
o information provided by th~ consumer during the application proct:ss (e.g., nJnlC. phone nunlber,
address, incom~)
o inJonnation resulting from the financial product or service transaction (e.g., pU)"lnent history, loan or
deposit balances, credit card purchases)
o infonnation from other sources about the consumer obtained in connection \'lith providing the financial
product or service (e.g.. infonnation from a consumer credit report or from court records)
Persona/(v identifiable financial inforl1lation nlso includes nny infonnation that "is disclosed in 3 manner that
indical~S Lhat the individual is or has bcen your consumer." s~~ Section 3J2.J(o)(2)(i)(D). Thus, the vcr)· fact that
an individual i~ a con!umer of a bank is personally identifiable financial information.

• Nonpuhlic personal information, the catt:gory ofinfonnntion protected by the privacy rule, consists of:

I. Personally identilinble financial inlonnation that is not publicly available

intornlation~

and

2. Lists, descriptions, or other groupings of consumers thnt \\'cre either
a. created using personally identifiable financial infonnation that is not publicly nvailable
infonnation, or
b. contain personally idc:ntifiable financial inlonnation that is not publicly available infonnation.
A list is considered nonpublic personal information if it is generated based on customer relationships, loan balances.
or other personally identifiable tinancial infonnation that is not publicly available. A list is also considered nonpublic
personal information if it contains any nonpublic personal information.
For example, in jwisdictions Y:here mortgage documents are public records, the names and address of all individuals
for "'hom a bank held a mortgage would not be nonpublic personal information since it was generated using publicly
available information and contained only publicly available infonnation. The list "'ould become nonpublic personal
infonnation.. however, if it contained current loan balanccs or if it \\"as generated using only those customers v,ith
current mortgage loan balances in excess of a certnin amOlUlt.
Thc t\'10 categories of nonpublic personal infonnation arc depicted in the foIlo\\ing diagram.

r
r

r
r
r

r

r

\Vhc are nonaffiliated third parties?

The pri vac)' rule restricts information sharing \vilh nonatliliated third parti~s. The.: rul~ defines nonanili3t~d third
partics as persons or entities except afliliates and persons jointly employcd by a bank nnd a nonafiiliuted third party.
Affiliates generally include n bank's subsidiaries, ils holding company. and any oth~r subsidiari~s of the holding
company. See Section 332.3(3), Section 332.3(d), nnd Section 332.3(g).
The priV:lc)' rule does not impose limitations on infonnation snaring \vith afiiliatcs. It docs, ho\\'cvcr, require
disclosure of such information sharing policics and practices. (Note: The rules go\"cmin·g thc sharing. of infonnation
b~t\\'c:cn a bank and its atliliatcs are set fonh in the Fair Credit Reporting Act.)
-

.

J\lthough the privacy ~le m05t commonly uses th~ term "nonaflili:lled third p:1I1i~$," ~crc ar~ somt: .instances in \\·hich
a distinction is mndc·bct"'ct:n nonalliliatc:d financial institutions and all othcr nonutliltnted lturd partlcs. Readcrs
should pay particular att~ntion to these distinctions. Sc:e Section 332.13.
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Other Resources

A variety of resources are available to help banks understand the privacy rule and related issues. Some of the most
significant are listed belo\\'. All FDIC material can be found at \\\\\\'.fdic.QOv.

FDIC Financial Institution Letter titl~d Final Rule on the Pri,,'acy ofConsunlers' Financiallnfornlation,
(FIL-34-2000 dated June S, 2000).

FDIC Financial Institution Letter titled Proposed Regulations Implementing the·Fair Credit Reporting Act,
(FIL-71-2000 dated October 26, 2000).

...

FDIC Financial Institution Letter titled Proposed Security Standards/or Cuslonler In/ormation, (FIL-43-2000
dated July 6, 2000).
FDIC Financial Institution Letter titl~d Internet JVeb Site
1999).

Pri~'ac.y Survey

Report, (FIL-II 3·99 dated

D~c~mbcr

27,

FDIC Financial Institution Lelter titled Online Privacj' o/Consumer Financial In/ormation. (FIL·86-98 dated
August 17. 1998).

Transcript of "Is /t Any of Your Business? Consumer Information, Privacy, anti the Financial Services
Industry," an interagency public forum hosted by the FDIC. March 23. 2000.
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's Bulletin titled Privacy La\\'s and Regulations. (September 8, 2000)
available at \\'ww.occ.treas.gov.
Office of Thrift Supervision's Memorandum to Chief Executive Officers titled Privacy Preparedness Check-up.
(Seplt:mber 29, 2000) available at W\\"\v.ots.treas.gov.
communications.1;rdie.gov
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New Rights to Privacy: You Navv Hold the Key to How Mucll Infonnation
Financial Institutions Can Share

r

You'll be able to limit the personal information that
banks and other financial institutions provide to
other companies. Here's help for )OOU in deciding
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n'hat's best.

\Vntch your mail. You'll soon be receiving an important
message from your bank and other financial institutions
you've: had dc:alings \vith ov~r the years, It's a notice
explaining that you, for the first time. can decide whether
certain infonnation these institutions have about you can
be shared \vith or sold to other companies that arc: not part
of the same parent organization.
The federal Gramm-Leach-Sliley Act of 1999 created this
ne\v opportunity for you as a way to balance your right to
privacy with fmancial institutions' need to share
infonnation for nonnal business purposes. Some
conswners don't object to infonnation sharing-they \,,'ant
-their names on mailing and telephone lists so they can
easily find out about new products and services, But other
consumers want fewer solicitations and more privacy. Ifyou're in the latter category, you have some important ne\v
responsibilities ifyou want to take advantage ofyour.nc\v rights. "You need to be observant," says Ken Baebel,
Assistant Director of the FDIC's Division of Compliance and Consumer Aflairs. "You need to look for these notices,
v.hich may come 8S part of a monthly statement or as a separate mailing. You also need to understand whether an
institution intends to share personal infonnation "'ith other companies and, if so, \vhat you can do to prevent
infonnation sharing, if that's \\'hat you want. Otherwise, it will be up to the institution to decide who gets details about
you and your finances."
You can expect to receive a lot ofthesc notices in the coming months because the nc\\' la\v applies to many types of
financial institutions. The la\v covers banks, savings and loans, credit unions, insurance companies and securities
finns, It evcn includes some retailers and automobile dealers that collect and share personal infonnation about
consumers to "Ohom they e:\1end or arrange: credit. Also, \vhile the rulcs from the FDIC and other federal agencies say
these notices to consumers must be accurate, clear and conspicuous, \vc: knO\V therc's a lot to consid~r before you
decide \vhat's best for you. That's \vhy FDIC Consumer Nell'S has developed the follo\\1ng qucstion-and-ans\vcr
fonnat to help )'ouundcrstand your ne\v rights to tin(lJ1cial privacy and \vhat you need to do to cx~rcise those rights.

\Vhat kinds of pcrsonal information do financial
collect and sharc ,'.ith other bu~ine5se~·!

in~titutions

·--"fore
r

-to --Stop Un,,'anfcd

\Va,'~

Solicitation~

Many linancinl institutions collect infonnation nbout their customers 3S a regular part of their business of providing
products or services_ Examples: When you apply for ~ 103n. you providt: your n3Inc. phone number, addrc~s, income,
and details about your assets. Whc:n the institution is considering your application, it m3Y coHeet additional details
from other sources, such as credit reports prepared by credit bureaus, And a$ you usc ~ t1nancial product-a credit
-:ard, for example-your institution \\'ill have a r~~ord ofho\\' much you buy and borro\v, \vherc you like to shop,pnd
\\'hcthcr you repay your bal~nce on time. Some (but not all) financial institution~ share this infonnation \\'ith other
cntitics-:-including 'completely unaffiliated- companies such as retailers, tcl.cmarkclcrs, 3irlincs and non-profit
-org~izations-to helpthcm target consumers \\'ho might b~·tntcrt..~tcd in th~ir -products or programs.
!-Io\\'docs thc Gramm-Lcach-Blilc)' Act protect m)' financial pri\'ac)'?
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First, the ne\\·la\\· requires each tinancial institution to tell it~ customers about the kinds of infonnation it coll~cts and
the types ofbusinc:sses that may be provided that infonnation. This di=,clo$llr~~ called the privacy notic~~ is intt:ndt:d
to help you dt:cide \\'hether you ar~ comfortable \\"ith that intormation-sharing arrangement. l·ht: notic~ has to b~
mailed 10 you by July I, 200 I, by any institution \\'hcrc= you already have nn account. [f you op~n an account \veith a
dillerernt institution after July I, you nlust be: gi\·c:n a copy of the privacy notic~ at that tirn~. Finuncial institutions also
are reqwrc:d to send a privncy notice to customers once a y~ar.
Second" the la\v says that if your financial institution intends to share your inlonnation \vith anyone outside its
corporate family, it also must give you the chance to "opt out" or say "no" to information sharing under c~rtain
circumstances. Even consumers "tho are not technically customers of a financial institution-such as foroler
customers or people \vho unsuccessfully applied for a loan or credit card-\\'ill have the right to opt out of
inJonnation sharing \\'ith outside companies.
-rhird, the la\\' requires that financial institutions dc:scribc ho\v thcy \vill
your intonnalion.

prOl~ct

tht: contidcntiality and security of

\Vhcn I receive a privac)' notice, ".. hat should I look for?

We encourage you to read th~ entire notice carefully. You may, though, \\'ant to focus on your financial institution's
of the follo\ving:

d~scriptions

• The kind of infonnation it shares \\·ith other parts of the same company, likely to be described as "members of
- oor corporate family" or "our atliliates";
• The infonnation it shares \\;th other companies or organizations that are not part of the: same corporate group
as your financial institution, perhaps called "nonaftiliatcd third parties";
• What infonnation you can prevent your fmancial institution from sharing \\'ith other companies or
organizations; and
• How you go about opting out, if that's "'hat you want to dOe
\Vill the privacy notice list exactl)' Y.hat infonnation the financial institution

~'ants

to share, and \\'ith

~'hom?

No. The regulations say the privacy notice must describe the basic categories of infonnation a financial institution
collects and shares with other entities, and give examplc:s. But a financial institution is not required to list cvery type
of infonnation it may gather or share, or tell you the names of specific companies or organizations that may buy or
rt:ccivc your infonnation. If you have questions or concerns, contact your financial institution at the address or phone
number listed in its privacy nolice.
"1"011

"eed 10 look/or Illese notjces. YOli also need /0 understand ".",he/her all ins/jtlltjOIl
10 share personal inJonnolioll with ather companies."

1("te"dof

,IKerr ,8aeb~~. r:P{F,c.~':'SI~'".e~ affairs ~pe~t.

., .. '

\Vhat kind of information can I stop an institution from

...... ,.. ..
!harin~?

You have a general right to block the sharing of non-public personal intonnation \\'ith outside companies nnd
organizations, but there arc exccption5 (as explained in lh~ n~Xl question and ans\\"cr). Also, your in$titution n13Y
r~mind you that a In\\' passed sevcral YC3rs ago, the.: Fnir Credit R~rorting Act. gi\'~s you limited rights to stop
sc.:l~ch:d inlbnnation-sharing \\'ith al1iliatc.:s.
\Vhat information can't I prc"cnt from

hcin~ ~harcd, c'·cn

if I opt out?

Und~r the nc\\· hl\v, you cannot bar an institution from providing personal infonnation to outsid~ compani~:\ and
urganizations if. for instance:

• Jhe inJormation is n~c:.ded to help conduct nonnal business. EX3mpl~: Your bank can s~nd pc.:rsonal
infQnnatiori to outside tirms that help market the in"stitut'ionts products. handle·its data processing (for your
loan pa}n1cntS, checking 4lCcoWltstatcments, elcctrQnic banking' trnnsactions or cr~dit card purchases)" or
mail account statem~nts.
• The intbnnnlion is necdc:d to protect against fraud or unnuthonzc:d transactions, or is provided in response to
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a coun order.
institution r~nsonably believes the inlonnation is "publicly aV3ilablt=." Robc:rt Patrick. 3n FDIC consumer
la\\' attom~y in Washington. explains that publicly a\'ailabh: inlonnation "includes your name. address. and
te.:lephonc number as th~y appcar in the telephone book. infonnalion about your home mortgag~ recorded in
county records. or infbnnation that \\'ould be.: found on your dri\'cr's license if that infonnation is available
trom your stutc's dc:partmcnt of nlolor \'c:hicles.
• Th~ information is used as p41rt of a "joint marke.:ting agrecmt:nt." '·hat's a situation in \\'hich t\\'O or more
tin41ncial institutions-s41Y, a b41nk and insurance company-agrc~ to joinlly oOer. t:nuorse or sponsor the
s41mc products or services.
•

Th~

II

In addition, the Fair Credit Reporting Act says an institution has a right to give an atliliale any infonnation obtained
from your transClctions with that institution. Example: Your bank can give an aniliat~d insurance company dc:tails
about your dt:posit accounts, This could be useful infonnation if, say, the insun:r \vants to oncr you an annuity 8S an
i,1vcstment \vhcn one of your CDs is about to moturt:. Evcn though you cannot prc\'t:nt this intbnnation from bc:ing
shar~d. the bank still must tell you about tht:st: practicc:s inils privacy nOlice.
Ho\\' do I

knO\\'

if I should opt out?

[t dc:pcnds on ho\v the inform3tion is shared,., and it depends on your \'iC:\\'Point. If a tinanci31 institution \\'idely
shares your personal inlbnnntion \vith other businesses, you'll get more mail, phone calls or oth~r unsolicited
promotions than ifyou decide to opt out. Some consumc:rs sec: infonnation sharing as a plus becaus~ it helps them
shop from home or find out about ne\v products and st:rvices. including potentially good dc:nls on a n~\v loan,
insurance policy or investment. Other consumers say they don't \\'ant so many solicitations from telemarketers and
mmloadvertisers, and they don't want a lot of other businesses and people knO\\'ing about their tinanc~s or spending
habits. You must decide what's best for you.

"If you opt out, your bank will still be able to share personal infonnation about you \\'ith outside entities in certain
circumstances, but you will be putting n limit on at least some: infonnation sharing." adds the FDIC's Patrick. "!fyou
don't opt out, your bank can sell infonnation about you to any business or person, and there arc fc\v restrictions on
to\V that information might be used."
The FDIC's Bacbel suggests that you rcvie\v your institution's privncy notice and "ask yourself if you're comfortable
v.ith the types of businesses receiving your personal infcnnation, and "with what they are likely to do with the
infonnation." !fyou have questions or concerns, he says, contact your institution. "Banks and other fmancial
institutions are interested in maintaining good customer relations," Sacbel adds, "They should be more than ~illing to
explain ho\v they use your infonnation, ho\v they protect that infonnation, and the circumstances in \\'hich they sharc
informatIon \,,'ith other businesses or peoplc."
You can also get general guidance by contacting the government agencies listed in
"For More Help or Inform41tion Regarding Your Rights to Financi41t Priv41CV".

r

other companies, and ~illl ha\'e a chance to correct errors?

r

The Gramm-Leach-Blilcy Act doesn't require your bank to givc you access to the information it collects or a chance
to make changes. Ho\\'ever, ifyou have concerns, you can ask your bank if it \\'ill voluntarily It:t you see your
personal rc:cords and comment on their accurncy. Banks do let customers revic\v thcir personal information und~r
ct:rtain circumstances,

r
r

r

Before I decide \\'hether to opt out, am I entitled to a COP)· of thc information m)' bank might sharc \\'ith

Hon' much timc willI ha\'c to decide n'hcthcr to opt out?

Federal regulations didn't set strict dc:adlines. The rult:s instc41d say that a consumcr nlust be gi\,'t:n 41 rcasonablt:
opportunity to opt out. You'll probably hav~ 3bout 30 days to reply to Don opt-out noticc deli\'crcd by mail. In limited
instanc~s. though, such as \\'hen you're using anothcr bank's ATM machint:. you muy he asked to make 3 d~cision
about opting out right th~n and there. [f 41n institution do~sn't gct a re.:$pons~ from you by its dt:ndlinl:. it can assumt:
that you have dccid~d not 10 opt out.

r;;ify~;;"~p~"~;;;:~~;~;;;'b;;;k"~;ili~~ilj"b;-~bl;';;;j;~;;··i;if~;'~~;i~;;·~h~;;·;~;;;;;;·~:·i;j~··~~·;;;:~i;i
ienli/ies ill certain CirClI/lI-stal1ces, bUI you "'ill be pUlling Q li,,,i! 011 at It!Qs!

!in/onnation
sharing. " Ro~rt Patrick.
FDIC allomc:y
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If I decide to opt out, do I havc to notif)' the institution in «I certain ,,'el)'?

YCS, most likely. That's bec3use the institution can establish a procedure that evcryonc must usc to opt out, providc=d
that it is r~ason3blc. So, bt: sure to cht:ck lht= instructions that conlC \vith your privucy notice. For cxample, your bank
may requir~ you to cull a c,-=rtain tclephone numb,-=r, not just any numb~r at tht.: bunk, Or, it may n:qL1ir~ you to
complete a fonn and muil it to a specific addr~ss. Patrick adds that "even if you cull the hank to opt out, it's a good
id~a to also notily it in \\TIting and to k~cp a copy of your \\Tittc:n notice lor your n:cords.
It

\Vhat if I dccide against opting out non' hut [ lettcr chnnge nlY mind, or "'h,tt if I forgct to opt out
datc'!

b)'

the due

You can always opt out. even months or years from no\v. But, be u\\'an.: that any opt-out request only covers the
sharing of information in the futur~, Thert= is no rt:quircmc:nt that u finuncial institution contact tht.: organizations it
has already shared your infonnalion \vith nnd lell them they cannot use thal inl(lmlUlion any more.
If I have an account at a hankjointly n'ith other people, do

\\'C

all need to "grec on "'hcthcr to opt out?

If the b3nk sends separate notices to each 3ccounl holdt:r. each person can choose tor hinlsclf or h~rsel[ f-Io\\'c\'cr,
bc.:cause the rules allov/ banks to provide a single opt-out notice \\'ht:n t\\'o or more custonlers have :1 joint account.
it's imponant to pay attention to \\'hat the bank says about opt-out requests. If. tor example, the bunk sends separate
notices to t\'r'O O\'fficrs of a joint account and only onc of them responds. the bank may continue sharing the other
person's infonnation. "If you receive an opt-out notice tram a bank \\'here you have a joint account, be sure to discuss
tlfat infonnation \vith the other people v:ho share that account with you." Patrick says. "That way. if any of you decide
ro opt out. you can do so properly."

Final Thoughts
Your right to fmancial privacy is important. And thanks to the ne\v privacy Ja\v. you no\v have more of a say in ho\v
much of your infonnation fmancial institutions may share with other companies. It's up to you to take advantage of
these protections. Watch for the privacy notices from your financial institutions, read them cart:fully and follo\v the
instructions if you decide to exercise your right to opt out. If you have questions, contact your financial institution or
one of the federal regulatory agencies on our "For More Help..... and "For More Infonnalion" pages. We hope that the
information we've provided here ";11 help you understand your rights... and help you make decisions that arc right for
you,

J\Vanted: Your Questions About Financial Institutions and Your Privacy;

il'1D'~';:~~h~~~';~~~'~~~'~~~~~i~~~'~b~'~l"h~~~fi~~'~i~i·i·~~;i;~·;i~~~···_.
···:.···im~~:~i;:~:·:i:·:··~j··:

:rnay collect and share customer infonnation or \\"h3t you can do to : '
~:
:.~:~:~:t~:~:·::::::::;.;.;.~.:.;:. :
;:
. I .
•
:.;:/::';.; :;:~·;:::;:::::;::::;::::::~:~::::~~~:::~~~~:::;;t~:.::~t~~ :
:protcct ),our fiInanCla
pnvac).,? PI ease sen d th l:m
to us, Th l:" b~st :
: ...' ':':~'::;s::::::::::;:::/::::::::::::::~~~:~~~':~~~!;j
Iquestions-and the ans\vers-may appear in an upcoming issu~ ~~. ~
:.::.,~ 'fi~~~~ .. ~k ~~:
t
•
_
r
.,_.
~';~l!
ior our ne\vsletter. ~ntc to: FDIC Consumer Nffl'S. :>50 17th . ' ...:~ .
,!Street, NW, WashIngton. DC 20429. You also can send an e-rnall . ~
!llo jro!len!llein@fdic.gov or fax your questions lo 202·898·J870.
r..::F:ffJ
I~Ple3s~ include your name. address and phone.: numb~r. No names \
~.
appear in print without pennission.
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BULLETIN

Comptroller of the Curiency
Administrator of National Banks

Guidelines Establishing Standards
for Safeguarding Customer
Information

Subject:

TO:

Description:

Final Guidelines

Chief Executive Officers and Compliance Officers of All National Banks, Federal
Branches and Agencies, Service Providers and Software Vendors, Department and
Division Heads, and All Examining Personnel

PURPOSE
Tfie-purpose of this bulletin is to alert you to the joint-agency issuance of the attached final
"Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information" and to highlight
provisions of these guidelines. The guidelines are mandated by Section 501 of the GrammLeach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), and are effective July 1, 2001. The guidelines affect all
national banks, federal branches and federal agencies of foreign banks, and any subsidiaries of
such entities (except brokers, dealers, persons providing insurance, investment companies, and
investment advisors). I The guidelines describe the Office of the Comptroller ofthe Currency's
(OCC's) expectations for the creation, implementation, and maintenance of a comprehensive
information security program.

BACKGROUND
Section 50 I of the GLBA requires the oce and other federal banking agencies to establish
appropriate standards for the administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for customers'
"nonpubJic personal information." The aee has done so by issuing guidelines that require each
national bank to establish an information security program.
A bank's information secuiity program must be designed to ensure the security and
confidentiality of customer information, protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the
security or integrity of such information, and protect against unauthorized access to or use of
such information that would result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.
Because the guidelines codify existing agency guidance. banks should already have existing
information security programs that identify and control risks to information and information
systems. \Vhile the guidelines cover only "cu~tomer information" as that ternl is defined, the

I Certain functionally -regulated subsidiaries. such as brokers. dealers.. alid in\'csuncnt ad\'isors ,,·ill be subject to
. security regulatio.ns iS$ucd by the Securities ~d Exchange Commission. Insurance entities may be subject to
. security regulations issued by their-respective state insurance authorities.
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aee encourages banks to use the approach provided by the Guidelines to protect all customer
and bank records.
Highlights of the Guidelines

The guidelines allow each institution the discretion to design an information security program
that suits its panicular size and complexity and the nature and scope of its activities. The
guidelines take a process-based approach that is consistent with acc guidance, notably ace
Bulletin 98-3 ("Technology Risk Management"), issued February 4, 1998; and ace Bulletin
2000-14 ("Infrastructure Threats -- Intrusion Risks"), issued May 15, 2000.
Role ofthe Board ofDirectors. The board of directors or an appropriate committee of the board
is responsible for approving the bank's written information security program and overseeing the
program's development, implementation, and maintenance, including assigning responsibility for
its implementation. At least once a year, bank management should report to the board or an
appropriate committee of the board on the overall status of the information security program and
the bank's compliance with the guidelines.

.'

..

Identify GIld Assess Risk. The bank should first assess risks to its customer information. A
bank's risk assessment should identify reasonably foreseeable internal and external threats that
could result in unauthorized disclosure, misuse, alteration, or destruction of customer
information or customer information systems. Additionally, the risk assessment should consider
the likelihood and potential damage of these threats, taking into consideration the sensitivity of
customer information. Finally, the assessment should consider the sufficiency of existing
policies, procedures, customer information systems, and other arrangements intended to control
the risks identified.

MGIIGge Gild Control ofRisk. The bank should design an information security program to control
the identified risks, commensurate with the sensitivity of the information and the complexity and
scope of the bank's activities. The guidelines highlight eight security measures that banks
should consider and adopt if appropriate.

-

The information security program also should include training for bank stafT and regular testing
of the key controls, systems, and procedures. The nature and frequency of the tests should be
determined by the bank's risk assessment. To ensure objectivity, tests should be conducted or
reviewed by third parties or staff who are independent of those who develop or maintain the
security programs.

. Oversee Service Provider Arral1genlellts. Banks also have an obligation to oversee their service
providers. Banks that use service providers should exercise appropriate due diligence-in
selecting them.. including conducting a revie\v of the measures taken by the service providers to
protect customer information. The contract between the bank and the service pr.ovider n1ust
require the provider to implement appropriate measures designed to meet the objectives of the
guidelines.. Wherever jndi~ated by a bank's risk assessment, the bank should nlonitor its service
providers to confirm they are implementing the agreed~upon security measures. As pan .of~his

Date: February 15, 2001
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monitoring, a bank should revie\v audits, summaries of test results, or other equivalent
evaluations of its service providers.
t

Adjusllhe Progranl. Risks to custon1er information change over time with changes in
technology, the sensitivity of customer information, internal or external threats to information,
and the bank's own business arrangements, such as mergers and acquisitions, alliances and joint
ventures, outsourcing arrangements, and changes to customer information systems. Therefore,
banks should monitor, evaluate, and adjust, as appropriate, their information security program.
The ace expects banks to make the appropriate changes to their information security programs
before any bank-initiated changes are made to their customer information systems, such as
. changes to accommodate new services.

Imp/erne/lIthe Gu ideliJles. The guidelines are effective on July 1, 2001. However, there is a
two-year grandfathering provision for service provider contracts. Existing service provider
contracts (namely, contracts entered into until March 5, 200 I) do not have to be renegotiated to
comply with the Guidelines until July 1,2003 .

. RESPONSIBLE OFFICE
Questions regarding this banking issuance should be directed to John Carlson, senior advisor for
Bank Technology, (202) 874-5013; Aida Plaza Carter, director for Bank Information Technology
Operations, (202) 874-4740; or Deborah Katz, senior attorney, Legislative and Regulatory
Activities Division, (202) 874-5090.

Clifford A. Wilke
Director, Bank Technology Division

Attachment--66 FR 8616
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Privacy Preparedness

Chief Executive Officers and Compliance Officers of All National Banks, Department
and Division Heads, and All Examining Personnel

This advisory is to help prepare you for the implementation of the new Privacy of Consumer
.Fina-ncial Information regulation, 12 CFR 40. The regulation becomes fully effective on July I,
2001, and it affects all national banks, large and small, including most of their subsidiaries. A
questionnaire is attached to assist you in your preparations and in performing a self-assessment.
During the 2001 quarterly reviews conducted with your bank, your examiner-in-charge or bank
portfolio manager will include a discussion of this advisory, the results of your self-assessment,
and your progress toward full compliance with the provisions of 12 CFR 40. The extent of that
discussion will be determined by the size of the institution involved, the nature of its information
collection and sharing practices, and any concerns the examiner may have regarding the state of
the bank's preparedness.

BACKGROUND
Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 sets forth provisions addressing the
obligations of a financial institution with respect to the privacy of consumers' nonpublic personal
information. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's (OCC's) implementing
regulation, 12 CFR 40, Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, provides for disclosures to
consumers of a financial institution's privacy policy and the rights of consumers to direct their
financial institution not to share their nonpublic personal information with third parties (opt out).
A copy of the regulation is included in ace Bulletin 2000-21 ("Privacy of Consumer Financial
Information"), issued June 20, 2000. In addition, oce Bulletin 2000-25 ("Privacy Laws and
Regulations"), issued September 8., 2000, provides information and guidance regarding the
various federal Jaws and regulations relating to the disclosure of consumer financial information.
NIany \vho commented on the proposed rule stated that they needed more time than \vas provided
in the statute to comply with the regulation. Commenters noted that they needed extra time to
assess existing information practices, prepare new disclosures, develop soft\vare to trac.k opt
outs,. train employees, and create management oversight, internal revie\v, 2nd auditing systems to
ensure. compliance. As a result of the comments, the agencies exercised their authority under
sectiol151 0(1) 'of the ·GL~.A and extended the mandatorYcompliaric~ date. finan.cial institutions
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are expected to be in full compliance with the regulation by July 1,2001. Full compliance
means that an institution has delivered a privacy notice to its customers and, \vhere applicable,
has afforded its customers a reasonable opportunity to opt out of information sharing before July
1, 2001. These institutions may continue to share nonpublic personal information after that date
for customers who do not opt out.
PRIVACY PREPAREDNESS MEASURES

Senior management and the boards of directors of national banks and their subsidiaries are
strongly encouraged to ensure that their institutions take all appropriate steps before the
mandatory compliance date so that their institutions will comply fully with the privacy regulation
by the July 1, 2001, deadline. The term "bank" in this advisory includes national banks, federal
branches and agencies of foreign banks, and subsidiaries of a national bank or federal branch or
agency, except subsidiaries that are brokers~ dealers, persons providing insurance, investment
companies, investment advisers, and entities subject to regulation by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission. I These steps should include
•

7\ssessing existing information practices by conducting an inventory of information
collection, disclosure, and security practices;

•

Evaluating agreements with nonaffiliated third parties that involve the disclosure of
consumer information;

•

Where necessary, establishing mechanisms to permit and process opt-out elections by
consumers;

•

Developing or revising existing privacy policies to reflect the new regulatory requirements;

•

Determining how to deliver privacy notices to consumers;

•

Establishing employee training and compliance programs; and

•

Developing an implementation plan.

Assessil1g Existil1g Informatioll Practices. Banks are encouraged to assess their existing

practices with respect to nonpublic personal information in order to (1) accurately represent them
in their privacy policies; (2) determine the extent to \vhich disclosures to third parties fall \vithin
the statutory exceptions; (3) evaluate which information disclosures, if any, \vould trigger opt-out
rights for consumers; and (4) determine \vhether any practices are prohibited, e.g., impermissible
sharing of account numbers with third parties. This exercise should also assist banks in
evaluating the desirability of continuing or altering existing practices.

I Cenain function~.ly regulatedsubsicijaries~ such as brokers. dealers.. and invcsuncnt advisers ~\"il1 be subject to
privacy regulations issued bJ the Securities and Exchange Commission. Insurance entities Ina)' be subject to
privacy regulations issued by their rcspectivc state insurance authorities.
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EvalualiJlg AgreenU!/lts lvith Nonaffiliated 711ird !Jar/ies Iha/lnvolve Disclosure ojCOJlSUnler
!,ljorlllatio/1. Banks should determine \vhether their agreements \vith nonaffiliated third parties

that involve the disclosure of non public personal information meet the regulatory requirements
for maintaining the confidentiality of the bank's consumer information. For instance, if a bank
discloses customer lists to a nonaffiliated third-party service provider to market the bank's own
products or services, or to a nonaffiliated financial institution pursuant to ajoint nlarketing
agreement, section 40.13 of the regulation requires the bank to enter into a contract limiting the
third party's use or disclosure of that information. Additionally, banks should consider how best
to maintain the confidentiality of the consumer information they disclose pursuant to other
nonaffiliated third-party arrangements, such as routine service agreements. Under the regulation,
any nonaffiliated third party that receives nonpublic personal information from a bank is limited
in its ability to use or disclose the information. Banks are encouraged to inform their service
providers to familiarize themselves with these limitations. Moreover, banks that obtain
nonpublic personal information from other nonaffiliated financial institutions also face limits on
their use or disclosure of this information.

r

ESlablishillg Mec}lQllisms 1o Ha/ldle Opl-Out Eleclio/lS. Banks that disclose information to

r
r

nonaffiliated third parties outside the statutory exceptions must provide their consumers with a
mechanism to opt out of that information sharing. Banks must ensure that they meet the
regula"tory requirements for providing consumers with a clear and conspicuous opt-out notice and
a reasonable means to do so (e.g., a convenient mechanism for opting out and a reasonable
period of time (e.g., 30 days)). In addition, banks must devise the means to record, maintain, and
eff~ctuate opt-out elections by consumers.
.

r
r
r
r

r
r

r,.
,
r
r

Developi/lg a Privacy Po/icy. The regulation requires that all banks, even those that do not

share nonpublic personal information, provide privacy notices to customers. Institutions must
develop or revise existing privacy notices to conform them to the new privacy requirements. The
notices must meet the clear and conspicuous standards, and they must accurately reflect the
bank's privacy practices. In developing their privacy practices and notices, banks may want to
evaluate the competitive aspects of their policies and obtain consumer input (e.g., as to whether
consumers understand and accept the policy).
De/iverillg Privacy No/ices. Banks must determine the mechanism to deliver initial, annual, and

revised privacy notices and opt-out notices to cu~tomers, consumers, and joint account holders.
Methods of delivery may include hand delivery, mail, and electronic delivery where the
consumer is conducting business with the bank electronically and agrees to electronic
disclosures. Banks should deliver privacy notices to customers, and where applicable, afford
them a reasonable opportunity to opt out of information sharing before July 1, 200 I.
Es/ablishi/lg Trailli/lg Progranls. All bank employees should have a general understanding of

the bank's privacy policies; however, certain employees require n10re detailed knov/ledge.
Customer service personnel, personnel \vho process requests for consumer information or who
provide such information to third parties, and other employees in contact \vith consumers must
have a thorough understanding of the bank's privacy policies and practices" They should be
prepared to answer questions abou~ the bank's privacy policies and practices, address \/vhether an
indivi-dual ~onsumer;s records are shared, direct consumers through thebank's~omplaint
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process, and if applicable, provide notices to consumers. Bank training programs should be
customized for the audience, should be ongoing, and should provide follo\v-up \vhen problems
are noted.
ESlah/ishi/lg CO.71p/ia/lce Programs. Banks should ensure that their compliance personnel are
involved in the privacy preparations. Compliance should evaluate the bank's privacy practices
and measures undertaken to ensure regulatory conformance. Internal controls, policies, and audit
procedures should be developed, and audits/compliance reviews scheduled, in time for the
July 1, 2001, implementation date. Implementation problems and compliance deficiencies
identified by the compliance staff should receive immediate attention by senior management.
To ensure timely and adequate compliance with the nevI
privacy requirements, banks should develop a privacy action plan that takes into consideration
the above measures, as appropriate. The plan should be approved by senior management and the
board, and should include target dates, goals, and responsible parties. Also, it should call for
testing and progress reports.

...

Developillg G/l/mp/enle/l/a/ioll }J/a11.

-Attached to this advisory is a privacy preparedness questionnaire that may be used to perform a
privacy self-assessment. It sets forth measures for implementation and compliance. The
questionnaire is a general guide that addresses a broad scope application, and as a result, some
questions may not be applicable to your financial institution. During the 2001 quarterly reviews
of your bank, examiners will inquire about your privacy policies and preparations, and the results
of any self-assessment. They will use the attached questionnaire to ask applicable questions
about your privacy readiness and may also offer suggestions to improve your compliance efforts.
Results of these reviews will allow the ace to detennine which national banks may be at higher
risk for noncompliance requiring priority in examination scheduling.

..

..

of

Questions concerning this advisory may be directed to your supervisory office or the Community
and Consumer Policy Division at (202) 874-4428.

Ralph E. Sharpe,
Deputy Comptroller for Community and
Consumer Policy

Attachment

Date: January 22, 2001

C·56

..

...

r

,.

Privacy Preparedness Questionnaire

...

Assessing Existing Information Practices
I. What are your information-sharing practices?

....

...

-...

-..
-

• What information is shared with affiliates and nonaffiliates (including sharing within and
•
•

•
•

outside of the regulatory exceptions contained in 12 CFR 40.13,40.14,40.15), what is the
purpose of the sharing, and is information shared on former customers?
Are account numbers or access numbers/codes disclosed to nonaffiliated third parties?
What information do you share on consumers \vho are not customers?
Do you route requests for nonpublic personal information to a central point or use other
control measures?
Will any of your current information-sharing practices be prohibited by the regulation?

2. What kinds of information do you collect from consumers and customers for the various
financial products and services offered by the bank?
3. Do you obtain. information about consumers and customers from other financial institutions?

If so, do you use or share the information for other purposes?
4. Are your safeguards for protecting customer infonnation consistent with Section 501(b) of the

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act?
•
•

Has the board approved the written information security program?
Are your safeguards adequate to: a) ensure security and confidentiality of customer records
and information, b) protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or
integrity of customer records and information, and c) protect against unauthorized access to,
or use of, such records or information that could result in substantial harm or inconvenience
to any customer?
Has your information security program been tested in accordance with the regulatory
guidelines?

..

•

..

Evaluating Agreements with Nonaffiliated Third Parties that Involve Disclosure of Consumer
Information

-

5. What arrangements, agreements, or contracts exist \vith nonaffiliated third parties that involve
disclosing consumer information? Do contracts or agreements detail responsibilities regarding
the use, disclosure, and protection of consumer information?
6. \Vhat changes need to be made to conform the arrangements, agreements, or contracts to the
regulation?

..
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I. INTRODUCTION
This outline reviews selected developments in bankruptcy case law during approximately
the last year. This material concentrates on developments of interest to lenders, and particularly
Sixth Circuit and Kentucky decisions. Decisions of interest during the past year demonstrate
continued development of the law on subjects such as the various ramifications of fraud, the
status of retirement funds, and otller subjects that are of particular interest to financial institutions
today.
Bankruptcy reform legislation is again moving through Congress and, if passed by both
houses, may face a more receptive executive branch. However, it is still uncertain when any
reform measure will actually be enacted. Certain of tIle provisions of the two versions are
reviewed below.

r

r
r

r
r

II. NEW BANKRUPTCY CASES

A. Dischargeabilitv and Discharge
The general discharge available to debtors, and the dischargeability of particular debts,
continue to see development in the case law. The Bankruptcy Code provides for the discharge of
debts under 11 U.S.C. § § 727, 1141, 1228 and 1328. A debtor may be denied a discharge
generally, usually for bankruptcy-related misconduct. Particular debts may be excepted from
discharge for reasons related to the nature of the debts themselves. These include, among other
things, certain tax-related debts, debts for fraud or defalcation while acting in fiduciary capacity,
debts for domestic obligations and debts arising from willful injuries.

In re Keeney, 227 F.3d 679 (6 th Cir. 2000). In this case, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the

r

bankruptcy court's order denying the debtor a discharge for concealing a "beneficial interest" in
property and making a false oath. Through this decision, the Sixth Circuit joined other courts in
adopting the doctrine of "continuing concealment." .

r

In 1971, Mary Jean Smith obtained a judgment against Milton Keeney, but had been
unable to collect it. Keeney filed for bankruptcy protection in 1996. Between 1992 and the

r

Many thanks to our associates Josllua Denton, AdallJ.Goebel, He()tller Pennington and Lee A.
~
Webb for their very valuable research and drafting assistarice.
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bankruptcy filing, two tracts of real property were purchased in the names of Keeney's parents.
However, Keeney and his wife lived on or otherwise used the property, he or his business made
the mortgage payments and improvements, and he paid no rent to his parents. Keeney claimed in
the bankruptcy proceeding to have no interest in the properties. Smith objected to discharge,
arguing that the real estate conveyances were made in an effort to conceal that the property was
actually Keeney's. The bankruptcy court denied the debtor discharge under 11 U.S.C.
§727(a)(2)(A), because he found that the debtor. had continuously concealed his beneficial
interest in the property. The bankruptcy court further found that the debtor had violated 11
.U.S.C.§727(a)(4)(A) by making a false oath when he omitted the property from his bankruptcy
schedules. The U.S. District Court (J. Coffman) upheld the bankruptcy court.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit adopted the doctrine of continuing concealment. It held that
the bankruptcy court's finding that debtor had concealed his beneficial interest in the two
properties by placing them in his parents' names, with the requisite intent to defraud, was not
clearly erroneous. The Court rejected the debtor's argument that he had nothing to conceal
because he had no interest in the property, finding that a beneficial interest would be inferred
from his payment for and use of the properties. The Court rejected the debtor's claim that the
action was time-barred. It 11eld that the debtor's concealment of his interest in the property
continued until the time of the filing of the bankruptcy, and this brought the debtor's actions
within the reach of §727(a)(2)(A).
The Sixth Circuit also rejected the debtor's argument that, because the statute of
limitations had run, precluding the plaintiff from recovering the separate property under
Kentucky law, his actions could not constitute a violation of §727(a)(2)(A). The Court held that,
even when no creditors are harmed by the concealment, a violation of §727(a)(2) may
nevertheless occur because proof of hann is not a required element of a cause of action under
§727. The court also rejected the debtor's argument that, because he had no interest in the
subject property, he could not have made a false oath concerning it. The Court found complete
financial disclosure to be prerequisite to the privilege of discharge.

1" re Bailey, 254 B.R. 901 (6 th eire BAP 2000). Ms. Bailey filed a complaint in
bankruptcy court asserting that a $20,000 debt owed to her by her fonner husband, the debtor,
was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C.§523(a)(5) because it was in the nature of support. The
bankruptcy court agreed and the debtor appealed. The Sixth Circuit BAP noted that the state
court that awarded plaintiff an absolute divorce repeatedly identified the award as being for
maintenance, support, and alimony. The court noted that an award that is designated as support
by a state court and that has other indicia of a support obligation should be conclusively
presumed a support obligation by the bankruptcy court. These indicia include the award being
contingent upon events such as death or remarriage, the relative disparity-of earning power, the
need for economic support and stability, the presence of minor children, and other factors. Once
a non-debtor spouse demonstrates that these indicia are present, the burden of proving the
obligation is nondischargeable pursuant to §523 is satisfied. The burden then shifts to the debtor
spouse to demonstrate that, although the debt is of the type that may not be discharged in
bankruptcy, its amount is unreasonable in light of the debtor's financial circumstances. Because
the indicia cited in the ba~ptcy court's factual findings supported the c.~nclusion tllat the
"obligation was in the nature of su:pport, the BAPco~cluded that the bankruptcy court's findings
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were not clearly erroneous and held the debt nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5).
The court did remand for additional factual findings regarding the amount of the
nondischargeable debt, because the record was insufficient to establish for the bankruptcy court's
ruling on that point.
t

In re Vitanovicll, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 226 (6 th eire BAP 2001). In this case, the
bankruptcy court found the plaintiff bank's claim was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C.
§523(a)(2)(A) (false pretenses, false representation or actual fraud other than a statement of
.financial condition), because the debtor incurred the debt as part of an elaborate and ongoing
check kiting scheme. The "overwhelming circumstantial evidence" showed the debtor's scheme
involved high dollar amounts, multiple transactions, careful planning and control by the debtor.
On appeal the BAP for the Sixth Circuit adopted the position of the Seventh Circuit which holds
that actual fraud as used in 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A) is not limited to misrepresentations and
misleading omissions, but can include an overall scheme designed to deprive or cheat another of
property or a legal right. Under this interpretation, the BAP agreed with the bankruptcy court
that the debtor had engaged in actual fraud and was not entitled to the fresh start provided by the
bankruptcy code. The BAP upheld the bankruptcy court's finding of nondischargeability. It
distinguished this case from cases like In re Renlbert, 141 F.3d 1277 (6 th Cir. 1998), involving an
allegation of a misrepresentation.
.
III Miller, 250 B.R. 294 (E.D. Ky. 2000). Here, Judge Howard made an attorney fee
award against a creditor who lost its nondischargeability action. 11 U.S.C. §523(d) requires the
court to award attorneys fees to a debtor and against a creditor wIlen the debtor prevails in a
nondischargeability action under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2) unless the creditor was "substantially
justified" in its position. The plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to have the debtor's $1,181.58
debt to it declared nondischargeable. The debtor's motion for summary judgment was granted,
and he sought attorney fees under 11 U.S.C. §523(d).

The court noted that the Supreme Court has interpreted the term "substantially justified"
to mean justified in substance or in the main -- that is "justified to a degree that could satisfy a
reasonable person." The court may also apply a three part standard of reasonableness: (1) a
reasonable basis in law for the theory propounded; (2) a reasonable basis in truth for the facts
alleged; and (3) a reasonable connection between the facts alleged and the legal theory advanced.
The court also held that the detennination should turn on a totality of the circumstances.
The court then analyzed the creditor's claim. It noted that, under In re: Rembert, 141
F.3d 277 (6 th eire 1998), a key element in establishing nondischargeability of the type at issue
here is whether the debtor intended to deceive. the creditor. This is whether the debtor
subjectively intended to repay the debt. The debtor apparently submitted affidavit proof on his
intent and the creditor had no contrary proof. The court also noted that there was no proof of the
facts necessary for a presumption of nondischargeability (i.e. limits on luxury goods or cash
advances within 60 days of the petition). The court then assessed the connection between the
facts alleged and a valid legal theory. It noted that the creditor alleged that the debtor knew that
he did not have the ability to repay the debt, but that it is intent to pay, not ability to pay that is a
factor in determining nondischargeability based on false pret~nses. In addition, all of the
allegations in the plaintiffs complaint were made only on the basis of the bankruptcy schedules
a:nd the bank's own records. The bank did not attend the 341 meeting Qr try to conduct a Rule
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2004 examination. While these failures on the plaintiffs part were not dispositive, the court
considered them probative because either one of these actions would have provided information
concerning material facts. Finally, the court held:
Creditors who challenge the dischargeability of debts based on the fraud
exception contained in 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A) are well advised to
consider whether they can offer facts which can support a finding of fraud
under the standards set out in In re Rembert, supra. Allegations that focus
on charges incurred or payments not made are not sufficient in and of
themselves. A minimal amount of pre-filing investigation might have
resulted in a better decision on the part of the plaintiff concerning the
filing and pursuit of this adversary proceeding.
Id. at 297.

1" re Wells, 246 B.R. 268 (E.D. Ky. 2000). Here, James and Paula Wells incurred a debt
to Fifth Third Bank that was secured by a certificate of deposit owned by debtor James' mother,
Norma McDowell, in the amount of $28,000. The Wellses defaulted and the CD was liquidated
and applied against the debt. The debtors then filed a Chapter 7 proceeding and did not list Ms.
McDowell as a creditor. There was some suggestion that the omission was deliberate. The
trustee filed a report of no distribution, the Wellses were granted a discharge and the case was
closed in early 1996. In 1999, Paula Wells moved to reopen the case to add McDowell as a
creditor. McDowell asserted that the debtors' deliberate failure to list her as a creditor was
fraudulent and the court should overrule the motion to reopen and amend schedules to list her as
a creditor. McDowell cited In re: Rosinski, 759 F.2d 539 (6 th Cir. 1985) for the proposition that
the reopening should not be allowed if the failure·to include the creditor in the original schedules
can be shown to have prejudiced the creditor or been part of the scheme to defraud and was done
intentionally. However, McDowell did not allege any ground for the nondischargeability of the
debt and there were no assets to distribute. The court concluded that McDowell's case was
more like that in In re Madaj, 149 F.3d 467 (6 th eire 1998), which held that, in a no asset chapter
7 case, the state of mind of the debtors in failing to list the objecting creditor is irrelevant. The
debtors' failure to list the claim, even if intentional, does not tum an "innocent" loan into a
fraudulent one. The court held that tIle discharge entered in the proceedings discharged the
debtors from their obligations to McDowell, even though the debt to her had not been scheduled.
It was not necessary to reopen the case and schedule McDowell's debt to accomplish that result.
In re Crun,p, 247 B.R. 1 (Bankr. W.D. I(y. 2000). This case involves a creditor's claim
that a debt to it is nondischargeable because of the debtor's failure to remit the proceeds from the
sale of the creditor's collateral. The debtor was a farmer. Most, if not all, of his assets \vere
encumbered to a local bank. Debtor was also heavily indebted to the Mayfield Grain Co. on an
open account. His farming operation was struggling, and he was unable to payoff his annual
debts to the bank or his other creditors. Following a disastrous crop year in 1998, Mayfield
Grain became concerned that he might not be able to payoff his account and asked him to sign a
security agreement on existing crops, with no advance of additional funds. He agreed and did so.
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The debtor's farming operation worsened further. He sold his grain and deposited the
various checks received from the sale of the grain into his fann account for the payment of farm
expenses. This was a violation of the security agreement, which required Debtor to remit the
proceeds generated from the sale of the collateral. He eventually filed a bankruptcy proceeding.
Mayfield Grain sought to have the debtor's debt to it declared nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C.
§523(a)(6). That statute states that "a discharge under section 727 ... of this title does not
discharge an individual from any debt -- (6) for willful and malicious injury by the Debtor to
another entity or to the property of another entity."
The bankruptcy court discussed the holdings of Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57
(1998) and In re: Markowitz, 190 F.3d 455 (6 th Cir. 1999), which analyzed the scope of the
"willful and malicious injury" exception set forth in §523(a)(6). The court (Judge Roberts)
concluded that "only acts done with intent to cause injury -- and not merely acts done
intentionally -- can cause willful and malicious injury." Markowitz, 190 F.3d 463; Geiger 523
U.S. at 61. Based on the evidence adduced at trial, the court concluded that Debtor's intent was
to keep his farming operation afloat, not to harm the creditor or its collateral. That evidence
included the Debtor's attempt to minimize his farming costs by using less fertilizer and
performing the majority of farm work with borrowed equipment, the reduction of his own cost of
living by trading in his truck for a less expensive truck and selling his $100,000 home to buy a
$24,000 mobile home and his work at a separate job. The court also found it significant that
Debtor executed the security agreement in favor of Plaintiff after he had already incurred
substantial debt, solely for the purpose of protecting Plaintiff, and that Debtor did not seek
additional credit or obtain any funds at any time after executing the agreement. The court found
all of this an indication of Plaintiffs good intent rather than malicious intent. Lastly, the court
found Plaintiffs own conduct reinforced Debtor's admittedly erroneous understanding that the
security agreement permitted him to funnel the proceeds of his grain sales back into the fanning
operation rather than remitting them to the Plaintiff. In several instances, the Plaintiff was the
purcllaser of Debtor's crop, and allowed the Debtor to take the check for the proceeds of the
grain with him, without retaining any portions thereof. That finding supported the conclusion
that Debtor not only lacked intent to harm tIle Plaintiff or its collateral, but also supported the
conclusion that the Plaintiff acquiesced in the Debtor's handling of the proceeds. The court
declined to except Plaintiffs claim from discharge under §523(a)(6).

.

B. Plan Confirmation
In re Tenn-Fla Partners, 226 F.3d 746 (6 th Cir. 2000). Here, the Sixth circuit addressed
the issue of the revocation of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization procured by fraud. The debtor
was a partnership that held a single asset, an apartment complex in Orlando, Florida. In 1999,
the partners refinanced the first mortgage on the property with approximately $12 million in taxexempt bonds issued by the Florida Housing Finance Authority. First Union National Bank of
Florida served as the indenture trustee for the bondholders. In 1992, the debtor partnership filed
a voluntary Chapter 11 petition. The filing of the petition was preceded by a downturn in the
Orlando real estate market, which Debtor alleged reduced the value of the apartment complex
well below the debt securing the property. The case revolved around the appropriate valuation of
the property. On January 21, 1994, after extensive Cllapter.l1 proceedings, the bankruptcy court
confinned an amended plan proposed by the debtor under which the partnership \vould purchase
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the property and outstanding bonds for slightly under $10 million. Approximately two weeks
after the confinnation order was entered, the debtor entered into a contract to sell the property
and the bonds for approximately $12.5 million. This sale resulted in a net recovery to the debtor
of approximately $2.5 million over the amount necessary to pay the bondholders and other
creditors under the confirmed plan. The bank asked the bankruptcy court to revoke the
confirmation order and to award it attorney fees, expenses, and punitive damages.
The bankruptcy court found the debtor proyided misleading and incomplete disclosures
.to the court, including the fact that it had serious contacts with several motivated and qualified
purchasers at prices far exceeding what the debtor represented was the market value of the
property. The court found the debtor's misrepresentations were motivated by its desire to protect
the investment of its insider partners. The bankruptcy court found that the debtor concealed or
failed to disclose material infonnation it was under a duty to disclose. This duty to disclose
arose from three separate sources: (1) a duty to comply with the disclosure requirements of §
1125; (2) a plan proponent's duty to propose a plan in good faith; and (3) the fiduciary duty of a
debtor in possession. The result was that the debtor concealed the true value of the property, and
fraudulently induced the court to confirm the debtor's proposed plan. Accordingly, the
bankruptcy court revoked the order of confinnation and awarded the bdnk attorney's fees and
expenses. The court refused to impose a reward of punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the bankruptcy court's factual findings supported the conclusion
that the debtor perpetrated an actual fraud upon the court. This finding supported the court's
revocation of the confirmation order pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §1144, which permits revocation of
such an order if such order was procured by fraud. The court upheld the award of attorney's fees
and costs to appellee because the debtor's fraud upon the court caused the appellees
unnecessarily to incur additional legal expenses. Lastly, the court upheld tIle denial of punitive
damages. Such an award lies in the discretion of the trial court, and the Sixth Circuit found no
abuse of discretion.

Barbosa v. So[olltal" 235 F.3d 31 (1 st eire 2000). In this case, the bankruptcy court
addressed the ability of the trustee and creditors to amend a bankruptcy plan after confinnation
to reach the proceeds of sale of property that the debtor sold after confirmation but before
discharge. In the case, the property sold was a two family building that was subject to a lien in
the amount of $114,000 held by Melon Mortgage Company. As part of the bankruptcy plan
Melon entered into a stipulation that the market value of the property was $64,000. This
agreement, with minor modifications, was in the confirmed plan along with the requirement that
the debtors pay unsecured equal claims at ten percent. In compliance with 11 U.S.C. § 1327 tIle
confirmation order provided that "the provisions of the confirmed plan bind the debtors and all
creditors; the confirmation of the plan vests all property of the estate in tIle debtors; and all
property vesting in the debtors is free and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor, except as
provided in the plan or this order."
After the court entered this order the debtors sought leave to sell the property free of liens
or encumbrances. The court granted leave and the property was sold for $137,500 to a good
faith purchaser. Thereafter, the trustee moved to compel the debtors to modify their plan in order
to pay the excess o..f the proce~ds to the debtors' unsecur~~ creditors. The. ~Dlstee proposed. that
the debtors pay a dividend. of 100% to the unsecured 'creditors rather than the 10% outliI).~d in the
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confirmed plan. The bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion. This was upheld by the
district court. The debtors appealed, contending that the district court erred in ruling tIlat the
proceeds were part of the bankruptcy estate based on 11 U.S.C. §1327 and §521(a)(6). They
relied on language quoted in the bankruptcy court's confirmation order, which stated that all of
the property vested in the debtor. They also argued that the bankruptcy court and district court
erred in applying §1329 of the code to allow the modification of the confirmed plan without the
showing of a substantial and unanticipated change in the debtors' financial circumstances from
the time of confirmation. They argued that the property sale was contemplated by the parties and
the court when the confirmation plan was entered into. As a result, they argued that the
.modification requested by the trustee and Melon was precluded by res judicata.
In deciding these issues the court noted that there is a conflict between §1327 and
§1306(a). While §1327 appears to vest all the property in the debtor at the time the confirmation
order is entered, §1306(a) provides for the continuing existence of the bankruptcy estate until the
case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under Chapter 7, 11, or 12 of the title. Property
of the estate at the time of confinnation vests in the debtors free of any claims from the creditors,
but the estate does not cease to exist and it continues to be funded by tIle debtors' regular income
and postpetition assets. In the present case, receiving of proceeds from the sale alters the
debtors' financial circumstances, which brings into play §1329 of the Code.
The court declined to find that the trustee's motion was barred by res judicata. Tile court
believed that approach would be contrary to the clear language of tIle statute, as §1329(a) allows
the parties a right to request a modification in response to changes in the debtors financial
circumstances. There is no reference to the requirement that a substantial or unanticipated
change occur before a modification could be granted. In addition, there is no language indicating
that res judicata was contemplated in this context. The court did caution that, as a practical
matter, parties requesting modifications of Chapter 13 plans must advance a legitimate reason for
doing so and they must strictly conform to the three limited circumstances set out in §1329. This
requirement accords finality to confirm plans without requiring specific threshold tests that were
not contemplated by the statute. Accordingly, the trustee and Melon were not precluded by res
judicata from seeking an amendment to the plan. Given the fact that the debtors realized a 215%
gain on the stipulated value of the property, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not
abuse its discretion in granting the amendment. The court states that it is antithetical to the
bankruptcy system to allow a debtor to "strip down a mortgage, under pay the unsecured
creditors, obtain a super discharge under §1328(a) of the code while selling the property
mortgaged for a price at two times its estimated value for purposes of the strip down, in keeping
the proceeds."

c.

Property of the Estate

In re Newpower, 233 F.3d 922 (6 th Cir. 2000). Here, the Sixth Circuit addressed
whether money which a debtor has embezzled prepetition becomes property of his bankruptcy .
estate. The court held that the funds themselves were not property of the estate, but tllat goods
purchased with those funds would be deemed property of the estate. Here, Mr. and Mrs. Robert
Kitchen and Mr. ,Newpower formed New Properties, Inc. ("NPI") to purchase and develop real
estate. The Kitchens transferred money to Mr. Newpower in order to purchase properti~s.
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However, Mr. Newpower took the funds personally and did not purchase the real property as
agreed upon. Mr. Newpower eventually plead guilty to embezzlement and filed for bankruptcy
protection. The Kitchens also had a lawsuit against the transferees of the funds. They sought
stay relief and abandonment so they could proceed with the state court action. The bankruptcy
court concluded that the funds which were transferred by the NPI account to a third party,
without passing through Newpower's personal acc~unt, were not property of the estate and the
Kitchens could proceed with their action to recover those funds from the recipients. However,
the bankruptcy court concluded that money that actually passed through Mr. Newpower's hands,
or was used to purchase assets in his name, was property of the estate. The district court
concluded that the bankruptcy court erred by concluding that property traceable to the Kitchens'
embezzled funds was property of the debtor's estate.
The Sixth Circuit cited Michigan state law for the proposition that a thief has no title in
the property he steals. However, also under Michigan law, when titled property is obtained by
fraud, the title is voidable, but not void. Thus, the critical difference between larceny and false
pretenses is the passage of title. The court held that NPI never intended to pass title to tIle funds
taken by the debtor, so that the funds the debtor embezzled directly from NPI were never
property of his estate. However, the court then concluded that this is not true with respect to
property that the debtor purchased for himself witll the stolen money. The seller of that property
intended to pass both title and possession to the thief and obtained good title to the money the
thief provided. As a result, the court concluded tilat the thief obtained legal title to the goods
purchased, so they became part of his estate. In a nonbankruptcy situation, a constructive trust
could be imposed in favor of the original owner of the funds on the proceeds held by the
embezzler. However, a constructive trust is an equitable interest exempted from a bankrupt's
estate only if that trust was declared by the court in a separate prepetition proceeding or a state
statute provides for the property to be held in trust for a particular purpose. There is a separate
concurrence that is the majority opinion with respect to certain automatic stay related issues in
this case.
/" re JVilcox, 233 F.3d 899 (6 th eire 2000). Here, the Sixth Circuit addressed the
question of whether a debtor's property interest in assets held by the trustees of a municipal
employees' retirement plan is to be turned over to the trustee in bankruptcy for the benefit of
creditors. 11 U.S.C. §541(c)(2) states, "a restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the
debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy law is enforceable in a case
under this title." Resolution of this case revolved around whether the terms of the plan (which
provided that the debtor's interest is "unassignable" and hence not subject to execution or
attachment) were "enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy law."

The debtor was a city employee and participant in the city's contribution retirement plan,
the terms of which were incorporated in Detroit's city charter. The fund consisted of employee
contributions. The terms of the plan permitted the withdrawal of funds from the debtor's
retirement account only upon his death, the termination of his employment, or his retirement.
None of those conditions had been met at the time of the bankruptcy. The debtor entered into a
loan agreement with a credit union and, despite the anti-assignment provision of the retirement
plan, purported to pledge his interest in the plan as collateral for the loan. Months after taking
out the loan, debtor filed fQr bankruptcy under Chapter 7. In deteml_ining wh-etller the
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bankruptcy trustee could reach the proceeds of debtor's retirement plan, the Sixth Circuit sought
to detennine whether the restriction on a transfer of debtor's interest in the trust was enforceable
under non-bankruptcy law. The trust was funded through the voluntary contributions of city
employees, and therefore was "self-settled" and could not be considered a spendthrift trust under
Michigan law. Because the plan was not a spendthrift trust, both the bankruptcy court and the
district court on appeal found that the anti-alienation provision prohibiting transfers via
garnishment, attachment, or bankruptcy, was not enforceable under federal or state law. The
district court also concluded that because the city charter provision which incorporated the
.contribution 'plan had no enforcement mechanism, it was not enforceable for purposes of
§541(c)(2).
The Sixth Circuit noted that an inquiry under § 54I(c)(2) has three parts; (I) whether the
debtor has a beneficial interest in a trust; (2) whether there is a restriction on the transfer on that
interest; and (3) whether the restriction is enforceable under nonbankruptcy law. The Court
noted that, here the debtor definitely had a beneficial interest in a trust and there was a restriction
on the transfer. The decision revolved around whether that restriction was enforceable under
non-bankruptcy law. The Sixth Circuit rejected the bankruptcy and district court's conclusions
on this point because it found that they conflicted with the Supreme Court's holding in Patterson
v. Schun1ate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992), that state law other than spendthrift trust law can serve as
"enforceable non-bankruptcy law" under §541 (c)(2). The Sixth Circuit also rejected the
charter's lack of enforcement mechanism as dispositive, in light of Patterson, whicll looked to
other indicia of enforceability than simply the existence of a statutory right to file a civil action,
including the statutory requirement that plan trustees and fiduciaries discharge their duties, and
the court's own ability to enforce anti-alienation provisions. The Sixth Circuit noted that
Michigan courts have enforced various provisions of the Detroit city charter at issue here,
including those relating to the retirement plan, without regard to the availability of a statutory
right of action. It noted that the non-alienation provision of the Detroit plan is enforceable by the
retirement system itself, which controls the distribution of funds. The court found that tIle antiassignment provision of the Detroit city cllarter was "enforceable" non-bankruptcy la\v for the
purposes of 11 U.S.C. §541(c)(2).

1" re Brucller, 2001 WL 223844 (6 th eire 2001). In tllis case, the Sixth Circuit
addressed the question of whether an Individual Retirement Account ("IRA") can be exempted
from a bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(10)(E), which exempts a debtor's right
to receive "payments under a stock, pension, profit sharing, annuity, or a similar plan or contract
on account of ... age." Here, the Debtor had an IRA valued at $7,900. He claimed an
exemption for $6,880 under 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(5) and claimed the rest as exempt under 11
U.S.C. §522(d)(10)(E). The bankruptcy court disallowed the exemption, the district court
reversed and allowed the exemption. The Sixth Circuit affinned the allowance of the exemption.
The trustee argued that the debtor's right to receive payment under llis IRA was not a
right to receive payment on account of age under a plan or contract "similar" to a pension plan or
contract. The Sixth Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's analysis of this issue in the case of In re
Carmichael, 100 F.3d 375 (5 th Cir. 1996), which held that (1) IRAs are "substitutes for future
earnings in that they are designed to provide retirement benefits to individuals" as are tIle four
typ'es of plans or contracts specifically listed in §522(d)(lO)(E); (2) the exception in §(d)(IO)(E)
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(iii) denies exemption to those similar plans or contracts that fail to qualify under §408 of the
Internal Revenue Code (a provision which deals e~clusively with IRAs), thus indicating that at
least some if not all IRAs were intended to be included in the phrase "similar plan or contract;"
(3) Congress did not intend to penalize self-employed individuals for their choice of the form in
which their retirement assets are held; and (4) exempting IRAs is consistent with the "fresh start"
policy which the exemptions are intended to advance.

In re Boot/I, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 219 (6 th eire BAP 2001). In this case, the bankruptcy
.court granted the Trustee's motion for turnover of a pro rata portion of a postpetition profit
sharing payment that the debtor received from his employer. The debtor appealed, claiming that,
because he filed his bankruptcy petition before his employer calculated its profits at the end of
the year, he had no legal or equitable interest in the profit sharing when he filed, and therefore no
part of the payment was property of the estate. The BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court's
decision. Although it agreed with debtor that his interest in the profit sharing payment was
contingent and unenforceable at the time he filed the bankruptcy it concluded that, to the extent
his interest in the profit sharing plan was based upon pre-petition employment, his interest came
within the broad concept of property of the estate found in II U.S.C. §541(a)(I). In determining
whether the debtor had an interest in the property, the BAP looked to state law. Under Ohio law,
a contingent interest is fully alienable and may be attached by creditors. Therefore, debtor's
contingent interest in the profit sharing plan became property of the estate under §54I(a)(I)
when the bankruptcy petition was filed. The U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Segal v. Rochelle,
382 U.S. 375 (1966), and the nearly unanimous view of most circuit and district court cases also
support the conclusion that a debtor's contillgent interest is to be considered property of the
estate if sufficiently rooted in the debtor's prepetition past. The BAP also rejected debtor's
alternative argument that his interest in the profit sharing program was excluded from property of
the estate pursuant to §54I(c)(2) which provides, -"a restriction on the transfer of a beneficial
interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy law is
enforceable in a case under this title." The court acknowledged that the collective bargaining
agreement in this case contained a restriction against transfer, however it found that tile debtor
had not shown the existence of either an express trust or a constructive trust under Ohio la\v.
Therefore, it held that §54I(c)(2) did not apply.
In re Rus/zing, 246 B.R. 291 (W.D. Ky. 2000). Here, the bankruptcy court (Judge
Roberts) found that pension fund contributions made on behalf of the debtor by his employer and
under a plan established pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"), were not property of the estate and were not subject the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction. In that case, the Chapter 7 trustee sought to recover funds in the debtor's pension
plan which were made within 120 days of the debtor's bankruptcy filing. The pension plan did
not maintain individual accounts, nor were the participants allowed to make individual
contributions. Benefits were payable to participants only upon the completion of specific
eligibility requirements and in accordance with the terms of the plan. While the debtor in this
action had satisfied the criteria to be eligible to receive future benefits from the pension plan, he
had not satisfied the eligibility requirements to receive such current distributions (i.e., age,
disability, years of service). The court held that, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §541(c)(2) and ERISA's
anti-alienation provision in §206(d)(I), of 49 U.S.C. §1Q56(d)(1), and tIle United States Supreme
·Court'~ construction of ~same, the contributions at issue were not property of the estate and'
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therefore not subject to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. KRS 427.150(2)(f) did not change
the conclusion. Kentucky's statutory provision provides an exemption for pension funds, witll
the exception of those contributions made within 120 days prior to the debtor's bankruptcy
filing. The bankruptcy court held that ERISA preempts the provision relating to an ERISAcovered pension plan.

D. Secured Claims Issues and Preferences

In re Nolan, 232 F.3d 528 (6 th eire 2000). Here, the Sixth Circuit addressed an issue of
first impression for the courts of appeal, and on which there was a split of authority among the
federal district courts. The issue was whether a Chapter 13 debtor may, pursuant to §1329,
modify a confirmed plan in order to surrender collateral for a secured claim, and then reclassify
any deficiency as an allowed, unsecured claim to be paid back at tIle general cents-on-the-dollar
rate set forth in the plan for unsecured debts. The Sixth Circuit held that the debtor may not.
The debtor filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 in August, 1997. The creditor, Chrysler
Financial Corporation, filed a proof of claim showing tile debtor owed it $12,291 for the
purchase of an automobile. In September, 1997, ~he bankruptcy court confirmed the debtor's
Chapter 13 plan, under which Chrysler was allowed a secured claim of $8,200 with interest at
10% per annum, leaving an unsecured claim of $4,091. In August, 1998, debtor filed a motion to
modify her plan and incur credit. She asked the court to permit her to surrender her vehicle to
Chrysler, reclassify the deficiency owed on that vehicle as an unsecured claim, and incur credit
in the amount of $10,000 to purchase another car. The bankruptcy court granted debtor's
motion. The district court reversed on appeal.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed tIle district court's disposition of the case, holding that a
debtor cannot modify a plan under §1329(a) by surrendering the collateral to a creditor, having
the creditor sell the collateral and apply the proceeds towards tIle claim and having any
deficiency classified as an unsecured claim. The court set forth five reasons for its holding. First,
the court found that the proposal would violate §1329(a)'s prohibition against adding claims to
the class of unsecured creditors. Second, §1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) provides that a plan cannot be
confirmed unless the property to be distributed on account of a claim is not less than the allowed
amount of the claim. To permit a debtor to modify the plan to bifurcate a claim that has already
been classified as fully secured into a secured claim and an unsecured claim would violate tIle
statutory mandate that a secured claim is fixed in amount and status and must be paid in full once
it has been allowed. Third, the court found that to permit such a modification of a confirmed
Chapter 13 plan would work an injustice on the creditor by permitting the debtor to shift the
burden of depreciation to the secured creditor once the collateral no longer has a value which
justifies full payment of the balance of the secured claim. The court found Congress surely did
not intend to "allow debtors to reap a windfall by employing a subterfuge that unfairly shifts
away depreciation, deficiency, and risk voluntarily assumed by the debtor through . . .
confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan." Fourth, §1329(a) permits only the debtor, the trustee, and
holders of unsecured claims to bring a motion to modify a plan. To permit a debtor to modify a
plan to revalue or reclassify a secured claim whenever the collateral depreciated, but to prohibit
the secured creditor from seeking to reclassify its claim in the event that the collateral
appreciated,would be inequitable. Fifth, and lastly, the court rejected the argulnent tilat the
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language of §1329, which permits the modification of "payments," can be interpreted to permit
modification of "claims."

In re Dublin Securities, Inc., 214 F.3d 773 (6 th eire 2000). In this case, the Sixth
Circuit interpreted the statute of limitations set forth in 11 U.S.C. §546(a), which states "an
action or proceeding under §544, 545, 547, 548, or 553 of this title may not be commenced ...
two years after the appointment ofa trustee under §702, 1104, 1163, 1302, or 1202 of this title ..
.." The debtor, Dublin Securities, initially filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in August
1993. Nearly a year later, the debtor converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. In August, 1994, the
.court appointed a Chapter 7 trustee for the estate. In May, 1996, approximately 21 months later,
the trustee filed several adversary proceedings against various individuals and businesses
alleging that the defendants were recipients of fraudulent and preferential transfers in violation of
11 U.S.C. §544(b). The defendants moved to dismiss the complaints claiming the two year
statute of limitations set forth in §546(a) had run because, under 11 U.S.C. §1107(a), a debtor in
possession not only has the same power as a trustee to avoid preferences and fraudulent transfers
but, according to the defendants, also has all of the limitations that the code imposes upon
trustees as well. The defendants argued that, pursuant to §1107(a), the debtor in possession is
bound by the two year statute of limitations set forth in §546(a)(I). More importantly,
defendants argued that that tIle statute accrues and begins to run against a later appointed trustee
at the time the debtor in possession is appointed. The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument,
finding instead that logic and the clear language of the statute support tIle conclusion that the
§546(a) statute of limitations for bringing avoidance actions begins to run upon the actual
appointment of a trustee. To hold otherwise, the court found, would create "incentives for shady
dealing" by permitting a debtor in possession to accomplish preferential or fraudulent transfers to
friends, family members, or valuable business associates, then to allow the limitations to run
before converting to a straight bankruptcy. The case deals with the pre-1994 amendment version
of §546.
re Call1'o,,, 237 F.3d 716 (6 th eire 2001). This is a check-kiting case in which the
Sixth Circuit faced what it called a "collision between Article 4 of the vee . . . and the
Bankruptcy Code." Debtor engaged in a check-kiting scheme involving First Tennessee Bank
and two other banks. Mr. Cannon opened an account containing $7,500 at Hibernia Bank, then
wrote two checks on that account totaling $163,350 which he deposited at First Tennessee. First
Tennessee extended a provisional credit to Mr. Cannon for the checks on the day of the deposit.
The checks, naturally, were returned for insufficient funds. On January 24, 1994, First
Tennessee turned the checks over to its collection officer. However, on that same day, Mr.
Cannon successfully covered the charge back by transferring money from a different account.
Eventually First Tennessee discovered the check-kiting scheme, and Mr. Cannon was forced into
bankruptcy.
III

The chapter 7 Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding on February 21, 1996, seeking to
avoid the January 24, 1994 transfers by debtor to cover the charge backs. The trustee claimed
these were preferential transfers which unduly benefited First Tennessee. The bankruptcy court
held that the check kiting scheme created an antecedent debt and that the provisional credit
extended by First Tennessee was unsecured. The bankruptcy cQurt then found that First
Tennessee recovered more in the January 2.4 transfer than it would ~ave received as an unsecured .,
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creditor. The bankruptcy court also rejected First Tennessee's new value defense. The district
court agreed that First Tennessee had a security interest in the deposits to Mr. Cannon's
accounts. However, it deemed the interest "valueless" because the Hibernia account did not have
sufficient funds to support the two checks. The Sixth Circuit reversed.
The Sixth Circuit framed the issue as whether the provisional credits allowed by Article 4
and the Expedited Sums Availability Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010) are "debts" within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, and if they are, whether or not the satisfaction of those debts is
a voidable transfer under 11 U.S.C. §547(b). Section 547(b) allows the trustee to avoid:
Any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-(1)

to or for the benefit of a creditor;

r

(2)

for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by debtor before such
transfer is made;

r
r

(3)

made while the debtor was insolvent;

(4)

made-(A)
on or within ninety days before the date of the filing of tIle
petition; or

r
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(B)
between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of
the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and

(5)

that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive
if - (A)

the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;

(B)

transfer had not been made; and

(C)
such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided
by the provisions of this title.
First Tennessee conceded that the first four factors of §547(b) had been met, but asked
the court to consider its debt as being fully secured. The Sixth Circuit agreed. Under
Tennessee's version of Article 4 (Tennessee Code §47-4-210(a)(I», a "collecting bank has a
security interest in an item and any accompanying documents or the proceeds of either in case of
an item deposited in an account, to the extent to which credit given for the item has been
withdrawn or applied." Therefore, when First Tennessee granted the debtor a provisional credit
for the checks, it received a security interest in the check. Because appellant had a valid security
interest, the sati.sfaction of that interest was not a preferential transfer. The court rejected the
argument that because the checks were worthless when \vritten~ appellant bank could not have a
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valid security interest in the checks or their proceeds. The kited checks were worth their face
value during the period which appellant bank extended a provisional credit to the debtor. The
purpose of the security interest granted by Article 4 is to cover situations where a deposited
check is dishonored by the drawer institution by giving the depositor bank an expansive security
interest in the check and its proceeds. To hold otherwise would be to destroy Article 4's system
of conditional credits, by considering every single conditional credit to be an unsecured debt,
avoidable as a preferential transfer. The result would be to thwart the current check clearing
system set up by Article 4 and federal banking laws. The court distinguished Cannon from In re
.Montgomery, 983 F.2d 1389 (6 th Cir. 1993), wherein the court allowed tIle bankruptcy trustee to
avoid approximately $3 million in transfers made to a depositor bank as part of check kiting
scheme. The case was distinguishable because the depositor bank had knowledge of the debtors'
kiting at the time the debtors shifted the kiting scheme to other banks. Thus the depositor bank
was not an innocent depositor, but rather it was a knowledgeable third party creditor of the
debtors. Thus, the transfers were considered avoidable preferences.
III re Oakwood Markets, ['Ie., 203 F.3d 406 (6

th

Cir. 2000). Here, defendant Oakwood
Properties, Inc. entered into lease agreements with the debtor in 1995 to rent property and
equipment at a rate of$12,825 per month, collectively. On March 6,1996, three creditors filed
an involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition against the debtor, which was later converted to a
Chapter 7 proceeding. On March 5, prior to the filing of the petition, Oakwood Properties
received two checks from the debtor in the amount of $12,825.00 (current rent) and $802.63.
(arrearage). Oakwood deposited the checks, and debtor's bank 110nored tl1em on March 7, the
day after the bankruptcy petition was filed. On April 2, 1996, an order for relief under Chapter
11 was entered. The case was later converted into a Chapter 7 proceeding. Oakwood occupied
the premises for only a few days in March because of a foreclosure sale which the bankruptcy
court permitted to go forward. The trustee sought to avoid the debtor's two March payments to
Oakwood as post-petition transfers under 11 U.S.C. §549 and to recover those payments for tIle
benefit of the estate under 11 U.S.C. §550. The bankruptcy court granted judgment to Oakwood
on the current rent check and to the trustee on the arrearage check. The district court affirmed.
This Sixth Circuit held that the "date of 110nor" rule applies in the context of 11 U.S.C.
§549(a), because the rule encourages the prompt submission of cllecks to the bank and provides a
date certain upon which parties to the transfer can rely, and upon which courts can base a ruling
in the event of litigation. Although Oakwood received the checks on March 5, the day before the
bankruptcy petition was filed, the checks were not honored by debtor's bank until March 7,
1996, the day after the commencement of the case. Therefore, the transfers were subject to
avoidance under §549(a). The court went on to hold, however, that the $12,825 transfer was
excepted from avoidance under 11 U.S.C. §549(b) because Oakwood had given the debtor value
in exchange for the transfer. Although the underlying lease between Oakwood and the debtor
was executed in 1985, because the lease terms required the debtor to pay each montll's rent in
advance on the first of the month, debtor's March 1996 rental payment was a transfer for value,
not a satisfaction of a pre-existing debt. The payment of $802.63, however, was not excepted
from avoidance under 11 U.S.C.§549(b) because it was payment for an arrearage. The Sixth
Circuit also approved of the bankruptcy court's conclusion that the extent of "value given" must
be detennined from "giver's" (i.e., Oakwood·'s) perspective. Finally, the court held that the fact
that the debtor subsequently lost its right to occupy the premises and use the equipment when its
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leasehold interest in the premises was sold at a foreclosure sale, did not preclude a finding that
Oakwood had transferred the value of an entire month's rental of the property. Oakwood did not
seek to re-occupy the premises or take back the leased equipment after the foreclosure sale, but
rather honored the possessory right of the party that had obtained the leasehold interest at the
sale. As a result, the amount of the value that the debtor received was not limited to tIle few days
that it actually occupied the premises.
[" re Weatl,ington, 254 B.R. 895 (6 th eire BAP 2000) addressed the issue of the proper
valuation for a vehicle for purposes of redemption in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The creditor
"argued that the appropriate value should be the replacement value as defined by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997), which addressed
valuation in a cramdown context. The debtor argued that the appropriate valuation \vould be the
liquidation value. The bankruptcy court selected liquidation value and the BAP agreed. The
court held that the liquidation value in a redemption context is fully consistent with the Rash
analysis as well as the legislative history of §722.
Under §722 an individual debtor may redeem tangible personal property intended for
personal family or household use from a lien securing the debt if such property is exempt in
other §522 or has been abandoned by §554 by paying the holder the lien the amount of the
allowed secured claim of the lien holder. The court concluded that valuation under §722 is not
controlled by Rash. Rash addressed the appropriate valuation of a secured claim when a Chapter
13 debtor uses the cramdown provision of §1325(a)(5)(B) in order to retain a vehicle. In Rash,
the proposed disposition or use of the collateral was of pllramount importance to the valuation
question. Rash concluded that the value of property retained when the debtor utilizes the
cramdown provision is "the cost that the debtor would incur to obtain a like asset for the same
proposed use." However, the disposition of collateral in a Cllapter 7 redemption is different.
In a chapter 13 cramdown, the proposed use is the debtor's retention of the vehicle
through the life of the plan. The creditor suffers risk of depreciation and subsequent default. To
the contrary, in a chapter 7 context, the proposed use and disposition of the collateral is, in
reality, repossession and the sale of the collateral in the manner most beneficial to the creditor.
Using the liquidation value, therefore, places the creditor in the exact same position it would
have occupied had it repossessed the collateral. The court concluded that this view best reflects
the congressional intent and enacting §722.

In re Vaugltn, 244 B.R. 631 (Bankr., W.D.Ky. 2000). Here, the trustee moved the court
to set aside various transfers by the debtors preceding the filing of their bankruptcy action on the
grounds that the transfers were fraudulent or preferential in nature. The court found that the
trustee was precluded by 11 U.S.C. §550(c) from recovering as a preference the transfer at issue
from Exchange Bank. Christopher Vaughn was the debtors' grandson. The debtor, Walter
Vaughn, was in the business of farming. In 1997, Christopher helped Walter with his tobacco
crop by assisting with its cultivation and harvest. In consideration, he and Christopher agreed
that Christopher would be paid an agreed upon share of the tobacco proceeds when the crop was
sold. The crop was sold to New Enterprise Tobacco Floor, Inc. At the time of the sale,
Christopher owed a debt of $4,893.62 to Exchange Bank. Coincidentally, New Enterprise was a
guarantor of that loan. Walter and Christopher agreed that Christopher's share of tIle crop
proceeds would be paid directly to Exchange Bank·to pay offthe note. In accordance with this
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agreement, Walter instructed New Enterprises to pay the $4,893.62 directly to Exchange Bank.
After this transfer \vas made, Christopher's note was marked paid in full and the collateral was
released. Exchange Bank had no dealings with Walter in relation to its loan to Christopher nor in
establishing the mechanism for repayment. Exchange Bank was not a creditor to Walter nor did
it have any kind of an insider relationship with him. Nearly six months after the transfer at issue
the debtor filed for bankruptcy.

-

The trustee sought to avoid the transfer from New Enterprise to Exchange Bank as a
preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. §547(b). Under that section the trustee may set aside
.transfers made within the 90 day period preceding the filing of bankruptcy. The preference
period is extended to one year when the transfer is made to or for the benefit of an insider.
Exchange Bank, the entity to whom the transfer was made, \vas not an insider. However
Christopher, for whose benefit the payment was made, was an insider. The court applied §550(c)
to this case. That section unequivocally states that the trustee may not recover a preferential
transfer from a transferee that is not an insider, if the transfer occurred outside of the general 90
day preference period. The trustee, therefore, was precluded from recovering the funds at issue
from Exchange Bank. The trustee also sought to have the transfer set aside as a fraudulent
transfer under §548. The debtor, by affidavit, offered evidence that the payment to Exchange
Bank was simply based on an agreement with Christopher in consideration for his work on the
tobacco crop. This affidavit testimony was not rebutted. The court found that §548(a)(I) did not
apply because the transfer was not made (with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
entity... ) nor did §548(a)(2) apply because there is no evidence that would support the finding
that the farming services that debtor received from Christopher was less than the reasonably
equivalent value of the transfer at issue.
The courts continue to interpret property valuation issues following the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 117 S.Ct. 1879, 138 L.
Ed.2d 148 (1997). The Rash decision addressed a conflict among the circuits regarding the
appropriate valuation of collateral for "cramdown" purposes in a Chapter 13. Pursuant to 11
U.S.C. §506(a), a lender's claim is secured only to the extent of the value of the collateral. In
order to have a plan confirmed in which the debtor retains a vehicle over tIle secured creditor's
objection, the debtor must invoke the cramdown power and must pay to that creditor the present
value of the allowed secured claim over the life of the plan. The court held that the proper
measure of value is the replacement value, not foreclosure value. The court noted that
replacement value is fair market value, not necessarily the cost of a new replacement item.
II" re Knowles, 253 B.R. 412 (E.D. Ky. 2000). Here, Judge Howard dealt with t\VO
issues: (1) how to calculate the replacement value in a "cramdown" under 11 U.S.C.
§1325(a)(5)(B); and (2) whether a rental purchase agreement is a security interest. Toyota Motor
Credit Corporation objected to the debtors' Chapter 13 plan because of its contention that its
collateral, a truck, was undervalued in the plan. The schedules valued the truck at $13,792.50
but listed Toyota's claim as $22,153.88. Rentway objected to the treatment of its rental purchase
agreements as security interests. The value of Rentway's collateral (furniture, a television and
jewelry) was listed as $1,190 while the amount of its claim was listed as $9,578.65. Debtors
aJ)1ended.their ~hapter 13 plan-to increase the value of the truck to $17,812 apparently using
some type of average valuation, but the value of Rentway's collateral remained the same.
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Toyota maintained that, under Rash, the proper value is the NADA retail value. The
Supreme Court also specifically prevented the use of any mechanical mid-point formula stating
"whatever the attractiveness of a standard that picks the mid-point between foreclosure or
replacement values, there is no warrant for it in the code."
The debtor argued that In re Getz, 242 B.R. 916 (6 th eire BAP 2000), held that averaging
the NADA wholesale and retail values to determine replacement was proper. However, Judge
Roberts held that Getz says that the use of that average as a starting point, with adjustments
.pursuant the evidence, was not inconsistent with Rash. This Court then held that it did not agree
that the average of the wholesale and the retail values was an appropriate starting point and that
Getz says that the trial court has the discretion to adopt a rule for replacement valuation. Judge
Roberts declined to use the average of wholesale and retail values as a starting point. Instead,
the court concluded that the starting point would be the NADA retail value, with appropriate
adjustments to be made based on the evidence.
The court also held that the rental purchase agreements were not security agreements.
Rentway maintained that the various rental purchase agreements were leases not security
interests and therefore must be assumed or rejected by the debtors under 11 U.S.C. §365. In
deciding the issue the court referred to KRS §§ 367.976 to 367.985 which defines the term
"Rental-Purchase Agreement" and states that it should not be construed to be, nor be governed
by ... (f) a security interest as defined in KRS §355.1-201(37). Rentway contended that the
debtors' plan attempted to convert lease agreements into secured transactions and tllereby allow
them to keep over $12,000 worth of personal property for the payment of $1,190. The court
found that the rental purchase agreements were neither true leases nor security instruments but
they were "sufficiently executory to fall within §365." The debtors, therefore, were required to
either assume or reject leases in question.
/1' re LYllllll', 246 B.R. 537 (Bankr. E.D.Ky., 2000). Here, Judge Howard dealt with
the priority of liens. The debtor owed National City Bank $33,942.34, secured by the debtor's
boat pursuant to a note and security agreement that was executed on May 13, 1998. National
City did not properly perfect its lien on the boat. The debtor then became indebted to M&T
Financing on December 4, 1998, in the sum of $50,000.00. To secure this loan, the debtor gave
M&T a security interest in the boat. M&T properly perfected its security interest. M&T moved
for stay relief and abandonment. The trustee objected. He argued that, ifhe avoided NCB's lien,
he would be in a position superior to that of M&T, as a hypothetical judicial lien creditor.
However, under Kentucky law, an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of the
subsequent lien creditor. If the trustee were to avoid the unperfected security interest, that lien
would be preserved for the benefit of the estate and the trustee would be substituted in the
position of the creditor holding the avoided lien.

However, under Kentucky law, conflicting security interests rank according to priority in
time of filing or perfection. As a result, the fact that the trustee could avoid NCB's lien and
preserve it for the benefit of the estate does not mean he would prevail over M&T. M&T l1ad the
prior and superior lien on account of its properly perfected security interest, versus the trustee's
prior in time but unperfected lien. The court granted M&T's motion for relief from stay.
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In re Brul"baugll, 250 BR 605 (W.D. Ky. 2000). Here, Judge Cooper addressed the
issue of whether a debtor's homestead exemption is impaired by a judgment lien filed upon the
debtor's interest in real estate owned with her non-debtor husband as tenants by the entirety. The
court held that the judgment lien did not impair the homestead exemption claimed by the debtor
and as a matter of law the debtor was not entitled to avoid the judgment lien. Because Kentucky
has opted out of the federal homestead exemptions set forth in 11 U.S.C. §522(b), the debtor
claimed a homestead exemption in the amount of $4,500 pursuant to KRS §427.060. The debtor
argued that the judgment creditor's lien impaired her homestead exemption, and the judgment
.creditor in tum argued that it did not impair her homestead exemption after applying the
impairment test of §522(f)(2)(A). The debtor argued that because under Kentucky law a creditor
may attach and sell under execution a debtor-spouse's interest in property, the judgment
creditor's lien impaired her exemption and was therefore avoidable under §522(f). The court
then applied the simple arithmetic test pursuant to § 522(f)(2) to determine whether the judgment
creditor's lien impaired the debtor's exemption. Under this formula, tIle court added the debtor's
mortgages and the judgment lien and subtracted those from the fair market value of the property.
The remaining amount was in excess of both the $4,500 homestead exemption claimed by the
debtor and the $5,000 maximum homestead exemption. TIle court held that the debtor's
homestead exemption could not be impaired where she will have preserved her homestead
exemption and equity in the property after payment of the judgment lien. The court noted that
the debtor's argument also fails under Kentucky law because the interest wllich the debtor's
creditors may attach is only her right of survivorship. If the non-debtor spouse outlives the
debtor spouse, then the holder of the right of survivorship takes nothing. Kentucky la\v does not
permit the sale of one spouse's present possessory interest in the property.

..

..
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Tllacker v. Ullited Co",pallies Le"dil'g COlporatiol', 256 B.R. 724 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
This case involved an improperly recorded mortgage and the Chapter 13 debtors' ability to avail
themselves of the strong-arm powers of a bankruptcy trustee under 11 U.S.C. §544(a). In 1995,
debtors borrowed $41,000 from the creditor, and secured the loan by granting a mortgage on
their real property. The debtors signed the mortgage in the presence of a notary public and the
mortgage was recorded. The debtors subsequently filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy and sought to
avoid the mortgage under §544(a). The mortgage failed to contain a description of the
encumbered real property within the body of the document (it was attached instead), which the
debtor claims was in violation of Kentucky's Conveyances and Encumbrances Statute (KRS,
Chapter 382), Kentucky's Statute of Frauds (KRS 371.010) and Kentucky common law, all of
which require mortgages to contain a written description of the encumbered property. The
mortgage also placed the parties' signature before the description of the property, and the notary
public's acknowledgement did not state who acknowledged or signed the instrument. The
debtors conceded that they granted the creditor the mortgage, that they signed the mortgage, that
the mortgage concerned the land at issue, and that they received the consideration set forth in the
mortgage. They nevertheless sought to set aside the mortgage as void. The bankruptcy court
(Judge Roberts) dismissed the debtors' complaint but the district court reversed.
The district court acknowledged the split of authority on the issue of whether chapter 13
debtors may avail themselves of the §544(a) strong-arm avoidance powers granted to trustees.
The court found persuasive the line of cases which holds that the debtors indeed have standing
th~ ass~rt the §544(a) powers. 11 U.S.C. §544(a) permits a trustee to avoid any transfer of
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property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor which is avoidable by a bona fide
purchaser of real property. Thus, the question before the court was whether a bona fide
purchaser would have had notice of the improperly executed mortgage. Citing KRS §382.270
and State Street Bank and Trust Company v. Heck's, Inc., 963 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1998), the court
concluded that the recordation of an unrecordable instrument does not constitute constructive
notice, and therefore no notice existed to defeat a buyer's bona fide purchaser status "... [N]o
constructive or inquiry notice exists to defeat a buyer's bona fide purchaser status." The court
acknowledged that the result compelled by this conclusion seemed to create an injustice but
concluded that, because bankruptcy law requires that chapter 13 debtors be treated as bona fide
"purchasers, and because the creditors involved in the original transaction are in the best position
to ensure compliance with the technical requirem"ents of mortgages, the proper result was to
permit the debtors to avoid the mortgage.
.

1" re Fears, 258 B.R. 371 (W.D.Ky. 2001). In this group of consolidated cases, the
bankruptcy court addressed the issue of whether formula-based collection costs added to
unsecured student loan claims are allowable under the Bankruptcy Code. None of the parties
disputed the fact that the principal and interest due on the loans was nondiscl1argeable pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(b), absent proof by a debtor tllat payment would cause an undo l1ardship.
The court held that, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §506, student loans are not oversecured claims, wl1ich
may include fees and costs. They are unsecured claims and may not include the additional fees
and costs. The district court reversed, 110lding that the Code's definition of "claims" is broad
enough to include the costs and fees. It concluded that the fact that §506(b) permits the charges
to be included in a fully secured claim does not mean that an unsecured claim cannot include
those charges.

i

E. Reaffirmation
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Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 233 F.3d 417 (6 th eire 2000). In this case, the debtors
purchased a van on which they obtained financing through the defendant Ford Motor Credit
Company. Debtors later filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, listed the van as a secured debt,
and filed a statement of intent to reaffirm their debt to Ford in order to retain possession of the
van. Ford tilen sent the plaintiffs a letter and proposed reaffirmation agreement. The debtors
signed the reaffirmation agreement and remained current on their payments to Ford both before
and after their discharge. Ford apparently failed to file the reaffirmation agreement with the
court.
The debtors later filed a purported class action suit against Ford alleging violations of 11
U.S.C. § § 524(a)(2) (discharge injunction), 524(c) (failure to file with the court), and 362
(automatic stay). The U.S. District Court dismissed the case upon Ford's motion, and the Sixtll
Circuit affinned. The court rejected the debtors' argument that §524 impliedly creates a private
right of action for an asserted violation of the section. It also rejected their alternative argument
that §524 is enforceable via 11 U.S.C. §105, which permits courts to "issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or permitted to carry out the provisions of this title." The court
analyzed the intent in the language and purpose of the statute and its legislative history, and
concluded that no private right of action was authorized. The purpose of §524(a)(2) is to
prohibit certain ~o~duct. The appropriate remedy for a vi.oIation of tIle prohibited conduct lies in

r
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contempt proceedings, not in a private lawsuit. Furthermore, the court found that §524(c) does
not prohibit a creditor from seeking reaffirmatio~, but rather sets forth the conditions under
which a reaffirmation agreement is enforceable. The violation of §524(c) merely renders the
agreement unenforceable. Lastly, the court held that §362, which creates an automatic stay upon
the debtor's filing of a bankruptcy petition, is not automatically violated by the sending of a
reaffirmation letter to a debtor. The court adopted the standards set forth in In re Briggs, 143
B.R. 438, 450-51 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992), which permits a finding that a course of conduct
violates §362(a)(6) if it "(1) could reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the
.debtor's determination as to whether to repay, and (2) is contrary to what a reasonable person
would consider to be fair under the circumstances."
Cox v. Zale Delaware Inc., 239 F.3d 910 (7 th Cir. 2000). The bankruptcy court held that
a debtor seeking affirmative relief from a discharged debt due to the creditor's failure to file a
reaffirmation agreement may bring an action only as a civil contempt proceeding in the
bankruptcy court that issued the discharge. In such a case, the procedure is to reopen the
bankruptcy proceeding because the debtor is seeking to enforce the order of discharge issued in
the previous bankruptcy proceeding.

...

.-

In this case, Ralph Cox filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. He
signed an agreement reaffirming his $218.93 debt on a piece of jewelry, payable at the rate of
$15.00 per month. This reaffirmation agreement was not filed with the bankruptcy court. He
received a discharge. He later brought this suit on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
arguing that the reaffirmation agreement must be rescinded and he be allowed to recover the
amounts that he and other members of the class had paid to Zale after discharge.
The district court reopened the case and then dismissed it, holding that §524(c) does not
create a private right of action for violation of the requirement that a debt reaffirmation
agreement be filed, relying on Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 233 F.3d 417 (6 th Cir. 2000).
While tIle Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court's result, it disagreed with the reliance on
Pertuso because the private rights of action that the court is reluctant to imply into federal
statutes are rights to obtain damages for statutory violations that are remediable by public
agencies. In this case, Cox was not seeking damages, and §524(c) is enforceable only by private
parties. As §524(c) makes an improper debt reaffirmation void, it gives the debtor a right to sue
for rescission and a defense to any suit to enforce that agreement. The effect of rescinding a debt
reaffirmation agreement is the same in either case: the debt is discharged to bankruptcy but the
creditor is still vested with its security interest. In such an event, Cox would be worse off if he
won than if he lost - - he could get his $219 back but Zale would get the ring back, together with
the rental value of the ring during the period because Zale, by signing the reaffirmation
agreement, agreed to forego repossession. The court found this to be a frivolous suit because the
payments that Cox sought to recoup were made voluntarily; and a nuisance suit because its net
expected value to Cox was negative.

F. Automatic Stay
A~ello v. ProvidialJ Fi~J.aIJcial Corp., 239 F.3d 876 (7

-

Cir. 2001). In this ~ase, tIle
bankruptcy court held that an individual may not recover damages for a violation of the
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automatic stay if those damages are purely emotional and not tied to any financial injury. Aiello
filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. One of her creditors, Providian, asked her to reaffirm
her $1,000 credit card debt. The creditor threatened to charge her witl1 fraud if sI1e refused. She
did refuse, but Providian did not charge her with fraud. She filed this class action suit to obtain
redress on behalf of herself and other similarly situated victims of Providian's alleged
harassment. The court assumed that Providian willfully violated the stay.
The court noted that a creditor may ask a debtor to reaffirm the creditor's debt so that it
will not be discharged. The right to seek reaffirmation is an exception to the automatic stay.
"But, if in seeking reaffirmation the creditor resorts to extortionate conduct, the creditor has
violated the automatic stay and brought the remedy provision, §362(h), into play.
The court stated, however, that this protection is financial in character and is not
protection for peace of mind. If the creditor had intimidated the debtor in the present case into
giving up her right of discharge, the bankruptcy court could have ordered under the authority of
§362(h) monetary relief necessary to restore her to the financial position she would have
occupied had the defendant not resorted to intimidation. The court noted tIlat, if such financial
injury were accompanied by emotional injury, the interest of judicial economy might weigh in
favor of joining a claim for emotional injury, citing Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb, 196
F.3d 265 (1 st Cir. 1999) as an action which "may have" presented such a situation. The court
concluded that, in the absence of a financial injury, the debtor must resort to state tort claims.

u.s. Departlllellt of Healtll alzd H,llllall Services v. Jallles, 256 B.R. 479 (W.D. Ky.
2000). This case addressed the issue of whether the filing of a bankruptcy petition allows a party
to avoid the requisite administrative remedies provided for in Medicare matters. Here, the
bankruptcy court ordered that the HHS' s exclusion of the debtor from participation in Medicare
and Medicaid programs be set aside. HHS appealed this decision. The district court reversed.
Dr. Gary D. James received four $10,000 Health Education Assistance Loans ("HEAL")
between 1980 and 1982. Dr. James did not repay these loans. The lenders therefore filed claims
with HHS. The United States made the lenders whole and reassigned the HEAL loans to HHS.
HHS unsuccessfully attempted to obtain repayment from Dr. James. HHS notified Dr. James
that, based upon his failure to pay the loans or enter into a repayment agreement, lle was
excluded from participation in Medicare, Medicaid and all federal health care programs. Dr.
James then filed a Chapter 11 petition. After a hearing, the bankruptcy court ordered the
exclusion temporarily lifted in connection with a repayment plan that would require James to
make payments to the United States in the amount $2,500 per month toward his HEAL debt.
HHS appealed on the issue of whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to review HHS's
authority.
The court found that neither the district court nor the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction
because Dr. James must have exhausted his administrative remedies before obtaining judicial
review. The court believed that anything less would circumvent the established procedures for
determination of Medicare matters and administrative review of such determinations as set out in
the Medicare program.
The court recognized that the issue is not well settled. Although the case law does not
. present a clear answer, the· arguments for and against jurisdiction have been well develqped and
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the court believed that its holding comported with the tenor of the only cases remotely on point
in the Sixth Circuit, citing Lavapies v. Bolin, 883 F.2d 465 (6 th Cir. 1989); In re: Clawson
Medical Rehab. and Pain Care Center, 12 B.R. 647 (E.D. Micll. 1981). The court also believed
that the decision was consistent with the goals ofthe Medicare program.

G. Bad Faith Filing and Dismissal
In TanJecki, 229 F.3d 205 (3 rd Cir. 2000). Here, the Third Circuit addressed bad faith
.filing. The debtor filed a Chapter 7 proceeding seeking discharge from approximately $35,000
in credit card debt owed to MBNA America. He had only one substantial asset, his share of a
tenancy by the entirety in a home which he held with his estranged wife. They had over
$100,000 equity in the home, and had been separated for approximately five years at the time the
debtor filed his bankruptcy. A divorce proceeding was pending.

In his petition the debtor claimed an exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)(B) for his
share of the home equity. The trustee in bankruptcy challenged this election and sought
dismissal of the debtor's petition for lack of good faith under § 707(a) of the Code. According to
the trustee, the debtor's divorce was right around tIle corner and, therefore, the debtor would
soon be entitled to his unencumbered sllare of the dissolved tenancy by the entirety, which would
allow the debtor to payoff his debt and have money left over. Given these facts, the trustee
reasoned that the debtor had acted in bad faith in filing llis petition because 11e knew that he
would soon be in a position to repay his debts. The bankruptcy court found that the debtor had
failed to prove his good faith in filing for bankruptcy and dismissed the petition under §707(a).
§707(a) allows the bankruptcy court to dismiss a petition for cause if the petitioner fails
to demonstrate good faith in filing. "At the very least, good faith requires a showing of honest
intention."
The court held that where the trustee has called into question a debtor's good faith, and
put on evidence sufficient to impugn that good faith, the burden then shifts to the debtor to prove
his good faith. The debtor's testimony confirmed the trustee's belief that his divorce was "right
around the comer." The debtor did not submit any evidence of the good faith other than his
testimony that he accrued his debt for subsistence purposes, he intended to repay the debt and
that he would take his wife back "in a heartbeat." The bankruptcy court discounted the selfserving testimony and relied upon the evidence that the debtor had acquired the large consumer
debt just before filing for bankruptcy and during the pendency of his divorce. The court rejected
the debtor's claim that the trustee must prove extreme misconduct; that the inability to repay is
not in and of itself evidence of bad faith, and that he did no more than avail himself of proper
exemption under the code. The court felt that the reasonableness of his accrual of the debt and
the timing of his filing, especially in relation to the unexplained circumstances relating to his
divorce proceeding, were sufficiently questionable to warrant good faith scrutiny. There was a
lengthy dissent.
H. Miscellaneous

Wallace Hardware COI"paIJY, Inc. v. Abral'Js, 223 F.3d 382 (6 th Cir. 2000). Here, the
Sixth Circuit recently upheld a Tennessee choice -o·f law provision in a gua~antY agreement,
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reversing the district court's application of Kentucky law. The Court of Appeals also considered
various other issues, not analyzed here. Wallace Hardware entered into an agreement to provide
hardware inventory to Tri-County Home Center and Tri-County executed a security agreement.
The documents were signed on behalf of Tri-County by brothers Lonnie and Bill Abrams. The
Abrams agreed to be liable jointly, severally and individually for payment of any and all goods
and services furnished by Wallace Hardware. Additionally, a guaranty agreement was executed,
although one of the Abrams brothers alleged his signature was forged. After bankruptcy
proceedings which were resolved by settlement among the trustee and Wallace Hardware,
Wallace Hardware brought an action against the Abrams in the U.S. District Court for the
.Eastern District of Kentucky. The Abrams sought an application of Kentucky law regarding the
breach of guaranty claim, despite the fact that the guaranty clearly stated that it would be
governed by Tennessee law. The guaranty failed. to meet the requirements set forth in KRS
371.065(1) regarding the form of guaranties. The district court reviewed Kentucky's choice of
law rules and concluded that the application of Kentucky law is appropriate whenever tIle state's
interests predominate over all others. The district court found that Kentucky had a greater
interest in the present case than did Tennessee. Wallace Hardware appealed.
The Sixth Circuit held that, in a standard commercial breach-of-contract case, the
Kentucky courts would choose to adopt § 187 of the Restatement (2 nd) of Conflict of Laws. The
Sixth Circuit extensively analyzes Kentucky case law dealing witll conflict of laws provisions.
The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not consider § 187 of the Restatement and
instead employed a purely interest-based approach. In doing so, the district court gave no weight
to tIle parties' written agreement indicating tllat Tennessee law would control. Under § 187, the
parties' choice of law should be honored unless (1) "the chosen state has no substantial
relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties'
choice"; or (2) "application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental
policy of a state which has a materially greater interest." The Sixth Circuit found that the first
prong was satisfied based on the fact that Wallace Hardware is located in Tennessee and that TriCounty elected to do business with and purchase goods from a Tennessee corporation. Second,
the Sixth Circuit analyzed the fundamental policy prong under this guaranty. While the laws of
the two states would reach different results, the court held that there must be a significant
difference in the application of the laws of the two states. The court held that the purposes
behind Kentucky's statute were largely served in this instance. In this case, the Abrams brothers
could not have been uncertain and they do not claim any uncertainty as to the indebtedness they
were agreeing to repay. The court further considered the fact that KRS §371.065 reflects only
one of the policies at issue. Another policy to c~nsider is that contract law upholds clearly
ascertained and negotiated contract rights, as well as parties' freedom to contract for substantive
rights.···llll'·!

In re Scl,u[tz, 254 B.R. 149 (6 th eire BAP 2000). In this case, the bankruptcy court
entered an order denying the debtor's general discharge on April 21, 2000. On May 8, 2000,
debtor's counsel filed a motion for an extension of time to file an appeal of the bankruptcy
court's order denying discharge. Here, the wife of debtor's counsel became seriously ill, and
counsel testified that he was suddenly and unexpectedly preoccupied with her physical and
psychological care. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, finding the debtor had not
demonstrated the excusable neglect required"to extend the time to file a notice of app·eal pqrsuant
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to Fed. R. Bankr. P.8002(c)(2). On appeal the BAP held the bankruptcy court abused its
discretion in determining the debtor's failure to timely file a notice of appeal was not excusable
neglect. The court distinguished this case from "law office upheaval" cases. The court
acknowledged that the determination of what constitutes "excusable neglect" is an equitable one
which must take into account all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission. The
court found that, because of the close familial relationship between a husband and wife and
because of the severity of the illness at issue, the facts of this case are analogous to a situation in
which the attorney is the one who is seriously il~. Accordingly, it reversed the bankruptcy
. court's order denying the debtor's motion for an extension of time to appeal.

In re Bersaglia, 254 B.R. 376 (Bankr. E.D.Ky., 2000). Here, Judge Howard addressed
the issue of whether workers compensation benefits could be classified as wages and, therefore,
be given priority. The Kentucky Uninsured Employers Fund (the "UEF") sought to have $4,000
of a total $12,000 claim designated a priority claim under 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(3). The UEF cited
KRS § 342.175, which provides that "all right of compensation granted by this chapter shall
have the same preference or priority for the whole thereof against the assets of tIle employer as is
allowed by law for any unpaid wages for labor." The court rejected the UEF's position and held
that worker's compensation benefits did not constitute wages and tllereby ordered tllat the claim
of the UEF be allowed as an unsecured non-priority claim.
The UEF's claim was based upon a worker's compensation claim that it paid to an
injured employee of the debtors under an agreed order between the UEF and the employee. In
the agreed order of settlement, the UEF specifically reserves the right to seek recovery from City
Enterprises and the Bersaglias for all amounts paid by it to the employee. UEF is responsible for
the payment of compensation when the employer defaults in its obligations. In the event that the
UEF pays, the employer is liable to the UEF for all amounts that were authorized to be paid. In
enforcing these rights the Labor Cabinet is subrogated to all the rights of the person receiving
such compensation from the fund. The UEF's claim in bankruptcy, therefore, was in the nature
of a reimbursement claim.
The UEF claimed that its debt should be given priority because under 11 U.S.C. §507(a),
the bankruptcy code provides:
(a) the following expenses and claims have priority in the following order... (3)
third, allowed unsecured claims, but only to the extent of $4,300 for each
individual corporation, as the case may be, earned within 90 days of the filing of
the petition or the date of the cessation of the debtor's business, whichever occurs
first, for - (A) wages, salaries, or commissions, including vacation, severance and
sick leave pay earned by an individual."
The court held that, in employing §507(a)(3) priority, Congress used precise language
and did not extend a priority to workers' compensation benefits. Any attempt to do so by state
statute would run afoul of the supremacy clause.

In re Tee/l"ologies 1"ternatio"alHoldi"gs, l"e., 256 B.R. 476 (E.D. Ky. 2000). Tllis
case addressed two issues: (1) the liability of the debtorTechnologi~s International Holdings
("TIH"), as guarantor on a note; (2) whether equitable considerations, including marshalling of
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assets, required the claimant to seek satisfaction from the principal obligor on the note before
turning to the guarantor. On June 1, 1998, TIH guaranteed the debt of Biosytems Technology
Inc. ("BTl") in the principal sum of $200,000. On May 29, 1999, BTl refinanced the note which
provided for a single advance of $203,912.28 with 'interest and was due four months later. TIH
contended that the refinancing of the June note paid BTl's indebtedness under the note in full as
a matter of law and discharged TIH's liability under the guaranty. Included in the guaranty,
however, was a provision that TIH was liable as guarantor for any extensions, renewals or
replacements of the note. TIH argued that this provision did not apply to the refinance because
.the terms of the second note were materially different from the terms of the first note. The major
difference was to change from an open end credit arrangement to a four month term loan.
The notes and guaranty were executed in Virginia and, therefore Virginia law applied.
The court cited Gullette v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 344 S.E. 2d 920 (Va. 1986),
where the Virginia Supreme Court held that a novation is never presumed. The burden of proof
is on the guarantor to establish by clear and satisfactory evidence that there existed on the part of
all parties involved in the transaction a clear and definite intention to effect a novation to a
previous note. Even though a second note may change some terms, the second note may still be
a renewal of a previous note. In other \vords, a change in terms will not affect a novation. As a
result TIH was liable under the guaranty.
The court also rejected TIH's contention that the court should apply marshalling of assets
or some other equitable theory to force the creditor to attempt to recover monies from BTl before
proceeding against TIH. The court refused to apply the marsllalling of assets or to force the
creditor to collect from BTl first because tIle guaranty was an unconditional guaranty. The court
recognized that its well settled that when a party signs an absolute guaranty the creditor is under
no obligation to collect from the debtor before looking to the guarantor. TIH was liable on the
guaranty.
II' re Treeo, 240 F.3d 148 (2d eire 2001). Here, the issue was whether a New York
bank, under 11 U.S.C. §304(a), should be forced to turn over funds to a Bahamian bank
undergoing bankruptcy proceedings in that country. For several years the Bank of New York
("BNY") acted as the Meridian International Bank Limited's ("MIBL") correspondent bank in
the United States, providing it and several of its subsidiaries account services, loans, and other
financial accommodations. BNY and MIBL entered into an agreement under which MIBL
pledged its accounts as security for all of MIBL's liabilities to BNY. The next year, MIBL
requested from BNY certain financial accommodations - - primarily in the form of overdrafts on
its operating accounts - - in the amount of $15.15 million to be secured by new funds deposited
at BNY by one of MIBL's subsidiaries, Meridian Bank Tanzania, Limited ("Meridian
Tanzania"). Meridian Tanzania and MIBL signed a second agreement pledging Meridian
Tanzania accounts at BNY to BNY as security.

MIBL failed to repay the $15.15 million and BNY liquidated Meridian Tanzania's
pledged account in that amount. However, the Central Bank of Tanzania appointed a manager to
operate Meridian Tanzania. The manager questioned the validity of the agreement and
demanded the return. of the $15.15 million that BNY had taken. TIle Supreme Court of the
Bahamas th~n ·placed MIBL into involuntary "liquidation.
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The MIBL liquidators initiated a proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York under 11 U.S.C. 304(a). Section 304(a) authorizes a foreign representative
in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding to commence a case ancillary to that proceeding in a United
States Bankruptcy Court to protect the administration of the foreign proceeding. That section,
among other things, authorizes an injunction prohibiting actions against the debtor and permits
the U.S. court to order the turnover of property to a foreign representative. BNY entered into a
settlement agreement with Meridian Tanzania but the liquidators moved for partial summary
judgment directing turnover of $600,000 remaining in MIBL's accounts at BNY and being held
.byBNY.
Section 304 of the Code was intended to deal with complex issues involving the legal
effect the United States courts will give to foreign "bankruptcy proceedings. The statute directs
the courts to consider six factors before deferring to the foreign court and granting relief in
support of foreign proceedings: (1) just treatment of all claims against or interests in the estate;
(2) protection of U.S. claim holders against prejudice and inconvenience; (3) prevention of
preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property; (4) distribution of proceeds of such estate
substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by U.S. bankruptcy law; (5) comity and (6)
if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for f~esh start for the individual in that the foreign
proceeding concerns. The court is required to conduct a case by case balancing of these statutory
factors.

...

The court believed that the first three factors did not present a bar to affording the relief
sought by the liquidators. The court, therefore, mainly addressed the competing interests of
comity and whether distribution of the proceeds of the estate would be substantially in
accordance with the order prescribed by the U.S. bankruptcy law While comity is a very
important consideration, it does not automatically override other specified factors. The court's
function under §304 is to determine whether comity should be extended to the foreign
proceeding in light of the other factors. In this case, the court was dealing with an allegedly
secured claim. Under Bahamian law the secured claim would be subordinate to all of the
administrative expenses of the estate. This difference in prioritization under U.S. and Bahamian
law was very significant because of the strong possibility that MIBL's estate would have little or
no funds after payment of the administrative expenses. The comparison between the priority
rules must consider the effect of the difference. Because administrative expenses would
diminish BNY's claim significantly, the court concluded that turnover was not appropriate. The
court also noted that the liquidators cited no cases in which a court had ordered the turn over of
assets under §304 from a creditor with a secured claim. In fact, several bankruptcy courts have
refused to grant relief under §304 where the priority of secured creditors was not recognized
under the law of foreign jurisdiction. The court limited the ruling to a degree. Neither the
bankruptcy court nor district court made a determination as to whether BNY's claim was, in fact,
secured. Instead, the Second Circuit remanded the case for that determination.

III. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
_ Bankruptcy refonn legislation has again passed in both the House of Representatives and
the Senate, although in two differentv~rsions. The two yersions passed e,acn feature significant
restrictions on consumers' ability to discharge
or o!herwise compromise debt. Eac..h versiop also
.
.
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contains less sweeping changes with respect to business bankruptcy. As of the date of this paper,
each house of Congress has sent the version it passed to the other house. The competing
versions are not formally in conference because there is no agreement regarding tile make up of
the conference committee. Proponents of the legislation believe that President Bush will be
more receptive to the legislation than was his predecessor. However, the press of apparently
higher priority legislative issues (ie., tax and budget le~islation) may make enactment of any
bankruptcy legislation before the summer recess difficult.

A. Means Testing: Needs-Based Bankruptcy
Both the Senate and House bills amend Federal bankruptcy law setting forth new
guidelines for dismissal or conversion of a Chapter 7 liquidation petition to one under Chapter 11
or Chapter 13. They also allow the bankruptcy pane.l trustee and any party in interest to move for
such dismissal or conversion. Currently, a party in interest does not llave this right.
Significantly, the bills lower the "substantial abuse" standard for dismissal or conversion to one
of simple abuse and replace the presumption in favor of granting relief with a presumption that
abuse exists when the debtor's current monthly income exceeds a certain amount, as determined
by a specified fonnula.
Under each bill, the presumption of abuse is strong and may only be rebutted by showing
special circumstances that require additional expenses or adjustment of the current monthly
income when there is no reasonable alternative. The bills also raise the bar for debtor's counsel.
Should the court find that the Chapter 7 filing is in violation of certain bankruptcy rules, the
debtor's attorneys will have to reimburse the trustee for legal fees incurred in pursuing the
dismissal or conversion motion. Additionally, a Chapter 13 debtor's "disposable income" under
each bill will be redefined to exclude domestic support obligations that first become payable
after the date the petition is filed.
There are also revisions to procedural guidelines that will require written notice be given
to the individual consumer debtor prior to filing for relief. This notice must advise of the types
of credit counseling services available, the criminal penalties for fraudulent concealment of
assets, and that creditor-supplied information may be examined by the Attorney General. (Sec.
104)
The bills require an individual debtor to obtain a briefing from an approved non-profit
budget and credit counseling service prior to filing for bankruptcy relief, with some exceptions
based upon availability of services in the district. A debtor cannot be discharged under Chapter
7 or 13 unless he has completed an approved course on personal financial management. The
clerk in each district must maintain a list of credit counseling agencies and courses concerning
personal financial management. The counseling services cannot inform credit reporting agencies
of an individual debtor's use of personal financial management instruction. There are civil
penalties for noncompliance. (Sec. 106)
2 The summarize of both the House and Senate bills is taken from summaries of the bills
prepared by the Congressional Research Service ("CRS"). The Senate bill suml11ary prepared by
the cR.s is current without' ame~dments passed In the Senate. The autllor has incorporated some
. of the amendments thought to be of jntet:est to thefmancial community.
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B. Enhanced Consumer Protection
Subsection A (Penalties for Abusive Creditor Practices) of Title II of both the House and
Senate bills provides for circumstances when the court may reduce (up to 20 percent) a claim
wholly based on unsecured consumer debts when the debtor can show by clear and convincing
evidence that the claim was filed by a creditor that unreasonably refused to negotiate a
reasonable alternative repayment schedule proposed by the debtor's approved credit counseling
agency.
If a creditor willfully fails to credit payments received from a debtor (with a specified
exception), and the failure causes material injury to the debtor, it is deemed a violation of
discharge and operates as an injunction. (Sec. 202) Debt reaffirmation guidelines governing
wholly unsecured consumer debts are modified to require specific detailed disclosures and
explanations to the debtor for dischargeable debt agreements. Credit unions are exempt from
these disclosures and explanations. Federal criminal law is amended and provides that U.S.
attorneys and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 'are to enforce laws concerning: (1) abusive
reaffirmations of debt; and (2) materially fraudulent statements in bankruptcy schedules that are
intentionally false or misleading. The bills require bankruptcy courts to establish procedures to
refer these cases to those agencies. (Sec. 203)

-

....

Subtitle B (Priority Child Support) of Title II of the Senate and House bills places certain
unsecured claims for domestic support obligations in the first priority claim category, when the
funds received by a governmental unit are applied in a prescribed order. The court cannot
confirm a debt repayment plan under Chapters 11, 12, and 13 unless it has certification of the
debtor's full payment of all adjudicated domestic support obligations which are due after the
petition filing date. (Sec. 213) The bills except from the automatic stay certain choose-in-action
that relate to domestic support obligation proceedings. (Sec. 214) The laws concerning
nondischargeability of certain debts for alimony, maintenance and support are also amended.
(Sec. 215) The bills would also make property, which is exempt from the estate, liable for a debt
arising from domestic support obligations. (Sec. 216) A bona fide payment of a debt for a
domestic support obligation cannot be avoided by the trustee. (Sec. 217) The trustee's duties
under Chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13 regarding a claim against an individual debtor for the collection
of child support are set forth. (Sec. 219) Debts for certain qualified educational loans that would
impose an undue hardship upon either the debtor or the debtor's dependent are dischargeable.
(Sec. 220)

c.

Discouraging Bankruptcy Abuse

Both the Senate and House bills provide for termination of the automatic stay 30 days
after filing of a petition when the debtor has had a Chapter 7, 11, or 13 petition dismissed during
the previous year, unless the subsequent filing is in good faith. (Sec. 302) If either of the bills
are passed in their present form, courts will be required to grant two-year relief from the
automatic stay when requested by a party in interest as to certain real property actions if there is
a finding that filing the bankruptcy petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, and defraud
creditors. (Sec. 303)
The bills also change a Chapter 7 debtor's duty to take certain affirmative actions in orger .. _
to retain possession of personal property.. Instead, creditors will be able to take action under
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nonbankruptcy law if the debtor fails to act within a certain time. There is an exception if the
court determines, upon the trustee's motion, that the property is of consequential value or benefit
to. the estate. (Sec. 304) The bills provide for termination of the automatic stay as to tIle estate's
property securing a claim or subject to an unexpired lease, when the debtor fails to complete an
intended surrender of consumer debt collateral, or an intended property redemption or debt
reaffirmation in order to retain such collateral, within a revised, accelerated time frame. This is
subject to the court's determination, upon the -trustee's motion, that the property is of
consequential value or benefit to the estate. (Sec. 305)
Under either bill, the court will be required to confirm Chapter 13 plans when they
provide that the holder of an allowed secured claim retains the attendant lien until payment or
discharge of all debts. The bill additionally provides that, when a Chapter 13 proceeding is
dismissed or converted without completing the plan, the holder retains the lien to the extent
recognized by nonbankruptcy law. There are statutory guidelines setting forth circumstances in
which cramdown under Section 506 cannot occur, and the creditor's entire claim will necessarily
receive secured status. In the Senate, these circumstances include when the creditor has a
purchase-money security interest in the debt; the underlying debt was incurred within three years
prior to the filing of the petition; and the collateral for that debt is for a motor vehicle for the
debtor's personal use (or if the collateral is anything else of value when the debt was incurred
during the year preceding the filing). In the House, the guidelines are similar, with the exception
that the underlying debt must have been incurred within the five years prior to the filing of the
petition. (S. 420, Sec. 306, H.R. 333, Sec. 306)
In determining which state law governs tIle debtor's selection of exempt property, both
bills hold that the debtor must be domiciled in the state for 730 days (an increase from the
present 180 day requirement) and address circumstances in which the debtor has not been
domiciled in a single state for that time period. (Sec. 307)
The House bill holds that the value of the homestead and burial plot exemptions are
reduced to the extent it is attributable to any portion of property disposed of by the debtor within
the seven-years prior to the filing date with the intent to obstruct or defraud a creditor; and to any
portion of property which the debtor could not exempt. (Sec. 308). The Senate bill alters
Section 308 by providing that a debtor may not exempt any amount of interest exceeding
$125,000 in the aggregate in real or personal property that the debtor or his dependent uses as a
residence; a cooperative that owns property the debtor or his dependent uses as a residence; or a
burial plot for the debtor or his dependant. Excepted from the limitation is the principal
residence of a family farmer (Sec. 420 Sec. 308)
The bills alter the provisions addressing conversion from Chapter 13 to another Chapter.
They state that (1) the valuation of property and of allowed secured claims in a chapter 13 case
shall not apply in a converted Chapter 7 case; and (2) the claim of any creditor holding security
as of the date of the Chapter 13 petition shall be secured by that security unless the full claim
amount (to be determined by nonbankruptcy law) has been paid in full as of the conversion date.
When there is a prebankruptcy default, it shall be treated under nonbankruptcy law unless it is
fully cured under the plan at conversion. (Sec. 309)
Both bills provide for a Chapter 7 debtor's .assumption of unexpired leases on personal
that, in a ~hapter 11 ca~e in which. the debtor is an individual and ~ Chapter 13

prop~rty and hoJd
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case, if the lease is not assumed in the plan, it is rejected at the close of the confinnation hearing.
Thus, the lease is free from the automatic stay. (Sec. 309)
The Senate bill provides for a cash payment plan for chapter 13 debtors in making
payments to lessors of personal property and to creditors holding a claim secured by personal
property. Debtors-in-possession will have to provide reasonable evidence of any requisite
insurance coverage with respect to the use or ownership of the property. (Sec. 309)
The Senate bill lowers the threshold amount for a presumption of nondischargeability to
$750 on both luxury goods and cash advances (which are extensions of consumer credit under an
open end credit plan) when acquired within 90 days and 70 days, respectively. (8. 420, Sec. 310)
The House bill makes the same adjustments as to time, but lowers the threshold for luxury goods
to $250. The House's threshold amount for cash advances remains at $750. (H.R. 333, Sec. 310)
The House bill precludes the automatic stay of any eviction, unlawful detainer action, or
similar proceeding by a lessor against a debtor involving residential real property when the
debtor resides as a tenant under a rental agreement, the debtor resides as a tenant under a rental
agreement that has terminated, or eviction actions are based on endangerment to the property or
person or the use of illegal drugs. This provision denies the automatic stay of any transfer that is
not avoidable by the trustee. (H.R. 333, Sec. 311) In addition to some of the same
circumstances, the Senate bill includes the situation in which the debtor has filed another
bankruptcy proceeding in the year preceding the date the current petition was filed. The Senate
bill also sets forth specific circumstances in which the automatic stay may not become effective.
(S. 420, Sec. 311)
Both bills extend the period between Chapter 7 discharges to eight years, and between
Chapter 13 discharges to five years. (Sec. 312)
Each of the Senate and House bills imposes strict deadlines and provides for automatic
dismissal when Chapter 7 or 13 debtors fail to furnish mandatory information to timely file the
required schedules. The court must dismiss within five days of any party-in-interest's request
based on the debtor's failure to timely submit required documents. (Sec. 316)
According to the Senate bill, the Chapter 13 confirmation hearing must be held within 45
days of the first meeting of creditors. (Sec. 31 7)
A formula is provided in both bills to determine when a Chapter 13 plan is to be made
over three or five years. (Sec. 318)
The bills each provide new guidelines for Chapter 11 business reorganization cases filed
by an individual. The debtor must identify the estate's property in bankruptcy and revise the
contents, confirmation and modification of a reorganization plan. (Sec. 321)
The House bill prohibits debtors from exempting any interest, which exceeds the
aggregate value of $100,000 and is acquired within the two years prior to filing the petition, in:
(1) real or personal property used as a residence; (2) a cooperative that owns property used as a
residence by the debtor or debtor's dependent; or (3) a burial plot for the debtor or debtor's
dependent. (H.R. 33-3, Sec. 322)

D· 30

r

r
r
r
r
r
r
r

r

r
r

r

r
r

r
r
r

Employee benefit plan participant contributions are exempted from property of the estate
under both bills. (8. 420, Sec. 322 and H.R. Sec. 323)
Under each bill, the value of personal property securing an allowed claim is to be
detennined based on its replacement value, as of the date of the filing of the petition, without
deduction for costs of sale or marketing. (S. 420, Sec. 326 and H.R. Sec. 327)

D. General and Small Business Bankruptcy Provisions
There are multiple new provisions under both the House and Senate bills concerning
.general and small business bankruptcy issues.
With respect to a trustee's authority to avoid a transfer of property, the length of time to
perfect the transfer is increased from ten to thirty days under both bills. (Sec. 403) Guidelines
for rejection and surrender of executory contracts and unexpired leases are revised under the
bills. (Sec. 404)
Under both the Senate and House bills, acceptance or rejection of a Chapter 11 plan may
be solicited from a holder of a claim or interest if: (1) the solicitation complies with applicable
nonbankruptcy law; and (2) the solicitation was made prior to filing the petition and in
compliance with applicable nonbankruptcy law. (Sec. 408) Both bills prohibit the trustee from
avoiding a transfer if, in a case where the debts are not primarily consumer debts, the aggregate
value of all property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than $5,000. (Sec.
409) The extensions of time pennitted for filing a Chapter 11 reorganization plan are limited
under both bills. (Sec. 411)
Investment bankers for any outstanding security of the debtor may be treated as
disinterested persons. (Sec. 414)
Both bills require the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial
Conference of the United States to propose amende~ Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and
Official Bankruptcy Fonns instructing Chapter 11 debtors to disclose information concerning the
value, operations, and profitability of any closely held corporation, partnership, or other entity in
which the debtor holds a substantial or controlling interest. (Sec. 419)
The Small Business Bankruptcy Provisions in both bills establish mandatory factors for
the court to consider in determining whether the disclosure statement regarding a small business
reorganization plan provides adequate information. Both bills define a small business debtor,
generally, as a person (including a debtor affiliate) with not more than $3 million in aggregate
non-contingent, liquidated secured and unsecured debts as of the date of the petition or tIle order
for relief (excluding debts owed to one or more affiliates or insiders). (Sec. 432)
Under each of the Senate and House bills, there are revised rules concerning the ability of
a secured single asset real estate interest creditor to get relief from the automatic stay when the
debtor has commenced monthly payments to each of these creditors to allow the debtor, in the
debtor's sole discretion, to make such payments from rents or other income generated before or
after the filing of the petition by or from the property. These provisions require such payments
i~ an amount equal to the interest on the value of the creditor's interest in the real estate,
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determined at the then-applicable nondefault contract rate of interest. This is currently the fair
market rate. (Sec. 444)
.
In the House bill, a small business bankruptcy reorganization plan must be confirmed
within 175 days after the order for relief. There are provisions for the extension of time (H.R.
333, Sec. 438). The Senate bill provides that the plan must be confirmed with 45 days of the
date of filing, with certain criteria specified for extensions (S. 420, Sec. 438)
Both of the bills allow, as an administrative expense, all monetary obligations due from a
.nonresidential real property lease previously assumed and subsequently rejected under the
requirements governing executory contracts and unexpired leases for the two-year period
following either the rejection date or date of actual turnover of the premises, whichever is later.
(Sec. 445)

E. Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases
The Senate and House have both expanded the scope of bankruptcy law to incorporate
the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, and established a statutory mechanism for
addressing cases involving cross-border insolvency and the cooperation among u.S. courts,
trustees, debtors and their foreign counterparts. (Title VIII)

F. Protection of Family Farmers
Both Senate and House bills propose to reenact Chapter 12 (Adjustment of Debts of a
Family Farmer with Regular Annual Income). However, the Senate includes more revisions of
bankruptcy law with regard to same and incorporates provisions set forth to protect the family
fisherman.
The House bill amends the Federal bankruptcy code to: (1) reenact Chapter 12,
Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer with Regular Annual Income (thereby reinstating
family farmer bankruptcy relief); and (2) cite circumstances under which the claim of a
governmental unit that arises as a result of the disposition of a farm asset used in the debtor's
fanning operation shall be treated as an unsecured claim not entitled to priority.
The Senate bill provides for triennial adjustments of family farmers' debt limit. (Sec.
1002) Both the Senate and House bills address circumstances in which a governmental unit's
claim, arising from the disposition of a farm asset used in the debtor's farming operation, shall be
treated as an unsecured claim and is not entitled to priority. (Sec. 1003)
With respect to the maximum aggregate debts an individual or individual and spouse
engaged in a farming operation may have to qualify as family farmers for debt adjustment
purposes, the Senate bill increases the amount from $1.5 million to $3 million. The Senate bill
also reduces, from 80 percent to 50 percent" the minimum percentage of aggregate,
noncontingent, liquidated debts (with certain exclusions) arising out of the farming operation.
(Sec. 1004)
The Senate bill repeals the requirement that the family fanner and spouse receive over 50
percent of income from fanning operations .in the year prior to the bankruptcy. Instead, it allows
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the income requirement to be met during at least one of the three taxable years preceding the
taxable year in which the petition is filed. (Sec. 1005)
.
Circumstances in which the court shall confirm a family farmer bankruptcy plan,
notwithstanding the objection of the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim, are set
forth in the Senate bill. This portion of the Senate bill prohibits post-confirmation modification
of the plan which increases the payment amounts due before the modification. Further, unless the
debtor proposes the modification, a modified plan may not require payments to unsecured
creditors in any particular month greater than debtor's disposable income for that month based on
an increase in debtor's disposable income or, if the modification takes place in the plan's last
year, require any payments that would leave the debtor with insufficient funds after plan
completion to carry on the fanning operation. (Sec. 1006)
G. Health Care and Emplovee Benefits
Title XI of the House and Senate bills both address health care and employee benefits and
provide guidelines for disposing of a health care businesses' patient records (not including a
health maintenance organization) when it brings a proceeding for debtor relief and the trustee
cannot pay for storage of patient records as required by law. Administrative expense claims are
pennitted for the costs of closing a health care business, including disposal of patient records and
transfer of patients. (Sec. 1103) The legislation mandates that the court appoint an ombudsman
to represent the interests of patients of a health care business within 30 days after filing under
Cllapters 7, 9, or 11 (Sec. 1104) and requires that the trustee use all reasonable and best efforts to
transfer patients from the health care business being closed to an appropriate substitute. (Sec.
1105) The bills also preclude the debtor's continuation or reinstatement in Medicare or any other
Federal health care program by denying tIle protection of the automatic stay. (Sec. 1106)
H. Miscellaneous

Both the Senate and House bills make technical corrections to Federal bankruptcy,
judicial, and criminal law.
The Senate and House bills redefine single asset real estate to exclude family fanns and
repeal the $4 million ceiling for noncontingent, liquidated secured debts on such property. They
also define the term "transfer" to include the creation of a lien, the retention of title as a security
interest, foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption, and every mode of disposing of
property or parting with an interest in property. (Sec. 1201)
Expenses incurred for an attorney or an accountant by an individual member of a
creditors' and equity security holders' committee are excluded from compensable professional
services by the Senate and House bills. (Sec. 1208)
The Senate and House bills revise preferences guidelines so that, if the trustee avoids a
security interest given between 90 days and one year prior to the filing date by the debtor to a
non-insider for the benefit of an insider creditor, then that security interest is considered avoided
only as to the insider creditor. (Sec. 1213)
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Pursuant to both Senate and House bills, the time within which a debtor may perfect a
security interest created by the transfer and which the trustee may not avoid, will be extended
from 20 to 30 days within the debtor's receipt of possession. (Sec. 1223)
Both bills set forth compensation guidelines for a trustee's services and expenses incurred
when petitioning the court to convert or dismiss a chapter 7 case. (8. 240, Sec 1226 and H.R.
333, Sec. 1225)
Both the Senate and House bills modify the right of a seller of goods to reclaim goods
.from the debtor if they are received while the debtor is insolvent. The bills also limit the period
of receipt to 45 days after the case begins, and limit the time when the seller may demand
reclamation to 45 days after the debtor's receipt or within 20 days after the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. (S. 240, Sec. 1229 and H.R. 333, Sec. 1228)
The Senate and House bills set forth provisions for expedited bankruptcy appeals to the
Courts of Appeals. Any judgment, decision, order, or decree of a bankruptcy judge is deemed to
be that of the appellate District Court, unless the District Court files its own decision within 30
days after the filing of the appeal. (S. 420, Sec. 1235 and H.R. 333, Sec. 1234)
Both Senate and the House bills provide that the Effective Date for each is 180 days after
enactment. (S. 420, Sec. 1501 and H.R. 333, Sec. 1401)
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I.

Establishment And Relocation Of Bank Branches Or Offices (808 KAR 1:150)

II.

Examination Of Records - Promulgation Of Rules - Delegation Of State
Treasurer's Authority (KRS 393.280)

III.

Unclaimed Property; Examination Of Holder Records (20 KAR 1:050)
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IV.

Unclaimed Property; Safe Deposit Boxes Or Other Safekeeping Repositories
(20 KAR 1:060)

V.

Reports To Be Filed By Holders Of Unclaimed Property (20 KAR 1:080)
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808 KAR 1:150.

ESTABLISHMENT AND RELOCATION OF BANK BRANCHES
OR OFFICES.
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Public Protection and Regulation Cabinet
808 KAR 1:150. Establishment and relocation of bank branches or efflces.
RELATES TO: KRS 287.102, 287.180, 287.185
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 287.180(2),287.185
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS 287.180(2) and 287.185 authorize the Department of Financial Institutions to designate those
banks that do not have to apply for approval of the commissioner for permission to establish a branch or to relocate its principal office or branch. KRS
287.102 authorizes a qualified state bank to engage in any banking activity in which the bank could engage in other states if the bank meets specified
conditions. Other states permit statewide branching as part of their authorized banking activities. This administrative regulation establishes the criteria
for a bank to meet in order to be designated as not having to obtain commissioner approval to establish a branch, or relocate a principal office or
branch.
Section 1. Permitted Activities Without Commissioner Approval. Any bank that meets the criteria set forth in Section 2 of this administrative regulation
and provides the notices required in Section 3 of this administrative regulation may do any of the following in any county of the state, whether or not
already located in the county, without commissioner approval:
(1) Establish a branch; or
(2) Relocate its main office or branch office.
Section 2. Criteria to Act Without Commissioner Approval. The following criteria shall be satisfied before a bank may undertake the activities described
in Section 1 of this administrative regulation without commissioner approval:
(1) The bank shall have received its bank charter from the department at least three (3) years prior to undertaking the activities;
(2) The bank shall "be well-capitalized.
(a) As defined by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, if the bank is a nonmember bank; or
(b) As defined by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, if the bank is a member bank;
(3) The bank shall have received a CAMEL composite rating of one (1) or two (2) on its most recent state or federal regUlatory examination:
(4) The bank shall have received a management rating of one (1) or two (2) on its most recent state or federal regulatory examination;
(5) The bank shall not be a party to any formal or informal enforcement action initiated by a state or federal regulatory agency; and
(6) The bank's activity shall not cause the bank to exceed the fixed asset limitation established in KRS 287.100.
Section 3. Required Notices. A bank that desires to engage in the activities described in Section 1 of this administrative regUlation without
commissioner approval shall submit the following notices:
(1) A notice shall be sent to the department within thirty (30) days after the bank's board of directors approves the activity, which notice shall provide as
follows:
(a) The address of the new location where the bank intends to establish or relocate its new branch or office;
(b) The expeded date the new branch or office $hall open; and
(c) A statement by the bank that it satisfies the criteria set forth in Section 2 of this administrative regulation signed by an authorized officer or agent of
the bank.
(2) A notice shall be sent to any state bank with its main office located in the county where the new branch or office will be located within thirty (30)
days after the bank's board of directors approve the activity, which notice shall provide as follows:
(a) The address of the new location where the bank intends to establish or re.locate its new branch or office; and
(b) The expected date the new branch or office shaft open.
(3) A notice shall bes~nt to the department within thirty (30) days after the bank has opened its branch or office at the new location advising the
department of the opening. .
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Public Protection and Regulation Cabinet
Section 4. Effect of Subsequent Noncompliance with Criteria. If. subsequent to the establishment or relocation of an office or branch without
commissioner approval, the bank no longer meets the requirements established in Section 2 of this administrative regulation, the bank shall thereafter
be required to obtain commissioner approval prior to establishing or relocating any additional offices or branches until the bank again meets the
criteria. The establishment or relocation already completed by the bank shall not be rendered ineffective. (27 Ky.R. 260; Am. 769; eft. 9-11-2000.)
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KRS 393.280

EXAMINATION OF RECORDS - PROMULGATION OF RULES _
DELEGATION OF STATE TREASURER'S AUTHORITY.
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393.280 Examination of records- Promulgation of rules - Delegation of State
Treasurer's authority.
(1)
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The department, through its employees, may at reasonable times and upon
reasonable notice examine all relevant records of any person except any banking
organization or financial organization where there is reason to believe that there has
been or is a failure to report property that should be reported under this chapter
during the preceding reporting period. Records shall be considered relevant to the
examination of the preceding reporting period· if they document the period
necessary, for that type of property, to establis~ presumed abandonment.
The Department of Financial Institutions may at reasonable times and upon
reasonable notice examine all relevant records of any banking organization or
fmancial organization if there is reason to believe that there has been or is a failure
to report property that should be reported under this chapter during the preceding
reporting period.
Documents and working papers obtained or compiled by the department or the
Department of Financial Institutions in the course of conducting an examination are
confidential and are not open records under KRS 61.870 to 61.884.
The State Treasurer may promulgate any reasonable and necessary rules for the
enforcement of this chapter, and govern hearings held before him. He may delegate
in writing to any regular employee of the department authority to perfonn any of the
duties imposed on him by this chapter, except the promulgation of rules.
Effective: July 15, 1998
History: Amended 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 560, sec. 2, effective July IS, 1998. - Amended
1994 Ky. Acts ch.58, sec. 19, effective March 10, 1994; and ch.276, sec. 18,
effective July 15, 1994. -- Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective
October 1, 1942, from Ky. Stat. sec. 1622-1.
Legislative Research Commission Note (7/15/94). This section was amended by 1994
Ky. Acts chs. 58 and 276. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been
codified together. Where a conflict exists, Acts ch. 276, which was last enacted by
the General Assembly, prevails under KRS 446.250.
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20 KAR 1:050.

UNCLAIMED PROPERTY; EXAMINATION OF HOLDER
RECORDS.
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20 KAR 1:050. Unclaimed property; examination of holder records.
RELATES TO: KRS 393.010.393.110.393.160.393.280
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 393.280
NECESSITY. FUNCTION. AND CONFORMITY: This administrative regulation relates to the examination of holder records by the department if any
holder fails to make a full and complete report of property as required by KRS Chapter 393.
Section 1. If any holder fails to make a full and complete report of property as required by KRS Chapter 393. the department. after giving notice as
provided in subsection (1) of this section. may examine the records and other accounts of the holder.
(1) The department shall notify the holder in writing ten (10) days prior to an examination. However. if the department determines that the existence of
the records may be placed in jeopardy unless action is taken forthwith. the department may examine all records immediately without any prior notice.
(2) The examination may include:
(a) Records of current accounts. dormant accounts. and accounts that may have been closed and archived;
(b) Verification of contractual agreements between depositors and the final organization regarding the deduction of service charges. account increases
or decreases. and the cessation of interest payments; and
(c) In addition to the examination of unclaimed accounts and contractual agreements. the examiner may review the holder's annual procedures for
reviewing dormant accounts.
(3) The department shall have reason to believe that a holder has failed to comply with the reporting requirements of KRS Chapter 393 and may
examine the records of the holder if one (1) of the following conditions exist:
(a) A holder has not submitted a report to the department;
(b) A holder has submitted reports to the department in which the holder's report states it has no unclaimed property;
(c) A holder fails to report types of unclaimed property normally reported by like businesses or associations;
(d) When amounts on the holder's report or amounts remitted from the holder are not comparable to reports received from like holders; and
(e) When information is provided by other governmental agencies or reliable sources that a holder may be holding unclaimed property that has not
been reported.
(4) At the completion of an examination a statement of examination findings and proposed adjustments shall be delivered to the holder. The statement
shall be delivered by the department by hand or by certified mail. The statement shall contain sufficient information to make the holder aware of his
reporting obligations and legal options.
(5) The holder shall have thirty (30) days in which to review the examination findings and proposed adjustments to the findings. No later than thirty (30)
days of the date of the statement. the holder shall cause to be generated an amended annual report. If the holder disagrees on the facts, he shall file
an official written protest within the thirty (30), day period or the amount as set out by the statement will become absolute 'and final and be immediately
due and payable. The protest shall be filed with the department and shall set out a clear and concise assignment of any error alleged to have been
committed by the dePartment in its examination or its statement. The holder may request an administrative hearing in its protest. (21 Ky.R. 684; Am.
1281; eff. 10-12-94.)
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20 KAR 1:060.

UNCLAIMED PROPERTY; SAFE DEPOSIT BOXES OR
OTHER SAFEKEEPING REPOSITORIES.
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20 KAR 1:060. Unclaimed property; safe deposit boxes or other safekeeping repositories.

RELATES TO: KRS 393.010. 393.020.393.050.393.060.393.062.393.064.393.090. 393.110. 393.120
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 393.280
NECESSITY. FUNCTION. AND CONFORMITY: This administrative regulation relates to the reporting. inventory. safekeeping and liquidation of
unclaimed property from holders who maintain safe deposit or other safekeeping repositories.
Section 1. Pursuant to KRS Chapter 393. every holder maintaining safe deposit boxes or other safekeeping repositories located in the Commonwealth
shall report to the department with an inventory of property in its possession which constitute unclaimed funds.
(1) An inventory report shall be submitted for each safe deposit box or safekeeping repository. Each report shall be signed by two (2) officials of the

holding company who opened the safe deposit box or safekeeping repository and conducted the inventory. Each report shall include a statement
containing the following information:
(a) The name. last known address. and Social Security number of owner;

r

(b) The expiration date of the lease or rental agreement for such safe deposit box or other safekeeping depository;

r

(d) The number or identifying description of the safe deposit box or other safekeeping repository;
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(c) The date of opening of such safe deposit box or other safekeeping repository;

(e) A detailed list describing each item therein;
(f) The name and address of the holder reporting the properly; and

(g) The names, signatures. and official positions of the two (2) holding company employees who opened the box and conducted the inventory.
(2) The property of each safe deposit box or safekeeping repository shall be placed in an individual envelope. A copy of the holder inventory report
shall be placed in the envelope. The envelope shall be sealed and initialed on the reverse side by the two (2) holding company employees who

conducted the inventory. The name of the owner of the box, date, and holder name shall be printed on the reverse side of the envelope. Transparent
sealing tape (of the strong bonding type) shall be placed over the flap of the envelope. A second copy of the holder inventory report shall be attached
to the front of the envelope.
(3) The holder shall mail a copy of the report(s) and notify the department of pending delivery of property.

(4) The holder shall be responsible for the secured delivery of the contents of each safe deposit box or other safekeeping repository to the department.
The department may take direct delivery from the holder at the holder's place of business or residence.

Section 2. Upon receipt of the contents of the safe deposit box(es) or other safekeeping repository(ies). along with the inventory report(s). the
department shall immediately conduct an inventory of property delivered. verify holder report(s). and secure property in the department vault.
(1) The inventory shall be conducted by two (2) department employees with appropriate supervision.
(2) The contents of each envelope will be separated into the following groups:

(a) TNG • jewelry with gemstones, watches and other valuables;
(b) MNY - coins and paper money (foreign & domestic) which have numismatic value;
(c) STK • stock certificates;
(d) BND • U.S. Savings Bonds;
(e) INS • insurance policies;
(I) C$H, - Coins and paper money which do not have numi~maUc value;

(g)DST • items of no value; and
(h) OTH • military discharge. birth certificate; photos,etc.
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(3) Each item shall be assigned an identification or serial number. A property tag shall be prepared for each group with an assigned owner
identification or serial number, name of owner, and Social Security number if available. The groups of tangible property will be placed in individually
secured plastic bags. The groups of intangible property shall placed into folders.
(4) A detailed department inventory statement shall be completed for each safety deposit box or safekeeping repository envelope received. Each
statement shall include the following information:
(a) The name and last known address of the owner(s);
(b) The name and address of holder reporting the property;
(c) Date of delivery and holder inventory;
(d) Date of holder inventory;
(e) Number or identifying description of the safe deposit box or safekeeping repositorY;

(f) Date of department inventory;
(9) A detailed list describing each item therein, separated into groups as stated in subsection (2) of this section;
(h) The assigned holder identification or serial number;

(i) The assigned owner identification or serial number; and

0) An official note signed by department employees, who conducted the inventory, verifying accuracy of holder report. The note shall be signed for
approval by a supervisor.
(5) Property shall be secured in the department vault for safekeeping purposes. Tangible property shall be retained for a period of three (3) years and
then put to public auction, pursuant to KRS Chapter 393, and proceeds, less costs, paid to the state. Intangible property shall be retained for a period
of one (1) year, then liquidated and the proceeds, less costs, paid to the state. Owners of property shall be credited for the amount received through
liquidation or auction.
(a) Coins and paper money not of numismatic value shall be deposited for the state immediately and a copy of the pay-in voucher placed in owner's
file;
(b) Misceflaneous papers or property of no value shall be retained for a period of three (3) years and, then, destroyed.
(c) The Kentucky Historical Society shall be contacted for determination of items of historical value. Papers or property determined to have historical
value shall be retained and may be loaned to the society.
(6) The department shall maintain an accurate inventory and essential information through entry into the computer.
(7) The department shall direct that two (2) employees be present at all times when handling property. Security of property in the vault shall be
maintained by the following procedure:
(a) Two (2) employees shall receive written authorization from a supervisor prior to entry to the vault; and
(b) The employees shall state in writing the purpose, property to be handled, the time and date. (21 Ky.R. 685;
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20 KAR 1:080.

REPORTS TO BE FILED BY HOLDERS OF
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY.
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General Government Cabinet
20 KAR 1:080. Reports to be filed by holders of unclaimed property.
RELATES TO: KRS 393.110(1)
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 393.110(1), 393.280(4)
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS 393.110(1) requires the holder of unclaimed property to submit annual reports to the State
Treasurer conceming the property. This administrative regulation establishes the reporting requirements for a holder of unclaimed property.
Section 1. Reports Filed by a Holder of Unclaimed Property. A holder of unclaimed property shall annually file a completed Form 400, Unclaimed
Property Report/Remit Form, with the main office of the State Treasurer no later than the close of business on November 1 of each year.
Section 2. Reports on Property Held in an Interest Bearing Account. If the holder of unclaimed property is required to place that property in an interest
bearing account, the holder shall submit to the State Treasurer the following reports:

(1) Statements on the interest-bearing account holding unclaimed property. The statement shall:
(a) Be the kind normally issued on an interest-bearing account;

(b) Be filed:
1. With the main office of the State Treasurer; and
2. According to the holder's normal course of business no less than quarterly; and
(c) Include the value of the unclaimed property and the amount of the interest paid on the account.
(2) Reports on an amount paid out of an account holding unclaimed property. A holder of an account holding unclaimed property shall file a report
within ten (10) business days of paying an amount out of the account. The report shall:
(a) Include:
1. The name, Social Security number, and the address of the property owner;
2.

T~e amount paid;

3. The portion of the amount that represents interest paid and the portion that represents the original amount of unclaimed property;
4. The date the property was presumed abandoned;
5. Proof of payment;
6. An itemization of each fee or expense charged against the account; and
7. An affidavit indicating:
8. What specific proof was used in detennining that the person that received the amount or payment was the rightful claimant; and

b. That the procedures for paying a claim for unclaimed property as established in 20 KAR 1:040 were followed; and
(b) Be filed at the main office of the State Treasurer.
Section 3.. Incorporation by Reference. (1) Form 400, ·Unclaimed Property Report/Remit Form-, October 1999, is incorporated by reference.
(2) This material may be inspected, copied or obtained at the Kentucky State Treasurer, Capitol Annex, Room 183, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601,
Monday through Friday. 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. (26 Ky.R. 491; Am. 989; elf. 11-15-99.)
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LOAN WORKOUTS: HOW TO LIMIT EXPOSURE FOR LENDERS

I.

PRE-DEFAULT ISSUES

r

A.

r

B.

!

,.
1

II.

r

r

r
,..

Loan Document Provisions in Contemplation
of Default (see Appendix A)
'

F-I

Pre-Default Extensions, Amendments, Waivers
and Credit Enhancements
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WORKOUT DUE DILIGENCE, OPTIONS AND ISSUES
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A.
B.
C.
D.
E..
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F.
G.
H.
I.

III.'

I
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A.

F-20
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C.

D.
E.

Manner of Corresponding with Client
Manner of Corresponding with Debtor
Pre-Workout Letter (see Appendix D)
Forbearance Agreeme~t
Mutual Release

Appendix A - Loan Document Provisions in Contemplation of Default
Appendix B - Form for Commercial Demand / Cure Letters Business
Purpose Loans
Appendix C - Invitation to Borrower to Engage a Crisis Manager
Appendix D - Agreement Concerning Discussions and Negotiations
Pertaining to Loans

r
r

Conflict Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Default/Demand Letter
Late Charges and Post-Default Interest Increase
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692, et. seq.)
Set-Offs
Loan Document Audit
File Correspondence and "Lender Conduct" Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Situational Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Workout; or Self-Help and Judicial Remedies?

IMPLEMENTATION OF WORKOUT

B.

r

F-l

Note:

Portions of this outline are drawn from materials that were prepared by the author in collaboration with
Susan S. Armstrong, Esq., Hon. Joan Lloyd Cooper and Lenna R. Macdonald, Esq. for a presentation to
the Louisville Bar Association on November 9, 1998, and the author thanks them for their contributions.
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LOAN WORKOUTS: HOW TO LIMIT
EXPOSURE FOR LENDERS

r

r

I.

PRE-DEFAULT ISSUES
A.

,.

Loan Document Pro\'isions in Contemplation of Default (see Appendix A)
1.

,.

Construction of Pro\,isions
[a]

Covenants construed independently

[b]

Borro\ver had benefit of counsel

[c]

inconsistent provisions

f

2.

r
r

,.
r

Additional Deli\'eries
[a]

3.

Po\ver of attorney

Indemnification
[a]

Lender liable only for gross negligence and \villful misconduct

4.

Acceptance of Partial Performance not a Waiver

5.

Claims and damages

".

r
f

r

6.

no consequential damages

[b]

"timely" notice of claims or barred

[c]

automatic release of Lender upon payment

Governing La\v; Consent to jurisdiction and venue
[a]

r
r
t

r
r

[a]

7.

See Wallace Hard\vare Co. v. Abrams, 223 F.3d 382 (6 th Cir. 2000)
though Kentucky courts have been observed to be "egocentric"
concerning choice oflaw questions, Kentucky would choose to adopt
§ 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of La\vs; therefore,
choice of Tennessee law by parties to guaranty is honored and
guarantor is unable to interpose KRS § 371.065 as a-defense

Disclosures

F ·1

[a]

8.

9.

B.

In reversing summary judgment against borrower, court· held that
confidential infonnation about corporate business plans fumished.by
individual borrower to lender was evidence of the existence of a
fiduciary relationship that lender may have breached when it agreed
to finance a competing business of a former director of borrower,
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky.
1991)

Waiver of Jury Trial
[a]

Must be kno\vingly and voluntarily given, K.M.C. v. Irving Trust
Company, 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985)

[b]

Enforceable in Ky. state court? see CR 38.01, but see CR 38.04

Arbitration

Pre-Default Extensions, Amendments, \Vai,·ers and Credit Enhancements
1.

Waiver of Covenant Violations
[a]

2.

Failure of lender to fonnally \vaive may prejudice its abilit), later to
claim entitlement to strict performance

Mechanics Lien Waivers
[a]

[b]

Tile House. Inc. v. Cumberland Federal Sa\'inQs Bank, 942 S.\\'.2d
904 (Ky. 1997) bank mortgagee's kno\vledge ofequitable lien (home
purchaser's contract), to which its mortgage in consequence \,·as
subordinate, resulted in the lien of the bank's mortgage also being
subordinate (to the extent ofthe amount secured by the equitable lien)
to claims ofmechanics lien holders who didn't have kno\vledge ofthe
equitable lien and whose claims \vere superior to the equitable lien,
but which claims otherwise would have been subordinate to the lien
of the bank's mortgage.
Metal Sales Mfg: Corp. v. Newton, 12 S.W.3d 691 (Ky. App. 1999)
materialman's lien is held to be created upon the delivery of labor or
materials and perfected upon the filing of the lien statement,
therefore, although the bank's mortgage was filed prior to filing of
materialman's lien, the lien ofthe bank's mortgage nevertheles$was
subordinate to the materialman's lien to the e~tent of that portion of
the.indebtedness secured by the bank's m.ortgage that was preexistiI!g
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debt being refinanced at the time the mortgage was given and so not
"for 'value" under KRS 376.010(2). Even though the proceeds of the
preexisting debt were used entirely for construction on the mortgaged
premises, the operative inquiry is not the purpose for \vhich the
preexisting debt \vas incurred, but \vhether the mortgage was given
"for value."

r
t

r
3.

r
t

r

Effect of Modifications on Obligations of Guarantors
[a]

Is contemporaneous consent from existing guarantors required or
advisable?

[1]

r

r

T\,~ro primary factors

are indicative ofaccommodation
status: (1) no benefits from the proceeds of the
instrument are received by the accommodation party,
and (2) the signature is needed by the maker to
acquire the loan. Id. at 954.

r
r

r

[2]

r
r

r
r

r
r

Ramsevv. First Nat. Bank and Trust CompanY ofCorbin, 683
S.W.2d 947 (Ky. App. 1984) business partner and co-signer
of note held to be a co-maker rather than an accommodation
part)', and so not entitled to discharge \vhen other partner \vas
released, under the "purposes and benefits" test.

[3]

KRS 355.3-605 pro\'ides that an accommodation part)r is not
discharged if:

(a)

The partY assertinQ discharQe consents to the
event or conduct that is the basis of the
discharge; or

(b)

the instrument or a separate agreement of the
party provides for \vaiver of discharge under
this section either specifically or by general
language indicating that parties waive
defenses based on suretyship or impairment of
collateral. (emphasis supplied)

Kane v. Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust CompanY,' 668
S.W.2d 1984 (Ky. App. 1984) guarantors under continuing
guaranty agreement who also cosigned the note at issue \vere
not entitled to assert impainnent of collateral defense \vhen
.1?ank did not levy on assets or otherwise aggressively seek to

r
r
!
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collect from the maker (guaranty agreement provided that it
"is several and is independent of any other obligations or
liabilities of guarantor on debtor's credits whether as eomaker, endorser, surety, or othen,,;ise," ide at 566; see also
Libertv National Bank and Trust Company v. Rus.s, 668
S.W.2d 567 (Ky. App. 1984)
[4]

[b]
4.

First Security Bank &Trust Company v. Robinson, 215 F.3d
1326 (6 th Cir. 2000) guarantor not entitled to discharge when
bank failed to perfect its security interest in collateral ·of
borro\ver, \vhere guaranty agreement provided. bank: may
"impair, fail to realize upon or perfect Lender's security
interest in the collateral." Id.

Legal consideration for ne\v guarantors

Real Estate Collateral
[a]

Effect of not recording mortgage modification
see KRS 382.520 re: extensions and rene\vals

[b]

KRS 382.520; future ad\rance and "dragnet" mortgage provisions:
In re Pollev, 219 B.R. 205 (Bankr. W.O. Ky. 1998) "artfully drafted"
future advance clause in residential mortgage \vas effective to secure
subsequent promissory notes evidencing business loans made to onl)'
one of the mortgagors and that made no reference to the mortgage,
\vhich provided:

[T]his mortgage shall also secure any additional indebtedness made to the Bank by
the mortgagors or any ofthem or \vhether made as surety, guarantor or othenvise and
regardless of \vhether the same makes reference to this mortgage or is of the same
t)'pe of class as the primary debt." Id. at 207.
First Common\vealth Bank of Prestonburg v. West, 27 S.W.3d (Ky.
App. 2000), future advance clause subjecting the interest of "the
Mortgagor or the Borro\ver or any of them" was sufficient to
encumber divorced spouse's interest in mortgaged property for
indebtedness incurred by former husband prior to divorce even
though she was not aware that he incurred the debt.
[c]

T~tle

policy endorsement versus attorneys' title opinion or ne\v
commitment or title r~port from undenwiter
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5.

Taking additional collateral/other credit enhancements
[a]

r

Preference Risks
[1 ]

Federal Law - Under the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee [\vhich
can be either the duly appointed and acting Trustee or the
Debtor-in-possession (DIP)] may seek to avoid transfers of
property of the debtor to the creditor on account of an
antecedent debt, made while the debtor is insolvent which
occur \vithin 90 days ofbankruptcy (or 1 year in the case ofan
insider to the debtor) and result in the creditor receiving more
on account of its claim than it \vould have on a Chapter 7
filed prior to the transfer. 11 V.S.C. § 547

[2]

State La\v - Under state la\v other creditors may, \vithin 6
months of a transfer (See KRS 378.070), file a petition to
avoid the transfer on the basis that it \vas made "in
contemplation of insolvency and \vith design to prefer one or
more creditors to the exclusion, in \vhole or in part, ofothers,"
KRS 378.060. See In re Rexplore DrillinQ. Inc., 971 F.2d
1219 (6th Cir. 1992), \vhere the Court continued that the
trustee may use either the federal or state avoidance actions
and held that, under KRS 378.060 (a) "contemplation of
insolvenc)'" means \vhether a reasonable debtor should have
knO\\l1 it \vas insol\'ent at the time of the transfer, and (b) a
rebuttable presumption of a "design to prefer" is created
\vhere the debtor makes a tra11sfer \vhile insolvent.

f

r•
r
t

r
r
I

r

,.
r
r
f

[b]

Fraudulent Con\'eyance Risks
[1]

Federal Law - 11 U.S.C. § 548 - Under the Bankruptcy Code,
the Trustee or DIP may seek to avoid transfers of propert)' of
the debtor \vhere the debtor; (a) intends to hinder delay or
defraud its creditors by the transfer; or (b) receives less than
reasonably equivalent consideration in exchange for the
transfer or obligation; and (i) was insolvent or became
insolven~ as a result of such transfer, or (ii) was or \vas about
to engage in business or a transaction for which any propert)'
remaining with the debtor is an unreasonably small capital, or
(iii) intended to incur or believed would incur debts beyond
debtor's ability to pay as they mature.

[2]

State La\v - Any transfer made \\ith the intent to delay, hinder

r
I

r

r
r
i

r
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or defraud creditors... is void as against creditors, KRS
378.010. Further, any transfer made \vithout valuable
consideration shall be void as to existing creditors but not as
to creditors whose claims are thereafter contracted, or as to
purchasers with knowledge of the sale or charge. KRS
378.020. Note that insolvency is not a required element under
KRS 378.020.
II.

\VORKOUT DUE DILIGENCE, OPTIONS AND ISSUES
A.

Conflict Check

1.
B.

DefaultfDemand Letter

1.

C.

Wai\'er of Conflicts

Identif}' defaults
[a]

Payment \'ersus non-payment

[b]

Ascertaining cure periods

2.

Distinguishing default from acceleration

3.

Default/Acceleration letter (see Appendix B}
[a]

Manner of giving notice

[b]

Conflicting addresses for notices

[c]

Notices to guarantors; inquiries from guarantors

Late charges and post-default interest increase

[a]

[b]

Traveler's Insurance Co. v. Corporex Properties, Inc., 798 F.Supp.
423 (E.D; Ky. 1992), "late charges specified in a contract are
recoverable as liquidated damages because of the difficulty and
impracticability of fixing the amount of actual damages for
administrative expenses that will be sustained in the event of late
payments," and "a 4% late fee is not unreasonable in commercial
transactions," Id. at 428
Capitol

CadiI~ac

Olds, Inc. v. Roberts, 813 S.\V.2d 287,. ·29-2~y.
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;
1991) (court upheld award of interest at contract rate of 15.5% from
acceleration until judgment in accordance with KRS §360.040).

,.
r
i

D.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692, et. seq.)
[a]

E.

Set-oCCs

1.

In Baker v. National City Bank of Cleveland, 511 F.2d 1016 (6 th Cir. 1975),
the Sixth Circuit, appl)'ing Ohio la\v, held that setoff is not complete until
three steps have been taken:

. [a]

r
r
r

Applicable to debts incurred primarily for personal, family or
household purposes

the decision to exercise the right,

[b]

some action \vhich accomplishes the set-off and

[c]

some record \vhich evidences that the right of set-off has been
exercised.

2.

In FerQuson Enterprises. Inc. v. Main Supplv, Inc.. 868 S.W. 2d 98 (K)'. App.
1993) the court, noting that the relationship bet\veen bank and depositor is
that of debtor and creditor, adopted the Baker criteria in holding that, under
KRS 355.4-303, a bank cannot set-off a customer's account after accepting
a garnishment order.

3.

Banks may freeze bank accounts that are subject to a bank's right of set-off.
Citizens Bank of Marvland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16,116 S. Ct. 286,133 L.
Ed. 258 (1995). The Supreme Court held that the bank did not \'iolate the
automatic stay by placing an administrative hold on the debtor's account
\vhile the bank sought judicial redress. The Court concluded that the
administrative hold was neither a taking of possession of the depositor's
property nor the exercising ofcontrol over it, but merely a refusal to perfonn
its promise to pay. Id. at 21, 116 S. Ct. at 290, 133 L. Ed. at 264.

4.

"Special deposits" - see. Bank One, Pikeville v. Com., Natural Resources
Cabinet, 901 S.W.2d 52 (Ky. App. 1995) a bank may not setoff against a
deposit made by depositor and accepted by bank for a special and particular
purpose such as, in this case, certificates ofdeposit maintained for the benefit
of the Natural Resources Cabinet pursuant to escrow agreement to \vhich
bank was a party.

r
~.
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r
r
r
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Loan Document Audit
1.

Promissory Note
[a]

Requirement to apply partial payments first to
interest then due

KRS 360.020(2)

[1]

Straub v. Chemical Bank, 608 S.W.2d 71 (Ky. App. 1980)
Creditor receiving payments from debtor without any
direction as to the application may apply them to any debt
owed to the creditor by the debtor, including to an unsecured
claim when the creditor also holds a secured claim, citing
\Vilkes v. Kitchen, 218 S.W. 718 (Ky. 1920); and, in any
event, debtor has right to direct ho\v payment shall be applied
only \vhere payment is \'oluntarily made, citing Cit\' ofOli,'e
Hill v. Gearhart, 157 S.W. 2d 481 (Ky. 1942).

[2]

Ranier v. Mount SterlinQ National Bank, 812 S.W.2d 154
(Ky. 1991). In every contract there is an implied co\'enantof
good faith and fair dealing, and \vhere mortgage
subordination agreement \vas silent concerning application of
payments, bank \vas under equitable duty to- apply those
payments to its loan that \vas benefitted b)' the subordination,
rather than to an unsecured loan it made to the borro\ver after
the subordination agreement \vas entered into.

2.

Loan Agreement

3.

Security Agreement/Financing Statements
[a]

Collateral descriptions don't match

[b]

Proper places to file

[c]

Financing Statement requirements
[1]

[d]

4.

Last name first for individuals

Impact of Revised Article 9

Mortgage
(a]

Mortgage not valid against purchaser for

KRS 382.270:

F-g

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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I
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I

r
f

r

valuable consideration without notice until
acknowledged and lodged for record

,.,

[1]

State Street Bank & Trust Company orEoston, Massachusetts
v. Heck's Inc., 963 S.W. 2d 626 (Ky. 1998) prior recorded
mortgage signed on Schedule C rather than signature page,
though not valid as constructive notice under KRS 382.270,
nevertheless created an equitable lien as of the date funds
secured by it \vere advanced \vhich had priority over lien on
same property in favor of subsequent mortgage having actual
and inquiry notice, at the time of its mortgage, of the earlier
mortgage.

[2]

Thacker\'. United Companies Lending Corporation, 256 B.R.
723 (\V.D. Ky. 2000) debtors in Chapter 13, relying on the
strong-arm po\vers under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a), held entitled to
set aside mortgage they had signed and \vhich \vas recorded
but \vhich could not gi,'e constructi,'e notice because the legal
description of the property \vas attached as a schedule
follo\ving the signatures of the mortgagors and not
incorporated by reference, and the names of the debtor I
mortgagors \vere not set forth in the ackno\vledgment
(distinguishing State Street Bank, supra, \vhere earlier
mortgage also failed to provide constructive notice but later
mortgagee, \vhich \vas not entitled to bona fide purchaser
status under bankruptcy la\v as in this case, had actual or
inquiry notice.

i

r
r
r
f

r
r
rJ

r
r

r
r

[b]

KRS 382.335:

Requirement for "Scrivener"

[c]

KRS 382.385:

"Line of Credit"I"Revolving Credit Plan"

[d]

KRS 382.520:

"Re\'olving Credit Statute"

[1]

[e]

Bank of Mavsville v. Brock, 375 S.W. 2d 814 (Ky. 1964)
($10,000 repaid on original note of$50,000 and then reloaned
remained- secured by mortgage containing future advance
clause covering indebtedness not exceeding $52,000 in the
aggregate pursuant to KRS 382.520).
Requirement for date and maturity date of
obligations secured.

KRS 382.330:

r

r

r
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[f]

[1]

Trio Realty Company, Inc. v. Queenan, 360 S.W. 2d 747 (Ky.
1962) (Although the reasons for the original enactment in
1926 of present KRS 382.330 requiring a mortgage to state
the date and maturity ·of the obligations thereby secured are
not evident, the judgment of the court below upholding the
clerk's action in declining to record a mortgage that did not
contain that information is affirmed).

[2]

In re Taylor, 18 B.R.128 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Ky. 1982) (Mortgage
complying in all respects with the recording statutes except
for the omission of the maturity date of the secured
obligation, but \vhich disclosed the amount of the monthly
payments, held sufficient to perfect the mortgage lien since
the document was recorded "however improper in form" ide
at 129).

[3]

Blieden \'. Citizens Fidelitv Bank and Trust CompanY, 49
B.R. 386 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Ky. 1985) (Although the mortgage
erroneously stated that it secured one note in the amount of
$86,600 rather than eleven notes totaling that amount, the
mortgage nevertheless satisfied requirements ofKRS
382.330, purporting to distinguish Trio Realty Companvv.
Queenan on the basis that the Queenan mortgage was patently
defective because of omission of the amount secured by that
mortgage).

Amount Requirement: Sho\v amount of obligations secured [Pearce
v. Hall, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 209 (1876)]
[1]

Baird v. Read, 288 S.W. 1014 (Ky. 1926) (mortgage that does
not recite the amount secured, even though recorded and even
though amount is \\Titten into the mortgage after the recording
of same, is not effective for constructive notice).
distinguish re-recording

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I

I

[g]

KRS 382.340:

Recording requirements for mortgage
executed by "public utility corporation"

I

[h]

KRS 382.380:

Requirement for filing "statement of amount
and maturity" in the case of mortgage granted
to a trustee to secure bonds to be issued later

I

[i]

KRS 382.430:

Requirement for county, state and post office

F· 10
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r

address of mortgagee

r
r

[j]

KRS 376.050:

Required recital in mortgage securing loan
made "for the purpose of erecting, improving
or adding to a building"

[k]

KRS 382.140:

Requirement for notary seal affixed to
documents executed outside ofKentucky to be
recorded in Kentucky

[1]

KRS411.195

Enforceability of \'lritten agreement to pay
attorney fees in event of default

rt

[1]

r
[m]

rt

,.

5.

Fanners Bank & Trust Company v. Brazell, 902 S.W. 2d 830
(Ky. App. 1995) (KRS 411.195 permits reco\'eryofattomeys'
fees only from those \vho are parties to the \\Titing, and so
fonner joint tenant in the alternative of certificate of deposit
\vho did not sign notes that permitted recovery of attorneys'
fees and who contested bank's right to liquidate same upon
death ofother joint tenant \vas not liable for attorneys' fees to
bank).
Short forms of ackno\vledgment

KRS 423.160:

Guaranty
[a]

I

r

K.R.S.371.065 A guaranty not \\rritten upon or that does not
expressly refer to the instrument guaranteed is not enforceable unless
it states the maximum aggregate liability of the guarantor and a
tennination date after which no newly created obligations \vill be
subject to the guaranty

t

[1]

r
r

r
r

[b]

K.R.S. 371.065 is ofgeneral applicability, including to leases
and trade payables, not just promissory notes, cf. APL, Inc. v.
Ohio Valley Aluminum Inc., 839 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. App.
1992) (suit against guarantor of trade payables).

Payment or "Absolute" Guaranty vs. Collection Guaranty.
[1]

Under a guaranty of payment, sometimes referred to as an
"absolute" guaranty, the guarantor is liable immediately upon

r

r
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default of the borrower, whereas under a guaranty of
collection, the guarantor promises to pay only after the
creditor has attempted unsuccessfully to collect from the
principal debtor including liquidation ofcollateral. SeeI<RS
355.3-419 for conditions concerning the guaranteed
indebtedness to be fulfilled in order to enforce a collection
guaranty of a (negotiable) instrument..
[c]

Equal Credit Opportunity Act 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) et seq.; Reg. B 12
C.F.R. § 292,6(d) (1990).
[1]

[2]

6.

(a)

\vhere the spouse jointly applies for the credit or

(b)

\vhere the spouse is an o\vner or active in the business
or

(c)

\vhere the spouse independently offers to sign the
guaranty.

A bank can al\vays require the applicant to pro\'ide additional
credit support \vherein the spouse can independently offer to
sign the guaranty.

Pledge Agreements
[a]

7.

Reg. B prohibits a bank from automatically requiring spouses
to sign guaranties except in limited circumstances:

Revised Article 8 and 9
[1]

May need to examine partnership agreements, etc. to
detennine \vhether perfection was attained

[2]

Uncertificated securities/account control agreements

Lien priority confinnation
[a]

VCC searches

[b]

Title policy endorsements

[c]

Organizational status / confinning borrower's identity

F·12
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[d]

G.

File Correspondence and "Lender Conduct" Audit
1.

,r

Lender Liability issues
[a]

Overview: claims by borrower that lender is liable based on theories
that may include fraud, duress, fiduciary responsibilities, breach of
duty of good faith and fair dealing, interference with contractual or
business relationships, interference with corporate governance, joint
venture, alter ego theories, negligence and, in the bankruptcy setting,
equitable subordination, (11 U.S.C. §51 O(c)), fraudulent conveyance
(11 U.S.C. §544 and 548), and preference recoveries.

[b]

\Vhat is "Good Faith and Fair Dealing?"

r
r

r
r
r

r

r
r

r
r

r

Litigation search

[1]

§205, Restatement
(Second) of Contracts

Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and in its enforcement. Good faith
perfonnance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to
an agreed common purpose and consistency \vith the justified
expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of t)'pes of
conduct characterized as involving "bad faith" because they \riolate
community standards of decenc)', fairness or reasonableness.

[2]

K.R.S.355.1-203

[3]

K.R.S. 355.1-201 (19) "Good Faith" means honesty-in-fact in
the conduct or transaction concerned.

[4]

Lender Insecurity Clauses. A term providing that one (1)
party or his successor in interest may accelerate payment or
performance or require collateral or additional collateral "at
will" or "when he deems himself insecure" or in \vords of
similar import shall be construed to mean that he shall have
power to do so only if he in good faith believes that the
prospect ofpayment or perfonnance is impaired. The burden
ofestablishing lack of good faith is' on the party agaiI1st \vhom
,the power~has been~xercised. KRS 355.1-208..

r

r
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Creates an obligation of good faith in
the perfonnance or enforcement of
every contract \vithin the VCC.

Ii
I
[5]

K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th eir. 1985)
bank breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
not giving borrower any notice prior to refusing to advance
funds to pay borrower's suppliers.

[6]

Lillard v. Fann Credit Services of Mid-America, AC,A, 831
S.W.2d 626 (Ky. App. 1991) mortgagee's premature
termination of mortgagor's application for credit was not
valid business decision, and therefore questions of whether
termination was arbitrary and whether mortgagee· acted in
good faith \vere questions for jury.

[7]

Gross v. Citizens Fidelit\' Bank-\Vinchester, 867 S.W.2d212
(Ky. App. 1993) court affirms jury \'erdict in favor of bank
that set off, under clause allo\ving it to do so if it believed it
"\vill ha\'e difficulty collecting" the amount o\\'ed, \vhen
plaintiff \vas indicted for drug and currency violations.

[8]

Peannan v. \Vest Point Nat'} Bank, 887 S.\V.2d 366 (Ky.
App. 1994) foreclosing lender breached duty of good faith
and fair dealing and so \vas not entitled to a deficiency as a
result ofits contracting, prior to its deficiencyjudgment being
entered, with third party to sell mortgaged property and, in
fact, selling property for an amount after the foreclosure
sufficient to pay the borro\ver's indebtedness in full, citing
Ranier v. Mount Sterling National Bank, supra.

[9]

Christie v. First American Bank, 908 S.\V.2d 679 (Ky. App.
1995), the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not extend
to a pure demand note since it would "prevent lenders from
enforcing their legal rights." ide at 680. The "holder· of a
demand note may demand payment at anytime with or
without any reason for so doing", ide at 680.

[10]

LaGre\v v. Hooks-Suprex, Inc., 905 F.Supp. 401 (E.D.Ky.
1995) citing Ranier v. Mount Sterling National Bankt supra,
court finds an implied covenant of continuous operations
\vhen tenant exercised extension option after vacating
premises under lease having low base minimum rent and a%
rental clause.

. - [11]

BiQ Yank Corp. v. Libertv

~utual

Fire Insurance

Co., 125_

I
I
I
I
I
Ii
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
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r
~.

F3d 308 (6th eire 1997) in context of suit by insured against
insurer for wrongful failure to defend under the policy, court
states that "a party's acting according to the express tenns of
a contract cannot be considered a breach ofthe duties ofgood
faith and fair dealing," ide at 313.

r

r
r
r

[12]

Forsythe v. BancBoston Mortgage Corporation, 135 F.3d
1069 (6 th eire 1997) court found that lender did not breach
duty ofgood faith and fair dealing in obtaining a release from
the borrower resolving a foreclosure action by the lender;
court refused to impose fiduciary duty on lender as holder of
mortgage escrow funds, citing Steel\'est. Inc. v. Scansteel
Serve etf.. Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991).

[13]

Star Bank. Kenton Counh'. Inc. "~I Parnell (992 S.W. 2d 189)
(Ky. App. 1998). Court reverses a jury \'erdict that bank
acted in bad faith in threatening, three years prior to actually
declaring a default, but at a time \vhen the borro\ver's
financial statements disclosed it to be insolvent, to call the
loan based on a "dee.m itself insecure" provision unless the
borrower granted additional collateral. Citing Fort Knox
National Bank v. Gustafson, Ky., 385 S.W. 2d 196 (1964),
court held that good faith under KRS 355.1-201 (19) ("hones!)'
in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned") is a
subjective detennination, and also that a bank's negligence,
unless contrived, should not be considered in detennining
good faith.

[14]

Ousley v. First Common\vealth Bank of Prestonburg, S. \\'.3d
45 (Ky. App. 1999) principles of good faith and fair dealing
require a bank to furnish a former customer's records to that
customer if the bank still has the records and the customer
\viII reimburse the bank for the cost of obtaining the records.

r
r

r

r
r
r
t

[c]

r

Fiduciary Responsibilities. See Steelvest, Inc., et at. v. Scansteel
Service Center, Inc., supra

[d]

What to do with potentially damaging correspondence

r
r,

[1]

[eJ

see Hanson Construction Company v. American National
Bank and Trust Company, 865 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1993)

Interviews with relationship Il?-an~gers and other bank personnel

r

r
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H.

[1]

lender, not interviewee, is the client

[2]

advisability of assigning file responsibility to business
vlorkout specialist

Other Situational Considerations
1.

Structure and posture of credit
[a]

Is additional credit support available?
[1]

[2]

[b]

See K.M.C. v. IrvinQ Trust, 757 F.2d 272, supra, lender must
give some prior notice of refusal to make further advances
under "-0- balance" funding arrangement

Estate as Debtor
[a]

[b]

3.

Bankruptcy is not required for creditors to attack the transfer
of ne\v or additional collateral. Creditors can sue in state
court \vithin 6 months ofthe transfer relying on state statutes.
(See KRS 378.060 and 378070).

Line of Credit or Revolving Credit versus Tenn Loan

[1]

2.

Preference issues - In a \vorkout, taking additional collateral
from whatever source available is usually advisable
notwithstanding exposure to a preferential transfer action

KRS Chapter 396
[1]

Proof of claim is barred if not presented \vithin 6 months of
appointment ofpersonal representative or 2 years from death
ifno representative appointed, KRS 396.011

[2]

Matured claims are not preferred over unmatured claims,
KRS 369.095(2), 396.115

Bankruptcy proceedings are not applicable to an Estate.

Non-Profit corporation as debtor
[a]

Complications caused by lender membership on board of directors,
etc.
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[b]

t

4.

r
;

r
r
r
r

5.

Special problems of Bank as Trustee
[a]

Fiduciary standard applicable

[b]

Bank trustee as "deep-pocket" target of bondholders

Lender's status as it affects enforceability of loan documents
[a]

6.

r

[a]

See Rainer v. Mount Sterling National Bank, supra.

[b]

Equitable Subordination in Bankruptcy - Generally, equitable
subordination of non-insider claims and liens arises only in cases of
the most serious misconduct if not actual fraud, overreaching or
spoilation of the detriment of others. (See In re Tinslev and Groom,
49 B.R. 85, 90 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984) where the Court stated that
"equitable subordination is a harsh remedy that is not to be lightly
invoked.") (See also Baker & Gettv Financial Services. Inc., 974 F.2d
712, 718 (6th Cir. 1992) where the Sixth Circuit set forth the
prevailing standard for equitable subordination including (1) the
claimant must have engaged in some type ofinequitable conduct; (2)
the misconduct must have resulted in injury to the creditors of the
bankrupt or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant; and (3)
equitable subordination ofthe claim must not be inconsistent with the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.)

r
t

r
r

7.

The failure of a financial institution subject to the franchise tax
imposed by KRS 136.505 to pay that tax or file the required return
bars it from maintaining an action or enforcing debt obligations until
the return is filed and any tax is paid, KRS 136.570

Problems presented by competing and "subordinate" lenders

r

r

No involuntary bankruptcy - An involuntary bankruptcy petition may
not be filed against a corporation that is not a moneyed business, or
commercial corporation. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a).

Environmental Risks
[a]

The 1992 EPA Lender Liability Rule ("EPA Rule") which interpreted
the "secured creditor exemption" under CERCLA [see 42. U.S.C. §
9601(20)(E)] in a manner generally helpful for lenders, but which
subsequently was vacated by the D.C. Circuit, was substantially
codified by the 1996 Asset Co~servation, Lender LiabilitY, and

r
J
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Deposit Insurance Protection Act, see Fed. Reg. 36424 (July 7, 1997)
[1]

1996 codification added protections for trustees not addressed
by EPA Rule, but didn't include "bright line" rules that are
contained in EPA Rule for disposing ofproperty after lender
takes title

[2]

U.S. v. Pesses, No. 90-0564, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7902
(W.D. Pa. May 6, 1998), reportedly the first decision holding
a lender exempt from liability under the 1996 codification,
holds that lender that re-Ieased and attempted unsuccessfully
to sell a site mortgaged to it under public finance arrangement
that \vas contaminated by hazardous waste and low·level
radiation, met the burden of satisfying the secured creditor
exemption, including by making commercially reasonable
efforts as soon as practicable to di\'est itself of the propert:)r

[b]

u.s. v. Best Foods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998) \'acates and remands U.S.
v. Cordova, 113 F. 3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997), but adopts its holding that
parent corporation is derivately liable as an "owner" under CERCLA
for the environmental liabilities ofits subsidiary only ifthe "corporate
veil" may be pierced based on traditional corporate la\v principles
[add 6th Circuit / Ohio case]

[c]
8.

Same-class debt rule re: "dragnet" clauses
[a]

[b]
9.

State la\v considerations

In general, "broad, boilerplate future advance clauses in adhesion
contacts are not enforceable as to future transactions \vhich·areofa
different type or class than the original secured transaction", Dalton
v. First National Bank of Grayson, 712 S.\V.2d 954, 957 (Ky. App.
1986) (in this case, security interest in mobile home of individual
held not to also secure overdraft).
Revised Article 9 addresses issue favorably to lenders

Co-Lenders; participants
[a]

Typically materially increases time and expense unless "lead banks"
have clear discretion under the loan documents to control the \vorkout

[b]

Risk that lenders with smaller expo~ures will seek to fo~ce a purchase
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r
of their interest by the lead by refusing to cooperate
[c]

r

10.

~.

r•

"Lender liability" can be incurred by lenders with smaller exposures
as a result of the actions of the lead bank

Election of remedies
[a]

Multi-state collateral
[1]

r

one fonn of action jurisdictions (e.g., California - seek local
counsel)

!

I.

r
r

\Vorkout; or self-help and judicial remedies?
1.

Is a "take-out" possible?

2.

Greater risks no\v presented by loan \vorkout than previously

3.

What did the document and file audits disclose?

4.

Nature of Borro\ver's business and the Collateral

r

r

r

[a]

5.

Profile of Borro\ver/Collateral in the community
[a]

6.

r

Public relations considerations

Quality of Borro\ver's management
[a]

Integrity

[b]

Expertise

[el

Posture: Adversarial or Constructive

r

[1]

r
7.

r

(e.g. construction \'ersus commodity)

Qu~lity

Possible '!sword" for lender: fiduciary duties of borro\ver' s
management to creditors as borrower approaches insol\'enc)',
see Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe
Communications Corp., No. CIV.A. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30,1991)

of fmaneial infonnation and reporting
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8.

IlL

Possibility of additional collateral/guarantors
[a]

Preference risk

[b]

Fraudulent conveyance issues

9.

Is additional funding critical to successful workout?

10.

Risk of further losses

11.

Advisability of engaging a "crisis manager" to help assess likelihoodofa
reco\'ery
[a]

Control risks, including equitable subordination risks in bankruptcy

[b]

Invitation to Borro\ver to engage crisis manager (see Appendix C)

Il\1PLEl\1ENTATION OF \VORKOUT

A.

l\1anner of corresponding ,,'ith Client
I.

B.

c.

When communicating in-house, oral communication may be preferable,
subject to reporting constraints

l\fanner of corresponding ,,'ith Debtor
1.

Importance of paper trail

2.

Prudent negotiating tactics, see State National Bank of EI Paso v.F@rah
Manufacturing Co., 678 S.W. 2d 661 (Texas 1984)

Pre-\Vorkout Letter (see Appendix D)
1.

Appendix D is intended to be a "shield", and not a "sword", for the lender
[a]

Should substantially help protect against allegations of oral
commitments to· modify the loan documents, advance additional
funds or forebear from exercising remedies

[b]

Document in Forms Appendix does not contain acknowledgm~nt of
defaults or that borrower has no defenses or counterclaims (see
Forbearance Agreement)

F· 20
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D.

Forbearance Agreement

1.

Is nonnally the document desired by the lender to govern the lender/borro\ver
relationship \vhen quick action by the borro\ver is necessary to avoid self
help, state court remedies or bankruptcy proceeding

2.

Customary components
[a]

Borrower~ s ackno\vledgment that defaults

have occurred and that the

loans are due and p~yable

r

r
r

[b]

Borro\ver's statement that it has no defenses or counterclaims

[c]

Confirmation of amounts o\ved

[d]

Agreement by lender to forbear, normally for some (t)rpically short)
specified interval, conditioned on performance by borro\ver of its
agreed undertakings during the forbearance period

[e]

Stipulations ofborro\ver's undertakings during the forbearance period
- - unique to each credit's facts and circumstances

r

[1]

I

r
r
r
r
,.
r

E.

Opportunity for lender to "cure" documentation defects

[f]

Identify events of default operative during forbearance period that
\vould entitle lender no longer to forbear

[g]

Various \vai\Ters and releases by borro\ver, e.g.
[1]

Agreement !lot to contest lender's motion for relief from
automatic stay

[2]

Release of any claims vs. lender

[3]

Agreement to pay lender's fees and expenses

Mutual Release

1.

See Forsythe v. BancBostom Mortgage Corporation, 135 F.3d 1069 (6th eire
1997), supra

r

r
r
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APPENDIX A

[LOAN DOCUl\fENT PRO"ISIONS IN CONTEl\IPLATION
OFDEFAULTj
_
Construction of Provisions. Each covenant by the Borrower contained in this
Agreement and the other Loan Documents shall be construed without reference to any other such
covenant, and any detennination of\vhether Borrower is in compliance \vith any such covenant shall
be made without reference to whether any Borrower is in compliance \vith any other such covenant.
Borro"'er and Lender each ackno,,'ledge that the)' ha"e consulted ,,,ith or had ample
opportunit)' to consult 'Yith their respective legal counsel in negotiating the pro\'isions of the
Loan Documents, and agree that no presumption in favor of either part)' sllould be applied in
construing the provisions of the Loan Documents, regardless of 'Yllicll part)' or legal counsel
for such part)' prepared the Loan Documents. In the event ofany conflict bet\veen or anl0ng the
provisions as contained in one Loan Document and other provisions contained in the same or one
or more other Loan Documents, Lender shall be entitled to resolve the conflict by selecting \vhich
provision shall be applicable unless such selection is nlanifestly unreasonable.
_
Additional Deliveries. Borro\ver shall deliver or cause to be delivered to Lender from
time to time 1lereafter, promptly upon request ofLender, SUClI additional documents, instruments and
infonnation as Lellder may request in order to insure tIle binding effect in accordance \,'ith the tenns
thereof of any Loan Document, or to effect the intent of this Agreement or to establisll tIle security
for tIle benefit of Lellder contemplated by this Agreenlent and tIle otller Loan Documents, and
BOlTo\ver llereby appoints Lender as Borro\ver's attonley-in-fact, \vhich is coupled \vitlI an illterest
and irrevocable until all of the Obligations are paid and discharged to tIle satisfaction of Lender, to
do all acts and things that Lender may deem necessary or appropriate in furtherance of any of such
purposes.

f

r
r
r
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Indemnification. Borro\vers hereby jointly and severally indemnify and hold Lender
hamlless from and against any and all costs, claims, losses, damages or expenses, including
reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred by Lender as a result, ill \vhole or in part, of Lender's entering
into tIlis Agreement and the other Loan Documents, or othenvise incurred by Lender in connection
\vith or arising out ofthis Agreement and the other Loan Docunlents unless resulting fronl tIle gross
negligellce or nlalicious conduct of Lender.
_
Acceptance of Partial Perfonnance not a Waiver. Without limitation of any other
provision contained in the Loan Documents concerning construction and enforceability ofwaivers,
any acceptance by Lender ofany payments ofprincipal, interest, late charges or any other sums due
under the Notes or other Loan Documents, or of tender of perfonnance by Borrower of nonmonetary obligations of BOlTo~ver under the Loan Documents, silall not constitute a \vaiver by
Lender of any. breach by BOlTo\ver of the provisions of the Note or Loan Document in respect of
which such pa~entwas made or perfonnance \vas tendered unless such \vaiver by Lender is' nlade

expressly in vvriting.
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Claims and Damages. In no event shall Lender ever be liable to the BOlTower for

conseq~tial damages resulting from. arising out of or in connection with the Loan or ~~o'the
Loan Documents, \vhatever the nature ofa breach by the Lender in the obligations ofthe:"Ltn.cier

hereunder. No action shall be commenced by the Borrower for any claim against the Lend~Ul1~er
the tenns ofthis Agreement unless a notice specifically setting forth the claim ofthe Borro\\,ershall
have been given to the Lender within fifteen (15) days after the occurrence of the eveJltwh~chthe
Borro\ver alleges gave rise to such claim, and failure to give such notice shall constitute a
rof
any: •such claim. Upon full payment and satisfaction of the Obligations, Lender:
on
automatically shall be fully, finally and forever released and discharged from any furt
liability or obligation in connection with the Loan and with this Agreement, except any#
to release Collateral of record from any lien or claim by Lender.'f~,'rir,',;:t'''
_.
Governin~ Law; Consent to Jurisdiction and Venue. This Agreeme~t'~~Jt»e
construed, enforced and other,,'ise go,"erned in all respects by the la'''5 of tIle Commoll~v,alth
ofKentuck)'. Borro,,,er hereb)" consents to the jurisdiction of an)' state or federal courit'loMed
,,'ithin, the Count)' of [Jefferson, Common,,,ealth of Kentuck)'l and, ,,,itllout limitatl ~bfthe
foregoing, irrevocably agrees that, subject to the Lender's sole and absolute electioD,r"ilycase
or proceeding relating to Title XI of the United States Code and an)' actions relating to tbe
Obligations shall be litigated in such courts, and Borrower waives any objectiolt~,:h~d~
Borrower may have based on improper venue or foi-um non conveniens to the condu'~j~!'~Y
proceeding in any of such courts. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall affect~~t'!!~ht
of the Lender to bring an)' action or proceeding against Borro,,,er or the propert)'ofBoI!tG,\'er
intbe courts of an)' other jurisdiction.
•
Disclosures. Lender is authorized by BOlTo\ver to disclose tIle contents oftheLian
Documents and its files concerning same to prospective purchasers thereof, alld BOITo\vetfarlher
agrees that Lender shall incur no liability to Borrower as a result of Lender discussing the business
affairs of Borro\ver with any Person guaranteeing or pledging Collateral for any part of the
Obligations, including but not limited to notifying such Person of the occurrence of a Default
Condition or Event of Default, although Lender shall be under no obligation \Vllatsoevert(f;~\iso.

•
\VAIVER OF JURY TRIAL. THE LENDER AND BORRO"'ERACKN •. ;V~EDGE THAT THE TIl\IE AND EXPENSE REQUIRED FOR TRIAL BY JURYEX.I·~J)
THE TIME AND EXPENSE REQUIRED FOR A BENCH TRIAL AND HfERlgB\'
KNOWINGLY VOLUNTARILY 'VAlVE, TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERl\fITTEl)BY
LA'V, AND AFrER HAVING CONSULTED OR HAVING HAD Al\1PLE OPPORTUNIty

_
t
CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH \VAIVER, TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY ACTION OROBli

TO CONSULT THEIR RESPECTIVE· LEGAL COUNSEL CONCERNING;i

c

PR()CEEDING (WHETHER CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHER'VISE) BROUG
ENFORCE OR DEFEND AGAINST COLLECTION OF OR OTHERWISfl'
CONNECTION \VITH THIS AGREEl\IENT OR THE OTHER LOAN DOCUl\fEN~f'('.·"'.

1lI[,1.i,f,,<.

>.,

_.' . hrbitration. . Lender and Horrower .agree that upon the written demand·,
par.tY/whethermadebefore or aft~rth~.mstittition ofany legal proc~edingstbut prior tothe~
or any judgment ih that" proceeding, all disputes, claims and controversies bet\veen them, \vhether
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individual, joint, or class in nature, arising from this Note, any Related Doculnent or other\\'ise..
including \\'ithout limitation contract disputes and tort claims, shall be resolved by binding
arbitration pursuant to the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association (ttAAA
Any arbitration proceeding held pursuant to this arbitration provision shall be conducted in tIle city
nearest the Borro\\'er's address having an AAA regional office, or any other place selected by nlutual
agreement ofthe parties. No act to take or dispose of any Collateral shall constitute a \vaiver oftIlis
arbitration agreement or be prohibited by this arbitration agreement. This arbitration provision shall
not limit the right of either party during any dispute, .claim or controversy to seek, use al1d employ
ancillary, or preliminary rights and/or remedies, judicial or otherwise, for tIle purpose of realizing
upon, preserving, protecting, foreclosing upon or proceeding under forcible entry and detainer for
possession of, any real or personal property, and any such action shall not be deemed an election for
renledies. Such remedies include, \vithout limitation, obtaining injunctive relief or a tenlporary
restraining order, invoking a power of sale under any deed of trust or mortgage, obtaining a \vrit of
attachnlent or inlposition of a receiversllip, or exercising any rigllts relating to personal property,
including exercising the right of set-off, or taking or disposing of such property \vitll or \vithout
judicial process pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code. Any disputes, clainls or COlltrO\,'ersies
concerning tIle la\vfulness or reasonableness ofan act, or exercise ofany right or rellled)' concerning
any Collateral, including any claim to rescind, reform, or otllerwise nlodify any agreenlent relating
to the Collateral, s11all also be arbitrated; provided, ho\ve\'er that no arbitrator sllaIl have the right
or the po\ver to enjoin or restrain any act ofeither party. Judgnlent upon any a\vard rendered by any
arbitrator nlay be entered in any court having jurisdiction. The statute of linlitations, estoppel.
\\"aiver, laches and siInilar doctrines \vhicIl \\'ould other\vise be applicable ill an action brougllt by
a party shall be applicable in any arbitration proceeding, and the COlnnlencement of an arbitration
proceeding shall be deemed the comnlencement of any action for tllese purposes. TIle Federal
Arbitration Act (Title 9 ofthe United States Code) shall apply to the constructioll, interpretation, and
enforcement of this arbitration provision.
If

).
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APPENDIXB
FORl\1.FOR COMl\IERCIAL DEMAND I CURE LETTERS
BUSINESS PURPOSE LOANS.

,r

[LETTERHEAD]

r

[DATE]

,r

r
r
r
r

r
r
r
r

r
r
r
r
r

[NA~1E OF CORPORATION]
a [STATE] corporation
[ADDRESS]
[ADDRESS]
Attention: [OFFICER]

CERTIFIED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
No.
_

[GUARANTOR]
a [STATE] corporation
[ADDRESS]
[ADDRESS]
Attention: [OFFICER]

CERTIFIED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

Re:
ProlllissoryNote (NoteNo.
origillal prillcipal a/lZOlllzt
_~

~

AND REGULAR MAIL

NOe

_

AND REGULAR MAIL

J (tI,e
of

dated
e.r:eCllted

"Note'~,

ill

alill

,a_~~~~~co/~orat~n("

ti,e or(ler 01
(the "Ballk'~.

(II/k/a

(lelivere(l

tlte
b)'

'~,p~tableto

)

Dear [ADDRESSEES]:
Reference is hereby made to the above-referenced Note which is secured, inter, alia, by a (1) a
"), dated
, executed and deli\'ered
- - - - - - - - - - (the"
by
in favor ofthe Bank guaranteeing, anl0ng other
things, tIle paynlent of the obligations o\ved under the Note, (2) a Mortgage. dated
, executed and delivered by
--~---(
)~drecordedagain~re~propertylocatedin~~
~_~~
~
(tIle "Property") with the _ _ County Clerk's Office in Mortgage Book
, Page _ _
(collectively,
and _ _ sometimes hereinafter referred to as the "Obligors"; collectivel)',
the Note, the Mortgage, the Guaranty, and all other documents evidencing or security the obligations
under the Note sometimes hereinafter referred to as the "Loan Documents").

F· 27

II
I:,l

[OFFICER]
[NAME OF CORPORATION]
[NAME OF GUARANTORS]
[DATE]
Page 2

I:~

I,

The indebtedness on the Note as of the date ofthis letter includes the following amounts,icexelasive
of attorney's fees and costs:
Per
Late
Diem
Char~es
Interest
Principal
Note No.
$
$
$
$
$
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT THE OBLIGORS CONTINUE TO BE IN DEFAULT
UNDERTHE TERMS OF THE NOTE AND THE LOAN DOCUMENTS FOR FAIL~t>'i,~-rO
MAKE PAYMENTS ON THE NOTE AS REQUIRED UNDER THE LOAN DOCU'.:'RTS.

[IF CURE PERIOD REQUIRED USE THE FOLLO"'ING LANGUAGE:

AS OF THE DATE HEREOF,
AND _/100
DOLLARS ($
), REPRESENTING THE
AND
,"!~
PAYl\'1ENTS EACH IN THE Al\10UNT OF
.... ',,\>~lSD
_/100 DOLLARS ($
), IS DUE AND PAYABLE. OBLIGORS l\fUST BRI~'~,J'~E
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NOTE CURRENT BY
, [INSERl'\(;~R.E
PERIOD REQUIRED NO. OF DAYS, I.E. 30] DAYS FR01\l THE DATE THERBBI!:,';AT
'VHICH TIl\IE
AND _/100 DOLLARS ($
) (\VIIICH
INCLUDES THE REGULARLY SCHEDULED
PAYl\IENT) l\lgSjf¥lQE
PAID TO THE HOLDER BY CASH, CERTIFIED CHECK OR l\fONEY ORDER,iIN
ORDER TO CURE THE DEFAULTS UNDER THE TERl\fS OF THE NOTE.]
~"; "
[IF CURE PERIOD IS NOT REQUIRED USE THE FOLLO"'ING LANGUAGE:

i,r

The obligations o,,,ed under the Note are bereb)' accelerated, and demand is hereb~' rn~~efor
the immediate payment in full of all amounts outstanding under the Note (plus any app,IJcribl,
interest which accrues on or before the date of payment) at or before 12. q~~I~n
_ _ _ _ _ _ at the office of the Bank,
,

K'8Jfr.
., ~

Attn: [ACCOUNT OFFICER], [TITLE].]

If such payment in full in accordance with the preceding sentence is not made such faiIllremay
result, \vithout further notice by the holder hereof, in the enforcement by the holder ofits rights and
remedies under the Note. These remedies iI?-clude, without limitation, the rigllt to foreclose the
Mortgage recorded ~gainst the Property, and to bring a suit a~~inst those liable for repaymentofthe
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[OFFICER]
[NAME OF CORPORATION]
[NAME OF GUARANTORS]
[DATE]
Page 3

obligations due and owing under the Note. The Bank reserves the rigllt to exercise or to refrain from
the exercise, in such order as the Bank elects, anyone or 1110re oftIle rellledies available to tIle Bank
pursuant to the Note and other Loan Documents or othenvise at Ia\v or in equity, and notlling
contained in this letter or any action or inaction on tIle part of the Bank sIlal1 constitute a \vaiver of
any rights of the Bank to pursue such rights and remedies.
shall not be
Acceptance by the Bank of any partial payment made prior to
deemed to be a \vaiver of the default, or of any of tIle rigllts or remedies available to the Bank in
connection \vith the Note or any of tIle Loall DocUll1ents.

Please be advised that the Bank, as of
, has elected to apply the
interest rate provided in the Note to be applicable upon acceleration of the amounts due
and payable under the Note. Specifically, the Note provides in part:

(INSERT DEFAULT RATE OF INTEREST LANGUAGE FROl\1 NOTE].
Obligors are hereby advised that negotiations, if any, bet\veen the Obligors alld tIle Bank sllall not
constitute a \vaiver of the Bank's right to exercise its rigllts alld renledies under tIle Note and the
Loan Documents or othenvise at la\v or in equit)T, including, but not linlited to, those described in
tllis letter. Any such \vaiver shall not be effective unless set fortll in \vriting, duly executed by an
authorized representati\'e of the Bank. Obligors sllall not be entitled to rely upon an)' verbal
statements made or purported to be made b)' or on behalf oCthe Bank in connection ,,,itll an~'
alleged agreement b)' the Bank to refrain from exercising an)' of its rights under the Note and
other Loan Documents or other,\'ise at la,\' or in equity.

[INCLUDE OTHER DISCLOSURE REQUIREl\fENTS OUTLINED IN EITHER
NOTE, l\10RTGAGE OR OTHER LOAN DOCUl\IENT.]
By copy hereof, the Bank hereby advises
, as the Guarantor, obligated to pay all or any
portion of the indebtedness evidenced by the Note of tIle herein described default, and tllis letter
constitutes fonnal notice to and demand upon such Guarantor to cure such default as llerein
specified.

r
r
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(OFFICER]
[NAME OF CORPORATION]
[NAME OF GUARANTORS]
[DATE]
Page 4

.{fy

I~

Feel free to contact me L/_--> if you ha,'e any questions ,vitll regard to tIle LII~tir

IA
........, -

I

Sincerely,
(

1
1<

By:

I
I

Nan1e:
Title:

cc:

i.;.,.j

[

]

I.:
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INVITATION TO BORRO\VER TO
ENGAGE A CRISIS MANAGER

We believe the Company needs to hire what is commonly referred to in the financial
services industry in these circumstances as a "crisis manager. tI This person \vould
be someone you hire who has experience in evaluating companies having financial
problems, evaluating their business plan and analyzing present and projected future
cash flo\vs, has contacts \vith and extensive kno\vledge of altemati\'e financing
sources, and so forth. However, you and the other members ofthe management team
\\'ould continue to control all aspects of management unless, as tIle Bank Ilas oftell
found to be tIle case, you elect to invol\'e this person in n1anagen1ent.
Accon1panying this letter is a list of such "crisis n1anagers," anyone of \vhich the
Bank belie\'es \vould be effective in tllis role. It is, of course, )'our clloice, but it is
the Bank's desire that inter\'ie\vs be set up \vith prospecti\'e crisis nlanagers
inlmediately.
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Appendix D

AGREEMENT CONCERNING DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS

PERTAINING TO LOANS
(Form)

THIS AGREEMENT CONCERNING DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS
PERTAINING TO LOANS (the "Agreement") is made and entered into effective as of
__________ by and among [i]
,a Kentucky corporation
(ftBorro\ver"), [ii] EDWARD A. JONES, individually ("Mr. E. Jones"), [iii] ROBERT T. JONES,
individually ("Mr. R. Jones"), and [iv]
association '("Lender").

, a national banking

RECITALS
A.
Borro\ver is indebted to Lender for the principal of, interest 011 and late
charges due in cOllnection \vith the "$1,000,000 Loan" and the "$500,000 Loan" (collectivel)', the
"Loans"), all as nl0re particularly described in a certain Loall Agreement dated as of January 30,
2000 to \Vllicll Borro\ver and Lender are parties (the "Loan AQreement").
B.
Mr. E. Jones and Mr. R. Jones (referred to collectively hereinafter as tIle
"Guarantors") l1a\'e jointly and severally, absolutely and unconditionally guaranteed paylnent ofthe
Loans pursuant to tIle two (2) Guaranty Agreements executed and delivered by eacll of them,
respectively, for the benefit of Lender, both dated as of January 30, 2000 (collectively, the
"Guaranties ft ).

c.

Borro\ver is in material default of tIle Loans, and Lender pursuant to and in
accordance \vitll the provisions ofthe documents governing those Loans has accelerated the paynlent
thereof, as set fortll in a letter from Lender to Borro\ver dated as ofMarcl128, 2000 (tIle fti\1arch 28
Letter").

D.

r
r
r

Borrower and Guarantors (referred to collectively hereinafter as tIle
"Obligors") llave requested that Lender enter into discussions and negotiations concerning the
operations, financial condition, business and affairs of the Obligors, whicll discussions and
negotiations might involve the execution and delivery of a forbearance agreenlent or other
agreements to which Obligors and Lender \vould be parties, and Obligors and Lender desire that all
discussions and negotiations and any other communications bet\veen and among them be governed
by the provisions of this Agreement.

r

consideration, the receipt of\vhich is hereby acknowledged, and intending to be legalI)' bound, it is
her~by agreed as follows:

r
r

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, for other valuable
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1.
Incorporation ofRecitals. The recitals to this Agreement are hereby incorporated by
reference as though fully set forth at this point and each of the Obligors and Lender acknowledge
tllose recitals to be true and correct.
No ObliQation to Negotiate or Agree. Neither Lender nor any Obligor shall be
2.
deenled to have waived any rights or to have incurred any obligations as a result of any disQUssions
or negotiations between or among Lender and any ofthe Obligors. Either the Lender or an)' of the

Obligors may elect at any time in the exercise oftheir sole and absolute discretion tot~,;>:;;~y

discussions or negotiations among them at any time and for any reason without liability'to"~"

'ther

I
I
I:~

IJ

party to this Agreement as a result of such election. Without limitation of the for~, . ~ ~!he
acceleration of the maturity of the Loans and the ability of Lender to pursue its reme,d!tX(,~ .~t
Borrower, Guarantors and/or any collateral for any of the Loans shall not be affected~#~~;~Vay

I;~

except, if the same should eventuate, pursuant to a Modification Agreement as hereinafter'defined.

I
I
I
I

3.
Reservation ofRiQhts and Remedies. Lender reserves all of its rights al1d renledies
under the Loan Agreelnent, tIle Guaranties and an)' and all otller agreenlents evidencing, securing,

guaranteeing or otherwise pertaining to any ofthe Loans (collectively, the "Loan Docume,Ql(lrNo
course of conduct by the Lender in meeting with any of the Obligors shall constitute a '~~~~~,by
Lender of, or an agreement by Lender to forbear now or hereafter from the exercise of, ~0~~the
rights and renledies available to Lender under any of the Loan Documents, at law or in>equity.
Lender l11ay pursue any of such rights and remedies at any time, irrespective of and \vithoutregard
to tlle existence or continuation of any discussions and negotiations bet\veen or amongLeg.~erand
any of the Obligors or their counsel.

4.
No Modification Except by Written Aereement. The Loan Documents shall\~~m~in
unchanged and in full force and effect unless and until one or more \vritten agreenlents,exp'reBSI)·
1110difying the Loan Documents is entered into anlong Lender and each Obligor tl1at is a part~'toal1)'

such written agreements. Notwithstanding that the Lender and one or more of the Oblit;~m:,~;lY
reach an oral understanding on one or more issues that Lender and one or more ofthe Obl~~g~\we
trying to resolve, neither Lender nor any Obligor shall be bound by any oral agreement, and~~&'lfs
or liabilities, either express or implied, shall arise on the part of Lender or any Obligor, or anY-third
party, unless and until the oral understanding pertaining to any. given issue has been reduced to a
written agreement that has been signed by each party that would incur rights or oblig*i·
in
connection \viththe oral understanding. Furthermore, no such written agreelnent (each a " "
tionAereement") shall be effective against Lender unless it is signed by either La\vrenc~ntft.~<
Vice President of Lender, or John Currency, Senior Vice President of Lender, and no Modi
Agreement shall be effective against Borrower unless signed by Mr. E. Jones, who is theP
of Borrower (Messrs. Doe, Currency and E. Jones in such capacity each being a "De~
Representative").
5.
Reliance on Negotiations not Warranted. As set forth above, either Le~e~i~;,~
Obligor may discontinue negotiations at any time and no oral agreement shall be bindiI1g~~A1'~~
untUreduced · to a definitive writt~n ~gf.-eement and s~gned by the applicable _~, .,; ••
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Representative of Lender and Borrower and any' other party that would incur an)' rigllts or
obligations thereunder. Accordingly, neither Lender nor Obligors shall be liable to the other for any
loss-incurred as a result of pursuing or consummating or not pursuing or consulll11lating alternati\'e
opportunities available to them including, in the case of Borro\ver, refinancings, sales~ leases'!
investments by additional stockholders, or entering into additional contracts or pursuing other
business opportunities or negotiations, nor shall Lender be liable on the account of any decrease in
value in any of the collateral heretofore granted or that hereafter may be granted to Lender as
security for any of the Loans, nor shall the obligations of any of the Obligors to pay additional
interest or late charges that accrue on any of the Loans be discharged or otherwise impaired in any
nlanner as a result of any negotiations and discussions bet\veen and among the Lender and the
Obligors.

f'

r

r
r
r
r
r

6.
Other Stipulations. This Agreement constitutes the final, conlplete and exclusi\·e
agreel1lent of tIle Lender and the Obligors with regard to its subject nlatter, nla)' not be nl0dified in
any respect except pursuant to a \vriting signed by Lender and eacll Obligor that is party to such
1110dification (and then only if the \vriting is signed by the Designated Represelltati\!e in the case of
Lender and Borrower), and shall be go\!erned in all respects by the la\v of the Conlnl01l\Vealth of
Kentucky. Lender and Obligors each represent to the other that they lla\'e obtained ad\'ice fronl
independent legal counsel for each \vith regard to and prior to signing this Agreement.

IN WITNESS 'VHEREOF, tllis Agreement has been executed by eacll oftIle parties
to it on the dates set forth in the notarial certificates belo\v, but shall be deellled effective as of the
date first set fortl1 above.

[add pro\'ision for signatures of parties to Agreement]
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EMPLOYMENT LAW ISSUES OF CONCERN
TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

r
r
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c.

S,lsall
Sears
Frost BrOJVl1 To([([ LLC
Le~y:il,gtol', Kelltllcky

r

r
r
,,.

r

Cop)lr,ight 2001, Susan C~ Sears

SECTION G
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TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
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INTRODUCTION

G-l

PART ONE: HIRING ISSUES

G-2

I.
II.
III.

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

r

r

IV.

r
r

Hiring - Overview Of General Legal Principles
G-2
General Principles For Establishing Selection Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. G-2
Recruiting.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. G-2

V.

r
r
v

r

Job Advertisements
Word of Mouth Recruiting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
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Recruiting Practices and the National Labor Relations Act. . . . . . . . . . ..

0-2
G-2
0-3
G-3
0-3

TIle Employment Application
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Discrimination
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At-Will Employment .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
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EMPLOYMENT LAW ISSUES OF CONCERN
TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
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INTRODUCTION
The employment litigation explosion of the last decade has made it imperative
that employers treat employment issues as a serious part of every business enterprise.
Employers are learning that prevention is key - and the cost of prevention is minimal
when compared to the cost of defense. Prevention means considering every aspect of the
employment experience ("from the cradle to tIle grave" or "Iliring tllrougll
separation/termination") as the veritable powder keg it can prove to be in a courtroom.
Prevention begins with seeking sound advice from professionals trained in the area of
human resources and/or employment law. Prevention means adopting sound policies tllat
incorporate neutral, work-related criteria - and \vllich are uniformly applied to similarly
situated employees across-the-board.

Prevention means documentation of those

unifonnly applied policies. Prevention means training, training and more training - for

r
l'

all employees, but particularly supervisors and executives.
The materials that follow are intended to provide an overview of the most

r
r
r

r
r
r

common employment issues that arise in every workplace, regardless of size. While
financial institutions have employment issues that are unique, e.g., training employees
with respect to obligations under banking regulations, or certain governmental reporting
requirements - the vast majority of employment issues faced by a financial institution
will be those "generic" employment issues which all businesses encounter witll
increasing ·frequency.
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HIRING ISSUES
I.

HIRING - OVERVIEW OF GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Employers today must balance the goal of hiring a productive work force withthe
legal limitations placed upon the pre-employment process, while addressing concerns
with respect to substance abuse, dishonesty, poor attendance, poor training and high
turnover. Employers also face increasing legal risks based upon claims of negligent
hiring in the event that they have not undertaken a diligent review of relevant
employment factors.

II.

III.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR ESTABLISHING SELECTION CRITERiA
A.

Define the Job

B.

Establish Essential Job Functions

c.

Establish qualifications, such as job-related education/licensure, jobrelated ""ork experience, and demonstrated ability to perform partic\llar
aspects of the job.
'

D.

Caution: Absolute requirements (such as test scores and diploma
requirements) may be suspect if they screen out minorities and/or 'Y0l'!l~
on a disproportionate basis or if they discriminatorily screen out otherWise
qualified individuals witll disabilities. Track any SUCll requirement~,>;to
establish lack of "disparate impact." Any absolute requirements musfbe
logically tied to the job duties of the open position such that business
reasons exist for imposing the requirements.

RECRUITING
A.

B.

Job Advertisements -- Be careful about \vhat you include as a description
of a job and the criteria which you use to eliminate a job candidate... Olle
court ruled that a rejected applicant had stated a claim in an age
discrimination case based on a "sloppy" want ad. The company defe11:~~d
the claim by stating that the applicant was unqualified, listing severafJ6b
requirements that the applicant had no experience in. The \vant ad lis!~d
in the newspaper did not list those same criteria.
Word of Mouth Recruiting -- Word of mouth recruiting is not per se
discriminatory under Title VII. ,But it may violate Title VII under,~pe
disparate treatment and impact theories. In one case, reliance on referrals
from the union as the sole method of lliring violated Title VII since the
emp~oyer kne\v tllat the u.nion didn't admit n1inorities. EEOC v. Cos:tello,
67 FEP Cases 626 (D.Mass 1994).
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C.

Nepotism Policies -- Pro nepotism policies have the sa111e problem as
word of mouth recruiting.

D.

Recruiting Agents -- A common practice among employers is the
utilization of third-party recruiters, such as private employment agencies,
to obtain employment candidates. An employer may be held liable under
agency principles for any discriminatory recruiting and referral practices
engaged in by employment agencies. Therefore, inform employment
agencies in writing of your expectation t11at they comply with
requirements of the ADA and Title VII. Include in any contract with a
recruiter that the agency will conduct its activities in compliance \vith the
ADA and other nondiscrimination requirements.

E.

Recruiting Practices and the National Labor Relations Act -- It is
pennissible for a company to seek to maintain or ac11ieve nonunion status.
However, the National Labor Relations Board and reviewing courts have
consistently found pre-employment inquiries about an applicant's prior or
current union affiliation or sentiments to constitute illegal "interrogation"
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

r

r
r
,.
J
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IV.

THE El\fPLOYIVIENT APPLICATION
A.

Overview -- Most organizations 11ave standard blank forms tl1at they
utilize month after month, year after year. Seldom do t11ey update these
forms until a problem arises. Because tl1ere are quite a few rapidly
c11anging obligations and prohibitions (especially as a result of the ADA
and FMLA), employers should have application fonns reviewed by legal
counsel on a regular basis.

B.

Discrimination -- The EEOC and Kentucky Human Rigl1ts Commission
(KHRC) expect employers to be able to demonstrate tl1at eac11 of the
questions it requires applicants to answer is related to any jobs for w11ic11
the applicant could reasonably be applying. Even questions that are not
discriminatory on their face may indirectly cause discrimination. For
example, requesting information about graduation dates combined with
selection of those early in their careers could lead to a pattern of hiring
people in their tl1irties. Such a practice could lead to an age discrimination
claim.

C.

Applicant Tracking Information -- Can you demonstrate what jobs were
applied for? What jobs was a particular applicant not considered for and
when? Wh~ether the claimant was even considered an applicant? What is
your process for rejecting a potential applicant?

r
I

r
r

r

r
r
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D.

At-Will Employment -- Define the employment applied for as "at-will" in
the application.
1.

To make the statement less intimidating, consider including the
employee's at-will rights too. An example of SUCll a statement is:

"I understand and agree that my employnlent with the company is
at-will, nleaning that I may resign at any time and lny employment
may be terminated by the company for any reason and at any time
without previous notice. "
2.

E.

The at-will statement should be legible and in a place on the
application where the applicant is likely to notice it. The end of
the application directly above the signature line is an appropriate
place.

Past Employment -- There should be enougll space for tIle applicant to
provide complete information about past employment 11istory. Ask for
positions and allow enougll room for multiple positions lleld with each
employer. The fact that an employee 11as been promoted or transferred
within a company is valuable infonnation.
1.

Also request salary infornlation. Allow the applicant to provide
starting and ending salary alTIOunts.

2.

Request applicants to supply you with reasons for leaving each
previous job.

3.

Also include:
a.

A statement certifying that the applicant was truthful in
completing the application.

b.

A release form authorizing you to verify education and
experience and to check credit infonnation.

c.

A reminder that the applicant will be required to provide
information for compliance with the Immigration Reforitl
and Control Act.

d.

A statement that employment may depend upon tIle results
of physical examinations, drug tests or otller types of preemployment tests.

e.

Consider the pros and cons of insisting on a release of
information by previous employers.

G·4
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4.

r
r

r

v.

Because you will be keeping the applications on file, be cautious of
\vhat you write. In fact, you sIl0uld refrain froin writing on tIle
employment application at all.

PRE-EMPLOYMENT TESTING AND INQUIRIES

A.

EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures
Under federal regulations, a selection criterion that disproportionately
screens out minorities or females is illegal unless it has been validated.
The easiest way to avoid issues is to demonstrate that the selection
procedure does not produce a "disparate impact."

B.

Drug/Alcohol Testing

r
r

1.

Constitutional protections. Generally, private enlployers are not
subject to constitutional prollibitions tllat might prollibit
drug/alcohol testing.

2.

r

Collective bargaining. Drug testing of applicants is normally not a
Inandatory subject of bargaining for a unionized employer.

3.

Americans \vitil Disabilities Act. Under the ADA, employers may
engage in pre-employment testing for the illegal use of drugs.
Moreover, individuals \Vll0 are currently engaged in the illegal use
of drugs are not protected under the ADA. Alcohol, however, is
not an illegal drug and testing for alcollo1 is considered a "llledical
examination" for purposes of the ADA, and tllerefore can only be
tested for post-offer.

4.

The most important protections concerning drug and alcohol
testing have to do with the process. If someone is rejected because
they "flunked," be sure you can demonstrate you were rigllt and
that you did not talk about it.

r

r
r
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C.

Polygraph Examinations
1.

Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988. The Employee
Polygraph Protection Act significantly curtails an employer's
ability to require polygraph testing of job applicants or current
employees.

r

a.

Prohibitions. Employers may not require or request that an
employee or applicant take a test.

r
r
r

b.

Exceptions. The Act perluits polygraph testing of job
applicants by the pilarrriaceutical ·industry and employeI,"s
that provide security systems. A polygraph examination

G·5
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may only be required of current employees when <an
elnployer reasonably suspects that tIle elnployee was
involved in a work place theft or otller misappropriatiollof
property. In other words, the results of the examinatioJ.'l,~
be used as justification for adverse employment action~but
additional supporting evidence is required.

D.

E.

F.

PsychologicallHonesty Tests
1.

Overview. Restrictions on employers' use of polygraphs have led
many employers to try alternative forms of testing in employee
selection procedures, including psychological and honesty tests.
Tests that have a disproportionate impact on lnembers of protected
groups, or which are applied in a disparate or discriminatory
manner, may violate Title VII and state anti-discrimination laws.

2.

Disability discrimination. Psychological/llonesty testing also raise
issues under the ADA. Psycilological tests may, for example, be
viewed as medical examinations for purposes of the ADA. Any
employer \vho relies on honesty or psychological testing,
especially those pre-marketed by large cOlnpanies, sllould obtain
\vritten assurances and/or indemnifications frolll the test
manufacturers that provide protection to the eillployer in tIle event
tilat the tests are later challenged under either tIle ADA, the
Unifonn Selection Guidelines or other discrilnination laws.

I~
1:~

I
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I
I
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I
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HIV Testing
1.

Overvie\v. HIV testing is not a recommended course of action for
the vast majority of employers.

2.

Disability discrimination. Individuals \vitil AIDS are consideredas·~
having a disability under the ADA and many state employment
discrimination laws. Accordingly, to tIle extent that the purpose of
a test is to screen out individuals with AIDS from employment,
significant employment discrimination issues are raised. In
addition, in Kentucky, disclosure of HIV-related test results is
prohibited except in limited circumstances.

The ADA is tIle source of most of the "non-obvious" restrictions on preemployment inquiries.
1.
Pre-employment Examination and Inquiries Regarding
Disability: Prohibited except for pre-employmellt inquiries into
tIle ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions.
E,mployers may ask an applicant if lle/slle' can, perfonn aparticnlar
task essential to the job applied for, or wIlether tIle applicant-can

G·6
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meet the attendance expectations for a position. However, an
employer may not ask about tIle nature or extent of a disability or
how often the applicant would require leave for treatment
necessitated by the disability. An employer also may not inquire
into an applicant's workers' compensation history.

r
r

2.

r
rl

r
r

r,.

3.

Physical agility tests are not medical examinations and so may be
given at any point in the application process. However, such tests
must be given to all similarly situated applicants regardless of
disability. On October 10, 1995 the EEOC issued its final
enforcement guidance regarding pre-employment inquiries. The
revised guidance is less restrictive and permits "limited questions"
about reasonable accommodation in pre-enlployment interviews if:

a.

an obvious disability reasonably causes the interviewer to
believe the applicant needs accommodation;

b.

the applicant voluntarily discloses a 11idden disability
reasonably causing inquiry about accommodation needs; or

c.

the applicant voluntarily discloses the need for
accommodation.

Post-Offer Medical Examinations:

J

Pennitted if:

r
r

a.

all entering employees are examined;

b.

medical information is collected and maintained on
separate forms and in separate medical files and is treated
as a confidential medical record; and

c.

medical information is used only in a Olanner that is
consistent with the ADA.

r
r

Under EEOC rules the medical examinations themselves do not
have to be job related and consistent with business necessity.
However, if certain criteria are used to screen out an employee or
employees with disabilities as a result of SUCll an examination or
inquiry, the exclusionary criteria must be job related and consistent
with business necessity and performance of the essential job
functions cannot be accomplished with reasonable accommodation
as required by the ADA.

r
r
i
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INTERVIE\VING
A.

Overview -- Pre-employment intervie\vs are perhaps tIle most important
part of the pre-employment process. Everyone who interviews should be
trained, not only of the various legal pitfalls wllich could result fromLan
inappropriate interview, but also about how to ask the right questions to
avoid hiring the problem employee.

B.

Educate supervisors about \vhat not to ask.

I
I
I
I
I

Examples:

c.

1.

When did you graduate from high school?

2.

"Family planning" and dependent care questions (no one will
believe you ask tllem of men, too);

3.

Workers compensation claims experience questions;

4.

Wllether the applicant has a specific disability;

5.

Whether tIle applicant needs leave for treatment, wIlen he first
became disabled and the like, even if the applicant volunteershs;
11as a disability -- relnember, the new guidelines permit inquiries
about reasonable accommodation, not the disability or its nature or
extent.

I
,I
I
I~

In addition, educate supervisors about what they can -- alld should -- ask,
especially to help identify "high risk" employees. Examples:

1.

I

Relationships with supervisors and co-workers.

I
I
I

a. Tell me about your best boss, your worst boss.

2.

b.

Describe the \vorst disagreement/conflict that you 11ad with
a supervisor/co-worker. How was it resolved?

c.

If the conflict was not resolved to your satisfaction, what
do you think the company should have done?

~-

How would you describe your relationship with your last
supervisor? With previous supervisors?
a.

Describe how you got along with co-workers in your last
job?

b.

Have co-\vorkers ever hanlpered your productivity? How
did you handle it?

G·8
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3.

r
r

..

a.

r

r

5.

r
rt D.

I

What volunteer activities outside \vork l1ave you
participated in that would enl1ance your candidacy for this
job?

Self-esteem.

4.

I

,.

Connections outside the workplace.

a.

What did you accomplish in your last job that you are most
proud of?

b.

What was the greatest challenge you faced in your last job
and how did you handle it?

c.

What \vas the greatest disappointment you had in your last
job? How did it affect your productivity?

Job changes.

a.

Why did you leave your last job? Previous jobs?

b.

If you left voluntarily, \vhat could the company have done
to keep you?

Elnployer may ask about an applicant's ability to perform botl1 essential
and marginal job functions. Employer may also:
1. Ask tI1e applicant if he can perfonn a specific function (i.e., can you
lift 50 pounds, can you drive a truck?);

r
J

2. Ask an applicant to describe or demonstrate how he can perfonn the
function. This request must be made of all applicants unless the
applicant 11as an obvious disability wl1ic11 n1ay prevent the
perfonnance of a particular function.
E.

r
r

r

r
r
r

Credit Checks/Background Checks
1.

Denying an applicant employment because of a poor credit rating
has a disparate impact on minority groups and has been found
unlawful unless a business necessity can be s11own.

2.

Pre-employment inquiries

a.

Prohibited inquiries include: assets, liabilities, charge
accounts, bank accounts, credit ratings, past wage
garnishments, home ownership, and car o\vnership.

b.

To determine \vl1ether an applicant is a stable residel1t of
the area \vithout aski.ng about home o\vnership, an
employer may inquire about how long the applicant l1as

G-9
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lived in the area. If car travel is necessary, the employer
should ask \vhether the applicant has tIle use of a reliable
car.

3.
F.

VII.

Fair Credit Reporting Act amended Septelnber 30, 1997

Covenants Not to Compete -- If employers don't ask the right questions,
the employer may have hired an employee who will be limited in <her
ability to perform her job because of a covenant not to compete thatshe
signed at a previous position. It is ilnportant to ask applicants about these
types of covenants in industries and companies which utilize this device.

THE El\IPLOYMENT OFFER
A.

Employment Offer Letter
The la\v does not require an employment offer letter and, if poorly written,
an offer letter can do more harm tllan good. Here are some ideas. to
consider:
1.

Quote salary as being paid "at an annual rate of
for
employment at-\vill for an indefinite term" to avoid the argument
that employment \vas for at least a one-year term.

2.

Avoid 111ention of future deadlines or milestones, such as, ttYour
first performance appraisal \vill be on 6-15-01." This could be
construed to imply a contract for a fixed period.

3.

Include an "at-will" statement in tIle offer letter.

4.

Avoid terms SUCIl as "permanent," "career" or "family." They may
imply unending employment.

5.

Keep the letter as brief as possible.

6.

Expressions of hope and optimism ("We look forward to many
contributions and our mutual success") are generally not the·stllff
of which contracts are made, and can create an argument· of an.
implied contract of employnlent.

VIII. CONSEQUENCES OF POOR OR ILLEGAL HIRING PRACTICES
A.

Negligent Hiring
1.

Overvie\v. An employer may reduce potential liability to a third
party by conduc;:ting tllO.rougl1 pre-elnploylnent background
investigations and screening out applicants \vitll a.llistory of certain
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problems. These investigations, by their very nature, raise issues
of discrimination and tIle prospective elnployee's right to privacy.
On the other hand, to the extent no investigation is undertaken, an
employer may be liable for negligently 11iring a person \\,ho is
incompetent or unfit.
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2.

Definition of negligent hiring. A cause of action for negligent
hiring arises when an employer knew or should have known by
conducting a reasonable pre-employment investigation that an
employee was not competent to perform the required job or was
othetwise deficient in a respect that could reasonably be foreseen
to cause harm to others.

3.

Background checks. The tort of negligent Iliring imposes a general
duty on the employer to conduct a reasonable background check of
a potential elnployee to ensure that the employee is fit for the
position.
a.

In California, a jury awarded $5.5 million \vhen it
determined an employment agency failed to do a
background clleck on a paroled murderer. Hollvay v.
Snelling Tenlporaries, Calif Super Ct., (1992). TIle court
ruled that the temporary agency should have noticed tIle 5.5
year gap in Ilis resume, and 11is listing of t\VO prison
addresses as Ilis references.

b.

A Florida jury determined tilat a Gainesville carpet
cleaning franchise should pay a $1 million judgment in a
negligent hiring action brought by tIle parents of two
students killed by an employee who had been previously
arrested on weapons, drug and violence cllarges.
McKishnie v. Rainbolv International Carpet Dr)Jing &
Cleaning Co., Fla Cir. Ct., (1994).

Summary for Financial Institutions
The costs of hiring the wrong worker can be enormous. The increased
investments in training and expectations of productivity are among the direct costs, not to
mention the fact that the job just does not get done - when the "wrong" worker is 11ired.
In the worst case, indirect costs include litigation that can range from negligent hiring
allegations ("with a reasonable investigation, the. bank would have kno\vn tIlat Ms. X, tIle
most recent safe deposit box attendant, has a history of dishonesty) to \vrongful
termination claims by employees who quit one job to take anotller that turns out to be a
bad "fit."
The aboye ¢aterials and suggestions \vith regard to tIle lliring process for tIle
most part apply to all employers. However, there are several particular hiring issues
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financial institutions should pay closer attention to, for obvious reasons. For example, if
your organization makes use of the psychological/honesty tests referred to above,
determine the source of the tests your organization administers as part of the hiring
process and whether or not the test manufacturer(s) has provided written assurance of
protection and/or indemnity in an instance of a challenge to the test. As you review the
above materials, pay close attention to those that may pertain to your business, and follow
up appropriately.
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AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
DO THE EXCEPTIONS SWALLOW THE WHOLE?
This section focuses on the long-standing Kentucky employment at will doctrine,
and some of its exceptions. As early as 1896, Kentucky's high court has recognized that
an employment relationship between two parties that is for an "indefinite" period of time
is employment "at will" - or employment that can be terminated at any time by either the
employee or the employer. Louisville and NR.Co. v. Offutt, 36 S.W. 181 (1986). See
also, Edl~/ards v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 150 S.W.2d 916 (1941). That is, neither tIle
employee nor the employer is entitled to have expectations of a future employment
relationship: the employee has no obligation to remain employed; the employer has no
obligation to retain the employee.
What is clear is that Kentucky's employment at \vill doctrine has increasingly
become limited due to the exceptions -- contractual, statutory and common la\v ill nature
- that often apply to defeat a defense to an employee's cllallenge of discharge that tIle
employment was "at will." The question that is increasingly asked from tIle perspective
of employers is whetller or not the "exceptions" to at-will employment have allTIOst
completely "swallowed" the concept. Clearly, \vith the employlnent litigation explosion
of the last decade, tilat is not an unreasonable question. However, to tIle extent tIle
question is valid and serves to encourage employers to (1) be clear about the ten11S of an
employment reiationsilip, and (2) to make personnel decisions on tIle basis of neutral
performance-based reasons, the net result over time may turn out to benefit botI1
employers and employees in the long run.

Contractual Exceptions of Employment at Will
It Ilas long been held that where employment is for a definite period of tin1e, an
employee cannot be discharged without "good cause". See, Otis & Co. v. POlver, 1 Ky.
Opinions 312 (Ky. App. 1866). In the absence of a written contract of elnploynlent, tIle
difficulty becolnes proving that tIle parties intended tIle employment to last for a definite
period of time. As with any agreement not evidenced by a writing, courts will look at all
the facts and circumstances to attempt to discern the parties' intentions.
In earlier Kentucky cases, it was not uncommon for the courts to accept proof of
compensation paid on an annual basis as evidence of tIle parties' intelltions to enter into a
one year contract. For example, in Stewart Dry Goods v. Hutchinson, 198 S.W. 17 (Ky.
1917), Hutchinson was employed by Stewarts at a stated annual salary. In that case, the
court held that where Hutchinson had continued to work for the same salary into the
second year, i.e., after the original contract year had expired, that circumstance \vas
evidence of the parties' intentions to continue his employment for anotller year.
Likewise, in Putnanl v. Producers' Livestock Marketing Assoc., Ky. App., 75 S.W.2d
1075 (1934), the court held that a one-year contra~t had been fOfIlled based upon
evidence that included, among other things, a per an,nun? salary. Other facts and
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circumstances the court noted were the fact that the company had paid Putnam's moving
expenses, as well as other representations made by tIle employer botil at tIle time of hiring
and throughout the employment relationship.
Kentucky courts' manner of dealing with claims of (unwritten) employ.ment
contracts can be seen in cases as recently as 1980. In Hun1ana v. Fairchild, Ky..~~p.,
603 S.W.2d 918 (1980), a terminated hospital administrator presented evidence 6f'an
"offer letter" stating an annual salary, various representations of the employer upon
which Fairchild had relied and proof relating to the type of job FaircIlild would perfQJn1
(management) to argue that there existed a contract of employment between the p~\Ps.
The Court held the extrinsic evidence to be sufficient to support a finding.qr'an
agreement between the parties of one year of employment. See also, Han1moner'v.
Heritage Con1n1unicatiollS, Inc., Ky. App., 756 S.W.2d 152 (1988) (oral assurancesfr'lm
manager that employee would not be fired if her picture appeared in Playboy magazine
sufficient to raise an inference that oral contract existed and at-will employment status
had been modified.)

Implied Employment Contracts
Witllout question, the most often cited Kentucky case on employment contract
Ia\v is Shah v. Anlerican Synthetic Rubber Corp., Ky., 655 S.W.2d 489 (1983). The issue
in Shah \vas whether the parties intended an employment contract such that Ame~i~3n
Syntlletic (ASRC) could fire Shah at will. Silah contended that ASRC fired him without
cause in violation of an implied contract, wIlere after a 90 day probation period, lleCQuld
be fired only "for cause" in accordance \vitil policies and procedures establislled by
ASRC for employees who were similarly situated. ASRC argued tilat Shah was an atwill employee \vho could be terminated with or witilout cause. TIle trial court sus~aill~d
Defendant ASRC's motion for summary judgment finding that Shah's employment was
"not for a definite period and was terminable at \vill be either party." The Kentucky
Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Edwards v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 150 S.W\.~~
916 (1941), supra.
The Kentucky Supreme Court first clarified that Shah was seeking relief ~9t ,~h~
alleged breach of an employment contract the terms of which included more "t~~n
employment for an indefinite period of time. Shah's claim was that his implied contract
with ASRC included a term under which he could only be terminated for workconnected, "just cause". In its opinion reversing the Court of Appeals, the Suprr~r
Court set forth the factors to be considered in determining the precise nature~f,;~~
(implied) contract between Shah and ASRC. A court should review the totality Oft~f
circumstances of each particular case, including: (1) the understanding of the pa~t~~
based upon their written or oral negotiations and/or agreements; (2) the usage,,9,f
business; (3) the situation and objectives of the parties; (4) the nature of tIle employm~nt
and (5) all other circumstances surrounding the transaction. Because of the case by c,~~
analysis a court must undertake (mucll of \vhich gave rise to a factual dispute bet\veentb~
parties), it was inappropriate to grant summary judgment for the defendant.
,.-
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Of significance to post-Shah Kentucky cases was the Court's holding in Shah that
"parties may enter into a contract of employment terminable only pursuant to its express
terms - as "for cause" - by clearly stating their intention to do so, even though no other
consideration than services to be performed or promised is expected by the employer, or
performed or promised by the employee." A particular importance of the Shah ruling is
that, when it is claimed that an employment contract arises from something other than an
unambiguous piece of writing and there is conflicting evidence, summary judgment is
inappropriate - as the conflict in evidence regarding the parties' intentions will be a
question for the fact-finder at trial. See also, Audiovox Corp. v. Moody, Ky. App., 737
S.W.2d 468 (1987).
Do Emplo)ree Handbooks or IVlanuals Create Contractual Obligations?
In Nork v. Fetter Printing Co., Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d 824 (1987), the issue was
\vhetller or not an employer's policy and procedure manual or llandbook created all
implied contract of employment. Employers often cite this case for the proposition that
implied contracts of employment are not created by provisions contained in such a
n1anual, and indeed, in Nork, the Court lleld this to be the case. A careful review of the
opinion reveals, however, tIlat as an "absolute," such a proposition may be too strong a
statement. In Nork, the Court reviewed the policy manuals at issue and determined tllat
those particular manuals did not satisfy tIle requirement set forth in Shah, i.e., did not
evidence clear statement of intention to create a contract of employment terminable only
pursuant to its express terms. Again, following Shah, while some manuals will contain
"strong enough" (disclaimer) language to support summary judgment, others \vill not and the Shah factors must be applied to determine the parties' intentions.
Does Nork apply to all employee manuals? While there is disagreement as to the
reach of the Nork case, there are some would argue that it does not stand for the
proposition that provisions within employee manuals, per se, will never constitute
contractual terms which are enforceable. It has been argued that employee manuals that
set out definite, unambiguous terms with respect to employees' rights, and contain no atwill disclaimer language may very well contain terms which can be enforced by a court
as terms of an employment contract. While there is no case law that specifically
addresses the question, what is clear - is that the factors set forth in Shah should control.
Some of the questions that might be critical in determining wllether representations in an
employee manual create contractual expectations include the following l :
,/ What was the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the personnel manual?
,/ What, if anything, was said when the manual was distributed to employees?
,/ Were there oral promises or disclaimers?
I The following questions were authored by Steven D. Do\vney, Esq., \vho practices in Bo\vling Green,
Kentucky. The questions are contained in materials created by Mr. Do\vney in connection \vith his article,
"Breach of. ~mployment Contrac~ Actions" \vhich appeared in the senlinar 111aterials distributed to attendees
at the 6th Bienpial Employment Law Institute, June 1998, a 'University of Kentuch.)' College of La\",
Continuing ..Legal Education program.
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Have other employees been able to rely upon tIle terms of tIle manual in the pastto
enforce a right which tlley believe they held based upon the language of the provision
at issue?
','fr
What is the testimony of management representatives of tIle business aSr,_ he
meaning of the employee manual?
f"4"
What is the stated purpose of the manual?
What do the plaintiff and other employees say was said to them by management;tlt
the manual?
Was there talk of unionization in the business at the time the manual was created,:~~.~
Were employees disgruntled because they felt they had no job security at the tim~lte
manual was created?
Did the employer offer the personnel manual in an area of lo\v unemployment tatry
to "keep employees" by offering "job security"?
Has the manual been changed and did it contain a disclaimer in the past which has
been deleted?
Did the employer ever tell the discllarged (or disciplined) employee that lle
could look to the manual to detennine what their rights were?

Statutory Exceptions to the Employment at 'ViiI Doctrine
The employment at will doctrine has also been linlited by specific local, state'aBd
federal statutes prohibiting the discllarge of employees for illegitimate reasons. rile
primary examples of such statutes are found in the various anti-discrimination laws.(;'So
prevalent are these exceptions that it makes sense to tllink of "at-will" employment, inrthe
first instance, as the ability of an employer to terminate a worker "for just aboutlJrty
reason except an inlpermissible one." These la\vs, wllich have become familiar tomott,
include inter alia:

Title VII (federal Civil Rigllts Act of 1964, and amendments of 1991) 8D'diits
state counterpart (KRS Chapter 344)
Prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion,
ethnic and national origin. The state statute also prohibits discrimination
on the basis of marital or familial status. Both statutes also prohibit
retaliation by any person against an employee who has opposed a
discriminatory practice, or participated in an investigation or other
proceeding under either statute.

Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and its state counterpart
(KRS Chapter 344)
These acts prohibit discrimination against workers who are
covered under the acts, i.e., over 40 years of age. The statutes similarly
protect against retaliation.
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Americans \vith Disabilities Act (ADA) and KRS Chapter 344 (as related to
disability)
Provides protection against discriminatory practices based upon an
individual's disabling physical or mental condition and/or retaliation under
the Act.
Family Medical Leave Act
Federal statute that provides certain job protections for workers
who fall within the scope of the act due to tlleir own, or a family
member's, illness that necessitates an absence of three days or longer (up
to twelve weeks annually) from \vork for medical reasons.
Workers Compensation Retaliation Act (KRS Chapter 342)
Prohibits retaliation against employees Wll0 llave exercised tlleir
rights under Kentucky's workers compensation statutes.
KRS 336.130
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Provides protection from retaliation for employees \Vll0 Ilave
participated in activities related to organized labor.
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) and state counterpart, KRS
Chapter 338
Tllese statutes, which extensively regulate Ilealtil and safety witilin
the work environment, also provide protection against an employee's
exercise of rights under these la\vs. Tilis includes, among other tilings, tIle
reporting of alleged OSHA violations, and participation in OSHA
investigations.
Fair Labor Standards Act and state counterpart (KRS Chapter 337)
These laws govern wage and hour issues, and contain antiretaliation provisions prohibiting discrimination against an employee who
exercises any right pursuant to federal or state \vage and hour statutes.
Other Statutes
The above statutes are just some examples of laws that provide protection for
employees from Kentucky's employment at will doctrine by way of federal or state
statute. The list is not exllaustive. For example, Lexington/Fayette County and
Louisville enacted "fairness ordinances" wllich prollibit discrilllination OIl the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity. While legislature has whittled a\\7.ay considerably
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at employment-at-will by enacting State statutes governing the employment relationship
in Kentucky, the courts have been less enthusiastic \vitll regard to "common law"
exceptions.

Common La,v Exceptions to Employment at Will
Absent contractual or explicit statutory protection, in Kentucky there exists. a
cause of action for the tort of "wrongful discharge against public policy". The
established public policy exceptions to at-will employment are articulated in the well
known case of Grzyb v. Evans, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 399 (1985). Grzyb provides for only
two situations where a discharge is so contrary to public policy tilat it is actionable absent
explicit legislative or constitutional pronouncements prohibiting tIle discharge. The ftrst
situation is where an employee suffers an adverse employment action because he or she
refuses or fails to violate the law in the course of employment, and the second is where
the reason for the discllarge \vas the employee's exercise of a right conferred by wellestablished legislative enactment. Id. at 402.
The first public policy exception, an employee's failure or refusal to violate· the
law, is easily imaginable. An example would be where an employer attempts to insist
that the company bookkeeper-employee sign and file false tax returns on behalf of the
business. Should the bookkeeper fail or refuse to violate the law, and suffer termination
(or any adverse employment action) for failing or refusing to violate the law, Grzyb
protection would be triggered. The second Grzyb exception would apply in a
circumstance where a \vorker suffers an adverse employment action SUCll as termination
or discipline because the worker exercised Ilis or her right to vote, for example.
However, "If plaintiffs discharge does not meet these criteria, it is not a basis for
a wrongful discharge claim, no matter how 'morally indefensible' tile employer's
reasons." Stewart v. The Pantry, Inc., 715 F.Supp. 1361, 1364 (W.D.Ky. 1988). Thus,
where a plaintiff has no statutory protection and further, fails to allege facts to wq.ich one
of Kentucky's two "public policy" exceptions apply, a complaint must be dismissedasa
matter of law. Id. at p. 401.
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The Kentucky Supreme Court has made clear its intent to refuse to expand an atwill employee's claims for wrongful discharge beyond the above two well-defined
situations, both implicating conduct that is contrary to public policy. In Boykins v
Housing Authority ofLouisville, Ky., 842 S.W.2d 527, 529 (1992), tIle high court stated:
"In Firestone Textile Company v. Meadows, Ky., 666 S. W.2d 730 (1983), we embraced
Broclaneyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis.2d 561,333 N.W.2d 834 (1983), to establish
the clear limitations on "any judicial exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine."
Emphasis in original.
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Because of the restrictive language in Firestone and BOykins, supra, convention~l
wisdom would dictate that it is fairly difficult for a plaintiff to make out aca~~A:~f
. wrongful discharge against public policy, absent contractual, statutory or clear "GrzYb·'
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protection. The fact that the Kentucky legislature has enacted explicit legislation to
prohibit various types of "retaliatory" termination also provides persuasive reasoning
against any judicially-created expansion of the tort of wrongful discilarge. Finding the
doctrine of separation of powers relevant, the Kentucky Supreme Court has indicated its
unwillingness to extend the tort of wrongful discharge beyond tIle explicit language in
statutes such as these because "[s]uch matters are for legislative determination, and are
not proper subjects for judicial policymaking." Nelson Steel Corporation v. McDaniel,
Ky., 898 S.W.2d 66, 69-70 (1995). In making this point, tIle Court was mindful of the
powers of the General Assembly, as well as the Court's own limitations. It stated: "we
recognize that the regulatory power of the state empowers the General Assembly to place
statutory limits on the employer/employee terminable-at-will relationship when necessary
consistent with public purpose." Id.
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In addition, the requirement that the public policy must be found in "explicit
legislative statements" has been interpreted by courts in the strictest sense. See Boykins
v. Housing Authority ofLouisville, Ky., 842 S.W.2d 527,528 (1992). For exal11ple, KRS
61.102(1) demonstrates Kentucky's General Assen1bly intent to provide state elnployees
(not private employees) with "Whistle-Blo\ver" protection. Moreover, subsequent case
law interpreting the statute has complied witil the Court's directive to narrowly construe
the statute. KRS 61.1 02( 1), in pertinent part, it prohibits a state elnployer froln acting to
" ... subject to reprisal ... or discriminate against any [state] employee \VI10 in good faitil
reports, discloses, divulges or otllenvise brings to the attention ... of any appropriate
body or authority
any facts or information relative to an actual or suspected violation
of any law, statute "
In Boykins, the Supreme Court rejected Plaintiffs retaliatory discllarge claim and
affirmed the Court of Appeals' finding that the legislature had not established a policy 011
retaliatory discharge. However, the Supreme Court did not do this \vitllout first
analyzing wilether the Kentucky state workers' whistleblower statute, KRS 61.101, et
seq., was applicable to the facts. In Boykins, an employee of the Housing Authority filed
a negligence action against her employer pertaining to an injury her nepllew received on
the property of the Housing Authority. Plaintiff was later discharged and sued, arguing
her discharge was in retaliation for her negligence action. Interpreting the "Whistle
Blower" statute narrowly, the Court lleld the employee was not protected because tIle
negligence action was unrelated to her employment. The Court found no merit to tIle
employee's argument that the statute applied because she raised public safety and health
issues (or issues of general "public interest.") The Supreme Court further states, "The
narrowly drafted purpose of KRS 61.102 reveals no legislative intent to encoll1pass tIle
action of filing suit the circumstances presented...."
Perhaps even more instructive is Davis v. Powell's Valley Water District, Ky.
App., 920 S.W.2d 75 (1995). In Davis, the Court of Appeals takes a consistently
restrictive view of the state workers' whistleblower statute, KRS 61.101, et seq. In
Davis, plaintiffs asserted retaliatory termination bec~use they discovered and publislled
infonnation they believed indicated the defendant and some of its elnployees allegedly
participated in""certain illegal activities. The trial court directed verdict for the defense,
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finding that the statute did not apply since the defendant was not a political subdiviiidiiof
2
.... '
the state and therefore, the statute did not apply. The Court of Appeals reversed t¥,{<l
court, focusing on the explicit language of the statute that applies onlv to em 10. ee f
the Commonwealth of Kentucky or political subdivisions. It detertnined the
afforded protection to the plaintiffs - but only after and because it determined the
District to be a "political subdivision" of the state. The clear implication is that w
defendant in a particular case cannot be considered a political subdivision of the st, ~r
any way connected to the state, but is strictly a private business, there is no whistleb'l~er
protection in Kentucky.
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For purposes of applyIng KRS 61.1 02( 1), "elnployer" IS defined as: "[t]he COln111011\Vealth of Kelltg.~~:Y~
or any .of .its political subdivisions. Employer al~o includes any person authorized to act 011 behalf'ofiij)~
Common,\,ealth, or any of its political subdivisions, with respect to fonnulation of policy or supervis'ioi1,'lft!j
a managerial capacity, of subordin~teemployees[.]" Id. at 76.
.
.
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SEXUAL HARASSl\1ENT
AN UPDATE SINCE THE US SCT 1998 DECISIONS
In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down seminal decisions interpreting the
law in sexual harassment cases. Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton, 77 FEP Cas. (BNA) 14,
U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 97-282 (1998) and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 77 FEP Cas.
(BNA) 1, U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 97-569 (1998). In those cases, the court established a new
standard for hostile-environment harassment committed by a supervisor. When not
accompanied by a tangible job detriment, an employer will be liable for supervisory
hostile environment unless it pleads and proves a two-pronged affirmative defense that:
(a) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) the plaintiff-employee unreasonably failed to take advantage
of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise.
However, when a supervisor's harassment can be demonstrated and culminates in
a tangible employment action, no affirmative defense is available. A tangible
employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring,
firing, failure to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, etc.
TIle Court did not alter tIle "knew or should have known" standard of liability for
non-supervisory hostile-environment harassment (peer to peer harassment).
The interpretation of Faragher and Burlington Industries by the lower courts is of
great interest (and concern) to employers. In the case, Willial1ls v. General Motors
Corporation, No. 97-3351 (6 th Cir. 1999), the Sixtll Circuit Court of Appeals applied the
Faragher and Burlington Industries standards.
The 6 th Circuit reversed the summary judglnent granted by tIle federal district
court on following facts. Ms. Williams was a 30-year employee at the Warren, Ohio
plant. She worked third shift in the tool crib. She alleged hostile environment based on
the following:
Co-worker "Harassment"
1. Giovannoe, a co-worker, used the "F" word constantly.
2. In June, 1995 Giovannoe used the phrase "Hey slut."
3. In September, 1995 Giovannoe said he was "sick and tired of these f--king women;"
she and Giovannoe threw boxes at one another.
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Supervisor "Harassment"
1. In July, 1995 Ryan, her supervisor, looking at her breasts said "You can rub up
against me anytime" and "You would kill me, Marilyn. I don't know if I can handle
it, but I'd die with a smile on my face."

.,

.

2. In July, 1995 Williams was bending over. Ryan, bellind her, said "Back up; just back
up."
3. In July, 1995 Williams was writing the phrase "Hancock Furniture Company." Ryan
put his ann around her back, leaned his face against hers and said "you left the dick
out of the hand."
General "Harassment"
1. Williams was forced to take tIlird shift aIthougIl Giovannoe had originally agreed to
take it.
2. In September, 1995 Williams discovered a box of tool crib release forms glued to the
top of her desk.
3. Williams \vas denied overtime.
4. Williams alone did not have a key to the office.
5. Williams alone was denied a break.

,

6. Williams was not allowed to sit at the table by the crib \vindow, but in tIle back.
7. A motorized cart once sat on a skid and blocked otller carts.
8. A female co-worker locked the crib with Williams inside.
9. Twice materials were stacked in front of the alternate exit.

Lessons to Learn from the Williaills case:
•

After Faragher and Willianzs it is no longer enough for an employer to take
corrective action. Employers have an affirmative duty to prevent sexual
llarassment by supervisors (emphasis mine). Once an employee llas
established active discrimination involving "no tangible employment action,"
an employer can escape liability only if it took reasonable care to prevent and
correct any sexually harassing behavior and the employee failed to use
remedial measures to alleviate tIle situation.
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•

The Sixth Circuit rejected the trial court's "dis-aggregation" of plaintiffs
claims into four separate categories of (1) foul language; (ii) allnoying
treatment by co-workers; (iii) perceived inequities of treatment; and (iv) sexbased remarks. The dis-aggregation divorced the incidents from tlleir context
and deprived them of their full force.

•

The supervisor "status" of the perpetrator matters for purposes of liability. It
does not matter for purposes of determining whether a hostile-environment
exists. The totality-of-the-circumstances test mandates that courts consider
harassment by all perpetrators combined.

r

•

The supervisor's conduct was not "merely crude, offensive, and humiliating,
but also contained an element of physical invasion."

r

•

Giavonnoe's remarks were not merely "foul language in the workplace" but
could be viewed as "humiliating and fundamentally offensive to any woman
in that work environment, and they go to the core of Williams's entitlement to
a workplace free of discriminatory animus."

•

The pranks are not merely oafish behavior but could be viewed as \vorksabotaging behavior that creates a llostile \vork environlnent.

•

At oral argument, Williams' attorney asked tIle court \VIletller the conduct
alleged in this case would be tolerated in our courtilouses. The court's
answer? "We believe it would not, and we reject tIle view tilat tIle standard
for sexual harassment varies depending on the work environment." [Does the
Court also reject Judge Scalia's "societal context" view?]

•

r
r
r

Conduct need not be overtly sexual to be "based on sex." The myriad
instances where Williams was ostracized, combined with gender-specific
epithets, create a inference - to be tried to a jury - tl1at gender \vas a
substantial motivating factor for co-workers' behavior.

•

The district court misconstrued the requirements of the subjective test when it
viewed as significant Williams's testimony that Ryan never threatened her and
she never felt physically threatened. She was aware of the policy against
harassment, but never complained about Ryan. She never told Ryan to stop
and stated she thought he was joking.

r

•

The Court says the district court turned the subjective test on its 11ead
substituting Ryan's intention for Williams's perception. That \Villiams
thought Ryan meant to joke does not mean she perceived his comments as
jokes. Humor is not a defense.

•

The "subjective offense" component of a prima facie case does not require
that a plaintiff report a 110stile \vork environment. "A plailltiff can be
subjected to sexual harassment... and yet, for a number of valid reasons, not
report the harassment. Williams's reluctance to report the incidents is entirely

1

r
r

r

r
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r
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r
r
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understandable considering that one of the alleged aggressors was her
supervisor and she wanted to get along at work." [The failure to complain
may be relevant to the affirmative defense.]
•

To show unreasonable interference with work perfonnance, the plaintiff'~d
not prove a decline in productivity or that her work was actually affecte·d.
"The employee need only show that the harassment made it more difficult to
do the job."

Lessons from EEOC Guidance about Vicarious Employer Liability (1999)
1.

Definition of Supervisor

An individual qualifies as an employee's supervisor if the individual has
authority to undertake or recommend tangible employment decisions affecting the
employee or the individual has authority to direct the employee's daily work
activities. As long as tIle individual's recommendation is given substantial weight
by the final decision-makers, that individual meets the definition of supervisor.
An employer may be subject to vicarious liability for 11arassment by a supervisor
who does not have actual autIlority over tIle employee wllere the employee
'
reasonably believed that the harasser had such power.
2.

Corrective Action May Not Be Enough

Unlawful harassment may occur despite the exercise of requisite legal care
by the employer and employee. In these circumstances, the employer will be
liable. The affirmative defense may be useful in limiting damages.
3.

Policy Is Not Enough

If an employer has an adequate policy and complaint procedure and
properly responded to a complaint, but management ignored previous complaint~
by other employees about the same Ilarasser, then the employer has not exercised
reasonable care.
4.

Implement A General Civility Code

Encourage employees to report "harassment before it becomes severe •. ~.J:"
pervasive." The employer must make clear to employees that it will stpp
harassment before it rises to the level of a violation of law.
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5.

A complaint procedure should not be rigid. A complainant should not be
forced to adhere to a particular format or commit to writing before a complaint is
taken seriously or is investigated.

r

6.

r

7.

r

r

Do Not Be Picky

Give Away The Store

The EEOC recommends that employers' policies contain information
about the time frames for filing charges with the EEOC.
"No" Means "Yes"

An employee may report alleged harassment to a supervisor, but ask
l1im/her to take no action. Inaction by a supervisor in SUCl1 circumstances may
lead to employer liability.
8.

Bend Over Backwards

r

Intermediate measures may be necessary before tI1e investigation is over,
such as scheduling changes to avoid contact between accuser and accused or
transfer of alleged harasser or placing alleged harasser on paid leave. TIle
complainant sl10uld not be involuntarily transferred or otherwise burdened.

r

9.

r

r

If no determination can be made because the evidence is inconclusive, the
employer should still undertake further preventive measures, such as training and
monitoring.
10.

r

r
r

Spill The Beans
Management should infonn both parties about corrective action taken.

11.

r

Do Something

Go Looking For Trouble

Due care requires management to correct unwelcome 11arassment
regardless of whether an employee files an internal complaint.
12.

Organize Your Skeleton Closet

TIle EEOC advises employers to keep records of all 11arasSlnel1t
complaints.

•

r
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13.

It's Always Your Problem

An employee \vho fails to complain does not carry the burden of proving
the reasonableness of that decision. The burden lies witil tIle employer to> prove
that the employee's failure to complaint was unreasonable. The employeetrlight
have reason to believe that the complaint mechanism entailed a risk of retaliation
or that it was not effective.

EDUCATE YOUR MANAGERS ON THE SEXUAL-HARASSMENT MYTHS

I
I
I
I
I~

'Myth No.1
It's the company's problem.

Reality Check
You may be disciplined or terminated for inappropriate behavior even if it does not meet
all the legal criteria of sexuaillarassment.
You may be sued individually.
You may not be "taken care of' by tIle conlpany.
You may be personally liable for punitive damages even wIlen tIle company is not.

Myth No.2
I can assume people are not offended if they do not express offense.

Reality Check
Plaintiffs/victims offer a hundred credible reasons/excuses for not speaking up, inclUding
fear, futility, ignorance of process.

Myth No.3
We're okay because we have a written policy against harassment and a complaint
procedure.

Reality Check
A policy and complaint procedure are no guarantee against liability. Tl1ey ~re on~yas
effective as their implementation and they depend upon employees' perceptions of the
company's seriousness about these issues.
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As long as everyone is okay \vith the speech/conduct, \ve are safe.

Reality Check
The fact that suggestive speech or conduct may be welcome is no excuse.
"Welcome" trash talk and conduct are extremely dangerous for many reasons.
Welcome can and does cllange to unwelcome.
Not all recipients \viII find the offending conduct \velcome.

r

Not all offenders are equal. What may be okay between coworkers/friends can become
offensive from manager or coworker/non-friend.

r

The sleaze factor in a \vork environment is critical.

'f

r
r
r
r
r
r
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Myth No.5
We cannot control people's "free speecll," their falling in love, their private
affairs, etc.

Reality Check
If you cannot control your employees in the \vork environn1ent, stop being a Inanage.
You can and should regulate speech in the \vork environment. Personal business stops
being personal when it begins to adversely affect the work environment. The company
should have a rule that supervisors should have no intimate relationship (sexual or
othenvise) with subordinates. Period.

Myth No.6
If I cut my employees some slack and make them like me, they'll return tIle favor
and no one will turn on me.

Reality Check

r
r

Yes, they will. Managers who are fair, consistent and play by the rules·are far less likely
to be sued or to lose suits than those who wing it or rely on employees' personal loyalty.
Effective management is not the same as a popularity contest.

r
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Myth No.7
Using my personal standards of business etiquette, I can decide \Vllat is and
offensive. If I'm not offended, it's permissible.

Reality Check
Your opinion is almost irrelevant. What the plaintiff and jury think matters.

Myth No.8
Touching and joking is necessary for good morale.

I
I
I

I
I
I

Reality Check
No. Effective, professional management and good profits are necessary for good morale.

I

Myth No.9

I

If it's true or I heard it on TV or radio, it's okay to talk about it.

Reality Check
"Truth" or rellashed trash is no defense. Many true tllings are best left unsaid.
Many things that are considered appropriate and funny on TVIradio are InapPlropnalt(fllna
risky in the workplace [or will sound horrible when repeated in a courtroom].

Myth No. 10

I
I
I
I
I
I

"i::

I can act at work they way I act everywhere else.

Reality Check
Not even close. Arrogance or clueless-ness (or both) is a huge problem in these cases.
The office is not your home, your car, your favorite bar or pick-up joint. You havll,{t~
right to say whatever pops into your head. You have no right to litter tIle company's
work environment with trash talk or conduct (or to allow it to be littered by others).
'

Myth No. 11
It's got to be really bad before we lose.

I
.1

l
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Reality Check
Juries do not distinguish between unlawful llarassment and bad taste. TIley will punish
you for breaches of etiquette, not just for sexual blackmail or egregious conduct.

Myth No. 12
If I'm careful to whom I talk and where, no one \vill ever know.

Reality Check

r

All workplace communications are subject to discovery, including conversations, e-mail,
voicemail, marginalia, interoffice memos, notes, planners, calendars, etc. Even
communications a\vay from work, but involving or relating to employees, are subject to
discovery and may be used against you and tIle company.

r
r

Myth No. 13

j

Reality Check

r

Forget about it. You are Goliath. No one likes him. Moreover, tIle picture presented in
the courtroom will bear little resemblance to the actual facts. You can't recreate past
context. People do lie and lie effectively.

r

Myth No. 14

,.

I \vill get a fair shake in the courtroom from a jury of my peers Ollce tlley Ilear tIle
"true version" of events.

People can't sue iftlley give as good as they get.

r

Reality Check

r

Yes they can and do. A victim's questionable behavior may not be admitted into
evidence, may be denied or may be rationalized away. Your mission is to nip the bad
seed in the bud, not water it.

i

r
r
r
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Myth No. IS
We only have to be careful around females.
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Reality Check
This law protects everyone. Males and females can be tIle victilTIS of opposite
sex harassment. If it's sexually explicit or suggestive in nature, whatever the
whoever the target, whatever the context, knock it off.

C'Att.l'ld·

Myth No. 16
We can wait until someone complains.

Reality Check
Absolutely not. We need to be proactive and err on the side of preventing na]~as:smlenl;~
some circumstances, we may be liable for harassment even if we did not know

Myth No. 17
If the "victim" asks me not to report or act on tIle problem, I'm okay doing
nothing.

I
I
I
I

Ie
I
I

Reality Check

I

Wrong. All too often the victim's request is later denied or reinterpreted. TIle victim's
wish is not controlling. The company has obligations to investigate and corrctR!
independent of his or her wish. It is not the "victim's" prerogative to make that call. '

I

Myth No. 18
If employees can't stand the heat, they should get out of tIle kitchen.
rules.

Reality Check
Law and company policies rule. The majority may have to defer to a more
minority.

Myth No. 19
I can fire people at will, so I'll just unload my sensitive types.

G· 30

seI1SllttV4~,

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

r

r

Reality Check
While most employers do maintain "employment-at-will," you, as a good
manager, \vill want to have a good and legitimate reason for termination. You
cannot fire or punish people for complaining about 11arassment or for supporting
such complaints.

,...
r

Myth No. 20

r

Reality Check

r

Nope. The management 11at trumps.

I can wear my "friend" or "regular person" 11at along witll my management hat.

fi

Myth No. 21
After I get the complaint or notice of a problem, it's best just to let it ride for a
\vllile and see how it shakes out.

r
r

r
r

r
r

r

r

Reali!)' Check
Report it immediately to the appropriate person. Get it up the line - NOW!

EDUCATE YOUR WORKFORCE ON SOl\fE BASIC DO'S AND DON'TS
DO:
Keep your hands to yourself.
Keep your mouth totally clean; avoid crude language, gestures and objects.

DO NOT:
Do not date or request dates from subordinates, direct or indirect [ifyoll feel tIle flicker of
mutual desire, ask for a company-blessed solution]
Do not "come on" to subordinates.
Do not "carouse" with subordinates.
No relating of dreams, sexual exploits, fantasies, etc.

r

r
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No retelling of smutty TV or radio humor.
No comments on body, weight, physical attributes, sexual habits or liaisons, intimate
topics, etc.
Do not use e-mail, voicemail or other Company information processing or storage
resources for suggestive jokes, comments, etc. No use of sexually explicit internet sites.
No suggestive magazines or objects in the workplace.
No sexual gag gifts, cards, etc.
No suggestive graffiti or posters or pictures.
No "hazing" or teasing of employees especially when it relates to sex, age, race, national
origin, disability, religion, sexual orientation.
No gender-biased remarks (tllis applies to all protected statuses).
No use of supervisory autll0rity to gain sexual advantage.
Do not wait for a complaint.
No delay in reporting any complaint or suspected problem.
Do not be bullied by or partial to either alleged victim or accused harasser.
Do not bring your private life into the workplace.
Keep company posters up at all times (anti-harassment policy, HOTLINE, open door).

I
I;
I
I
I
I.,
I
I
I

I
I

Impose tIle above rules on subordinates.

I
I
I
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1999 - THE YEAR OF THE ADA
(AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT)

A.

WHO IS DISABLED?

The Supreme Court ruled that individuals must be viewed in their corrected or medicated
state in detennining whether they are disabled. The three decisions \vere a clear
victory for employers: Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct.
2139,9 AD Cas. (BNA) 673 (1999); Murphy v. UPS, Inc., 527 U.S. _ (1999)
and Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburgz. 527 U.S. _ (1999).
Plaintiffs were twin sisters; eacll has severe myopia [uncorrected
20/200 (R) 20/400 (L); corrected 20/20]. Without corrective lenses, the
sisters could not drive, \Vatcl1 TV or shop.

SuttOl1 --

In 1992, they applied to United as commercial airline pilots. They did not
meet the airline's Ininimum vision requirement of 20/1 00 or better.
The sisters filed a cllarge alleging disability discrimination, pursuing a
theory of actual disability and a "regarded as" theory. The trial court
dismissed. The trial court vie\ved them in tl1eir "corrected" state. In
addition, the trial court said the airline did not view plaintiffs as generally
foreclosed from piloting, just from the particular job of global airline pilot.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed (contra the First, Second, Third, Fifth and
Seventh and the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance).
The Supreme Court held that the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance is an
impermissible interpretation of the EEOC. If a person is taking measures
to correct for the impairment, the effects of those measures - positive and
negative - must be taken into account \vhen deciding "substal1tial
limitation." The Court cites three bases for its rationale: (i) a disability is
an impairment that currently "substantially limits," 110t one that could or
might; (ii) the inquiry is individualized; are the major life activities of SUCl1
individual limited; and (iii) Congress could not have meant to protect as
disabled the 43,000,000 Americans with impairments (which, if
uncorrected, \vould be disabling). Therefore, the Court found tIlat tIle
sisters were not disabled.
In addition, the Court held that the airline did not regard them as disabled.
An employer can "regard" in two ways: (i) it may mistakenly believe a
person has an impairment that substantially limits; or (ii) it nlay
mistakenly believe that an actual, non-limiting ilnpairment does, in fact,
substantially limit. Here the sisters argued the second "mistake," i.e.~ tIlat
the airline mistakenly believed that tIle actual nlyopia- substantially lilnited
them in the major life activity of working. The Court Jejected that
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argument holding that the particular job of global pilot is not a broad class
ofjobs.

Mltrp/IV -- Murphy was a UPS mechanic hired in August, 1994. ,··His
position required him to drive commercial motor vehicles. He~as,
diagnosed with high blood pressure at age 10. Witll medicatiop~
functioned normally. Driving was conceded to be an essentialJob
function. A DOT regulation required that drivers not have a"c\.l~nt
clinical diagnosis of high blood pressure likely to interfere with· their
ability to operate a commercial vehicle safely." At hire, Murphyw~s
erroneously certified and began work. In September, the error was
discovered and he was retested. In October, UPS fired him because ,his
blood pressure was too high. Sutton determined tIle result of Murpfty's
claim. Murphy in his medicated state \vas not disabled. UPS did notview
Murphy as precluded from a broad class of jobs and did not firebilll
because of an unsubstantiated fear that he \vould suffer a lleart attack<or
stroke while driving. Rather, it fired hinl because 11is blood pressure
exceeded the DOT's requirements for drivers of commercial vehicles.
AiberfsOl1S, IIIC. -- Kirkingburg was offered a job as a truck driver at an

Albertson's warehouse. Before actually starting work, lle took a vision
test to see if he met DOT requirements for commercial vellicle drivers.
Although he did not, he was improperly certified and began work/in
August, 1990. In December, 1991 he took a LOA because of a job injury.
On return to work he took a physical exam where it was detenninedhis
eyesight failed DOT standards. He applied for a waiver, but was fired.
He received the waiver in early 1993 but \vas not rellired. The Ninth
Circuit reversed tIle trial court's granting of summary judgment to
Albertsons.
The Supreme Court cited three "missteps" by tIle Ninth Circuit: (i) while
Kirkingburg sees using only one eye and most people use two,
"difference" is not tantamount to a "substantial limitation;" (ii) the Ninth
Circuit improperly disregarded Kirkingburg's ability to
compensate/mitigate the impairment; his brain developed subconscious
mechanisms to cope; and (iii) the Ninth Circuit ignored its obligation to
determine the existence of a disability on a case-by-case basis;
monocularity differs in its impact on individuals.
Kirkingberg's obtaining a waiver made no difference since the \vaiver
program was experimental and did not purport to modify the substantive
content of the general regulations.
Employers can expect plaintiffs' lawyers to come up with ways to circumvent the
effect of those decisions. Anticipated circumventions include greater use of tIle other
definitions of disabled: having a "history of disability" and being "regarded as disabled."
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Employers can also anticipate the argument that the medication itself has a disabling
effect. See, e.g., McAlindin v. County of San Diego, No 97-56787 (9 th Cir. 9/16/99).
McAlindin suffered from anxiety and panic disorders and l1ad trouble sleeping. He
undertook the corrective measure of psychotherapy and medication. The medication
made him impotent. The Court held that sex, sleeping and .interacting with others are
major life activities and that McAlindin was substantially limited in sex and sleeping.
See also EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645,9 AD 917 (5 th eire 1997). Boyle
was a 20-year employee of Gallagher. He rose from salesman to President. He
performed well. In late 1993 he was diagnosed with blood cancer. He underwent a
month of chemotherapy, but stayed in touch with work and made decisions and
assignments. He was pronounced in remission and released to work. The Company
chairman demanded what amounted to a guarantee that Boyle could serve as President.
The Chairman suggested retirement citing Boyle's affluence. He then demoted Boyle to
Vice President of Sales and reduced his salary by 50%. Boyle declined the opportunity.
(Boyle died in January, 1995.)
The Court found the blood cancer was an impairment and that working is a major life
activity. The issue was tIle effect of tIle treatlnent (continuing chemotherapy). The Court
held tilat Boyle, in remission, was not disabled. His need to return to the hospital for six
monthly treatn1ents (3-5 days each) did not suffice, especially given the flexibility
executives enjoy.
However, the Court reversed summary judgment to tIle employer on the "record of' and
"regarded as" definitions. A record of a cancer diagnosis is not enougll; plaintiff must
sho\v a record of an impairment that substantially limits. The Court cited Boyle's 30-day
hospitalization, limited vision, etc. The employer's offering a reduced position does not
preclude trial on the regarded as tlleory since it arguably led to constructive discharge.
OilIer URegarded" Cases
•

Ross v. Canlpbell Soup Conzpany, 237 F. 3d 701 (6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit
reversed summary judgment for employer finding that the federal district court had
"too easily dismissed" as direct evidence that tIle employer regarded the p~aintiff as
disabled a note written by plaintiffs supervisor referring to the plaintiff as "the back
case."

•

Heyman v. Queens Village Com111ittee for Mental Health for Janlaica Conl111unity
Adolescent Program, Inc., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 30720 (2d eire 11/30/99). The
employer fired an employee \vith lymphoma and moved for summary judgm"ent on
the theory that the employee was not actually disabled. The Court denied the motion
allowing the plaintiffs "regarded as" claim to proceed.

•

Deane v. Pocono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en bane). Plaintiffs
pursuing a regarded as theory (but \vho are not actually disabled) only 11ave to proye

r
r
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that they can perform the essential functions of the job to gain the
Act.
•

B.
•

Spades v. City 0/ TValnut Ridge, Arkansas, 186 F.3d 897, 9 Am. Dis. Cas.
1015 (8 th Cir. 1999). Police officer Sam Spades attempted suicide witll hand
survived. He received counseling and medication for depression. He asked to
to work, but was fired because of the City's fear of increased liability.
for disability discrimination, the Court held that since tIle depression was __....·• •
with medication, he was not disabled. The Court rejected Spades'
theory \vithout any helpful discussion.

!II'Y,.,.

REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
Vollmert v. Wisconsin o/Transportation, 197 F.3d 293, 9 Am. Dis. Cas. (BNA)'l'~Q4
(7th Cir. 1999). A learning disabled employee failed to learn a new computer s~"tn
and was transferred to a dead-end job. Plaintiffs expert testified tilat piaintiff:\v*s
capable of learning the new system \vith proper training. TIle Court rever~~d
summary judgment for the employer on the basis of tIle testitTIony. The COUrt
rejected the argument that the opinion \vas conclusory, holding that tIle exp 's
opinion was based on his review of tIle employee's education, employmenthist~£y
and performance on an aptitude test.
'rJ;J
th

•

Two years earlier in Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461 (7 Cir. 1997), the S8Jlle
Court rejected as conclusory an expert's opinion tilat an employee with depre~'si6n
could do her job.

•

Belkv. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 194 F.3d 946,9 Am. Dis. Cas. (B~~)
1621 (8 th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff, a polio victim, requested his employer to modify'.
physical performance test for a telephone cable repair position. TIle employer re '" p
and plaintiff sued. The trial court rejected the defense request for a jury instru:~? '
that job-related tests are acceptable. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff.. "The
Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial because tIle employer was deprived
of its business necessary defense.
-

•

Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 9 Am. Dis. Cas. (BNA) 738 (10th . Cir.
1999) (en bane). Reassignment is not just the opportunity to apply for a job with
other applicants. When a disabled employee cannot perform his current j09~(t~~
employer must reassign the employee if there is an available position he can do. LThl
arguably creates a preference for the disabled e m p l o y e e . '

•

Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519 (7 Cir. 1996). Request for a transfer
to a different supervisor is per se unreasonable.

•

Kennedy v. Dresser Rand Co., 193 F.3d 120,9 Am. Dis. Cas. (BNA) 1335 (2dCir:;'
1999). Re"questing .a cliange in supervisors as an accon1modation is not"per'$e
uiiteasonable but ~tbe plaintiff must overcome a presumption_ of unreasonableness.

i

th

G· 36

I
I
I

I
I~

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

,.!

•

r

,,.
r

1.

An employer may ask an individual to provide "reaSOllable documentation"
regarding the alleged disability and limitations wIlen the disability and/or need for
accommodation is not obvious.
The employer may require that tIle
documentation be provided by "an appropriate llealth care or rehabilitation
professional." What is "reasonable documentation?" Only that information
needed to establish the person has a disability and that tIle disability necessitates a
reasonable accommodation (not complete medical records, usually).

r

r
r
r

An individual may be required to be exanlined by tIle employer's doctor only iflle
llas not provided adequate information from his o\vn and only after the
inadequacy has been explained, but not cured.
b) The interactive process.
A worker's "notice" to the employer that he needs an accommodation need not
mention tIle ADA or use the words "reasonable accommodation." Requests may
be oral and casual. The request may come from someone otIler tllan tIle disabled
individual. A disabled employee is not precluded from requesting a reasonable
accommodation because he failed to request one at the time of application or llire.

r
~'
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EEOC Interpretive Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation
a) What information can you get on the employee's disability and
need for accommodation?

r
r

r
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Cannice v. Nonvest Bank Iowa NA., 189 F.3d 723,9 Am. Dis. Cas. (BNA) 1103 (8 th
Cir. 1999). Plaintiff suffered from depression that was aggravated by several work
events. However, maintaining an aggravation-free work environment is not a
reasonable accommodation.

Employers should respond to such requests "expeditiously." Unnecessary delays
violate the Act. The interactive process, or dialogue between tIle employer and
employee is an absolute imperative.

C.
•

DIRECT THREAT
Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers, 173 F.3d 254, 9 Am. Dis. Cas. (BNA)
436 rehearing en bane granted 8/27/99, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21402, 9 Am. Dis.
Cas. (BNA) 1407, 187 F.3d 680 (5 th Cir. 1999). Rizzo was a hearing-impaired school
van driver. A parent complained her child was unable to get Rizzo's attention and
expressed fear that Rizzo could not hear a choking child. The Board removed Rizzo
from driving so that Rizzo's hours as an aide were reduced. After tIle Court noted
that choking children probably do not make sounds, tIle Board contended that Rizzo
could not distinguish spoken words- and specific sounds ("pain" was "chain," etc.).
The parties stipulated Rizzo was disabled. TIle ability to discriminate spoken \yords
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was a safety requirement that tends to screen out a class of individuals with heating
disabilities. In such a case the defendant bears the burden to prove the employee
poses a direct threat (otherwise, the burden of proof is on tIle plaintiff to show she~an
perform safely and is not a direct threat). The Board did not meet its burden. Rizzo
had an excellent safety record; mirrors allowed her to see the cllildren; and who·· can
distinguish words in a van full of little kids?

D.

BENEFITS

•

Rogers v. Departnlent of Health and Environnlental Control, 174 F.3d 431, 9 Am.
Dis. Cas. (BNA) 257 (4 th Cir. 1999). Title II does not prevent an employee from
offering a LTD plan \vith unequal benefits for mental and physical conditions.

•

Kin1ber v. Thiokol Corporation, 196 F.3d 1092 (loth Cir. 1999). A plaintiff was.
receiving benefits under his employer's long-term disability plan. After two years,
the employer stopped payments \vhen it learned tllat the disability condition was
actually a nlental impairment (diabetes related). Plaintiff argued that to provide
unequal benefits for different disabilities is discriminatory. However, the employer
obtained summary judgment.

E.
•

SOCIAL SECURITY
Cleveland v. Policy Mgt. Systenls COlp., 119 S.Ct. 1597,9 Am. Dis. Cas. (BNA) 491
(1991). Application for social security disability is not an automatic bar to an ADA
suit, nor does it create a strong presumption against the plaintiffs success under the
ADA.

Inconsistency in theory of claims under ADA and SSA is of sort normally tolerated
by legal system. Claimant's sworn assertion in application to SSA that slle is "unable
to work" appears to negate an essential element of ADA case if slle does not offer a
sufficient explanation.
The Court noted the statute's differences including the SSA's lack of a "reasonable
accommodation" provision (i.e., an ADA suit claiming plaintiff can do job with
reasonable accommodation may be consistent with S8 claim that she could not
perform her job without it). Moreover, conditions change and a statement ma:de toSS
at time of application may not reflect the actual capability of the employee at the time
of a relevant employment decision.

F.

•

ARBITRATION

Bratten v. SSI Services, Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 9 Am. Dis. Cas. (BNA) 1045 «(itbYir.
1999) (Jones, Nelson, Norris). A union member filed his disability claim in federal
court and the employer argued tIlat Ile was bound to take his claim to arbitration
under the CBA. The Sixth Circuit held for the union member because thewaiV"tr,:.·gf
1
the .right to litigation, as opposed to arbitration, was not clear.and unmistakable: ".TQ
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\vaive the right to litigate a statutory claim, a CBA must specifically refer to the
statute in question.

G.

PRIVACY

•

Cossette v. Minnesota Powers Light, 188 F.3d 964, 9 Am. Dis. Cas. (BNA) 1086 (8 th
eire 1999). Plaintiff complained that the employer disclosed her past back injury and
lifting restrictions to a prospective employer. The ADA protects plaintiff from such
unauthorized disclosure regardless of whether she is "disabled" under the ADA.

r

•

Scott v. Leavenworth School Dist., (D. Kansas 2000). Defendant may not use ADA's
confidentiality provisions to decline to produce coworkers' medical information in
discovery to Plaintiff.

r
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J.

HARASSMENT

Farley v. Nationwide Insurance (11 th Cir. 12/14/99). Jury verdict of $414,603
affirmed; $300,000 was for emotional pain. Plaintiffs wife and doctors testified that
his mental condition worsened because of colleagues' jokes and calling him "one of
the crazies." One supervisor posted a cartoon labeling the employee as "Just Plain
Nuts."
STRAY REMARKS

Hopkins v. Electronic Data Systen1s C01poration, 196 F.3d 655, 9 Am. Dis. Cas.
(BNA) 1724 (6 th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff \vas terminated for cost-cutting reasons from a
department to which he earlier had volunteered to go. Plaintiff claimed
discrimination in part because a co-employee (later his supervisor) allegedly called
him "the mentally ill guy on Prozac that's going to shoot the place up." TIle court
held that this remark, if made, was too vague to constitute direct evidence of
discrimination, especially where a non-disabled employee was fired under similar
circumstances and the cost-cutting defense was not shown to be pretextual.
VERDICTS

•

EEOC v. Chuck E. Cheese, No. 98c-698x (W.D. Wis. 11/5/99). Chuck E. Cheese's
regional manager fired David Perkl, a janitor, in 1997 for stated financial reasons.
The regional manager allegedly said the restaurant chain did not hire "those kind of
people." Perkl cannot speak. He communicates with pictures and signs. He \vorks
with the help of a full-time job coach. The jury awarded Perkl $13 million in
punitive, $100,000 in backpay and $700,000 in compensation. It was tIle largest
verdict in an EEOC prosecuted ADA case.

•

Owens v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
52 (C.D. Ill. 3/5/99)...O\vens, a Vietnam veteran, suff~red froln post-tral:lll1atic stress
syndrome. He claimed that co-workers harassed and taunted him alld banged tools

r

r
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against metal desks to unnerve him. The jury returned a verdict of $4.4
dollars.

•

K.
•

~illion

Fitzgerald v. Lucent Technologies, No. C2-96-1031 (S.D. Ohio 3/8/99). Ani}"~~
jury awarded Fitzgerald $2.14 million for alleged disability discrimination..~~~
surgery for pancreatic cancer in 1994, her doctor released her to work. Co~~~y
doctors disagreed and the company fired her six mont11s before she was retirement
eligible.

I

I;:
I~

I

IMMUNITY
Board of Trustees ofthe Universil)J ofAlabanla, et ale v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955;2001
LEXIS 1700 (2001). The Americans with Disabilities Act does not apply to any state
or state agency as Congress exceeded the scope of its authority and invat*y
abrogated the States Eleventh Amendn1ent immunity in enacting the ADA. [Note:
States and state agencies may still be liable under state disability laws similar to the
ADA.]
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WAGE AND HOUR LAWS
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Now more than 60 years old, the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") remains
probably the second most frequently violated law in the United States (after the speed
limit). This is so principally because the exemptions from overtime compensation are
complicated and poorly understood by both employers and employees, tile salary basis
test for exempt workers is often ignored, and workers are often "pennitted" to work a
flexible schedule other than the one that the employer intends to pay.
The materials that follow are designed to serve as a continuing reference tool for
the H.R. professional or supervisor \vho wants to avoid being "burned" by wage-hour
liability. A thorough understanding of these materials can help managers resolve the case
studies that are offered at the end of the materials.

OVERVIEW
Histor)' and Purpose
The FLSA was enacted by Congress in 1938 in response to the Great Depression.
Congress wanted to ensure that workers would be paid a minimum \vage for tlleir work.
Congress also wanted to maximize the number of available jobs by requiring ell1ployers
to pay a premium for working fe\ver employees lots of hours instead of more employees
only 40 hours each week. As a result, the FLSA contains a number of regulations
designed to assure both a minimum wage and compensation for overtime hours worked.
The FLSA also contains regulations ainled at curbing abuses in cllild labor.
Minimum Wage
The current minimum wage for covered employees is $5.15 per hour. There are
no increases scheduled at this time. Legislation has been introduced that would increase
the minimum wage by $1.00/hour.
l\laximum Hours
After an employee has \vorked 40 hours in one seven-day work week, any hours
worked over 40 must be compensated at one and one-half times the regular rate. The
work week must be fixed and defined, as discussed below. An employer has no
requirement to pay overtime compensation for hours in excess of eight per day, or for
work on Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, or regular days of rest.

r
r
r
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Child Labor Provisions
The FLSA restricts employment to persons 16 years of age and older. However,
younger children may be employed in certain circumstances. For example, chi~~:\<14
and 15 years of age may be employed in certain occupations other than m·~'4 g.
manufacturing or p r o c e s s i n g . + : , ~
Work hours for 14- and I5-year old children are limited to 3 hours per day'aii~\18
hours per week when school is in session, and all hours worked must be outside of sc
I
hours. When school is not in session, work hours are limited to 8 hours per day an<i40
hours per week. Work must be limited to the hours between 7:00 a.m. and 7:00pim.
(9:00 p.m. from June 1 through Labor D a Y ) . M i
Special rules apply to agriculture, and younger cllildren may be employed to'do
agricultural work under certain circumstances. For example, children under 14 years of
age may be employed on farms owned or operated by the child's parent or a.pel1en
standing in the place of the parent. Ho\vever, those children may not be employed or
perlnitted to work in agricultural occupations that have been declared 11azardous for
children under 16 years of age. Those occupations include operation of certain machines,
work with certain animals, and work from a ladder or scaffold.
The FLSA also prevents persons under the age of 18 from working in particularly
11azardous industries. Restricted industries illclude manufacturing and storing:/(iQf
explosives, logging and sawmilling, roofing, excavation, demolition, meat packiag,
mining, \vork involving certain power-driven machines, and work involving expos~itQ
radioactive substances.

Employees vs. Independent Contractors
The FLSA defines an employee as any person "suffered or permitted to work" by
an employer and not excluded from the definition by any other section of the FLSA. The
definition is very broad and does not require a contract of employment.
Independent contractors, however, are not employees within the meaning oftl1ie
FLSA. One way to determine whether a person is an employee or an independent
contractor is to consider the "economic reality test." The economic reality test is used to
determine whether an individual is economically dependent on the business or, asa
matter of economic fact, is in business for himself or herself. Some of those factors to
consider include:
•

The degree of control exerted by the alleged employer over
the worker;

•

The worker's opportunity for profit or loss;

•

The degree of skill required to perform tIle work;
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•

The permanency of tIle relationship between the individual
and the organization;

r

•

The worker's investment in tile business; and

•

The extent to which the work is an integral part of the
alleged employee's business, or the extent to which the
alleged employee is economically dependent on a particular
business.
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The greater the degree of control and supervision that tile business exercises over
the worker or the work performed, and the greater the economic dependence of the
worker on the business, the greater the likelihood tllat the \vorker is an employee rather
than an independent contractor.

EXEMPT El\fPLOYEES - NO O\'ERTIl\fE PAY REQUIRED
FOR "WHITE COLLAR" EMPLOYEES
The Duties Test
The FLSA permits an employer to exempt individuals \vho are bona fide
administrative, professional, executive or management employees from tIle paylnent of
overtime compensation. These are kno\vn as the "\vhite collar" exemptions. It is
important to remember that an employee's exempt status cannot be conferred by paying a
salary of particular level, and is determine not by the title of tIle position, but by the
nature of the duties actually peJfOrnled. Exenlpt.status depends largely on a case-by-case
analysis of these duties in the case of a particular employee. The employer bears the
burden of proving the exemption.
Althougll in the case of each exemption a "long test" exists, since most employees
pay exempt employees at least $250/week, the "short tests" summarized below most
frequently apply.
Administrative Employees
•

A bona fide "administrative" employee is one who is paid a
salary of at least $250/week and \vho meets tIle following
requirements:

•

Office or nonmanual work directly related to management
policies or general business operations of his or her employer
or the employer's customers; or

•

Functions in tIle administration of a school system, or
educational establishment; and

r
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•

He or she customarily and regularly exercises discretion 'and
independent judgment.

Some examples of exempt administrative en1ployees includ.e
executive and administrative assistants, personnel directors, ~radit
managers, investment consultants, management consultants, school
principals and vice-principals and heads of school departments.
Professionals
•

A bona fide professional is an employee who is paid a sali:f;1,~f
at least $250/weekand who meets the following requirements:

•

His or 11er primary duty consists of tIle perfanl1ance of:

•

Work requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field
of science or learning acquired by a prolonged course of
specialized intellectual instruction and study; or

•

Wark tllat is original and creative in cllaracter in a
recognized field of artistic endeavor, the result of which
depends primarily on the invention, imagination or talent, .
of the employee; or

•

Teaching, tutoring, instructing or lecturing as a
recognized or certified teacller; and

•

His or her work requires the consistent exercise of discretion
and judgment in its p e r f o r m a n c e . " "

Some examples of exempt professionals include doctors, nurses, engineers, lawyers and teachers.
Executive/Managerial Employees
•

A bona fide executive or managerial employee is an employee who is
paid a salary of at least $250/week and who meets the following
requirements:

•

His or her primary duty consists of the management of the
enterprise in which he or she is employed or of a customarily
recognized department or subdivision of the enterprise; and .
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He or she customarily and regularly directs the work of two or
more other employees.

Some relevant considerations in determining whether an employee is an exempt executive or
management employee are: 1) time spent on "management" duties; 2) relative importance of
management duties; 3) how often the employee exercises discretionary powers; 4) how closely
the employee is supervised; and 5) relationship between the employee's salary and that of others
performing nonexempt work.
Computer-Related Occupations
In response to the growing number of employees holding computer-related positions, tIle FLSA
and its related regulations were amended to permit these professionals to be exempt from
overtime requirements in certain circumstances. The exemption extends to highly skilled
computer programmers, systems analysis, and software engineers. The exemption does not
extend to trainees, beginning programmers, or employees involved in operating computers or in
manufacturing, repairing or maintaining computers.
An exempt employee in a computer-related occupation must meet the following requirements:
•

His or Iler primary job duties must include:

•

The application of systems analysis techniques and procedures,
to include consultations with users in order to determine
hardware, software or system functional specifications; or

r
r
r

•

The design, development, documentation, analysis, creation,
testing, or modification of computer systems or programs base
don and related to user specifications; or

•

r

The design, documentation, testing, creation, or modification
of computer programs related to machine operating systems; or

A combination of the above duties; and

r

r
t
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•

He or she is compensated on a salary or fee basis of $170 per
week, or if compensated on an hourly basis, he or she must be
paid in excess of$27.63 per hour.

The Salary Test
Salary Basis

,.
r

In order to qualify under the \vhite-collar exemptions for executi\Te, professional,
and ad~~nistrative employees, ~such employees must be paid on a salary basis. As
discussed below, professional and administrative employees m~y also be 'paid on a fee

r
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basis. A private sector employee is paid on a salary basis if he regularly receives each
pay period, on a weekly or less frequent basis, a pre-determined amount constituting all
or part of his compensation. This pre-determined amount may not be subject to reduction
because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed. Subject~ ~e
'exceptions noted below, the employee must receive his full salary for any week in %~"<h
he performs any work, without regard to the number of days or hours worked. flo
an employee need not be paid for any lvorkweek in which he performs no work. " )
Permissible Deductions from an Employee's Salary
Deductions from an employee's salary may be made for absences of a day or ~~f~;~ffr
personal reasons other than sickness or accident. In addition, deductions fi~~~~
employee's salary may be made for absences of a day or more as a result of sicknt~(er
disability, provided that such deductions are made pursuant to a bona fide pla~~?,.f,·Fr,
or practice of providing compensation for loss of salary caused by sicknesst~tl.d
disability. Deductions also may be made for absences covered by tIle Family',~~d
Medical Leave Act.
' ..

Subject to Deduction
An employee's salaried status - and thus tIle employee's exempt status - will be lost if
the employee is covered by a policy that permits disciplinary or other deductions in pay
"as a practical matter." The "as a practical matter" standard is met if there is either an
actual practice of making such deductions or an employment policy that creates' a
"significant likelihood" of such deductions.
Window of Correction
The regulations interpreting the FLSA provide for a "window of correction" with regard
to the salary basis test for exempt white-collar employees - "where a deduction not
pennitted by these interpretations is inadvertent, or is made for reasons otller than lack of
work, the exemption will not be considered to have been lost if the employer reimburse.s
the employee for such deductions and promises to comply in the future."
Fee Basis
Professional and administrative employees remain exempt under the Act if they are
compensated on a fee basis rather than a salary basis. Compensation on a fee basis is
characterized by the payment of an agreed sum for a single job regardless of the time
required for its completion. A fee payment is adequate to satisfy the professional
employee exemption if it is at a rate that would amount to at least $250 if 40 hours w~re
worked. Similarly, a fee payment is adequate to satisfy the administrative e1ll-BI~~_
exemption if it is at a rate that would amount to at least $250 if 40 houts were workC':d:1<'c- ,;
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CALCULATING OVERTIME
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The FLSA's overtime payment requirements are based on the concept of a workweek.
An employee's workweek is a fixed and regularly occurring period of 168 hours - seven
consecutive 24-hour periods. It need not coincide with the calendar week but may begin
on any day and at any hour of the day.
Each workweek is treated as a separate and independent period. Tllere is generally no
carryover of time worked from one workweek to another. For example, even if an
employee works 60 hours in one \veek and only 5 hours in the second week of a pay
period, the employer must pay the employee for 20 llours of overtime earned during tIle
first week.
The FLSA allo\vs employers to cllange a \vorkweek from one period of seven
consecutive days to anotller period of seven consecutive days, provided that the cllange
is intended to be permanent and is not designed to evade the purposes of the Act.
Exception to the General Workweek Rule for Hospitals. Section 7U) of tIle FLSA
allows an "employer engaged in the operation of a llospital or an establisllment wllich is
an institution primarily engaged in the care of tIle sick, tIle aged, or the mentally ill or
defective who reside on the premises" to calculate overtinle compensation owed by
using a \vork period of 14 consecutive days, instead of the workweek of seven
consecutive days, if the following conditions are met:
•

Prior to tIle performance of tIle work, tIle employer and the
employee reached an agreement or understanding tilat overtime
would be calculated in tllis way; and

•

The employee receives compensation at a rate not less tllan
time and one-half his regular rate for all hours \vorked in
excess of (i) eight hours in any workday and (ii) 80 hours in the
established fourteen-day work period.

Regular Rate of Pay Defined
As discussed above, the FLSA requires that overtime be compensated at a rate not less
than one and one-half times the regular rate at which the employee is actually employed.
Of course, the regular rate at which the employee is employed may in no event be less
than the statutory minimum.

r

The regular rate is the hourly rate actually paid tIle employee for the nOfinal,
nonovertime ,vorkweek for \vhicll he is employed. If an employee is ell1ployed solely
on tbe basis of a single 110urly rate, that hourly rate is his regular rate. He must be paid

r
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one and one-half times that hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a 'given
workweek.

Not Included In "Regular Rate"
The regular rate includes all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf9tqte
employee, with the exception of the following.
.'
, ..~.

•

Sums paid as gifts, the amounts of which are not meas~~,y
or dependent upon hours worked, production, or efficien,.cy;,;;i

•

Payments made for occasional periods when no w()~~!is
performed due to vacation, holiday, illness, or other similar
cause; reasonable payments for traveling expenses; and otper
payments to an employee Wllich are not made as compensiatlon
for the hours of employment;

•

Sums paid in recognition of services performed during ~.•.~.~~~
period of time if: (i) such sums are paid and determined~ft~~e
sole discretion ofthe enlployer at or near the end of the period
and not pursuant to any prior contract; or (ii) such sums~re
nlade pursuant to a bona fide profit sllaring plan; or (iii)'"the
payments are talent fees;
;.

•

Contributions irrevocably made by an employer to a trustee or
third person pursuant to a bona fide plan for providing old age,
retirement, life, accident, or health insurance, or similar
benefits for employees;

•

Extra compensation provided by a premium rate for certain
hours worked by the employee in any day or workweek
because such hours are in excess of eight in a day or in excess
of the maximum workweek;

•

Extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid for work
by the employee on Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays, provided
that such premium rate is not less than one and one-half tirn~s
the rate that the employer has established, in good faitb~;~r
like work performed in non-overtime hours on other days;aQ«I\

•

Extra compensation provided by a premium rate paid to' the
employee, pursuant to an applicable employment agreemeJlt.qr
collective bargaining agreement, for \vork outside of the h()l;l~
establislled in good faitll by the agreelnent.
'

Most Common Violations of "Regular Rate" Compensation
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Some employers do not realize everything that is included in an employee's regular rate,
upon which the employee's rate of compensation for overtime work is determined.
Shift Premiums
Shift premiums are included in an employee's regular rate. For example, if an employee
receives a 10% shift premium for working on the second shift, his regular rate is his
hourly rate plus the shift premium. For his overtime work, of course, he must be paid
time and one-half of his regular rate.
Awards and Prizes
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The value of prizes won by employees for quality, quantity, or efficiency in the
performance of their customary tasks during regular working hours must be included in
their regular rate calculations. An employer generally must allocate the prize over the
period in which it is earned. If merchandise is awarded, the employer must allocate tIle
cost of the merchandise.
Bonuses and Incentive Payments
Bonuses and incentive payments that are dependent on the quality, quantity, or
efficiency of production or hours worked gener~lly must be included in the regular rate.
Examples of such bonuses include: lump sum bonuses paid pursuant to a labor contract,
production or work incentive bonuses, bonuses that are based on a percentage of sales,
cost-of-living bonuses, and attendance bonuses. There is an exception, however, for
discretionary bonuses. If both the fact that payment is to be made and the amount of the
bonus are determined by the employer, in its sole discretion, at or near the end of the
period the bonus covers, and the payment is not made pursuant to any prior agreement or
promise that would lead the employee to expect the payments regularly, the amount of
the bonus is excluded from the regular rate calculation.

l
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CALCULATING HOURS WORKED
Preparation To \Vork
In response to confusion generated by early court decisions about \vllether employers
had to pay for incidental job-related activities, Congress clarified the law in 1947 to
exclude the following from the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA:

•

Time spent by an employee traveling to and from the actual place
of perfonnance of tIle principal activities, unless payillellt for suell
activities is required by a contract or by custom or practice;

r
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•

Time spent by an employee on tasks that are performed before or
after the principal activities in a workday, unless payment for such
activities is required by a contract or by custom or practice.

These exclusions apply only to those periods of time just before or just after the
"workday." The FLSA continues to cover, for example, travel that occurs during
normally scheduled work hours.

I
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On-Call Time And Waiting Time
Employees must be compensated for time spent "on-call" unless the employee can use
the time effectively for his or her own purposes. If the employee remains on the
employer's premises or so near that he or she cannot use the time freely, tllen he or she
must be compensated for the time. However, if the employee can come and go, the time
generally may be excluded from working time.
The same is true for time spent by an employee \vaiting to perform work. TIle inquiry
turns on the question of \vhetiler the time spent is primarily for tIle benefit of the
employer. Unless the employee is completely relieved from duty and allowed to leave
for a specified period of time, and the period of time is long enough to give the
employee discretion as to ho\v to use tIle time, the employee must be compensated for
the time spent waiting. If the employee is "engaged to be waiting," as opposed to
"waiting to be engaged," the time is compensable.
Employers can reduce the likelihood that on-call time will be treated as compensable by
following this eigllt-part test:
•

Send on-call employees off the premises;

•

Make sure that the employees have a reasonable amount of time to
respond to ca.lls;

•

Schedule and publicize on-call periods;

•

Make sure that callbacks are infrequent;

•

If possible, do not require called-i1,1 employees to wear uniforms;

•

Encourage employees to spend on-all time pursuing personal
activities;

•

Carefully choose when to discipline employees for on-call policy
infractions;

•

Provide a \vritten on-call policy to employees.
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Seminars And Training
An employee must be compensated for time spent attending seminars and training
programs, unless:

•

The event occurs outside of the employee's regular working hours;

•

Attendance is truly voluntary;

•

The program is not directly related to the employee's job; and

•

The employee does not perform any productive work while
attending the event.

Attendance is not voluntary if the employee
disadvantaged in any way by non-attendance.

IS

led to believe he or slle will be

Travel Time
An employee must be compensated for travel:
•

That is considered "all in the day's work"; or

•

From home to work \vhen the employee is on special assignment in
another city; or

•

During normal working hours in conjunction with an overnight
trip.

In addition, employees must be compensated for work actually performed while
traveling.

Rest And Meal Periods
Rest periods are counted as working time unless they are more than 20 minutes long.
The FLSA does not require rest breaks; however, if they are provided, employees must
be paid for that time.
Meal breaks are counted as working time unless:

•
•

•

They are more than 30 minutes long;
Employees are relieved of all duties, including answering tile phone and
waiting on customers; and
Employees are free to leave their stations.
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In order to avoid an overtime situation with an employee who frequently eats meals at
his or her work station, an employer may wish to require employees to leave their work
stations during meal breaks.

I

I

Time "Suffered" To Work
An employee who voluntarily works overtime still nlust be paidfor that time, even if the
employee works overtime without being requested to do so and without permission to do
so. An employee's "voluntary" overtime, including time "made up" at the employee's
request, constitutes compensable time because the employee is being "suffered or
permitted to work" for the benefit of the employer. If the employer knows or has reason
to know that the employee is \vorking overtime hours, and does nothing to prevent the
employee's conduct, the employer is responsible for tIle payment of overtime. A policy
specifically disallowing unauthorized overtime may not be sufficient. The employer
must be vigilant in ensuring that the policy is followed.
This rule is equally applicable to work performed at 110me. Moreover, employers are
responsible for accurately recording and paying botll minimum wage and overtime for
employees WI10 work from home.
Enlployers should tnake sure that all time worked is reported by the employee and paid.
Even if an employee agrees that time \vill be unpaid, tllat promise is not binding on the
employee. Steps employers can take to reduce the risk of FLSA violations include:
•

Don't allow employees to catch up over their lunch hours without
writing the time down, even if the employee wants to;

•

Compensate an employee who works overtime witll0ut permission,
even if your policy requires advance approval;

•

Develop a means for monitoring time worked at home;

•

Do not permit informal "comp" time practices;

•

Pay seminar or training time if the employee is required to attend
or does work while attending.

Compensatory Time Off - "Comp Time"
Meeting overtime obligations by permitting time off instead of pay is risky and
complicated. It is only effective if the pay period is longer than one week; the time off
must be granted during the same pay period in which the overtime hours are worked.
An example of permissible comp time occurs where Joe works 42 hours in \veek one of
a t\vo-\veek pay period, and he \vorks ,only 37 'hours in \veek two. It's the elnployer's
. responsibility to assure - and be able to, prove -,that Joe 'does,not work more hours than
permitted.
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ENFORCEMENT
The FLSA is enforced by the U.S. Department of Labor, Wage & Hour and Public
Contracts Division. A comprehensive wage and hour audit by the Department of Labor
may be triggered by the complaints of just one employee. Either tIle DOL or an
employee may bring a lawsuit against the employer for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid
overtime compensation and liquidated damages, and an employee's lawsuit may be
brought on behalf of other employees similarly situated.
The statute of limitations for actions for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime
compensation and liquidated dam_ages under the FLSA is two years from the time the
cause of action accrues. As a result, \vage and hour audits by the Department typically
cover a two-year period. However, the statute of limitations for lvillful violations is
three years, and thus, some audits may cover three years. In the course of its
investigation, the Department of Labor is authorized to enter the business premises to
inspect records and intervie\v employees. The Departn1ent may sllbpoena records, if
necessary_

r
r

Failure to conlply with the FLSA can be extremely costly. Violations of the wage and
hour provisions may require the employer to pay employees an amount equal to tIle
underpayment, plus an equal amount in liquidated damages. In addition, elnployers may
be required to pay reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. The FLSA also contains an antiretaliation provision. In one recent case discussed belo\v, all allegation of retaliation for
complaining about overtime pay problems resulted in a jury verdict of over $13 million
for six employees.

r
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The FLSA also provides that in the case of a willful violation, tIle Department may
ill1pose a fine of up to $10,000, imprisonnlent up to six months, or botIl. Any person
\vho repeatedly or willfully violates tIle wage and hour provisions of the FLSA is subject
to a penalty of up to $1,000 per violation. Violations of the child labor provisions may
result in a penalty of $1 0,000 for each enzployee lvho was the subject ofsuch a violation.
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THE TERMINATION PROCESS
Terminating an employee is one of the worse aspects of an employer's
responsibilities. An employer faces a number of potential pitfalls during tIle termination
process. Especially with the growing number of lawsuits by fonner employees, employer
must be mindful of the legal risks associated with terminating an employee. For instance,
has the employee's employment history been documented to explain the justification for
the termination? Has the employee received prior disciplinary actions? Have the
employee's performance deficiencies been documented and noted to the employee? Has
the employer over-documented the employee's deficiencies or documented the wrong
deficiencies?

Has the employee complained to management about discriminatory

behavior in the \vorkplace, which could lead to a retaliatory discIlarge claim? Is tIle
employee a member of a protected class? These questions are considerations tIlat tIle
employer must evaluate and take into account when making the decision to tenninate an
employee.
Courts recently llave been provided \vitIl ample opportunities to interpret and
expand the laws governing the employee-employer relationship. Now more than ever,
employers are exposed to great legal risks when terminating an etnployee. As a result,
the employer needs to carefully consider the legal risks involved in the termination
process more so than any other decision an employer makes. However, these risks do not
begin when the employee is terminated.

The risks began at the creation of the

employment relationship and continue throughout the employee's tenure. How the
employer structures the relationship (i.e., is the employment relationsllip at-will or
governed by contract?) determines the manner of terminating.an employee. TIle al1lount

r

r
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and number of evaluations and disciplinary actions also impact the termination process
and the employer's success if the employee sues for wrongful termination. In general,
smart documentation throughout the employment relationship llelps to protect the
employer in employment-related issues.

DOCUMENTATION DURING THE EMPLOYl\fENT RELATIONSHIP
In addition to the structure of the employment relationship, the employer's actions
throughout the employment relationship impact the employer's ability to terminate an
employee. Documentation tllrougll performance evaluations and disciplinary reviews
creates the record of the employment relationship which may be necessary to defend a
lawsuit. Poor performance evaluations and numerous disciplinary actions serve as the
evidence to explain the employer's rationale for discharging tIle employee.

A

sympatlletic plaintiff is one \vho can argue that he was unaware of his performance
problems and was provided good evaluations \Vllile employed. Consistent documentation
of personnel issues through counseling and performance reviews provides the employer
with useful evidence \vhen defending against a wrongful termination claim.
Routinely and accurately evaluating your employee allows both the employer and
employee to gauge the employee's performance and address problem areas at the initial
stages. In addition, during evaluations of its employees, an employer must be alert to its
manner and presentation of the review. A pattern of giving unrealistically low ratings
may later be used as evidence of supervisory bias. Moreover, an employer is placed in a
difficult position when it terminates an employee who received unrealistically high
ratings.

The best advice for the employer is to accurately reflect the employee's

performance during the -review. Sugar coating results only lead to future problems for
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employers. Above all, communicate regularly and communicate honestly. Then, write
down these communications.
Finally, evidence that an employer promptly took corrective action to address
claims of harassment or other problems in the workplace has always been important in
defending harassment lawsuits.

However, especially with the Supreme Court's recent

decision in Faragher v. City of

~oca

Raton, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998), and Burlington

Industries v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (1998) an employer's prompt remedial measures is
essential to defend effectively a lawsuit brought by an employee alleging harassment. By
providing an affirmative defense in hostile \vork environment lawsuit for supervisory
Ilarassment, the Supreme Court's message is that employers WilO take corrective measures
to remedy workplace harassment are in a better defensive position if a lawsuit arises.
Accordingly, taking prompt corrective actions \vhen allegations of harassment arise and
documenting the actions as record for potential la\vsuits are additional safeguards to
prevent future problems when deciding to terminate an employee.
Consistently performing evaluations· of employees, documenting poor
performance or behavior problems and efficiently addressing problems in the workplace
leads to better employment relationship and places the employer in a better position wIlen
deciding to temlinate an employee. Creating and then following a system to deal with its
employee aids the employer in both its present relationship with the employee and later if
it decides to terminate the employee.

TERMINATING THE EMPLOYEE
The termination of an employee is a precarious situation for an employer because
of the possibility of a jury second-guessing tile employer's decision -years later. WIlen tile
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employer decides to terminate an employee, the reality is that employees are increasingly
likely to consider litigation as the means to remedy the situation.
Before deciding to fire someone, the employer should evaluate the litigation
potential involved in the termination. A wrongful termination can be based on a number
of theories, such as discrimination based on the employee's protected class, retaliation for
engaging in protected activity,

an~

constructive discharge. Evaluating the employee's

litigation potential at this stage makes the employer more cognizant of what the employee
may possibly allege in a lawsuit.

TEN TIPS FOR TERMINATIONS
MAKING THE DECISION TO TERMINATE:
1.

Prepare for the termination. Gather and accurately document all the facts.
This may include reviewing performance records, attendance records,
and/or discipline records. Where appropriate, get witness statements as to
what happened. Give the employee the opportunity to tell his/her side of
the story. Basing tIle termination decision on tIle facts, not unsupported
inference, suspicion, or emotion will likely lead to a favorable outcome.

2.

Have someone review the termination decision. If an employee is being
terminated for poor performance, consider whetller the job requirements
and/or behavior standards have been adequately communicated to the
employee and whether the employee has had adequate time to learn the
job and/or take corrective action to meet the requirements of the job.

3.

Be consistent. Consider whether terminating the employee is consistent
with your past disciplinary practices. While independently evaluating the
circu-mstances surrounding any potential disciplinary action is important,
consistency in your disciplinary practices is also important. Similar
infractions should receive similar punishment. Consistency in termination
decisions is an important and useful tool in defending challenged
terminations.

4.

Consider whether there is an alternative to discharge which would be
preferable, i.e., \varning, suspension, referral to an employee assistance
program, reassignment, etc. While considering otller options from
.discharge, do not avoid addressin~ the unde(lying problem with the
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employee. Postponing a termination decision rarely makes the decision
easier.
5.

Consider whether legal advice should be sought. Is there a possibility that
the employee will institute legal action such as a discrimination claim
(race, age, sex, national origin, religion, disability, union activity),
wrongful discharge claim, retaliation, and/or other claim?

6.

Conduct the termination session in a manner sensitive to the employee's
best interests. Conduct the meeting in a private place and come directly to
the point. Give all the real reasons for the discharge, but don't throw in
each and every shortcoming that comes to mind. Keep in mind that the
discharge may have to be defended down the road. Consider sc11eduling
the meeting at such a time and location that will minimize the employee's
personal contact with other employees before he/she leaves the premises.
In most circumstances, have a witness present during the meeting who can
recall accurately \vhat transpired. If a discrepancy arises about what was
said, then another witness to the events is available.

7.

Tell the employee the truth about why he or she is being terminated, but
do not get too detailed. Do not sugar coat the termination because this can
11urt you in the end.

8.

Consider whether to seek a release from the employee. A release is an
agreement with the employee in which you agree to pay the employee
some money or other benefit to \vhich he/she is not already entitled in
exchange for the employee releasing the employer from any claims he/she
may have against the employer. Use legal counsel to make sure your
release will be enforced if it is ever challenged.

9.

Restrict disclosing the reasons for the discharge to those with a clear
business need to know. Do not "make an example" of the employee by
suggesting to other employees that they could be subject to the same
discipline if they fail to meet performance and/or behavior standards.

10.

Be prepared for requests for recommendations from potential employers
of your former employees. Generally, it is safest to confirm only name,
position, and dates of employment. If a previous employee has been
violent in the workplace, you may need to consider varying from this
policy.
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OVERVIEW OF THE REVISED VCC ARTICLE 9
(The Big Changes)
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JOIII'I T. McGarvey
Morgall & Pottillger, P.S.C.
LOllisville, Kentllcky
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OVERVIEW OF REVISED ARTICLE 9--SECURED TRANSACTIONS

JOHN T. McGARVEY
Morgan & Pottinger, P.S.C.
60 1 West Main Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
(502) 560-6759
jtm@,n10rganandpottinQer.com

Revised Article 9, recommended to the states by the American La\v Institute and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State La\vs in 1998, is the most substantial
revision of Article 9 since Kentucky adopted the Uniform Commercial Code in 1958. The 1972
revisions, adopted in Kentucky in 1986, \vas more ofa fine tuning ofthe original Article. Introduced
and adopted by the 2000 Kentucky General Assembly as Senate Bill 11, Revised Article 9 makes
\vholesale changes to the law ofsecured transactions. The amendments are codified at KRS Chapter
355.9, in other parts ofthe Dec including Article 2 on sales and Article 8 on Investment Securities,
and in related laws such as the title lien statutes at KRS Chapters 186 and 186A.
Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have adopted Revised Article 9. The
remaining states all no\v have bills pending. Ohio and Missouri are the only states bordering
Kentucky that have not adopted Revised Article 9. The problem in Missouri and Ohio has been
\vorking out a compromise with filing officers \vho may no longer receive fees under the ne\v la\v.
The adoptions by Kentucky's neighbors, particularly the bills in Indiana and Tennessee, vary little
from the Model Act. The most significant variation in Indiana is that a debtor is required to
"authenticate" a financing statement.
At least forty states are expected to be on board by the July 1, 2001 model effective date.
Until all states have adopted the revisions there \vill be serious conflict of la\v issues and dual
perfection systems that will require close analysis by commercial la\vyers.
The scope of property and transactions covered by Article 9 is enlarged but the rules for
creation, priority, enforcement, and particularly filing, are simplified and more user friendly.
Revised Article 9 takes into account advances in technology, particularly the trend toward paperless
transactions, new forms of collateral such as healthcare receivables, and ne\v classes of collateral
such as payment intangibles. Revised Article 9 also reflects the world of electronic transactions
through terms such as "authenticated" that replaces the requirement for a manual signature. The
new law distinguishes hard goods from software. However, the revisions recognize that some
software becomes "embedded" in goods.
The drafters primarily intend the revisions to bring greater certainty to secured transactions
and thus to reduce transaction costs. The new version resolves the uncertainty of the 1972 version
on where to file to perfect security interests. Transactions that require records searches, legal
.research and co~plianc·e with the la\v (that sometimes includes a filing tax) of potentially all 50
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states can be handled under Revised Article 9 ina single state. A new national form financing
statement, which appears as a form in the model act, \vill be accepted in all jurisdictions that adopt
the model version which also adds to both ease of compliance and certainty of perfection. The
model form is found at 9-521. The information required by the model form exceeds the
requirements of 9-502 for a valid financing statement. However, 9-502 does not even require an
address for the parties. A financing statement without addresses for both the debtor and secured
party can be rejected by a filing officer under 9-516.
What is more important, the law that adopts Revised Article 9 for Kentucky also adopts
central filing of security interests in the office of the Secretary of State. Before the adoption of
Revised Article 9, Kentucky \vas the only state in the union that maintained a purely local filing
system. Eleven states continue to have some form of dual filing that will disappear as our sister
states adopt Revised Article 9. There will be a five year transition period during which dual searches
will still be required, however, by July 1, 2006 there \vill be a cOlnplete record of non-real estate
related financing statements filed in the office of the Secretary of State and searchable on the web.
Existing local filings remain valid after July 1,2001 but any action other than termination, including
continuation, must be taken through a new filing with the Secretary of State. The priority of the
local filing will be preserved by reference to the old filing in the new "in lieu financing statement."
The scope of Article 9, the kinds of property in which a secured party can take a security
interest, is larger. More forms of transactions, including the sale of payment intangibles and
promissory notes, healthcare receivables, commercial tort claims, and security interests created by
certain governmental debtors are included under the rules of Revised Article 9. The inclusion of
deposit accounts under Revised Article 9 \vill be a major change for bankers and secured creditors
who want to protect their rights in proceeds of collateral. Perfection on deposit accounts will be
through control of the account, easy if you are the depository, more difficult if the account is held
by a third party. The primary form ofperfection ofa security interest in most types ofcollateral \vill
continue to be the filing of a financing statement. However, perfection through control, previously
recognized for only investment property, is no\v expanded to letter ofcredit rights as \vell as deposit
accounts.
Under current Article 9, the location of collateral determines \vhat state's law applies to the
perfection of a security interest in collateral. In contrast, to simplify various conflict of law issues,
Revised Article 9 will use the law ofthe state \vhere the debtor resides. Any debtor created through
a state registration (corporation, LLC, etc.) is deemed to reside in the state where the organization
files its charter, or in \vhich it is registered. Lenders must ascertain if their customers that are
physically located in Kentucky are actually registered organizations under Kentucky law. The
Secretary of State's web site contains a key as to whether the organization is only registered to do
business here or is a registered organization under our law. There will be no more conflicts over the
location of the chief executive office, principal place of business, or registered agent. Most
significantly, parties secured by collateral such as inventory of a company \vith nationwide
operations will find their transactions costs significantly lo\vered and their credit administration
simplified.
As all states move to only central filing, the goal is for filing systems to be searchable on
the Internet. Fixtures and titled property are the only forms ofcollateral that \viII require local filing.
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Perfection on crops will not require local filing. The filing fee schedule in Inost states, including
Kentucky, anticipates and encourages electronic filing \vithout the debtor's signature. The fee in
Kentucky \vill be $5.00 for electronic filings, $10.00 for paper filings, and $20.00 for paper filings
in excess of two pages. Filing in Kentucky will be made simple through use of the Secretary of
State's web site. Both a financing statement and an amendment \viIl be available in template form.
If you pay the filing fee by credit card or a prep~id account, filing is as simple as the enter key on
your PC. As long as the secured party has an authenticated security agreement, or other
authorization to file a financing statement, it has the right to file in any form without the debtor's
signature. The secretary ofstate is adopting filing rules, as authorized by Revised Article 9, and \vill
publish the administrative regulation on its web site.
A significant change for agricultural lenders is the new rules for obtaining a purchase money
security interest in livestock. Now livestock fall under the same rule as equipment (trace your
proceeds and perfect within 20 days). Beginning July 1,2001, a PMSI lender on livestock \vill have
to follo\v the same rules as an inventory lender, obtain the security interest, perfect the security
interest, and notify all prior filed secured parties before the debtor takes possession ofthe livestock.
A ne\v Part 4 of Article 9, governs the rights of third parties in secured transactions.
Usually, as a Inatter of law, Part 4 voids anti-assignability provisions. However, there are many
specific exceptions, such as one included in Kentucky's bill to preserve the rights of the
beneficiaries of structured settlements and supplemental needs trusts.
The former Part 4 on filing becomes Part 5 and the former Part 5 on enforcement rights
becomes Part 6. The ne\v part on enforcement rights Inakes a clear distinction between conSUlner
and commercial transactions and recognizes the rights of "secondary obligors" such as guarantors.
Consumers will be entitled to a notice of ho\v a secured creditor calculates a post sale deficiency.
While giving additional rights to consumers, the revisions to the enforcement rules also introduce
the concept of a safe harbor notice of sale that removes questions as to the "colnmercial
reasonableness" of the notice. A non-uniform section of Part 6 resolves the debtor's argument that
when a secured party obtains a repossession title in its before the foreclosure sale, it is a disposition
that required a notice of sale.
Kentucky's system for perfection on titled property was aJnended by the same bill that
adopted Revised Article 9. Kentucky's county clerks have encountered a problem with the title lien
that is good forever, or until released by the secured party. The problem results from secured parties
that have gone out of business or merged five times and the paid offaccount cannot be located. The
resolution is a seven year sunset rule on title liens except for liens on manufactured housing \vhic~
\viII be good for 30 years. The Transportation Cabinet is working on a system for continuing title
liens and will promulgate an administrative regulation on the procedures to be used. It will probably
involve a filing, for which no charge is authorized, \vith a county clerk. The fee for filing a title lien
increases from $8.00 to $12.00 on July 1, 2001. Another change in Chapter 186 removes statutory
, and paperwork problems related to the assignment of security interests in motor vehicles and the
securitization of motor vehicle paper.
Revised Article 9 brings secured transactions and the perfection of security interest into the
digital age, reduces transaction costs, bring greater certainty to the process and expands debtor
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protections in the foreclosure process but simultaneously gives creditors a set of rules that are more
clear and easier to follow.
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ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTION COUNSEL:
A Quick Treatment of Three Significant Subjects
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21 st Annual Conference on Legal Issues for Financial Institutions
University of Kentucky College of Law
April 20, 2001
Benjamin Cowgill, Jr.
Acting Bar Counsel
Kentucky Bar Association
bcowgill@kybar.org
502/564-3795

I.

Unauthorized Practice Issues in Real Estate and Banking Transactions
[See KBA Unauthorized Practice Advisory Opinion U-58 (attached)]

II.

Trust Account Overdraft Reporting Requirements
[See SCR 3.130-1.15 and "Dear Bank Officer... ," Bench and Bar Magazine,
March 1999 (attached)]

III.

Representing an Organization through Individuals - Who is the Client?
[See SCR 3.130-1.13 (attached)]
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KBA V-58
Question:

May real estate closings be conducted by persons who are not real parties in
interest without direct supervision of a licensed attorney?

Answer:

No.

Question:

May title agencies or title insurance companies conduct real estate closings?

Answer:

No.

Unauthorized Practice of Law
Only licensed attorneys may practice law in Kentucky. The practice is regulated exclusively by
the Kentucky Supreme Court. The compelling reason for such regulation is to protect the public against
rendition of legal services by unqualified persons. Kentucky Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 5.5.
The practice of law is defmed by SCR 3.020 as any service:
"involving legal knowledge or legal advice, whether of representation, counselor
advocacy in or 0:ut of court, rendered in respect to the rights, duties, obligations,
liabilities, or business relations of one requiring the services. tt
The "unauthorized" practice of law is the performance of those services contained in the
defmition by "non-lawyers" for "others".
It is not the unauthorized practice of law for a party to a real estate transaction to represent
himself or to prepare closing documents to which he is a real party in interest, provided that no fee is
charged to any other party. SCR 3.020 Otherwise only a licensed attorney may represent a closmg
party, prepare conveyancing or mortgage instruments, or charge a fee for legal services related to a real
estate transaction. Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1965); Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank of Louisville v. Kentucky Bar Association, 540 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. S.Ct. 1976).

Real Estate Closings
Real estate closings typically have either two or three. real parties in interest: seller and buyer,
borrower and lender, or seller, buyer-borrower, and lender. Of these three, the least complex are the
two-party closings of single sale or loan transactions involving the transfer of an interest in real estate, by
deed or mortgage, for purchase money or loan proceeds. The sale of real estate fmanced by a third-party
lender is the more complex because it involves separate sale and secured loan transactions in a
simultaneous closing.
The "conduct" of a closing is the culmination of such transactions. Notwithstanding the
standardization of real estate' closing documentation, it is unrealistic and naive to assume that, in all
instances, the settlement agent can present important legal documents to the seller, buyer, borrower,
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and/or lender at a closing without legal questions being asked and without giving legal advice. The
preparation and presentation of closing documents is an implied representation that the documents fulflll
the requirements of the parties' contractual commitments and the law, and' that the documents!laye been
reviewed and found to be legally sufficient. . Real estate closings should be conducted onlyimder the
supervision of an attorney because questions of legal rights and duties are always involved, and there is no
way of assuring that lay settlement agents would raise, or would not attempt to answe~,J.he legal
questions. State v. Buyer~s Service Co., 357 S.E.2d 15 (S.C. 1987). Whether stated or not, the person
conducting the closing vouches for the legal sufficiency of the documents, whether complex,,,.jplpJe, or
pre-printed. It does not matter whether the instruments are deemed simple or complex. As Judge Pound
said when closing transactions were much less complicated than today, "The most complex are~imple to
the skilled, and the simplest often trouble the inexperienced." People v. Title Guaranty and Trost, 125
N.E. 666 (N.Y. 1919).
The legal questions present at a closing; whe'ther asked or should be asked, are endless, as
demonstrated by the attached appendix of issues affecting the quality of title and enforceabU,ity of
documents. In summary, the contract of sale or the loan commitment must be reviewed and~rpreted
for contract compliance and remedies. Sufficiency of the legal description or survey plat and access to
public ways and utilities must be determined. The title opinion or title insurance commitment must be
reviewed and interpreted to inform the purchaser· of its meaning and potential risks, and the effect of
restrictions, encumbrances, and other title exceptions. The closing documents must be explained.
By its very nature a real estate closing involves substantial rights and liabilities. The parties
approach the closing having made commitments with other parties and invested time and .money in
anticipation of a mutual understanding of their contractual obligations and trusting that all legal.· issues
have been properly addressed. If a proble~ arises during closing and. there is no attomey-elient
relationship, the parties are without the benefit of independent counsel and may lack the leverage or will
to halt a transaction that is not in their best interests.
Closing Supervision by Attorney

An attorney need not be physically present at the closing, so long as it is in fact conducteeJ under
his supervision and control, but the responsible attorney must be familiar with the documentatiorl'and be
available at the time of closing for consultation. He bears ultimate responsibility for the closing and is
subject to disciplinary action for any act or omission which otherwise would be misconduct by him or his
closing employees, as well as being legally accountable under the duty imposed by Seigle v. Jasper, 867
S.W.2d 476 (Ky. App. 1993). By failing to attend or supervise a closing, the attorney who is respollSible
for tile documentation or who has examined and opined on the quality of title may be guilty of ~ing or
assisting lay settlement agents in the unauthorized practice of law contrary to SCR 3.470.
Closing by Institutional Lender

When an institutional lender is a real party in interest to a real estate transaction as mortgagee, its
lay employee or in-house attorney may preside over the mortgage closing with a customer not represented
by an attorney. Though institutional lenders, namely banks, savings and loans, and Farm Credit Services
are not subject to the same disciplinary action as attorneys, the public is protected to some degree by state
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and federal requirements for licensure, capitalization, oaths of directors and officers, insured deposits,
and other regulations. The lender's employee may attend to the ministerial issues of fmancial matters,
payments, and insurance related to the loan, as these are commonly non-legal functions. KBA U-31.
The lender's employee may also prepare or select and complete necessary "form" loan documents
if no fee is charged, directly or indirectly, for such servi~, provided that the lender's own attorney or
some other licensed attorney passes judgment on and is responsible for the documents as fmally executed.
Federal Intennediate Credit Bank of Louisville, supra.
. However, institutional lenders may not by their employees or salaried attorneys provide title
opinions to their borrowers because the "analysis· of recorded interests in land coupled with an opinion as
to its legal stanis" is a service lawfully performed for others only.by a licensed attorney. Kentucky State
Bar Association v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Covington, 342 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1961).
Moreover, no lender's lay employee may undertake to give legal advi~ to or ~swer any questions posed
by the borrower or any other transaction party involving interpretation of legal provisions of closing
documents or other matters requiring legal knowledge or skill. When a legal question is asked or
becomes apparent, the institutional lender employee should suspend the closing to consult legal counsel in
order to avoid the unauthorized practice of law. (See KBA U 31.) Such employee may not conduct any
part of a real estate closing other than the mortgage loan.
Closing by Title Companies

A distinction JJ:lust be made as to lay settlement agencies such as title companies and title
insurance companies which are not real parties in interest to the real estate or loan transactions. Their
only interest is the payment of settlement fees. They act only as a conduit to exchange funds and
documents. A lay settlement agency may compile and report factual information from the public records,
including abstracts of title, but may not render title opinions. They may act as an agent or broker in
connection with the issuance of title insurance commitments and policies, and may provide clerical
services for a closing. KBA U-21; U-31-.. They do not conduct a closing or examine the required
documents with an eye for protecting the independent legal rights of the seller, buyer, or lender. Such
agencies are not regulated and owe no legal duties to the parties other than those imposed by agency or
tort law. Their employees have no mandated educational prerequisites for real estate transactions or
disciplinary oversight. A title agency may not conduct real estate closings or mask legal fees for closing
services under the guise of a "settlement fee" or other charge. Their conduct of a closing absent
independent legal counsel constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. Virginia UPL Opinion #183
(1996); Annotation, 85 A.L.R. 2d 184.
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APPENDIX
Typical Questions at Real Estate Closings That May Involve Legal Advice
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

the legal name, existence, and authority of an entity-grantor;
the nature of the estate and quality of title conveyed;
the effect of survivorship title on estate plans;
the difference between special and general warranties, or no warranty at all, and the purchaser's
remedies for title defects;
generic deed exceptions for easements and other enc~mbrances of record;
closure of a metes and bounds description or other description deficiencies;
rights of access to public ways and utilities;
interpretation and impact of zoning and other land use regulations;
completion of promised improvements by the seller or subdivider;
air and mineral rights;
significance of deed covenants, conditions, and restrictions;
upstream and downstream surface drainage;
.
the presence of unacceptable dominant easements, or the lack of necessary servient easements
appurtenant;
the effect of adverse possession, prescriptive use, and the champerty statute;
eviction of tenants and trespassers;
release of statutory liens for labor and materiais furnished, unemployment contributions and ,federal
and Kentucky death taxes;
survey and other exceptions in the preliminary title opinion or title commitment;
what title policies cover and what they exclude;
the duties and liability of title attorneys, real estate agents, and lenders;
the rights to and limitations of future advances under open-end loans;
remedies against defaulting parties;
interpretation of environmental site assessments and remediation of contamination;
survival of warranties, representations, and covenants, and indemnification;
claims for late~t defects in buildings;
disclaimers in homeowner's warranties and termite inspection reports;
disclosures of condition of property improvements, or of the agency and loyalty·of a broker;
the tax consequences of various matters in ~e closing;
the effect of marital dissolution upon loan obligations; or
the fme print of the so-called federal closing documents.
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III ,PRACI1CE OF LAW
ble accord the represented person the status of client, pa~icularly
in maintaining communication. '
. [3J If a legal representative has already been appointed for the
client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for
decisions on behalf of the client. If a legal representative has· not
been appointed, the lawyer should see to such an appointment
where it would serve the client's best interests. Thus, if a disabled
client has substantial property that should be sold for the client's
benefit, effe~ive ~mpletion of the transaction ordinarily requires
appointment of a ,legal representative. In many circumstances,
however, appointme,~t of a legal representative It)ay be expensive
or traumatic for the client. Evaluation of these considerations is a
matter of professional judgment on the lawyer's part.

(4) If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the
ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to· the
ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or
rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Rule 1.2(d).

r

r
r
r
r
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Disclosure of the Client's Condition

(5) Rules of procedu're in litigation generally provide· that
minors or persons suffering mental disapility shall be represented
by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. However, disclosure of the client's dis~bi1ity. can adversely
affect the client's interests. For example, raising the question of
disability could, in some circumstances, lead to·. proceedings for
involuntary commitment. The lawyer's position in such cases is an
unavoidably difficult one. The lawyer may seek guidance from an
appropriate diagnostician.
' .

SCR 3.130(1.15) SAFEKEEPING PROPERlY
(a) A lawyer shall hold 'property of clients or third
persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with
a representation separate from a.. ,lawyer's own property.
Funds shall be kept in a separate' account maintained in
the state where the lawyer's office is situated, or elsewhere
with the consent of the client or third person. The separate
account referred to in the preceding sen'tence shall' be
maintained in a bank which has agreed to notify the Ken~
tucky Bar Association in .the event that any overdraft
occurs in the account. Other property shall be identified as
such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of
such account funds and other property shall be kept, by the
lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of. five years
after termination of the representation. ::
'.'
(b) Upon receiving funds or ,o~her property in which a
client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall
promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated
in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement
with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the ~Iient
or third person any funds or other property that the ·client
or third person is entitled to receive and, ~pon request by
the client or third person, shall promptly render a full
accounting regarding such property.
(c) When in the course 'of representation a lawyer is in
possession of property in which both the lawyer and
an9ther"person claim inte,rests, the property shall be kept·
separate by, t~e lawyer until there is an accounting .~nd
sev~rance of. their interests..If a dispute arises conce.rnjng
their respective interests, the portion in dispute. shall; b~
kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.
,(~) A Ja~er may deposit f\1nds"in an~ccount fOf ~b:e
limited purpose of minimizing bank charges. A ~aV'Yer may

SCR 3.130(1.16)

also,participate in an IOLTA program authorized by law
or court rule.
[Amended by Order 98-1, eft. .10-1-98; adopted by Order
89-1, eff. 1-1-90]
COMMENTARY
Supreme Court

1989: [1] A lawyer should hold property of others' with the
care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities should be kept
in a safe deposit box, except when some other form of safekeeping
is warranted by special circumstances. All proPerty ·which is the
property of clients ·or third persons should be kept sepa,rate from
the; lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one
or more trust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted
when ~dministering estate monies or a~ting in "similar fiduciary
capacit~~s.
.."
: :
.
[2] Lawyers often receive ~nds frqm ~hird parties from which
the lawyer's fee wil) be paid. If. there is' risk .that the cHen't may
divert the funds without paying the fee, the lawyer is ~ot required
to remit the portion from which the fee is to be paid.-However, a
lawyer may not hold, funds to coerce a clieitt into accepting the
lawyer's contention. The disputed portion 'of the funds should be
kept in trust and the lawyer should suggest means: for prompt
resolution of the dispute, such ~ ar~itration. The undisputed
portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed.
[3] Third parties, such as a client's creditor~, may have just
claims against funds or other property in a lawyer's custody.' A
lawyer may have a duty under appl~cable law to protect such thirdparty claims against w~ongful inter(erence, by the client, and
accordingly may r~fuse 't.o surrender the property to the client.
However, a lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a
dispute between the client and the third party.
[4] The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are independent of those arising from activity other than. rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is
governed by the applicable law relatin'g to fiduciaries even though
the lawyer does not render legal services in the' transaction. "
[5] A "clien;s' security fund'''.prQ~id,es ~' m'~a~s through the
collective efforts. of the bar to reimburse persons who have lost
money or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer,
Where such a fund has been established," a lawyer' should
participate.
'

SCR 3.130(1.16) DECLINING OR TERMINATING
REPRESENTATION ;
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a ,lawyer shall not
represenOt a client or, where represen'tation has' commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a.client
if:
(1) The represen'tation will result in violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;
.
(2) The lawyer's physi.cal or mental conditiori m'a,terially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or
(3) The lawyer is disch~rged.
"
.
. (b) Except as stated in paragr~ph' (c), a la~er may
withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be
accomplished~ wit)1out material adverse effect
lhe inter,. '
' ,
ests of the client, or if:.
(1) The client persists in a course of action involving
the lawyer~s services that the lawyer reasonably believes is
criminal' or fraudulent;

'on
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Benjamin Cowgill, Jr.
Chief Deputy Bar Counsel
Kentucky Bar Association

r
r

"Dear Bank Officer..."

r

A Suggested Letter to Your Escrow and Trust Account Depo~itory
If you have been wondering how to comply with the new" overdraft reporting rule in Kentucky Rules of
Professional Conduct (KRPC) 1.15, here is an example to follow in discussing the matter with your banker.

r
rI

ing sentence:
The separate account...shall be maintained in a
bank which has agreed to notify the Kentucky
Bar Association in the event that any overdraft
occurs in the account.

r

A number ofbanks in Kentucky are already providing
their attorney customers with letters confmning their
agreement to notify the KBA ofany
overdraft in the escrow or trust
accounts maintained by those attorneys. Ifyour bank is unable to make
such an agreement, it will be my
ethical obligation to move my escrow
and trust accounts to another bank
that
does report. I am therefore
Ben Cowgill"
eager to' provide you with the infor~
mation Y0l:! need to understand the new requirement and
assist me in bringing my accounts at your bank into
compliance with the rules ofthe Kentucky Supreme
Court that govern my professional conduct.'
In order to comply ~ith the new requirement, I need
to obtain a letter.from your bank confmning your agreement to notify the Kentucky Bar Association ifand when
any overdraft occurs in any account to which the Rule
applies. I am presently maintaining the following accounts at your bank which are subject to the new
requirement:

Dear Bank Officer;

r
r
r
r

r
r
r

r
r
r
r

am writing to inform you ofa new ethics rule which
I am required to follow as a member ofthe Kentucky
Bar. I need your assistance and cooperation to
comply with this rule,'because it relates to one or more
accounts at your bank.
The new rule requires that I obtain an agreement from
your bank to notify the Kentucky Bar Association ifand
when any overdraft occurs in any escrow or trust
account established by me or my finn. I will identify the
particular accounts to which the rule applies.
This overdraft reporting requirement is designed to
help the KBA fulfill its mission ofprotecting the public by
maintaining a proper discipline among members ofthe
Bar.] Experience in other states has s~own that overdraft reporting rules are an effective means ofidentifying
and correcting shortcomings in the management and
application ofclient funds by practicing attorneys. The
corollary benefit to the bank is that such problems are
promptly resolved
The rule recogniZes that an overdraft is not always the
lawyer's fault. A report ofoverdraft does not constitute
a complaint or allegation ofmisconduct by the bank
against the attorney. It is merely an infonnational report
which pennits the Bar to investigate the circumstances
and determine whether any action is necessary with
respect to the attorney's management ofthe account.
The new requirement appears in Rule 1.15 ofthe
Kentucky Rules ofProfessional Conduct (SCR 3.1301.15). Rule 1.15 has long required that I hold any funds
ofclients or third persons in one or more escrow or trust
accounts separate from my personal and business
accounts. The new requirement was added through an
amendment to the Rule, effective October 1, 1998, to
which the Supreme Court ofKentucky added the foll~w

1·9

[Identify all escrow accounts, trust accounts, real
estate closing accounts and other "clearing" accounts which contain funds of clients or third persons.J2

I will be responsible for updating this infonnation when
any escrow or trust account is opened or closed.

YOw" confinnation letter should

identify each ofthese accounts by
name and number, to avoid any
misunderstanding as to which accounts will be "f1agged~' for overdraft
reporting to the KBA.
The only other essential component
ofyour letter is the confmnati~n that
your bank agrees to report any
overdraft in the specified account(s).
It is sufficient for your letter to read
as follows:
.

.Dear Attorney:
Re: [List each account by name
and number]
You have advised us that your
firm maintains the above-referenced account(s) at our Bank, and
that such a~count(s) contain (or
may at times contain) funds of
clients or tb,ird persons. You have
further advised us that Rule 1.15 of
the Kentucky Rules ofProfessional
Conduct requires you to maintain
any such account at a financial
institution· which agrees to notify
the Kentucky Bar Association in the
event that any overdraft occurs in
the account.
Our Bank agrees to comply with
the overdraft reponing requirement
with respect to the above-referenced account(s). Accordingly, this
will confirm that we will immediately notify the Office ofBar
Counsel at the Kentucky Bar.
Association, 514 West Main Street,
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601, if and
when any properly payable instrument is presented for payment
against an .account identified
above which contains insufficient
funds to pay the instrument in full,
whether or not·the instrument is
actually dishonored.

sl

----------

Bank Officer

I will maintain your letter in my
files as evidence ofmy compliance
with the new requirement. I ask that
you also send a copy ofyour letter
directly to the KBA Office ofBar
Counsel at the address indicated.
This will provide the KBAwith the
name ofthe appropriate contact
person at your bank in the event any
question arises.
For purposes ofthe reporting
requirement, an overdraft occurs
whenever a properly payable instrument is presented ag~inst an account
which contains insufficient funds to
pay the instrument in full. It does not
matter whether the instrument is
actually dishonored or paid.
When an overdraft occurs, it must
be reported to the KBA. The bank
does not need to concern itselfwith
the circumstances ofthe overdraft or
the reason it occurred, because the .
KBA will investigate to detennine
wheth~r any further action is necessary.
The notice to the KBA must be in
writing, sent to the attention ofthe
Office ofBar Counsel at the KBA
as indicated in the sample confmnation letter. The notice must provide
the KBA. with enough basic infonnation about the overdraft to initiate an
inquiry -i.e~, the name ofthe
attorney (or firm), the account name
and number, and the date and amount
ofthe overdraft. Otherwise, the
notice does not need to follow any
particular fonn; it can simply be a
duplicate copy ofthe overdraft notice
sent to the attorney customer, so long
as it is issued when there is any
overdraft as defmed above.
Ifyou have any further questions
regarding the new requirement,
please contact Barbara S. Rea, Chief
Bar Counsel, or Benjamin Cowgill,
Jr., ChiefDeputy Bar Counsel, at
502-564-3795. Otherwise, I look
forward to receiving your letter
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confinning that you will notify the
~A ofany overdraft in the accounts mentioned above. Please
remember to send a copy ofyour
letter to the Office ofBar Counsel. .
Sincerely yours,
Member ofthe Kentucky Bar

1. SCR3.02S.
2. The Rule applies to all client escrow

and trust accounts, whether·or not
they are part ofthe Kentucky IOLTA
program ("interest on lawyers' trust
accounts). UnderlOLTA, the interest
on pooled accounts~. paid into the
IOLTA Fund which ia tUm grants the
funds to law-related charitable
organizations. The'overdraftreporting
requirement is separate and distinct
from participation in thelOLTA
program.

r
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(2) Written notice is promptly given to the appropriate
tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.
(d) An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a
multi-member arbitration panel is not prohibited from
subsequently representing that party.
[Adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90]
COMMENTARY
Supreme Court
1989: [1] This Rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The term
"personally and substantially" signifies that a judge who was a
member of a multi-member court, and thereafter left judicial
office to practice law, is not prohibited from representing a· client
in a matter pending in the court, but in which the former judge d~d
not participate. So also thefaet that a former judge exercised
administrative responsibility in a court does not prevent the former judge from acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had
previously exercised remote or incidental administrative respoJ:lsibility that did not affect the merits. Compare the Comment to
Rule 1.11. The term Uadju~icative officer" includes such officials
as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers
and other parajudicial officers, and also lawyers who serve as parttime judges. Compliance Canons A(2), B(2) and C of the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct provide that a part-time judge, judge
pro tempore or retired judge recalled to active service, may not
"act as a lawyer in any proceeding in which he served as a judge or
in any other proceeding related thereto." Although phrased differently from this Rule, those rules correspond in meaning.

SCR 3.130(1.13)

behalf· of the organization as· determined by applicable
law.
(c) If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with
paragraph (b), the highest authority that can act on behalf
of the organ~ation insists upon action, or'a refusal to act,
that is clearly a violation of law,and is likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization, .the lawyer may
resign in accordance with Rule 1.16.
. ..
(d) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers,
employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a
lawyer shall· explain the identity of the client when it· is
apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to
those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.
(e) A lawyer representing an organization may also
represent any of its directors, officers, employees, mem" bers, sharehC?lders or other constituents, subject to the
provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the
dual representation is required by Rule 1.7" the consent
shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individl.lal who is to be· represented, or
by the shareholders.
[Adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90]
COMMENTARY
Supreme Court
1989:
The Entity as the Client

SCR 3.130(1.13) ORGANIZATION AS CLIENT
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization
represents the organization acting through its duly a:uthorized constituents.
..(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an
officer, employee or other person associated with the
organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses
to act in a matter ~elated to the representation that is a
violation of a legal obligation to the. organizati~n, or a
violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the
organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury' to
the organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably
necessary in t~e best interest of the organization. In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due c(J.nsideration to the seriousness' of the violation and its consequences, the scope and nat~re of the .lawyer's
representation, the respon.sibility in the organization and
the apparent motivation of the person involved, th~ policies of the organization concerning such matters and any
other 'relevant considerations. Any measures 'taken shall
be designed to minimize disruption of the organization
and the risk of revealing information relating to the repre~entation to persons outside the organization. Such measures may include among others:
. ,.'
(1) .Asking reconsideration of the matter; .':'
(2) Advising that a separate .legal opinio'n on' t~e matter be sought for presentation to appropriate a~thority in
the organization; and
(3) Referring the matter to higher authority in the
organization, including, if warranted by, the seriousness of
the matter, referral to the highest authority that can act in

(1] An organizational client is a legal e~tity, but it cannot act
except through its officers, directors, employees, s~areholders and
other constituents.
[2] Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the
constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties
defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. "Other constituents" as used in this Comment mearis the
positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are
not corporations.
[3] When one of the constituents of an qrganizational client
communicates with the organization's lawyer in that person's organizational capacity, the communication is prot~cted by Rule 1.6.
Thus, by way of example, if an organizational client. requests its
lawyer to investigate allegations of \vrongdoing, interviews made
in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the
client's employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6.
This does not mean, however, that constituents of ..an organizational client are th.e clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not
disclose to such constituents information relating to the representation except. for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by
the organizational client in order to carry.out the representation
or as othetwise permitted by Rule 1.6.
[4] When constituents of the organization make decisions for
it, the decisions ordinarily must be accep·ted by tlJe lawyer even if
their utility· or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy
and operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as
such in the lawyer's province. However, different considerations
arise when the lawyer knows that the organization may be substantially injured by action of a constituent that is in violation of law.
In such a circumstance, it may be reasonably necessary for the
lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter. If that fails,
or if the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance to the
organization, it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer to take
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steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the
organization. Oear justification should exist for seeking review
over the head of the constituent normally responsible for it. The
stated policy of the organization may define cirCumstances and
prescribe channels for such review, and a lawyer should ~ncOurage
the formulation of such a pOlicy. Even in the absence of C?rganiza':
tion policy, however, the lawyer may have an obligation to refer a
matter to· higher authority, depending on the seriousness of the
matter and whether the constituent in question has apparent
motives to act at variance with the .organization's interest. Review
by the chief executive officer or by' the board of:direetors may be
required when the matter is of importance commensurate with
their authority. At some point it may be useful ;OTi ,essential to
', .,..':" :.
.
obtain an independent legal opinion.
(5] In an extreme case, it may be reasonably necessary for the
lawyer to refer the matter to the organization's. highest a~thori~.
Ordinarily, that is the board of directors or.. s~ilar governing
body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain
conditions highest authority reposes elsewhere; for ~xample, in the
independent directors of a corporation.
'..t.
.
..
.
.;
,..
Relation· to Other Rules '
.
.
[6] The authority and responsibility provided in paragraph (b)
are concurrent with the authority and responsibility provided in
other Rules. In particular, this Rule does not limit or expand the
lawyer's responsibility under Rule 1.6, 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 and 4.1. If the
lawyer's services are being used by an organization to further a
crime or fraud by the organization, Rule 1.2(d) can be applicable.
;

Government Agency
[7] The duty defined in this Rule applies to governmental
organizations. However, when the client is a governmental organization~"8 different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful official act is
prevented or rectified, for public business is involved. In addition,
duties of lawyers employed by,.the government or lawyers in military service may be defmed by statutes and regulation. Therefore,
defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the
resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the
government context. Althoug~ in some circumstances the client
may be a specific agency, it is generally the govern~ent as a whole.
For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a
bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a pan or the
government as a whole may be the client for purpose of this Rule.
Moreover, in a matter involviPlg the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority to question such
conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances. This Rule does not limit that
authority. See note on Scope.
Clarifying the Lawyer's Role
[S} There are times when the organization's interest may be or
become adverse· to those of one or more of its· constituents. In
such circumstances the lawyer should advise any-· constituent,
whose interest the lawyer fmds adverse to that of the organization
of the contlict or pote~tial conflict of interest, that t4e ~awyer
cannot represent such constituent, and that s~h persQD may wish
to obtain independent represent~~ion. Care must be taken to
assure tbat the individual understands that, when there is such
adversity of interest, the lawyer for', the organization cannot provide legal representation for that constituent individual, and that
discussions between the lawyer for. the organizatio~ and t~e indi",
.'
,.'.
vidual may not. be privileged.
[9] Whether such a warning should be given by ,the 'lawyer for
the organization to any constituent individual may turn on the
facts of each case.

Dual Representation

(10] Paragraph (e) recognizes that a lawyer for an organizatic;)n
may also represent a p~incipal officer or major sha~eholder.
Derivative Actions
[11] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to compel the direet0rsto
perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the orpftiZa..
tion. Members of unincorporated associations have essentially .th~
same right. Such an action may be brought nominally by the
organization, but usually is, in fact, 8 legal controversy over,IftIIl..
agement of the organization.
..
[12] The question can arise whether counsel for the or.aaiu... ·
tion may defend such an action. The proposition that theOJi'_
zation is the.1awyer's Client does not alone resolve the issue"MOiti:r
derivative actions are: a normal incident pf an organizatioB~l.
affairs, to ~e defended by the orgaqization's lawyer like anyotbet,
suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoiaa
by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise
between the lawyer's .duty to the organization and the lawyer's
relationship with th~ board. In those circumstances, Rule 1..7 JOVeros who should repr:,~ent the. directors and the ,organization. '

SCR 3.130(1.14) CUENT UNDER A DISABILITY
(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the .representation is
impaired, whether because of [minority] age, mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as
reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyerrela..
tionship with the client.
(b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian
or take other protective action with respect to a client,
only when the lawyer' teasonably believes that the client
cannot adequately act in t.h.e client's own interest.
.
[Adopted by Order 8?,-1, eff. 1-1-90]
COMMENTARY
Supreme Court

1989: [1] The normal client-lawyer relationship is based .on
the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted.
is capable of making. decisions about important matters. When the,
client is a minor or s~ffers from a mental disorder or disability,
however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationsbiplll8Y
not be possible in all respects. In particular, an incapacitated
person may have no power to make legally binding· decisioDl.
Nevertheless, a client lacking legal competence often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and· reach ·conclusionsabout'
matters affecting the client's own well-being. Funhermore,to an
increasing extent the law recognizes intermediate degrees of com~
petence. For example, children as young· as five or six years of &Ie,
and certainly those.of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings· conceminl
their custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons· of
advanced age can be quite capable of handling routine financial
matters while needing special legal protection concerning major
transactions.
[2] The fact that a client suffers a disability does not dimin~
the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and
respect. If the person has no guardian or legal representative,the
lawyer often must act as de facto guardian. Even· if the person
does have a legal representative, the lawyer should as far as possi-

I · 12
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RE\'ISED ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORJ'I CO~Il\'1ERCIALCODE:
AN ANALYSIS OF PARTS I, II AND III
By
Charles R. Keeton 1

and
Sara L. Abner 2

I. INTRODUCTION.
As \ve enter into the 21 st Century, teclmology is in an ever constantly changing
state of flux.

Like\vise, the manner in \vhich \ve conduct business has undergone

resulting change, as well. In keeping stride \vith our changing business \vorld, Article 9
of the Unifonn Commercial Code ("UeC") has been significantly revised and expanded.

r

It is poised to become la\v effective July 1,2001, in nearly all states, including Kentucky.

f

r
r

r
r

r

r
r
r
r

r
r

In the remaining states in \\'llich tIle Revised Statute has not actually been adopted, it is
pending before the state legislatures and expected to be adopted. 3

To n1illimize

substantial problems in the transition process, it is the goal of the sponsors that the
Revised Act be uniformly adopted by all states effective July 1,2001.
Article 9 of the

vee \vas first enacted into la\v in 1953.

Since that tin1e, it has

been revised only three previous times. The first revision involved only minor c11anges,
and in 1977 and 1994, Article 9 \vas revised to address changes in the securities industry.
The current revision process commenced in 1990, ultimately culminating in an eightyear endeavor, the product of which is the present set of revisions. The ne\v revisions

I Charles R. Keeton is a member in Frost Bro\vn Todd LLC.
He co-chairs the finn's Conm1ercial
Transactions, Financial Restructuring, and E-Business and Technology Practice Groups. He practices in
the firm's Louisville, Kentucky office. Mr. Keeton is a 1975 graduate of the University of Kentucky
College of Law.
2 Sara L. Abner is an associate in Frost Bro\\TI Todd, LLC. She practices in the firm's Louisville, Kentucky
office. 1\1s. Abner is a 1990 graduate of the Louis D. Brandeis School of La\\' at the lTni\·ersity of
Louisville.
~ .~evised Article 9 is pend~g in Alaska, Dela\vare, Hav;aii, 11linois~ Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, !\1aine..'
Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, Vermont, \Vest Virginia, and \\Tashington, D.C.

J . 1

IA
represent a major overhaul of Article 9's scope, substantive rules and procedures. In
1998, both the American La\v Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Unifonn State La\vs approved Revised Article 9, and the Official Con1ments were
issued in early 1999.
The Drafting Committee designed the revisions \vith the intent of establishing
greater certainty, simplicity, and unifonnity in the realm of financing transactions. 4 The
drafters attempted to accomplish those goals through nvo mechanisms:
(1)

By expanding the scope of Article 9, in tenns of both the property and

transactions covered; and
(2)

By simplifying and clarifying the rules governing the creation, perfection,

priority and enforcement of security interests.
Most pronounced is the revised version's recognition and inclusion of current
technologies' role in today's \vorld of commercial and financing transactions.

New

technology has brought about major changes in the manner in \vhich transactions occur.
The drafters have expanded the scope of Article 9 to incorporate those changes.
At the same time, the drafters have attempted to simplify many of the rules and
provisions to make them more "user friendly."s Through the revisions, the drafters hope
to reduce transaction costs, as \vell as credit costs. 6

II. SCOPE.
Article 9 governs consensual security interests in personal property and

fixtures.]

While Revised Article 9 maintains the basic structure of Current Article 9, it significantly';

.\ The Ne\v Article 9 Uniform Conunercial Code; Stev"n O. \Veise, at 1 (2d ed. 2000».
5
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expands its scope. This expansion includes ne\v types of property and transactions, as
\vell as creating new definitions, nlQdemizing and simplifying the filing system for
financing statements, and adding ne\v methods of perfection and ne\v priority rules. The
particular revisions will be discussed in detail below.

Article 9 continues to promote substance over form for purposes of detennining
Article 9's application to a particular transaction. The label given by the parties to a
particular transaction is irrelevant.

7

Regardless of the terms or characterizations given by

the parties, Article 9 applies \vhenever a securit)' interest \vithin Revised Article 9's scope
is created. 8 As will be addressed belo\v, the types of collateral within Article 9's scope
include not only personal property9, fixtures 10, sales of accounts, 11 letter-of-credit rights,
all of\vhich are categories of collateral that are included \vithin Current Article 9's scope,
but additionally include ne\v types of collateral. Revised Article 9 no\v brings \vithin its
scope the follo\ving ne\v categories of collateral: sales of payment intangibles,12 sale of
promissory notes,13 agricultural liens,14 goods held on consignment,15 health-careinsurance receivables, 16 commercial tort claims, 17 commercial deposit accollnts,18

r
i

r
r

r
r
r
r

7
8
9

vee Revised §9-109(a)(I).
vee Revised §9-109(a).
uee Revised §9-109(a).

10Id.
Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
IS Id.
16 -:7Health Care Insurance Receivable" included \vithin definition of "account" under
§ 102(a); Revised §9-109(d)(8).
II

Ii
18

vee Revised §9-102 defmition of "account;" DeC Revised §9-109(d)(12).
vec Re\Tlsed §9-102(a)(26); §9-102(a)(~9) (defining "deposit account"');

"conSUDler .deposit llccounf').

vec

Revised

§9-109(a)(13) (~xcIuding

1&
as \vellas electronic letter-of-credit rightS. 19 See U.C.C. Rev. §9-109(a) andOfflciaI

I

Comment 4(a) to §9-101.

1/;

III. PARTIES.
Revised Article 9 clarifies the identities of the parties involved in a secured
transaction. It has accomplished this by adding a ne\v term, "obligor.,,2o

(1) CURRENT ARTICLE 9.
Under Current Article 9, only t\VO party tenns are used: "debtor"
and "secured party." The term "debtor" refers not only to the person who
o\ves payment or performance of the obligation secured by the collateral,
but also includes the person \vho

OJVIIS

the collateral. 21 This dual use of

the term creates confusion \vhen the collateral is o\vned by someone other
than tIle borro\ver. In such an instance, the term "debtor" couldmea,n
either the borro\ver or the owner. 22

(2) REVISED ARTICLE -9.
Under Revised Article 9, the confusion has been eliminated\vith
the inclusion of a new tenn, "obligor." "Obligor" is the label given to the
person \vho owes the obligation that is the subject of the secufity

19

vec Revised §9-102(a)(51); Revised §9-203(f).
vec Revised §9-102(a)(59).

Currel!t §9-1 05(1 )(d).
22.~ John M. McElro'y, "Acq~iring Collateral Under Revised Article 9," The Journal ofLending~4
21

.Credit.Risk Managem~nt, April 4, 2000, at 2; Official Comment 2(a) to Rev. §9-102.
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A. DEBTOR VERSUS OBLIGOR.
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interest. 23

r

The tenn "debtor" refers to a person having an 0\vners11ip

interest in the collateral, other than the secured party or some other type of
lienholder. 24 "Secured parties and other lienholders are excluded from the

r

definition of 'debtor' because the interests of those parties nonnally derive

r

from and encumber a debtor's interest.,,25

r

Under Current Article 9, "debtor" includes a seller of accounts or
chattel paper. 26 'Revised Article 9 like\vise including those categories of

r

persons as "debtors" and, in addition, extends the definition, to sellers of

r
,..

payment intangibles and promissory notes,27 persons with a property

i

interest in collateral subject to an agriculturallien,28 and consignees. 29

t

B. SECURED PARTY.

r
r
r

Under both Current Article 9 and Revised Article 9, the "secured party" is
the person to \vhom a security interest is granted. 3o Under Current Article 9, the
term "secured party" includes buyers of accounts or chattel paper. 31

Revised

Article 9 not only incorporates those categories of secured parties, but
additionally includes buyers of payment intangibles and promissory notes,32

r
r
r
j

r

r
r

holders of agricultural liens, 33 and consignors. 34

Revised §9 - 102(a)(59).
Revised §9-102(a)(28)(A); Official Comment 2(a) to Rev. 9-102(a)(28)(A).
2S Official Comment 2(a) to Revised §9-102(a)(28)(A).
26 Current §9-105(1)(d).
27 Revised §9-102(a)(28)(B).
28 Revised §9-102(a)(28)(A).
29 Revised §9-102(a)(28)(C).
30 Current §9-105(1)(m);Revised § 9-102(a)(72)(A).
3) Current §9-1 05( 1)(m).
31 Revised §9-102(a)(72)(D).
33 Revised §9-102(a)(72)(B).
34 Revised §9-1 02(a)(72)(C).
23

24
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IV. COLLATERAL.
Current Article 9 classifies collateral into a variety of categories. Revised Article

9 retains those classifications, \vhile at the same time expanding the types of collateral
'and the kinds of transactions governed. In addition, new tenninology has been added,
and definitions of historical Article 9 tenninology have been significantly revised. The
traditional collateral categories includes accounts, inventory, equipment, instruments,
investment property, chattel paper, consumer goods, finn products and general
intangibles. Revised Article 9 expands the categories of collateral \vit11in its scope to
include the following: commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper,
health-care-insurance receivables, non-possessory statutory agricultural liens, and
software. In addition, Article 9 brings \vithin its scope the sale of payment intangibles

Some of the new categories of collateral are simply not subject to the provisions
of Current Article 9. They include deposit accounts, health-care-insurance receivables,
liens, and commercial tort claims. Ho\vever, other types of categories that

are now been expressly included in Revised Article 9, have been construed as coming
within the scope of Current Article 9, but are not specifically addressed. They include
sales of payment intangibles, electronic chattel paper, and software. They have

been

construed as falling within the broader collateral category of "general intangibles.,,3s

The Ne\\' Article 9.. at 21: John f\.1. McElroy, It's nelv! It's (sonlev~tlzat)conlplicated!It ·s{goillgtobej"
lalv! It's uee Article 9 Revisiolts, The Journal ofLending and Credit Risk i\fanagenlent.
.
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and promissory notes. These \vill be discussed individually at length below.
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r

A. GOODS.

r

The definition of "goods" is substantially the same in both tIle Current Article 9

r
r

,.

and Revised Article 9.
interest attaches."

36

"Goods" means "all things that are moveable when a security

Excluded from the definition are: money, documents, instruments,

investment property, accounts, chattel paper, and general intangibles, as \vell as minerals
before extraction. Revised Article 9 extends the exclusions to include deposit accounts
and letter-of-credit rightS. 37

r
f

The category of "goods" is divided into four subcategories: consumer goods,

r

r

inventory, fann products, and equipment. 38
exclusive.

The four classes of goods are mutually

Thus, the same property cannot simultaneously fall into t\VO separate

f~

r
,r

r

categories of "goods." Ho\vever, goods can fall into different classes at different points
of time. For example, a television set maybe inventory \vhile in the possession of a retail
store, but a consumer good once in the hands of the purchaser.

39

The four categories of

"goods" \viII be discussed as follo\vs.

(1) CONSUl\1ER GOODS.

r

Under both Current Article 9 and Revised Article 9, "consumer goods" are

,.

goods that are "used or bought for use primarily for personal, family, or

)

household purposes."

r

40

Thus, the classification turns on the debtor's iII/elIded

pllrpose for the goodS. 41

Current §9-105(1)(h);Revised §9-102(a)(44).
Revised §9-102(a)(44).
38 Official Comment 4(a) Rev. §9-102.
39 Id.
40 Current §9-109(1);Rev. §9-102(a)(23).
41 Official Comment 4(a) Rev §9-102.
36

r
r

r

37
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(2) INVENTORY.

Under both Current Article 9 and Revised Article 9, "in\Tentory"
consist of goods, other than fann products, \vhich are: (1) leased.by a
person as lessor; (2) held by a person for sale or lease or to be
under a contract of service; (2) furnished by a person under a
service; or (4) ra\v materials, work in process, or

furni~hed

contra~tof

materialsus~4;,or

consumed in a business. 42

(3) FARl'I PRODUCTS.

Revised Article 9 expands the definition of [ann products that exist
under Current Article 9.

Under Current Article 9, to constitute

"farm

products," goods must: (1) be in the possession of tIle debtor, and (2),tlre
debtor lnllst be a farnzer.

43

Under Revised Article 9, goods are

"fann

products" if they are "goods, other than standing timber, \vith respect\to
\vhich the debtor is engaged in a fanning operation." In addition,ithe
goods must either be (1) crops, (2) livestock, (3) supplies used or produced
in a fanning operation, or (4) products of crops or livestock in their
unmanufactured state.

44

Significantly, the tenns "crops" and "livestock"

are not defined. 45

Current §9-109(4); Rev. §9-102(a)(48); Offici~l Conlffient 4(a) to Rev. §9-102.
Current §9-109(3).
44'Revise-d §9-1 02( a)(34).
4sOfficial Comment 4(a) to Rev. §9-102.
42

.43
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r

Revised Article 9 expressly extends the tenn "fanning operations"
to include aquatic fanning operations, and extends the tenn "fann
products" to include aquatic goods. 46
It is important to note that under both Current Article 9 and

r

Revised Article 9 crops, livestock, and the products thereof cease to be
"fann products" when they cease to be used in the debtor's fanning

r
~.

operations.

r
,r

For example, once a poultry fanner sells eggs to a

manufacturer or distributor, they cease to be fann products and, instead,

t

become inventory of the manufacturer or distributor.
Also significant, is the fact that products of crops or livestock lose

r

their status as "fann products" if they are subject to a manufacturing

r

process, even if they remain in the possession of a person engaged in

f

fanning operations. For example, once a crop, such as green beans, is

r

subjected to an extensive canning operation, it \vould then be classified as

r

being in a manufactured state. On the other hand, some processes are "so
closely connected \vith fanning - such as pasteurizing milk or boiling sap

r

to produce maple syrup or sugar - that they \vould not constitute

r

manufacturing. ,,47

r
,..
I

r
f

r
r

46
47

Revised §9-102 (a) (34); The New Article 9, at 22.
Official Comment 4(a) to Rev. §9-102.
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(4) EQUIPl\IENT.
Under both Current Article 9 and Revised Article 9, "equipm.ent"

1&

is a residual category. It is defined as "goods other than inventory,· farm

I;

products, or consumer goods." 48·

I

B. GOODS \'ERSUS SOFT\VARE.
Revised Article 9 specifically addresses "soft\vare."

With today's

technology, sofhvare is often an integral part of a particular good.

Revised

Article 9 dra\vs a distinction bet\veen "goods" and "soft\vare." When soft\vare is
an integral part of the goods, Revised Article 9 treats tIle soft\vare as "goods/' as
\vell. Ho\vever, \vhen the soft\vare maintains its independence, it is considered a
"general intangible."

I~

I
I;

Thus, "the tenn does not include a computer program

embedded in goods that consists solely of the medium on \vhich the program is
embedded. ,,49

c.

I,

INVESTl\1ENT PROPERTY.
The category of "investment property" is comprised of certificated and

uncertificated securities, securities accounts, and security entitlements. These are
defined in Article 8 of the UCC.,so Commodity contracts and commodity accounts
are additionally included within the category of "investment property."Sl
The rules governing investment property are contained in Current Article

9 in §9-115. Revised Article 9 continues the rules governing investment property;

Current §9-1 09(2); Rev §9-1 02(a)(33).
Rev. §9-102(44); see als~o TheNe~v Article 9, at 2.
-. sOUCC §115(1)(f); Rev. § 9-102(a)(49);
§§ 8-102(a)(15)(defining "securi~"), 8-501, 8102(a){l 1)(defining "security entitlement''').
51 Current 9-115 (1)(a) and (b); Rev. §9-102)(a)(14)(15).
48

49
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r

r

ho\vever, the rules are no longer found in one section. Rather, Re\7ised Article 9

r

distributes the rules governing investment property to the relevant provisions
throughout the Revised Article

r
r

pertaining to the particular subcategories of

"investment property."S2

D.

SEMI-INTANGIBLES.
Certain types of movables have been described as "conventional tangible

r
•

embodiments of intangible rights of the debtor."

r

include instruments, documents, chattel paper and letter-of-credit rights. Each of

53

Those types of movables

I

those semi-intangibles \viII be addressed as follo\vs.

(1) INSTRUMENTS.

r

An "instrument" is defined by Revised § 9-102 (a) (47) as "a
negotiable instrument or any other \vriting that evidences a right to the
payment of a monetary obligation, is not itself a security agreement or

r
r

lease, and is of a type that in the ordinary course of business is transferred
by delivery \vith any necessary endorsement or assignment."
term includes not only negotiable instruments governed by

r
,.

the ordinary course of business, are transferred by delivery accompanied by

t

any necessary endorsement or assignment.

r
r

It is significant to note that Revised Article 9 has defined
"promissory notes" as a subset of "instruments."S4 \Vhile Current Article 9
additional includes promissory notes as a category of collateral in credit

r

,

52

r

vee Article 3,

but also other writings evidencing a right to the payment of money that, in

I.

r

Thus, the

53

The Ne\v Article 9, at 3 and 22.
Id. 22.
.

at
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transaction. Revised Article 9 includes "the sale of promissorynotes't. in
recognition of the fact that the sale of a promissory note can function as a
financing transaction. 55

The tenn does not, ho\vever, include leases,

investment property, letters-of-credit, or \vritings evidencing a right to
payment arising out of the use of a credit or charge card. 56

(2) DOCUMENTS.
Under both Current Article 9 and Revised Article 9, a "document"
means a document of title. This includes bills of lading and warehouse
receipts. 57

Both Current Article 9 and Revised Article 9 define "chattel paper"
as including any \vritings that evidence both a monetary obligation and a
security interest in specific goods or a lease of specific goods. 58
Significantly, under Revised Article 9, chattel paper may no\v· be
evidenced by electronic records, as \vell as by a \vriting. Additionally,
chattel paper includes not only security interests or leases in specific
goods, but also in the software used in those goods. 59
In clarifying Revised Article 9's inclusion of "electronic chattel
paper," the Official Comments to Revised § 9-102 state that "the

S4Revised § 9-102 (a) (65).

ss Revised § 9-109 (a) (3).
Current § 9-~05 (1) (i); Revised § 9-102 (a) (47); CommeJ:}t 5(c) to Revised § 9-102.
Current §.§ 9-105 (1) (f);
§1-201 (15);
§7-102 (1) (e);- Revised § 9-102 (a) (30).
s~,Current § 9-105 (1) (b); Revised § 9-102 (a) (11).
.
s9Revised § 9-102 (a) (11); Official Conunent 5(b) to Revised § 9-102.
S6
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(3) CHATTEL PAPER.

57

I

vec
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definition of electronic chattel paper does not dictate that it be created in
any particular fashion.

For example, a record consisting of a tangible

\vriting may be converted to electronic fonn." Like\vise, "records may be
. initially created and executed in electronic fonn.

In both cases, the

resulting records are electronic chattel paper." Id.

r

Lastly, Revised Article 9 contains nvo exclusions \vitIl regard to
the tenn "chattel paper." First, charters of vessels are expressly excluded
from the definition. 60 They are instead "accounts." The tenn "charter"

r
J

includes "barefoot charters, time charters, successive voyage charters,

r

contracts

all

other

(4) LETTER-OF-CREDIT RIGHTS.
Current Article 9 uses the tenn "rights to proceeds of a \vritten

r

letter-of-credit.,,62 That tenn was defined to mean a beneficiary's right to
payment upon a drawing under a letter-of-credit. 63 In comparison,

r
r

Revised Article 9 uses a slightly different tenn. The revisions incorporate
the tenn "letter-of-credit right," which is defined by the Revised Article to

r

r

and

or charge card.

r

r

of carriage,

are records evidencing a right to payment arising out of the use of a credit

r

,r

contracts

arrangements for the use of vessels.,,61 Also, excluded from the definition

r

r

of affreightment,

mean a right to payment or perfonnance under a letter-of-credit. Letter-ofcredit rights are included within the scope of Revised Article 9 \vhether

Revised § 9-102 (a) (11).
Official Comment 5b to Revised §9-102.
61 Current § 9-105 (3).
63 Current § 5-102.
60

61
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the letter-of-credit is \vritten or electronic. The tenn does not, ho\vever,
include "the right of a beneficiary to del11alld payment or perfonnance
under a letter-of-credit. ,,64 This difference

grO\VS

out of vee Article S's

transfer of a beneficiary's right to demand payment or perfonnance'is

I]
Ij

I

transferee beneficiary or nominated person are independent of the

I~

beneficiary" assignment of the proceeds of a letter-of-credit and are

Ii

governed by Article 5. Section 5-114(e) provides that "the rightsofa

superior to the assignee"

right to the proceeds."" Thus, Article 9

recognizes the independent and superior rights of a beneficiary transferee
under Article 5. 65

E. OTHER INTANGIBLES.
Revised Article 9 has broadened the scope of "other intangibles." Current
Article 9 recognizes only two types of pure intangibles that are not investment
properties: accounts and general intangibles. Revised Article 9 broadens this
category to additionally include deposit accounts and commercial tort clail'Qs.
Revised Article 9 also expands the definition of "accounts" to no\v include certain

I
11
;:ID~

I
I
Ij
I
I

~;:;;:'t

~~5':

rights to payment that presently fall within the definition of "general intangibles"
under Current Article 9.

(1) ACCOUNTS.
Under Current Article 9, an "account" is defined as a right to
payment for goods sold or leased, or for services rendered that

MRevtsed § '9-..102 (a) (51); Official Comment 5(e) to Revised § 9-102.
Official Comment 4 to Rev. §9-108.

65
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r
r

evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper. Under Revised Article 9, the

r

definition of "account" has been expanded and refom1ulated.

longer limited to rights to payment relating only to goods or services.

r

Many categories of rights to payment classified as "general intangibles"

r

under Current Article 9 are no\v classified as "accounts" under Revised
Article 9.

r
r

from: the sale of real property; the licensing of intellectual property; the
issuance of a policy of insurance; a secondary obligation incurred or to be
incurred; energy provided or to be provided; the use or hire of a vessel

r
r
r
r

under a charter or other contract; the use of a credit card or charge card;
and licensed lottery \vinnings. 66
In addition, the revised definition of "account" no\v specifically
includes health-care-insurance receivables,

previously excluded by

Current Article 9. A "health-care-insurance receivable" is defined as an
"interest in or claim under a policy of insurance \vhich is a right to

r

payment of

a monetary obligation for health-care goods or services

provided. ,,67

r

(2) DEPOSIT ACCOUNT.

r

r

Accordingly, under the Revised classifications, "accounts"

includes a right to payment, \vhether or not earned by perfonnance, arising

r

r
r
r

It is no

A "deposit account" is an account maintained with a bank. The
tenn includes demand accounts, time savings accounts, passbook

§ 9~ 102 (a) (2); Official Comment 5(a); The Ne'" Article 9, at 24.
Revised § 9-102 (a) (2) and (46); Official Comment 5(a)

66. Revised
. 67

J ·15

accounts, and other similar bank accounts. The tenn does not,ho\vever,
include investment property or an account evidenced by an instrument. 68

(j
"if"

,~

11
Ii!:
:{j~:~;{;

The revised definition clarifies the proper treatment of

non-

negotiable or uncertificated certificates of deposit. Under the revised
definition, an uncertificated certificate of deposit comes within. the
parameters of a "deposit account" (assuming there is no written document

:j~i:t

Ii
IQ

~:;

evidencing the bank's obligation to pay), \vhile a non-negotiable certificate
of deposit constitutes a "deposit account" only if it is not an "instrument"
as defined by Revised § 9-102. As Official Comment 12 to Revised §9102 makes clear, that detennination turns on \vhether the non-negotiable
certificate of deposit is "of a type that in ordinary course of business is
transferred by delivery \vith any necessary endorsement or assignment.'·

I~

I
I

q

l~

(3) COl\Il\IERCIAL TORT CLAIl\IS.

Current Article 9 excludes tort claims from its scope.

Revised

Article 9 continues to exclude personal tort claims; ho\vever, the Revised
Article makes an exception for "commercial tort claims," bringing those
within its scope. 69 Under Revised Article 9, the definition of "commercial
tort claims" encompasses two types of tort claims:

I

(1) a claim of an

organization arising in tort; and (2) a claim of an individual arising in the

I~

III

I;
I

I
68
69

Revised § 9-102 (a) (8) and (29); Official Comment 12 to Revised § 9-102.
Revised § 9-102 (a) (13); Revised § 9-109 (d) (12).
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r

r
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r

course of the individual's business, as long as it does not involve a
personal injury.7o
It is important to note that a secured party may not take a security
interest in an after-acquired commercial tort claim.?l

r

Lastly, if a security interest is granted in a commercial tort claim,
the security agreement must describe the commercial tort claim \vith

r
r

specificity.72

(4) GENERAL INTANGIBLES.

r

Current Article 9 defines "general intangibles" as personal property

r

otller tIl all goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments,

r
r
r

investment property, rights to proceeds of \vritten letters-of-credit, or

J

money.73

Revised Article 9 retains that definition, but expands the

exclusions to encompass commercial tort claims and deposit accounts. As
addressed above, those types of property are now incorporated as separate
categories of Revised Article 9. Additionally, Revised Article 9 uses the

r
r

proceeds of written letters-of-credit," used in Current Article 9. 74

r

"general intangibles": payment intangibles and software.

r
r
r
r

tenn "letter-of-credit rights," rather than the more narro\v tenn "right to

Revised Article 9 adds two special subcategories to the category of
A "payment

intangible" is defined by the Revised Article as a general intangible under

Revised § 9-102 (a) (13).
Revised § 9-204 (b) (2).
72 Revised § 9-108 (e) (1).
73 Current § 9-106.
70

71
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\vhich the principle obligation of the account debtor is to pay money.'s
"Soft\vare" is defined by the Revised Article as "a computer

program~d

any supporting infonnation provided in connection with a transaction
relating to the program." It is important to note, however, that the. lenn
does not include a computer program that is included in the definition of
"goods.,,76

That is, sofnvare that has become an integral part . of a

particular good.

v.

Ii
I
I
I'
Ij
I~

ATTACHMENT.
The tenn "attachment" refers to the creation of a security interest. It specifically

refers to the moment at which a security interest becomes enforceable against. the
debtor. 77 The current rules for creation and attachment of a security interest remain
substantially the same in n1any respects under the ne\v revisions. Both \'ersions require
basically three elements for an attachment to occur: (1) value must be given; (2) the
debtor must have rights in the collateral; and (3) the collateral must be in the possession
of the secured party by agreement of the debtor, the secured party must have "control" of
the collateral for certain types of designated property, or the debtor must have executed a
security agreement that contains a description of the collateral.78
Revised Article 9 expands the types of collateral in \vhich attachment may occur
by the secured party taking "control" of the collateral. Additionally, it alters to some
extent the requirements for executing a security agreement. Lastly, Revised Article 9
provides for automatic perfection of a security interest in several circumstances,

Revised § 9-102 (a) (42).
Revised § 9-102 (a) (61).
76'Revised §·9-.102 (a) (75); The Ne\\' Article 9, at 25.
77 Current § 9-203 (2); Revised § 9-203 (a); The Ne\v Article 9, at 25.
74

7S
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r
r
r

including the sale of payment intangibles, the sale of promissory 110tes and supporting
obligations.
The individual requirements necessary for attachment of a security interest are:

r
r

A. VALUE.
Value is deemed to have been given \vhere there is any consideration
sufficient to support a simple contract. Value not only includes loans of money, a

r
r
r

binding contract to lend money, the issuance of a guaranty, but also includes

t

whole or partial satisfaction of pre-existing claims, as well as value previously
given. 79

B. RIGHTS IN THE COLLATERAL.

r

r

A debtor must possess rights in the collateral before the debtor can grant a
security interest therein. That is, a debtor can only grant a security interest in the
o\vnership or other rights it holds \vith regard to the collateral.

r
r

secured party can only obtain security interests in collateral to t11e extent of the
debtor's rights in that collateral. 80 Significantly, however, Revised Article 9 does
clarify that a debtor's "po\ver to transfer collateral" is sufficient to satisfy the

r
,.

"rights in the collateral" requirement. 81

C. SECURITY AGREEMENTS.

l

r
r
r
r

r

Like\vise, a

The third element necessary for attachment requires the debtor to execute
a security agreement, or in the alternative the secured party may take possession
or control (in certain instances) of the collateral. To execute a valid security

78

Current § 9-203 (1); Revised § 9-203 (b).
§ 1-201 (44) (b); The Ne\\' Article 9, at 25.
Current §9-203 (1); Revised·§ 9-203 (b); Official Connnent 62 to Revised § 9-203.
Revised § 9-203 (b) (2).

i9 UCC
80
81
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agreement, Current Article 9 requires the debtor to "sign" a "\vriting." In

","V.I.• ".,"''''''.

Revised § 9-203 (b) (3) (A) mandates the debtor to "authenticate" a security
agreement that "provides a description of the collateral." The tenn "authenticate"
replaces the tenn "sign." While the tenn "authenticating" includes "signing,"it
additionally includes encrypting a record. 82 Thus, a debtor may no\v not onlyslgn
a written document in order to execute a security agreement, but may ·inithe
alternative execute an electronic transmission. 83

l(j

Ii
'~~
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1;i~

IJ
~':~Ttf}

In addition to requiring the debtor to authenticate the security agreement,
Revised § 9-203 (b) (3) (A) additionally requires that the security agreement
contain a description of the collateral. This requirement is retained from Current
Article 9. 84 A "reasonable identification" may be provided in a variety of ways;
including, a specific listing, category, type, quantity, or computational fomlula. 85
Ho\vever, the Revised Article makes it clear that an overly general description. of
collateral, such as, "all the debtor's assets" or "all the debtor's personal property,"
does not constitute a sufficient description of collateral. 86
A detailed description of collateral is required \vhere the collateral in
which a security interest is taken is a commercial tort claim, consumer goods (in

1;1

lj
I~
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the case of a consumer transaction), a security entitlement, a securities account,or
a commodity account.

A description only by "type" is insufficient in those

Revised § 9-203 (b) (3) (A); Revised § 9-102 (a) (7).
See Federal E-Sign Legislation and VET A, Charles R. Keeton and David A. Cornett, presented at
Annual Computer and Technology La\v Institute (March 16 and 17, 2001, University of .A~\"' l~Y".~
82

83

...

ofLa\v).
CUITent § 9-203 (1).
Revised § 9-108 (b).
• Revised § 9-108 (c).
84

85
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r

r

instances. 87 Finally, if the collateral is "timber to be cut," a real-estate description

r

is required to be included in the security agreement.

88

D. POSSESSION AND CONTROL BY THE SECURED PARTY.

r

Under Current Article 9, the secured party is given two options in lieu of a

r

security agreement. The secured party may either possess the collateral or, if the
collateral is investment property, the secured party may acquire "control" of the

r

property.89 Revised Article 9 has retained those t\VO options, \vhile at the same

r
r

time expanding them. 9o

(1) POSSESSION.
While a secured party could satisfy the possession requirement

r

under both Current Article 9 and Revised Article 9 by taking possession of
the collateral, Revised Article 9 expands this option.

The possession

requirement may no\v be satisfied through the possession of the collateral

r

by a tllird parO'. The possession requirement is met if the third party is in
possession of the collateral by agreement of the debtor and the third party

r
t

authenticates a record ackno\vledging that it holds the collateral for the

r

secured party.91
In situations where the collateral is a certificated security in

r
r

r
r
,..

registered fonn, Revised Article 9 requires that the certificated security be
delivered to the secured party under § 8-301. 92

Revised § 9-1 08 (e).
Revised § 9-203 (b) (3) (A).
89 Current § 9-203 (1).
90 Revised § 9-203 (1) (a).
.
91 Revised § 9-102 (a) (7) and (69); Revised § 9-203 (b) (3) (B); Revised § 9-313 (c) (1).
92 Revised § 9-203 (b) (3) (C).
87

88

r

r
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(2) CONTROL.
Current Article 9 allo\vs the third requirement of

'-4 .... l..... "".L.U.L.Lllof ...

met by "control" \vhere the collateral is investment property. The

.L"

cor,eel~t"~~c"

of "control" is expanded under Revised Article 9 to include
investment property, but also deposit accounts, electronic chattel
and letter-of-credit rightS. 93

(3) PRACTICE POINTERS.
As a matter of good practice and sound business

judgment,~a

secured party should al\vays obtain a security agreement \vheneverpossible, even \vhere Article 9 pennits a security interest to be perfeqted
by control or possession. A security agreement not only provides better
evidence of the transaction, it also provides an opportunity to obtain
numerous contractual protections that augment the rights provided a

,

~

.~

secured party under Article 9.

E. AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY.
Revised Article 9 continues the rules set forth in Current Article'9
regarding after-acquired property.

Both versions of Article 9 pennitthe.

I

1.·•.··::[.
1.• [

1.

. If·.

attachment of a security interest in after-acquired property.94
Revised Article 9 continues Current Article 9's limitation with regard to

•~
/6:·

after-acquired

COllSlllller

goods. Under both versions, a security interest may not

be granted in after-acquired

COllSlllller

goods as original collateral, unless

I
I
I
I

<~

i

Revised § 9-203 (b) (3) (G).
94 Current §"·9-204 (1); Revised § 9-204 (a).

93
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r
I

r

debtor acquires rights in those goods \vithin 10 days of the secured party giving

r
r
r

value. 95
Significantly, ho\vever, there is one additional class of after-acquired
collateral that Revised Article 9 precludes creditors from taking a security
interest: commercial tort claims. As discussed above, commercial tort claims are
new to Revised Article 9. Revised Article 9 provides that a security interest can

r

only attach to

r•

Cllrrellt

commercial tort claims existing at the time the security

interest is authenticated. 96

F. SUPPORTING OBLIGATIONS.

r

The tenn "supporting obligation" is

r

ne\v in Revised Article 9.

It is

defined as a letter-of-credit right or secondary obligation that supports the
payment or perfoffilance of an account, chattel paper, document, general

r
)

intangible, instrument or investment property. Revised Article 9 recognizes that a

r

secured party typically desires to obtain a security interest in the secondary,
supporting obligation, as \vell as in the original collateral, itself. 97 Thus, Revised

r

Article 9 treats the supporting obligation as "part and parcel of the collateral it

I

r

supports."

r

98

Revised Section 9-203(f) expressly provides that the attachment of a

security interest in collateral effects an automatic attachment of a security interest
in any supporting obligations, as wel1. 99

r

r
r

r
r

95
96

97

Current § 9-204 (2); Revised § 9-204 (b) (1).
Revised § 9-204 (b) (2);.See also The Ne\v Article 9, at 27; Official Comnlent to Revised § 9-204 (b )(2).
"Acquiring Collateral Under Revised Article 9," at 4.
.

98Id.
99

Revised § 9-203 (f).
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G. FUTURE ADVANCES.

Revised Article 9 continues Current Article 9's treatment of security,
interests in future advances. Under both versions, a security interest mays
future advances and provide for cross-collateralization of obligatio
Importantly, however, several cases under Current Article 9 required

thelufure

advances to be of the same type or otherwise related to the original advance.1Q\,
Official Comment 5 to Revised § 9-204 expressly rejects the holdingofthqle
cases, and eliminates such requirements.

H. PROCEEDS.
Under both Current Article 9 and Revised Article 9, the attachment of>a
security interest in collateral also gives rise to a security in the proceeds of that
collateral. 102

While under both versions of Article 9, "proceeds" refers,,:lo

\vhatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection, or other disposition of
collateral,103 Revised Article 9 greatly expands the definition to include:

(I)

rights and claims arising out of the collateral; (2) collections on and distributions
on account of the collateral; and (3) claims arising from insurance proceeds paid
as a result of loss, damage to, defects in, or nonconfonnity of the collateral. 104
Revised Article 9 also includes a new provision addressing the situati911
that arises when proceeds are commingled \vith other property. Revised Section
9-315 (b) adopts the position of many cases under Current Article 9 that
law tracing methods may be utilized.

Current § 9-204 (3); Revised § 9-204 (c).
See, e.g., Dalton v. First National Bank, Ky. App., 712 S.\V.2d 954 (1986).
J02Current § 9-306 (2); ReVIsed § 9-293(f) and § 9-315 (a) (2).
J03Current § 9-306(1); Revised § 9-102 (a) (64).
100

JOI
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co~on

r
I

r

r
r
r

r
r

r

VI. PERFECTION.
Once a security interest has attached, additional steps must be taken to "perfect"
that interest. "Perfection," in general, protects the secured party against other creditors
and transferees of the debtor, including any representatives of creditors in insolvency
proceedings instituted by or against the debtor. lOS A security interest is perfected if it has
attached and all of the requirements for perfection as set forth in Revised §§ 9-310
through 9-316 have been satisfied. 106
Revised Article 9 for the most part retains, but clarifies, the fanner rules.

It

additionally expands to some extent the methods for perfection.
There are three primary ways in which to perfect a security interest once it has

r
r

secured party may file a properly completed financing statement in the appropriate

r

possession of the collateral (for "possessable" collateral), or for certain specified types of

r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r

attached, \vhich vary some\vhat depending upon the nature of the collateral. l07 First, the

filing office(s) for most types of collatera1. 108

vec

Second, the secured party may take

collateral may assert control thereof. l09 Third, in a few specified situations, the security
interest may be automatically perfected upon attachment. 110

A. PERFECTION BY FILING.
Most security interests may be perfected by filing a properly completed
financing statement in the appropriate

Dee

filing office(s).lll

The required

Revised § 9-102 (a) (64) (A)-(E).
Official Comment 2 to Revised § 9-308; See also Revised § 9-317.
106 Revised § 9-308.
107 Only an "attached" security interest may be perfected. Revised § 9-308.
J08 Current § 9-302 (1); Revised § 9-310 (a).
109 Current §§ 9-304, 9-305, 9-115; Revised §§ 9-312, 9-313, 9-308, 9...314, 9-104 through 9-107.
110 Current §§ 9-115 and 9-302; ReVIsed §§ 9-309, 9-302, 9-304 and 9-306.
IJ( Current §9-302 (1); Revised § 9-310 (a).
104

105
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contents of the financing statement, as \vell as the rules for filing, are addfe~.~~i~·
Parts IV and V of Revised Article 9, and are outside the scope of this paper.

B. PERFECTION BY POSSESSION.
(1) POSSESSION REQUIRED: l\10NEY.

Under both Current Article 9 and Revised Article 9, certaint
of collateral are reqllired to be perfected by the method of posse
Under Current Article 9, possession is required \vhere the collateralis
·
·
I etter-o f -cre dOIt. 11'n1oney, an Instrument,
or a \vntten

\Vhile Revised

Article 9 retains the possession requirement for perfection of a seetirity
interest in money,113 it has revised the rule as applied to instruments'lUId'
letter-of-credit rights.

(2) INSTRUl\IENTS.
Under Revised Article 9, a security interest in an instrument·
be perfected by eit/ler possession or filing. 114 Nevertheless, it is ~sa._
to note that such a perfected security interest may in some circumst.a.
still be defeated by others, e.g., a holder in due course. See VII.A.. below,
addressing priority issues as effected by Articles 3, 7 and 8.

(3) LETTER-OF-CREDIT RIGHTS.
Under Revised Article 9, "possession" of a \vritten letter-of-cl;dit,
\viII no longer be effective to perfect a security interest in that collater'

112 Current § 9-304 (1).
113.Revised §.9-312 (b) (3).
114 Revised §§ 9-312(a) and 9-313 (a).

I
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I
'~

r
r

security interest In a letter-of-credit must be perfected by cOlltrol

r
r

(discussed belo\v).115 There is one exception to this rule: \vhere a security
interest is taken in a letter-of-credit right that is a sllpportillg obligatiol'.
In that instance, the security interest is automatically perfected, if the

r
r
r

security interest in the related collateral has been perfected. 116

(4) OTHER TYPES OF COLLATERAL 'VHERE PERl\IISSIVE
POSSESSION IS ALLO'VED.
There are additional types of property \vhere both Current Article 9

r

and Revised Article 9 perlltit perfection by possession. Perfection lIt a}' be
accomplished by possession \vhere the collateral falls into one of the

r

follo\ving categories:

r

goods, negotiable documents and certificated

securities (as distinguished from uncertificated securities).. 117

Chattel

r

paper is also included in that list, but involves additional rules.

r

Current Article 9 simply allo\vs for perfection of a security interest in

r
r

chattel paper by possession,118 Revised Article 9 limits perfection by
possession of chattel paper to tallgible chattel paper. Where the collateral
is electrollic chattel paper, perfection may only be effected by control or

r

filing. 119

r
r

r
r
r

\Vhile

Revised § 3'12 (b) (2); Official Comment 6 to Revised § 312 (b) (2).
Id.; Revised § 9-308 (d).
117 C:urrent § 9-305 and § 8-301; Revised §9-3t'3 (a).
118 Current § 9-305.
119 Revised §§ 9-313 (a) and 9-314 (a). ; Official Comment 2 to Revised § 9-314.
115

116
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(5) EXCLUDED COLLATERAL.
Article 9 excludes the follo\ving types of collateral
perfection by possession rule: accounts, commercial tort claims,de
accounts, investment property, letter-of-credit rights (discussed abqye),,<
uncertificated securities (see discussion VI.C.(I) regarding perfectiol'fby,.
control of investment property), and oil, gas or other mineralsb«are
extraction. 120

(6) POSSESSION BY THIRD PARTIES.
Both Current Article 9 and Revised Article 9 address the
of goods held by a bailee.

situation

Current Article 9 pennits perfection

of~

security interest in goods held by a bailee by simply giving notification to
the bailee of that security interest. 121
Revised Article 9 imposes more extensive requirementsaJ)d
distinguishes between goods in the possession of a bailee who has

issuld~a

document of title covering the goods (addressed by Revised § 9-312 (d),
and goods in the possession of a bailee \vho has not issued a documentof
title (addressed by Revised § 9-313 (c)).
Where the goods are not covered by a document of title, Reviscd,§

9-313 (c) requires not only that the secured party give the bailee noticeo!
the security interest.

It now additionally requires the bailee . to

"authenticate" a "record" ackno\vledging that it is holding the "''''''J.J.'-4'''''4'''~l.i'V!'''Y

120
121

Official Comments 2 to Revised § 9-313.
Current § 9-305.
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r

r

the secured party. For perfection by this method to be effective, Revised

r
r
r
r
r

Section 9-313 (c) also requires that the bailee in possession may not be the
debtor, the secured party or a lessee of the collateral from the debtor in the
ordinary course of the debtor's business. I22 It is important to note that
Revised § 9-313 (c)'s exclusion of "lessees of the collateral from the
debtor in the ordinary course of the debtor's business" overrules In re
Atlantic Systems, Inc., 135 BR 463 (Banker. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that
notification to a debtor-lessor's lessee \vas sufficient to perfect a security
interest in leased goods).

r
r

With regard to goods covered by a non-negotiable document of
title, Revised § 9-312 (d) continues the previous rule that the bailee's
receipt of notification of the secured party's interest is sufficient to perfect

r
r
r
r

that security interest, even \vithout the bailee's "authentication of a record"
ackno\vledging receipt. 123
\Vith regard to goods covered by a negotiable document of title,
Revised § 9-313 (c) clarifies the perfection and

r
r

rules in Current §

9-304 (2) that a security interest in goods covered by a negotiable

r
r
r
r

priorit~y

document may be perfected by either perfecting a security interest in the
document, or by the method of filing. Thus, title to the goods is, so to
speak, "locked up in the document.,,124 This remains the rule, even \vhen
the goods are in the possession of a bailee. 125

Revised § 9-313 (c); Qfficial Comment 4 to Revised § 9-313 (c); The Xe\\' Article 9.. at 30.
§ 9-312 (d); Official Comment 4 to Revised § 9-313.
124 Official Comment tp Revis.ed § 9-312; Revised § 9-312 (c).
125 Id.
112

123 "Revised

J·29

c.

PERFECTION BY CONTROL.
Current Article 9 provides for perfection of a security interest by>lhe

method of "control" for one category of collateral:

investment propert

Revised Article 9 expands the types of collateral in which a security interest"
be perfected by that mechanism. Under Revised Article 9, a security inteI"elt~ltf
deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, and letter-of-credit rights, in additie,./
investment property, may be perfected by control. 127

(1) INVESTl\IENT PROPERTY.
Under both Current Article 9 and Revised Article 9, a security
interest in investment property n1ay be perfected by either control or by
filing. Revised Article 9 expressly incorporates t}le concept of control~s
provided in

uee

§ 8_106. 128

Under Article 8, control of investment

property includes:
(a)

delivery \vith endorsements, to the security party;

(b)

an agreement by the issuer of uncertified securities thatfue
issuer \viII folIo\v the instructions of the

securedparty~

rather than the debtor and \vith no further consent orlb.
debtor;
(c)

an agreement by a commodity intennediary or a

securiti~s

intennediary, such as a bank or broker, holding a securities
account that it will honor the instructions of the secured

126 Current § 9-115 (4)
J2'Jl~vised §'§ 9-104, 9-105, 9-106, 9-107 and 9~314 (a).
.
128 Rev-ised §9-106 (a); Official Comment 2 to Revised § 9-106.
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r
r
r

party, rather than the debtor and \vith no further consent of
the debtor; or
(d)

r
r

registering securities, a securities account, or a commodity
account in the name of the secured party. 129

When the secured party happens to be the securities or commodity
intennediary, control is automatically effected. 130

r

(2) DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS.
A security interest in a deposit account n1ay

r
r
r
r
r

Dill)'

be perfected by

the mechanism of control. The secured party must obtain control over the
deposit account in order to perfect the security interest.

This may be

accomplished only by the follo\ving specific methods:
(a)

A secured party has control over a deposit account if the
secured party is the bank \vith \vhich the deposit account is
maintained; or

(b)

A secured party may exerCIse control over a deposit
account if the bank with which it is maintained executes an

r

agreement with the secured party that it \vill follo\v the
instructions of the secured party, rather than the debtor,

r
r
r·

r
r

\vith no further consent from the debtor. I31

J29
130

131

Revised § 9-106; vee § 8-1 06~. Official Comment 4 § 9-106.
Revised § 9-'} 06 (b) (1).
ReVi~ed § 9-104 (a); Official Coinrnent 3 to Revised § 9-104.
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(3) ELECTRONIC CHATTEL PAPER.
A secured party may perfect a security interest in electronic e

I

paper by either control or filing. 132 To perfect a security in ele~.F
chattel paper by co/ttrol, six requirements must be met:
(a)

there must be only one aut110ritative or identifiable cop,ofl
the electronic record of the chattel paper;

(b)

the copy of the electronic record must identify the secured
party and its interest;

(c)

the copy of the electronic record must be communicated,tc,
and n1aintained by the secured party or its

designa~e4

custodian;
(d)

copies that purport to assign the authoritative copy cano~ty
be made \vitll the participation of the secured party;

(e)

any copies of the authoritative copy must be readily
identifiable as a copy thereof and not the authoritatiye
copy, itself; and

(f)

any revision to the authoritative copy must be readily
identifiable as having been authorized or unauthorized. IJ3

Thus, it is imperative that the authoritative copy be made distinguishable
in some manner from any other copy or revision thereto.

§§ 9-312 (a)and 9-314 (a).
Revised § 9-105.

132 Revised
133
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r
r
r
r

(4) LETTER-OF-CREDIT RIGHTS.
A security interest in a letter-of-credit right, other than one that is a
supporting obligation for other collateral,

that category of collateral. 134 The secured party may assert control over a

r

letter-of-credit right if the issuer or nominated person consents to an
assignment of the proceeds thereof. 135

r

D.

r
f

AUT01\1ATIC PERFECTION.

Both Current Article 9 and Revised Article 9 recognize a few limited

r
r

circumstances in which perfection occurs automatically, upon attachment of the
security interest. 136

Current Article 9 recognizes automatic perfection in the

following instances: a purchase-money security interest in consumer goods; an

r

assignment of accounts that does not transfer a significant portion of the

r

assignor's outstanding accounts; security interests arising under

intennediary or commodity intennediary; security interests in instruments,

r

certificated securities and negotiable documents, which are temporarily perfected
for a period of 21 days (under Current Article 9); and a security interest in

r

proceeds, which is temporarily perfected for 10 days (under Current Article 9).137

r

r

uee Articles 2,

2A or 4; a security interest in investment property held by the securities

r

r

be perfected by control.

That is the only method accepted for perfection of a security interest in

r

r

11',ISt

Revised § 9~312 (b)(2) and 9-314 (a).
Ig.; See also
§ 5-114.
.
136 Cllrrent § 9-302.(1); Revised § 9-309.
1-37 Current §§ 9'-113 (4) and 9-302 (1).
134

J3S
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Revised Article 9 not only incorporates this same list,138 it expands
to include:

the sale of payment intangibles and promissory notes; a s

assignment of payment intangibles that does not transfer a significant port
the assignor's payment intangibles; an assignment of a health-care-ins
receivable to the healthcare provider; and a security interest held by an issu.
nominated person in documents presented to the issuer or nominated

Delr50n]kot,/I:f

draw under a letter-of-credit. 139
Revised Article 9 also provides that perfection of a security

1nt~llarA8<t'~IW,\

collateral automatically perfects a security interest in any supporting obJllgllllons,:;fC,
for the collateral. 14o

A supporting obligation is a secondary obligation

supports the payment or perfonnance of an account, chattel paper,docu;
general intangible, instrument or investment property. 141

Article 9 recognizes automatic perfection: a beneficiary's interest in a. comm;'
law trust. 142 Filing is now the required method ofperfection. 143
Finally, Revised Article 9 changes the time period
perfection of security interests in instruments, certificated
negotiable documents, reducing it from 21 days to 20 days.144 It also makes
temporary perfection period for proceeds consistent, expanding it from

Revised §§ 9-304, 9-306, 9-309 and 9-312.
Revised §§ 9-309, 9-312 and 9-203; The Ne\v Article 9, at 32.
140 Revised § 9-308 (d).
14~ Revised § 9-102 (a) (77).
142·.Current §.9-302 (1).
JUR.evised' § 9-309 (13).
t.... Revised·§9-312 (e).
138

139

.
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r
r

20 days.14S Under Revised § 9-315 (c) and (d), a security interest in proceeds is

r
r
r

perfected automatically for 20 days if the security interest in the original collateral
is perfected. Perfection of a security interest in proceeds extends even beyond the
20 days, however, in several instances. First, perfection continues where the
following three conditions are met: (1) a filed financing statement covers the
original collateral; (2) the proceeds are collateral in which a security interest may

r

be perfected by filing in the same office where the financing statement covering

J

r
r
r
r

the original collateral has been filed; and (3) the proceeds are not acquired with
cash proceeds. 146 This rule is in essence a continuation of Current § 9-306 (3) (a).
Additionally, perfection of a security interest in proceeds likewise
continues beyond the 20 days where the proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds
and the security interest in the original collateral \vas perfected by any method. 147
This is an expansion of Current Article 9's recognition of continued perfection in

r

proceeds \vhere either the security interest in the original collateral \vas perfected

r

by a filed financing statement,148 or the original collateral was investment
property. 149

r

identifiable cash proceeds of all categories of original collateral in which a
security interest is perfected by any method. ISO

r

r
r
r
r

The Revised Article extends the continued perfection rule to

Revised § 9-315 (d).
Revised § 9-315 (d) (1).
147 Revised § 9-315 (d) (2).
'48 Current § 9-306 (3) (b).
J49 Current § 9-306 (3) (c).
150 Revised § 9-315 (d) (2); Official Comment 7 to Revised § 9-315.
145
146
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E. PERFECTION UNDER OTHER FEDERAL AND STATE
Both Current and Revised Article 9 ackno\vledge that certain

sta~t.(~<I_',/

federal statutes, regulations, and United States Treaties provide me
perfecting security interests in specific types of property; including,V"
aircraft, intellectual property and title goods (such as motor vehicles).
versions of Article 9 provide that compliance with these statutory and

re.'

fonns of perfection is equivalent to filing a financing statement under Article
Excluded from this treatment are motor vehicles that are

lnv~~"'1~n't1/<~r).!i

dealer, held for sale. Current Article 9 requires perfection by filing.
the security interest on the certificate of title is not sufficient. 152 However, CUJn-er.t)'\".
Article 9 gives a different rule for goods held for

lease~

With regard'to

held for lease, the secured party must comply with the pertinent state's certifi
of-title statute. IS3
Revised Article 9 establishes unifonnity with regard to motor'vehic·les
held by a dealer for sale or lease. The drafters recognized that quite oft~.'·
dealer does not

knO\V

whether a particular automobile will be sold or leased.'

Revised Article 9 now requires that in both instances a security intereSI,,~
perfected by filing. 154 Once the goods are removed from inventory, the applieabt,e,~/
certificate-of-title statute governs perfection. This includes not only thesaJf';'Of

U1Current § 9-302 (3) and (4); Revised § 9-311 (a) and (b).
.
.
.1$3 Current § 9-302 (3); Official Comme~t 4 to Revised § 9-311.
l~Revised § 9 .. 311 (d); Official Comment 4 to Revised §9':311.

•SJ.Cwrent § 9-302 (3) (b).

-
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r

r

lease of the vehicle, but also removal of the vehicle from inventory by the dealer
for use in his business. Iss

r

r
r
r
r
r
r
r

VII. PRIORITY.
Once a security interest has attached and has become perfected, it still may not
prevail over competing interests held by other creditors and claimants. Article 9 sets
forth rules for prioritizing the competing interests. The general rule under both versions
of Article 9 is that the first secured party to perfect its security interest has priority. This
is kno\vn as the "first-to-perfect" rule.

exceptions to the rule based on the Illet/lod of perfection. The priority rules are addressed
as follo\vs:

A. EFFECT OF OTHER VCC ARTICLES.
Revised Article 9 defers to the other Articles of the vec in hvo instances.
It defers to the rights of holders in due course and protected purchasers of

r
r

securities under Articles 3, 7 and 8. 1S6 Revised Section 9-331 (a) provides that
holders in due course and purchasers of securities "take priority over an earlier
security interest, even ifperfected, to the extent provided in Articles 3, 7, and 8."

r

B. GENERAL -UNSECURED CREDITORS VERSUS SECURED
CREDITORS.

r
r

Under both versions of Article 9, a secured creditor takes priority over a
general unsecured creditor, even if the secured party has failed to perfect its
security interest. 157

r
r

r

There are, ho\vever, many non-temporal

Official Comment 4 to Revised § 9-311.
Revised § 9-221 ( a ) . .
.
.
157 Current, §§ 9-201 and 9-301 (1) (b);·Revised §§ 9-201 (a) and 9-317(a).

, ISS

156
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c.

LIEN CREDITORS VERSUS SECURED CREDITORS.
A lien creditor is a creditor \vho has obtained a lien on the d

property by attachment, levy, or by other judicial means.
assignees for the benefit of creditors, trustees in bankruptcy, and

recelV'SIR ~)'In,·,,;

equity. 158
Under both versions of Article 9, a perfected secured party takes
over a lien creditor, as long as the secured party's interest was

perfect,~
;l

before the lien creditor's lien arose. 159 This is, ho\vever, subject to the

'~i?

.fil.l'l;l"";,;;',

advance rules.
Revised Article 9 continues Current Article 9's priority rules re
h',

-'._

',"',:'

future advances by a secured party. Future advances against collateral inwhiolla

i

secured creditor's security interest has priority over a lien creditor \viII like~.
have priority over the lien creditor, as long as two requirements are met: (l):·t~~f"
future advances must be made \vithin 45 days after the lien creditor's lien .....

VJIIiIlY.;.·

and (2) the lien arose before the secured party has kno\vledge of the lien. l60
Both versions of Article 9 also grant priority to a secured creditor
purChase-money security interest as against a lien creditor, as long as the sec' ,
party perfects that interest by filing within a specified period of time following'•• ,'
debtor's receiving possession of the collateral. 161 Under Current Article 9,·tbe '
secured party must file a financing statement covering the collateral within.~,l.Q·'

Revised § 9-102 (a) (52).
~5~'CurIent §.. 9-301 (1) (b); Revised § 9-317 (a) (2).
160'CUrrent"§9-301 (4); Revised § 9-323 (b).
161 Current § 9-301; Revised § -9-317.
158
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r

r
r

days of the debtor's receipt ofpossession. 162 Revised Article 9 extends the period
to 20 days. 163

D. UNPERFECTEDSECURITYINTERESTSVERSUSUNPERFECTED
SECURITY INTERESTS.

r

Where there are two competing unperfected security interests, Revised

r
r
r

Article 9 continues the rule of Current Article 9 that the first to attach has
priority. 164

E. PERFECTED SECURITY INTERESTS VERSUS UNPERFECTED
SECURITY INTERESTS.
While it is implicit under Current Article 9, Revised Article 9 expressly

r

states the rule that a perfected security interest has priority over an unperfected

r

security interest in the same collateral. 165

F. PURCHASE-l\10NEY SECURITY INTERESTS.

r

A purchase-money security interest is a security interest that is either (1)

r

taken by the supplier of the collateral to secure the collateral's purchase price, or

(2) taken by a third-party lender \vho has loaned the debtor money to finance the

r

purchase of the collateral. l66 According to the new Official Comments, Current

r

r
r
r
r·
r

r

Article 9 requires the collateral to be "goods" in order to qualify as purchasemoney collateral. Revised Article 9 expands the classification to include software
sold or licensed with goods where the software is to be principally used with the
goodS. 167

Current § 9-301 (2).
Revised § 9-317 (e).
1.64 Current § 9-312 (5) (b); Revised § 9-322 (a) (3).
165 Revised § 9-322(a)(2).
.
166 Current § 9-107; Revised § 9-103.
167 Official Comment 5 to Rev. §9-103.
162

163
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Creditors \vho hold a purcllase-money security interest and folIo
proper steps for perfecting that interest achieve a super-priority status.
purchase-money security interest takes priority over all other security
regardless of when those other security interests were perfected. To achi
super-priority status, certain steps must be taken, depending on the
collateral involved.

(1) INVENTORY.

To perfect a purchase-money security interest in
Revised § 9-324(b) sets forth four requirements that must be met 1I.IA_xt
the debtor even receives possession of the inventory:
(a)

The secured party must perfect its purchase-money

interest;

(b)

The secured party must send an authenticated notification to

entity holding a conflicting security interest;
(c)

The holder of a conflicting security interest must

notification within five years before the debtor receives possession
inventory; and
(d)

The notification must describe the inventory and state

...... ,=,~= . """"" .

party sending the notification either has or expects to acquire a sec
interest in the inventory.

J. 40

r

r

Again, it must be stressed that these requirements must be
completed before the debtor ever receives possession of the inventory.

r

The requirements may be accomplished at any time \vithin the five year

r

time frame preceding the debtor's receipt. 168

r

It is also important to note that the 20 days grace period for

~.

r
r
r

purchase-money security interests in "goods",169 does not apply to
inventory. 170

(2) LIVESTOCK THAT ARE FARl\1 PRODUCTS.
Revised Article 9 adopts the same four requirements for perfecting

r

a purchase-money security interest in livestock that are fann products that
apply to inventory, \vith one small modification. The notification must be

r

sent \vithin six
livestock. 171

r
r
r

r
r

As with inventory, the required steps for perfecting the

possession of the livestock. But, in this case, cannot be done earlier than
six months preceding the receipt. 172

r
r

r

before tIle debtor receives possession of the

purchase-money security interest must be taken before the debtor receives

{'

r

11t01,tl,S

Once again, the 20 day grace period applicable to purChase-money
security interests in goods is inapplicable to livestock. 173

Revised § 9-324 (b).
Revised § 9-324 (a).
170 Official Comment 4 to Revised § 9-324.
J7J Revised § 9-324 (d).
172 Id.
173 Revised § 9-324 (a).
168

169
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(3) OTHER COLLATERAL.

As stated above, for all other types of goods (other than inv,<
and livestock) serving as collateral, a purchase-money security
must be perfected within 20 days after the debtor receives

DO~;SeJSSIC:

those goods to achieve priority over all other competing
interests. 174

(4) COl\fPETING PURCHASE-l\fONEY SECURITY INTERE""II'!';:_'_'I"'i:',

Revised Article 9 adds a ne\v section in recognition of the fact that .b)l!_I;:i'f~(i'
frequently borrow money from a lender to finance the purchase

pri,.tte"'6{;~%f;'!!

certain goods, and also grant a purchase-money security interest

tti'\III!I/,

supplier. In those situations, both the supplier of the goods and the Ie··"··,··...··",,,
may have competing purchase-money security interests in
collateral. 175

The Revised Article adds § 9-324 (g) to

situation. It grants priority to the supplier.

Lastly, the Revised Article recognIzes that
security interest transactions are occasionally intenningled
purchase-money security interest transactions. For example, a debtor
have a $10,000.00 loan secured by a purchase-money security int
which he subsequently refinances and as part of the transaction bo.......".. _;·,,",.>
additional funds. Those additional funds were not utilized in the Plll:O
of the collateral, and therefore, do not qualify for purchase-moneys

.

.

'fuRevise"d § 9-324 (a).
11sOfficial Conunent 13 to Revised § 9-324 (g).

r

r

interest status. 176 By the same token a purchase-money obligation may be

r

secured by collateral in addition to the purchase-money collateral.

r
r

Section 9-103 (f) of the Revised Article states that the purchasemoney security interest in a commercial transaction does not lose its status
as a result of this kind of intermingling of transactions.

r

G. BUYERS IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS VERSUS
SECURED CREDITORS.

r
r

Revised Article 9 continues the priority rule of Current Article 9 that a
buyer in the ordinary course of the debtor's business takes free and clear of the
security interests created by the seller, eve" if the security interest is perfected and

r

the buyer knows of its existence. 177

r
r

Revised Article 9 does, however, establish a new rule for situations in
which the secured party is in possession of the goods. In that instance, a buyer of
the goods does not take free and clear of the secured party's interest. 178 This new

r

rule overrules the holding of Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39
N.Y.2d 632,385 N.Y.S.2d 260,350 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1976).179

r

H. BUYERS OUTSIDE OF THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS
VERSUS SECURED CREDITORS.

r

The general rule under both versions of Article 9 is that where property is

r

sold, leased, licensed, exchanged or otherwise disposed of outside the ordinary

r

r
r
r

l76Id.
Revised § 9-320 (a); Current § 9-307 (1).
Revised§ 9-3~O (5).
179:0fficial Comment'S to Revised § 9-320.
177

178
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course of business, the security interest continues unmarred in the colla
Thus, the secured party has priority over the purchaser. 180
There are some limited exceptions. Revised Article 9 continues
under Current Article 9 that when a debtor sells encumbered household g
defined as goods that were used or bought by the debtor primarily for pe
family or household use - the purchaser takes free of the security interest
(1)

The purchaser was without knowledge of the security interest;

(2)

gave value;

(3)

purchased the goods for personal, family or household use; a"d

(4)

purchased the goods before a financing statement coverins':,:,lJe

goods was filed. 181
One other exception that is recognized is where the secured intere$ti'js
unperfected. In that instance, the buyer will prevail over the secured party·it;••
buyer gave value and had no knowledge of the security interest at the time;t'it:
buyer received delivery of the goodS. 182

While Current Article 9 has

construed by case law as merely "subordinating" the interest of the secured
to that of the buyer, Revised Article 9 expressly provides that the buyer' UIB;IiDt'·,c.
free" of the security interest. IS3

Official Comment 8 to Revised § 9-321.
Current §§ 9-307 (2); Revised § 9-320 (b).
I~% Revised § 9-317 (b).
Revised § 9-317 (b) (overruling Aircraft Trading a"nd Services, Inc. v. Braniff; Inc., 819 F",2<l.'l'

180
181

I"

Cir.1987).
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r
r

r

r
r
r
r
,r

r
r
r

r
r

r
rt

I. CONSIGNORS.
Revised Article 9 incorporates consignments within its scope, treating
them as purchase-money security interests. 184 Thus, consignors must comply with
the rules for purchase-money security interests in order to establish priority.

J. NEGOTIABLE DOCUMENTS COVERING GOODS HELD BY
BAILEES.
Like Current Article 9, Revised Article 9 provides that while goods are in
the possession of a bailee that has issued a negotiable document covering the
goods, "a security perfected in the document has priority over any security
interest that becomes perfected in the goods by another method during that
time."I8S
As stated above, Article 9 defers to Article 7 where goods are evidenced
by a negotiable document.

Thus, the holder of a duly negotiated document

prevails over an earlier security interest to the extent provided in Article 7. 186
K. INSTRUMENTS.

Under Current Article 9, a security interest in instruments can only be
perfected by possession.

Under Revised Article 9, a security interest in

instruments may be perfected by either possession or filing. Thus, for the first
time there is the potential for a priority dispute. Revised Article 9 provides that a
purchaser of an instrument who takes possessio" has priority over a security
interest perfected by filing, as long as the purchaser with possession:

r
g

r

r
r

184 Revised" §§ '1-201 (37) and 9-1 03 (d);, Official Comment 6 to Revised § 9-103.
l~S Revised § 9'-312 (c)(2);.See also Current § 9-304 (2).
'
186 Revised §§ 9-309 arid 9-33 t (a).
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(1)

gave value;

(2)

took possession in good faith; and

(3)

without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights

secured party.I8?
With regard to holders In due course of negotiable instruments,
important to note that it is one of the categories for which Revised Article 9
to Article 3. 188
Significantly, Revised § 9-309 (4) provides that the buyer of a promis
note enjoys aittolllatic perfection of its security interests. This rule is SlDllfltfIO;?,i3£',;
the rule pertaining to the pitre/laser of a payment intangible, who also
automatic perfection of its security interest.
promissory notes and payment intangibles don't necessarily protect each

I'C'a"'!r'rI.-,X;·",,'

same extent because with "payment intangibles" there is nothing to pass
Consequently, the first buyer of the payment intangible will always have nrt,I"'ftl~I";'."
In comparison, however, a buyer of a promissory note that relies on aUltontatlQ,i,
perfection and does not take possession of the promissory note will
subsequent buyer of the promissory note who does take possession thereof. 189

L. CHATTEL PAPER.
Current Article 9 allows for perfection of a security interest in chi
paper by filing or possession. As discussed above, Revised Article 9 expands
perfection methods, now allowing for perfection by possession (for taDllUl_'8);;;;';;',)

187

Revised § 9-330 (d).

§§ 9-~09 and 9-331 (a).
Revised § 9-330 (d);the New Article 9, at 3.

'lU, Revised
189

J - 46

r
r
r

chattel paper) and control (for electronic chattel paper). As a result, there are also
new priority considerations \vith regard to chattel paper.
Revised Section 330 (b) mirrors Current Section 9-310, but adds

r

references to perfection by control.

r

possession or control takes priority over a competing security interest (perfected
by filing), if the following requirements are met:

r
r

(1)

The purchaser gave new value;

(2)

took possession (of tangible chattel paper) or took control (of

electronic chattel paper) in good faith;

r
r

(3)

took possession or control In the ordinary course of the

pllrclzQser's business; and

(4)

rt

took without knowledge that the purchase violated the rights of the

secured party.

r

Significantly, paragraph (f) of Revised § 9-330 imputes knowledge of the
security interest to the purchaser, if the chattel paper indicates it has been assigned

r

to.an identified secured party.

r

M. LETTER-OF-CREDIT RIGHTS.

~

r

Revised Article 9 requires perfection of a security interest in letter-ofcredit rights to be perfected by control. 190 However, where the letter-of-credit

r

rights, are sllpportillg obligations, Revised Article 9 provides that perfection of a

r

security interest in the original collateral automatically perfects a security interest
in the letter-of-credit rights. 191

r

In the event of a priority contest between a

r

r
r

It provides that a purchaser who takes

190
191

Revised §§ 9-312~)(2) and 9-314(a).
Revised § 9-308 (d).
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security interest in letter-of-credit rights perfected by control and one
automatically, the security interest perfected by control takes priority.192
are competing security interests, each perfected by control, they rank in pri
accordance with the temporal order in which control was obtained. 193

N. INVESTl\1ENT PROPERTY.
Under both Current Article 9 and Revised Article 9, a security int
investment property may be perfected by either filing or control. 194 RoW.Mi~1~1r?<.
Article 9 reiterates the priority rules of Current Article 9, providing that perfi
by control takes priority over perfection by filing. 195
involving brokers, securities intennediaries, and commodity intennedi
(discussed below), where there are competing security interests each perfectM';by .'"

to the rule of equal priority for those security interests under Current

Ar.'1[rml.R'\~

9).196

A special rule applies to a security interest held by a

secltft·1K.ip:.·····.'"

intennediary in a securities entitlement or securities account maintainedwittt.C,
securities intennediary. Such a security interest takes priority over a

cempe'

security interest perfected by control or by filing. 197
Additionally, a special rule applies to security interests in
certificates in registered fonn which are perfected by possession under § 9..3l,

192 Revised

§ 9-329 (1).

~93 Revised § 9-329 (2).
I~ Revjsed § 9-106 (a).
. ~95.CUrrent-§ 9-115 (5) (a); ReVised § 9-328 (1).

'''Current § 9-115 (5)(b); Revised § 9-328 (2).
197,Current § 9-115 (S)(c), Revised § 9-328 (3).
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r
r
r

Such a security interest takes priority over a security interest perfected by
filing. 198 That rule "eliminates the need to conduct a search of public records only
insofar as necessary to serve the needs of the securities market.,,199

r
r

Security interests created by brokers, securities intennediaries, or
commodity intennediaries which are perfected lvitl,Ollt cOlltrol, all rank
equally.200

r

O. DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS.

r
r
r
r

Deposit accounts are excluded from the scope of Current Article 9, but
have been brought \vithin the scope of Revised Article 9. Accordingly, Revised
Article 9 has set forth priority rules with regard to deposit accounts.
The primary rule is that a security interest in a deposit account perfected
by control defeats a competing security interest perfected by another method. 20t
Competing security interests each perfected by control rank temporally in
accordance with the order in which control was obtained. 202

r
r

Where the bank in which the deposit account is maintained has a security
interest in the account, the bank's security interest generally defeats any

r

conflicting security interests. 203 This rule pennits a bank to extend credit to its

f

depositors without having to detennine whether another party has a security

ri

interest in their customers' deposit accounts. 204

r
r

r

r
r

The Official Comments to

Revised § 9-327 explain that a secured party who takes a security interest in a

Revised § 9-328 (5).
Official Comment 6 to Revised § 9-328.
200 Revised § 9-328 (6).
201 Revised § 9-327 (1).
202 Revised § 9-327(2).
203 Revised § 9-327 (3).
204 Official Comment 4 to Revised § 9-327.
198

199
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deposit account as origillal collateral can escape the results of that rule,
priority over the bank's security interest, in two \vays. TIle secured partyc:·
control of the deposit account by becoming the depository bank's custo
respect to that deposit account. That arrangement will Sllbordi"ate the
security interest. 20S

In the alternative, "the secured party can 0&

subordination agreement from the bank.. ,,206
When funds are transferred from the deposit account, the transfere,
free of any security interests therein. There is, ho\vever, one exception>t
rule. The security interest retains its priority if it is detennined that the tr
acted in collusion with the debtor to violate the secured party's interest.

P. STATUTORY LIENS.
Revised Article 9 continues the rule under Current Article 9
possessory lien on goods, created by statute or common law, which
l

payment or perfonnance of an obligation for services rendered or'
furnished in the ordinary course of business with regard to those
priority over a competing security interest in the goods. The only excep
this rule is where the statute creating the lien expressly provides

205 Official Comment 5 to Revised § 9-327; Revised § 9-327 (4).
~'Official Comment 5 to Revised 9-327.
,_io'Revi~ed § 9-332 (b).
208Revised§ 9-333 (a)'and (b).
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r

r

Q. AGRICULTURAL LIENS.

r
r

Where agricultural liens are concerned, Revised Article 9 directs that they
are to be treated the same as other security interests. 209 Thus, the general rules of
priority apply.

r

The one exception recognized is where the agricultural lien is created

f

pursuant to state statute which grants priority to the lien. Revised Section 9-322

r

(g) defers to the statute in that instance, as long as the agricultural lien is properly

r

perfected. 210
R. CROPS.

r
r

Current Article 9 defers to the individual states' real estate la\vs for
detennining priority among competing interests in crops.

competition is between the holder of a perfected security interest in the crops and

r
r

the owner or mortgagee of the real estate. 211 Under Current Article 9, priority
hinges on the state's real estate law's treatment of crops.
Under Revised Article 9, crops are "goods" in which a security interest

r
r
r
r
'r

r

r

r

Generally, the

may be created and perfected. 212 A perfected Article 9 security interest in crops
takes priority over a competing interest of the owner or mortgagee of the real
property. The one requirement is that the debtor either have an interest ofrecord
in the real property or be inpossessioll thereof. 213

Revised § 9-322 (a); Official Comme~t 12 to Revised § 9-322 (a).
See also Official COmn1ent 12 to Revised § 9-322.
·211 The New Article 9, at 42. .
212 Offici~ COl11q1t:nt 12 to Rev. §9-335.
2)3 Revised § 9-334 (i).
209

210

J·51

s.

FIXTURES.
Revised Article 9 for the most part continues the priority rules for

set forth in Current Article 9, \vith only one slight modification extending
period in which to file fixture filings and an addition of a new

rule~re

manufactured homes.
Under both versions, the tenn "fixture" is defined as a

good'Whi~

become so related to a particular parcel of real property that an interest
the goods under real estate law. 214 A security interest in fixtures mayeittJ"
perfected by a regular Article 9 filing or by a fixture filing filed in the
where a real estate mortgage on the real property would be filed. 2ls
As with crops, there is also the potential for conflicts bet\veen reali'
interests and security interests in fixtures. Generally, the conflicting

,nt.I!l''''''l~l~

in the fonn of interests held by the Olv"er of the real estate and/or by ",ort6'
A security interest takes priority over the competing interests of an
mortgagee of real estate if three requirements are met:
(1)

The debtor has an "interest of record" in the real property

or'il~'i.fj31",~frir{.

possession thereof;
(2)

The security interest was perfected by fLXtllre jili"g

DeI10l'O;:'1

interest of the mortgagee or owner was of record; and
(3)

The security interest has priority over any conflicting

predecessor in title of the owner or mortgagee. 216

214

Y

Current§9-313 (1) (a); Revised §9-102 (a) (41).
~~~'CUITent §§ 9-313 (4) (d) and 9-402(5); Revised§ 9-334 (e).
..216 'Current § 9-313 (4) (b); Revised §9-334 (e) (1).
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Int~ere:SI"411

r
r
r

There is a separate rule which grants priority to holders of security
interests in the follo\ving specified types of readily movable goods: (1) factory
and office machines; (2) equipment that is not primarily used or leased for use in

r
r

the operation of the real property; and (3) replacements of domestic appliances
that are consumer goods. Revised Section 9-334(e)(2) gives priority to a security

t

r
r

interest in such goods, as long as it is perfected before the goods beconle fixtures.
Official Comment 8 to Revised Section 9-334 explains that this rule was included
as a result of confusion that sometimes arises as to whether and when these types
of goods become fixtures. Revised Section 9-334(e)(2) eliminates this confusion

r
r

by protecting a creditor who files a financing statement, rather than a fixture
filing. 217

r
r

Revised Section 9-334 also addresses purchase-money security interests in
goods that become fixtures.

It grants priority to the purchase-money security

interest as against an already existillg interest of record of the owner or a

r

mortgagee of the real estate, if a fixture filing covering the goods is filed within a
specified time after the goods become fixtures. 2lS The specified period under

r

,.

Current Article 9 is 10 days.219 Revised Article extends the period to 20 days,220
thus allowing for a 20 day grace period.

t

It is important to note that Revised Article 9, like Current Article 9, has a

r
r
r
r
r

provision specially dealing with construction mortgages. 221

Construction

mortgages generally take priority over a security interest in fixtures where the

Official Comment 8 to Revised § 9-334.
Current § 9-313 (4) (a); Revised § 9-334 (d).
2J9 Current § 9-313 (4). (a).
220 Revised § 9~334(d).
217

218
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goods have become fixtures before con.struction is completed, \vith the e
of the security interests addressed above (pertaining to security interests p
by a fixture filing before the interest of the owner or the interest of mort
including, a construction mortgagee -- has been filed of record, and the
rule governing readily moveable machines, equipment and collateral.)222
A construction mortgage is also junior to a security interest<l'"
manufactured home transaction under an applicable certificate of title,sta';
Revised Article 9's inclusion within its scope of manufactured homes that
fixtures is new. Current Article 9 does not address manufactured homes.
Article 9 incorporates a new rule which grants priority to certain security inf'
In

"manufactured homes" created as part of a "manufactured

transaction.,,224 Under the new rule, the security interest in a ~"I~'1'1~n~."",,·,,"""
that becomes a fixture takes priority over a conflicting interest of an,p
encumbrance of the real property, as long as the security interest is,pe
under a certificate-of-title statute. 225

T.

ACCESSIONS.
Accessions are "goods that are physically united with other good~ i

a manner that the identity of the original goods is not lost.,,226 For example,.
engine installed in the debtor's tractor would be an accession. 227 Current
contains special rules governing the priority behveen holders of security i,nt ·

22J.CWTent § 9-313(6); Revised § 9-334 (h).
al'Current § 9-313 (4) (c); Revised § 9-334 (h) and (e).
m Revised § 9-334 (h) and (e) (4).
Z24Revised § 9-334 (e) (4).
.us Id.; Official Comment 10 lo Revised § 9-334.
~Revised § 9-102 (a)(l).
2%7ae"ised §9-102 (a) (1).
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r

r

in accessions to goods and the holders of security interests in the goods as a
\vhole. 228 Revised Article 9, however, \vith one exception, leaves the resolution

r
~

of priority disputes involving accessions to the priority rules set forth in the other

r

sections of Part 3 of Revised Article 9. 229 Revised Section 9-335 does contain a

..

F

special priority rule applicable where the competing security interest in the goods

r

as a whole is perfected in compliance with a certificate-of-title statute. In that

r

instance, the security interest in the accession is subordinated to the competing
interest. 23o

r
r

An example of this type of competing security interests can be seen where

a debtor grants a secured party a security interest in a vehicle, perfected in
accordance with the governing certificate-of-title statute.

r
r
r

The dealer then

purchases a car stereo system from a retail electronics store, granting the retail
seller a security interest in the stereo system, which the seller timely perfects.
Thereafter, the stereo system is installed in the debtor's vehicle. Under Revised
§9-335(d), the security interest in the accession (the stereo system) will be

r

subordinated to the security interest in the \vhole (the vehicle).

u.

COMMINGLED GOODS.
Priority disputes with regard to "commingled goods" arise \vhen goods

r

subject to a security interest by one creditor are mixed with goods subject to a

J

,.

security interest held by another creditor, such that the individual identity of the

t

goods is lost in a product or mass. Upon the commingling, the security interest in

r

r
r
r
I:

the commingled goods attaches to the entire product or mass. If neither secured

Current § 9-314.
229~Revised § 9-3~5(c); Official C·oniment' 5 to Revised§ 9-335.

228
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I~
party would otherwise have priority in the other's collateral, Article 9 sets forth a
fonnula for ranking their priority.231
somewhat ambiguous. 232

Under Current Article 9, the fonnula is

Thus, Revised Article 9 has sought to clarifYithe

fonnula, which now reads that "the security interests rank equally in proportion to
the value of the collateral at the time it became commingled goods.,,233

V. PROCEEDS.
Revised Article 9 continues the general rule under Current Article 9 that a
secured party's priority in proceeds generally relates back in time to the date the
secured party perfected its interest in the collateral from which the proceeds \vere
generated. 234

Thus, the security interests in proceeds rank in priority···· in

accordance with the first-to-file-or-perfect rule in the original collateral. There
are ho\vever, some exceptions that, warrant being separately addressed.

(1)
INVENTORY PURCHASE-MONEY SECURITY
INTEREST.
As addressed above, in certain instances an inventory purchasemoney security interest will take priority over a security interest perfected
~

by an earlier filing. In that event, the "inventory purchase-money security
party" is entitled to priority in the proceeds of the inventory, as well, in
certain limited circumstances.

First, the "inventory purchase-money

secured party" takes priority if (1) the proceeds are identifiable cash
proceeds, and (2) the proceeds are received by the debtor

230M.

~evised §9-336(f).
232~Current § 9-315 (2).

234

or before

I)
I
I
I
I
I
I

I;
I
I
I
I
I

231

233

0"

I
I
I,
I

Revised § 9-336 (f).
Current §' 9-312 (b); Revised § 9-322 (b) (1).
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I

r
delivery to the purchaser of the inventory from \vhich the proceeds \vere

r

generated.

Second, Revised Article 9 also grants the "inventory

purchase-money secured party" priority in proceeds where the proceeds
take the fonn of: instruments, chattel paper, and proceeds of chattel paper

r

r

to which the secured party is entitled to priority under § 9-330.
Lastly, Revised Article 9 grants priority to the "inventory
purchase-money secured party's" interest in proceeds of inventory
consisting of fann products livestock. 235
(2) TRANSFEREES OF MONEY.

r

,.
r

Revised Article 9 adds a ne\v section addressing the rights of a
transferee of money in \vhich another party claims a security interest. A
transferee of money takes priority over a secured party claiming a security

l

r

r

r
r

r
r
r
r

interest in the same funds as proceeds. The one exception is \vhere it can
be demonstrated that the transferee acted in collusion with debtor in
violation of the secured party's rightS. 236

(3) SECURITY INTERESTS PERFECTED BY POSSESSION OR
CONTROL IN DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS, INVESTMENT
PROPERTY, LETTER-OF-CREDITRIGHTS, CHATTEL PAPER,
INSTRUMENTS AND NEGOTIABLE DOCUMENTS.
As addressed above, under Revised Article 9, a security interest in
deposit accounts, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, chattel paper,
instruments and negotiable documents may be perfected by possession or
control. A security interest perfected by either of those mechanisms under
. ~3s-Revised § 9-324 (b) .and (d).
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.".'~J

1'21
Revised Article 9 may in certain instances take priority over a competing
security interest perfected by an earlier filing.

In such cases, Revised

I~
I~,

Article 9 grants the secured party priority in the proceeds of that collateral
as well, if: (1) the proceeds are cash proceeds; or (2) the proceeds arc of
the same type as the original collatera1. 237

105

I'
I
Ij
I"
.~-:;

Where there are proceeds of proceeds, the secured party who< has'
perfected by possession or control retains priority as long as one of the .
follo\ving three conditions is met: (1) all of the intervening

proceeds_~~

cash proceeds; (2) all intervening proceeds are of the same type as the
original collateral; or (3) the proceeds are an account relating to the
collateral. 238

1~~':i~i

"~

,,~

'--";"';:,$-

However, a special rule applies where: (1) the proceeds are not
cash proceeds, a deposit account, investment property, letter-of-credit

I;
\~:t

I,~

5c~i

right, chattel paper, an instrument or a negotiable document; and (2) there
is a competing security interest in the proceeds that was perfected by

jilillg. In that instance, the security interests rank according to priority. in
time of jili"g. That is, a first-to-file rule displaces the first-to-file-orperfect rule. 239

i
I,

:_;;;t~~
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236, Revised

§ 9-332 (a).

237 Revised

S 9-322 (c).

23& Revised § 9-322

(c); See also The New Article 9, at 40.

139.Re:vised § 9-322 (d) and (e).
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(4) INSOLVENCY.
Current Article 9 contains special rules governing priority of
interests in proceeds in the event of insolvency.24o Revised Article 9 has

;
f

eliminated those rules.

r

(5) RETURNED OR REPOSSESSED GOODS.

r

Current Article 9 contains special rules for returned or repossessed

•

goodS. 241

r

Revised Article 9 deletes those rules, as ,veIl.

However,

Official Comments 9 through 11 to Revised § 9-330 explain ho,v the same

rf

results under Current Article 9 flow from the proceeds provisions
incorporated by Revised Article 9. 242

r
,..

(6) PROCEEDS OF AGRICULTURAL LIENS.

!

Revised Article 9 includes agricultural liens \vithin its scope, but

rt

does not address the proceeds of such liens. Revised Article 9 defers to
the state law governing agricultural liens. 243

\v.

r

CONTRACTUAL SUBORDINATION.
Revised Article 9 continues the rule under Current Article 9 that a party

entitled to priority may contractually subordinate its claim. 244 Official Comment
2 to Revised § 9-339 makes it clear that a person's or entity's rights may only be

r

subordinated by an agreement to which the person or entity is a party.

r
r

r
r

Current § 9-306 (4).
Current § 9-306 (5).
2J2 The New Article 9, at 40.
,
243 Official Comment 9 to Revised § 9-315; See Also TheN~w Article- 9, at 40.
244 Revised § 9-339.
..
240
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J. 59

".

1

···.\········\·'
•...•·1.1+

VIII. DUTIES O\VED BY THE SECURED PARTY.
Revised Article 9 continues the duties imposed by Current Article 9 upon' a
secured party. The secured party's duties fall into three basic categories. First. the
secured party bears a duty to use reasonable care to preserve collateral in the secured
party's possession or contro1. 245 Both versions of Article 9 permit the secured party to
charge the collateral reasonable expenses incurred in its preservation. 246
Second, under both versions of Article 9 the debtor may request an accounting
from the secured party. Upon such a request the secured party has the duty to account to
the debtor with regard to the amount of the secured obligations and the identity of the
collatera1. 247 If the secured party has sold its interest in the secured obligations and the
collateral, the secured party must give an accounting of the assignee or successor in
interest. 248 The secured party must respond within 14 days to a debtor's request for
accounting. 249

During any six month period, a debtor is entitled to one free

accounting. 250 Thereafter, debtor must pay a charge not exceeding $25.00 [or any
additional accounting requested within that period. 25t That is an increase from the $10
charge pennitted under Current Article 9.
The secured party's third, and final, duty is the duty to tenninate or release the
security interest once the obligation has been satisfied. That is covered by Parts IV and V
ofRevised Article 9 and is outside the scope of this paper.

245
246

Current § 9-207; Revised § 9-207.
Id.

Current § 9-207 (1); Revised § 9-207 (a).
248,Current § 9-208 (2); Revised § 9-210 (d).
_249 Revised' § '9-210 (b) - (d).
2SORevised §9-210 (f).
• 247
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IX. CHOICE OF LAW.
Article 9 contains choice of law rules governing the attachment, perfection and
priority of security interests. Often times the security agreement itself: will specify which

~

r
r
r

state's law shall govern the parties' rights thereunder. The forum jurisdiction will
generally respect the state law specified, as long as the transaction bears a reasonable
relation to that jurisdiction.

However, the parties are precluded from contractually

t

r

,.,

altering the mandatory choice of law rules set forth in Article 9 governing the perfeet;oll
and priorio' of security interests. Those rules cannot be contractually altered under either
Current or Revised Article 9, with the one exception that a party may contractually
Sllbordillate its own claim (discussed above).

The mandatory rules governing perfection and priority are as follows.

r
r

A. PERFECTION AND PRIORITY: GENERAL RULE.
Under Current Article 9, the choice of law rules governing perfection are

r

found in § 9-103.

Current Article 9 divides collateral into the following six

categories for choice of Ia\v purposes: (1) documents, instruments, and ordinary

r

goods; (2) collateral with certificates of title; (3) certain accounts, general

r

intangibles, and non-titled mobile goods; (4) chattel paper; (5) minerals; and (6)
investment property.

r

In revising Article 9, the drafters engaged in a major overhaul of the
choice of law rules. Revised Article 9 not only incorporates dramatic changes,

r

r
r

251

Id.
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but also expands the scope of the choice of law rules to include the new'categdries
of collateral incorporated by Revised Article 9.
At the outset, Revised Article 9 has adopted a general rule to be appltediD
the majority of instances. The general rule is designed to simplify the perfection
process and to eliminate the need for filing financing statements inm'Oltlple
jurisdictions. Under Revised Article 9, the general rule is that the lawFol:Nthe
jurisdiction JVI,ere ti,e debtor is located governs perfection of security interests:Jn
both tangible and intangible collateral, \vhether perfected by

filin~'<',or

automatically.252 Thus, the revised rule eliminates Current Article 9's

divergCnt

rules governing the various categories of collateral, and instead replaces',thesold
system with one general rule \vhich applies the law of a single jurisdiction.
Current Article 9 incorporated a "last event test" in its choice of law
provisions governing the perfection of security interests in ordinary goods.
Revised Article 9 eliminates this test and replaces it with the new simplified rule
that merely looks to the jurisdiction where the debtor is located. 253

Revised Article 9 contains the following clear rules for detenniningthe
jurisdiction in which the debtor is located:

.252

Revised- § 9-301 (1); Official Comment 4 to Revised § 9-301.

2" Id.
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r
r

(1) INDIVIDUALS.

r
r

An individual is located at his or her principal place of

residence. 254
(2) UNREGISTERED ORGANIZATIONS WITH ONLY ONE

r

PLACE OF BUSINESS.
An unregistered organization that has only one place of business is

r
r

located at that place ofbusiness. 255
(3) AN UNREGISTERED ORGANIZATION WITH MORE THAN

ONE PLACE OF BUSINESS.

r
r
r
r
r

An unregistered organization having more than one place of

business is deemed located at its chief executive office. 256

executive office" is not defined by Article 9. However, Official Comment
2 to Revised § 9-307 states that it means "the place from which the debtor
manages the main part of its business operations or other affairs."

(4) REGISTERED ORGANIZATIONS.
A registered organization is located in the state in which it is

r

registered. 257

r
r

r
r

Registered organizations include corporations, limited

liability companies, limited partnerships, etc.

That is, it is any

organization that is required to maintain a public record showing it has

r

r

"Chief

been organized. 258

254

Revised § 9-307 (b).

255Id.

Id.
Revised § 9-3047 (e).
258 The New Article 9, at 48.

256
257
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(5) FOREIGN DEBTORS.
If the debtor is located outside of the United States and is not
subject to a public filing system, the debtor is deemed to be located inithe
District of Columbia. 259

B. PERFECTION AND PRIORITY - EXCEPTIONS TO GENERAL
RULE.
Revised Article 9 does contain some exceptions to the General Choice of
Law rule governing perfection for some specific types of collateral.

(1) POSSESSORY SECURITY INTERESTS.
The perfection and priority of security interests perfected by
possession are governed by the local law of the jurisdiction where the
collateral is physically located. 26o

(2) FIXTURES.
The perfection and priority of a security interest perfected by a
fixture filing are governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the fixtures
are located

.261

(3) AGRICULTURAL LIENS.
The local law of the jurisdiction in which fann goods are located
governs the perfection and priority of any agricultural liens on those
goods. 262

Revised § 9-307 (c); Official Comment 3 to Revised § 9-307.
Revised § 9-301 (2).
261 Revised § 9-301 (3) (a) and (c); Official Comment 5(b) to Revised § 9-301..
262 Revised'§ 9":'302.
.
259

260
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(4) GOODS COVERED BY CERTIFICATES OF TITLE.
The perfection and priority of goods covered by a certificate of
title are governed by the law of the jurisdiction under whose certificate of

r
r

title the goods are covered. The law of that jurisdiction controls for a
specified period:

"from the time the goods become covered by the

certificate of title until the goods cease to be covered by the certificate of

r

title.,,263 Goods become covered by a certificate of title "when a valid

r

application for the certificate of title and the applicable fee are delivered to

r
r

the appropriate authority.,,264

I

certificate of title upon the happening of either of two events: (1) if the
title ceases to be effective under the law of jurisdiction which issued it, or
(2) if the goods subsequently become covered by a certificate of title

r

issued by another jurisdiction. 265

r

It is crucial to note, however, if the titled goods are ilJvellfory, the

r

choice of law rule for perfection and priority is that of the debtor's
location. 266

r

(5) DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS.

r
J

The perfection and priority of a security interest in a deposit

r
r
r
r

r

The goods cease to be covered by the

account are governed by the jurisdiction in which the bank maintaining the

263
264

Revised § 9-303 (c); Official Comment 3 to Revised § 9-303.
Revised § 9-303 (b).
.
.
.

2651d.

266

Revised § 9-311 (d); Official Comment 5 to Revised § 9-303; The Ne\v Article 9, at 48.
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II
deposit account is located. 267 Section 9-304 of Revised Article 9 has very
specific, detailed rules for detennining the jurisdiction in which a bank is
located. 268

(6) INVESTMENT PROPERTY.
Where a security interest in investment property has been perfected
by jili,'g, the choice of law rule is the jurisdiction in which the debtor is
located. Where the security interest is perfected by a method otl'erthtln

jili"g and the collateral is a certificated security, the local law of the
jurisdiction where the security certificate is located governs. 269 Wherethe
security interest is perfected by a method otller tl,a" jili',g and the
collateral is an u"certificated security, the local law of the issuer's

jurisdiction governs. 270 For security interests in a secllrity e"titlementor
seCllrities accoll"t, the local law of the jurisdiction where the securities
intennediary is located governs. 271

Finally, the local law of the

commodity intennediary governs the perfection and priority of a security
interest in a commodity contract or commodity account. 272

(7) LETTER-OF-CREDIT RIGHTS.
The perfection and priority of a security interest in letter-of-credit
rights are governed by the law of the jurisdiction of the issuer or other

267

Revised § 9-304 (a).

269 Revised § 9-304(a) (1).
270 Revised § 9-304 (a) (1).
271~eviscd §9-304 (a) (3).
~?2 Revised § 9-304 (a) (4).
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r
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r

r

nominated person, as long as that jurisdiction is a state. 273

If the

jurisdiction is not a state, then the law of jurisdiction where the debtor is
located governs.

x.

POST-CLOSING CHANGES WITH REGARD TO DEBTOR AND
COLLATERAL.
Collateral frequently does not remain in one location indefinitely.

Likewise,

debtors do not always remain static in their locations. In fact, debtors not only change
their locations on occasion, but additionally sometimes change their identities and
corporate structure. Both Current Article 9 and Revised Article 9 address the effect of
some of these changes. Revised Article 9, however, goes even further, particularly in
addressing changes involving the debtor.

A. CHANGE OF LOCATION OF COLLATERAL.

r
r

Under Current Article 9, if collateral in which a security interest \vas
perfected by filing is moved to a new jurisdiction, the security interest remains
perfected for four months. Within that time period, the secured party is required
to perfect its security interest in the new jurisdiction to maintain continuous

r
r

perfection. 274
Revised Article 9 eliminates this rule. The simplified new general choice

r

of law rule requires filing in only one place for most types of collateral: the
jurisdiction in which the debtor is located. Thus, choice of law no longer pivots

r

r
r

r

273

274

Revised § 9-306 (a).
Current § 9-103 (1) (d).
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IJ

upon the location of the collateral, and there is no need to re-perfect
location of the collateral changes.

~:r~

275

B. CHANGE OF THE DEBTOR'S LOCATION.
For individuals and unregistered corporations, Revised Article9,cc:,~
the rule of Current Article 9.

If the debtor moves to a new jurisdiction,ithe

security interest remains perfected for four months, unless the perfection,rtl'ses
before the expiration of four months. To continue the perfection without,IJ'sc,
the secured party must perfect the security interest in the new jurisdiction,\Y~lhin
the four month period. 276
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On the other hand, a registered organization cannot, by definition,
exist.

c~~t()

Revised Article 9 states that a registered organization continues to be

located in the jurisdiction in which it is registered even if it dissolves, winds 'lIp or
cancels its existence. 277

c.

TRANSFER OF COLLATERAL TO A DEBTOR LOCATED IN A
NE\V JURISDICTION.
Revised Article 9 specifically addresses the transfer of collateral perfected

in one jurisdiction to a person located in another jurisdiction. As explained in
Section III of this paper, any person or entity that has an ownership interest in
,collateral subject to a security interest is a "debtor," under Revised Article 9. 278

The security interest perfected in the jurisdiction of the transferor remains
perfected for one year. To continue the perfection without lapse, the secured

I:
Ii
~f~
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I
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27:,Revised § 9~103;.The New Article 9, at 50.

)~6Current § 9-103.(3) (e); Revised.§ 9..316 (a).
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r

r

party must re-perfect in the jurisdiction to. which the collateral has been
transferred \vithin the one year. 279

r

D. TRANSFER OF COLLATERAL SUBJECT TO A SECURITY
INTEREST TO A NE\V DEBTOR \VHO PROCEEDS TO GRANT A
SECURITY INTEREST IN THE SAME COLLATERAL TO ANOTHER
SECURED PARTY.

r

Revised Article 9 incorporates a new rule to deal with competing security
interests in transferred collateral. Specifically, Revised Section 9-325 addresses

r

the conflict that arises \vhere a debtor transfers collateral subject to a perfected
security interest to a new debtor and the new debtor proceeds to grant a security
interest in the same collateral to a different secured creditor. In such an instance,

r

there will be competing security interests between the transferor's secured

rf

creditor and the transferee's secured creditor. Revised Section 9-325 provides
that the security interest held by the tralls!eree's secured creditor is Sllbordillated

to the security interest held by the tralls!eror's secured creditor, as long as the

r

following conditions are met: (1) the security interest held by the transferor's

p-

secured party was perfected when the transferee acquired the collateral; and (2)

I

there was no period thereafter in \vhich the security interest was unperfected.

r

E. TRANSFER OF COLLATERAL SUBJECT TO A SECURITY
INTEREST TO A NEW DEBTOR WHO BECOMES BOUND BY THE
TRANSFEROR'S SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Revised Article 9 incorporates the concept of a "new debtor." A "new

r

debtor" is a new tenn incorporated and defined by Revised § 9-102 (a) (56) as a

r

person who becomes legally bound by another debtor's security interest. This

f

r
r
r

2n Revised § 9-307 (g).
. 278
279

' .
Revise.d § 9-316(a) '(3); Official Comment 2 to Revised § 9~316.
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commonly occurs where the debtor changes its identity or corporate stl1uct:un",I$'<'
for example, when a corporate debtor merges with another corporate
partnership decides to incorporate.

Changes in corporate structure. or lCle:a.tl'ty<

inherently involve a transfer of assets from the original entity to the new
"new debtor" is also created whenever another entity contractually

ass~un1eS.ittle

obligations under a security agreement. 280
Current Article 9 deals with this situation by requiring a new
financing statement" filing if the existing financing statements are
~1I.~.~

misleading as a result of the change. That process has been criticized,
as failing to satisfactorily address the situation. 281
Revised Article 9 is more expansive than Current Article 9,

~...,,,,,,,,;a ......,,,,,,,..;a"!J'

addressing the issues of attachment and perfection of a security
collateral transferred to a "ne\v debtor." The issue of whether the new

OClJIIOf:

takes the collateral subject to the old debtor's security interest hinges on wn1euttetr
the new debtor becomes bound by the security agreement by operation of
other than Article 9 or by contract. 282 If the new debtor becomes
contractually bound, the security interest attaches to the collateral and
:,

acquired property, if applicable, in the hands of the new debtor. 283
"where the transferee becomes ge"erally liable for the debts of the

tr8Jt1st~ero:r~

debtor by law or by contract, the transferee becomes bound by the

I"\ptll'l'tft,~.

280 Revised § 9-102 (a) (56); Revised § 9-203; "It's ...ne\v! It's...(some\vhat) complicated!
be) I~w! It;$
Article 9 Revisions," at 5-6.
~~I "It's....new! It's...(somewMt). (:ompIicatedL... ~' at p.. 6; S.ee also "Aequiring' Collate,ra! Un(1eI(;Rett,....!~'ii,;

vec

Article 9,"·af 5-6.

,

-

2IZRevised ~ 9-203 (d); -Official Coniment 7 to Revised § 9--263.
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r
r

r

debtor's security agreement, both for existing and, if applicable, after-acquired

r
r

collateral.,,284 If the new debtor is not, however, bound by the original debtor's
security agreement, and has not ge"erally assumed the debts of the original
debtor, the new debtor's assets will not be subject to the security interest. 285

r
r

With regard to perfection, the security interest \vill generally remain
perfected. The rules regarding the effectiveness of a financing statement filed
while the collateral was in the hands of the original debtor is covered by Part V of
Revised Article 9, and outside of the scope of this paper. If, however, the new

r

debtor is located in a different jurisdiction, Revised § 9-316 (a) provides a one
year grace period to continue perfection in collateral existing at the time of the

r

transfer to the new debtor. 286 To continue the perfected status of the security
interest, the secured party must file a new financing statement in the new
jurisdiction within that one year period.
Where the transferred collateral takes subject to a security interest held by

rt

the new debtor's secured creditor, the first-to-file priority rule does not apply.

r

r
r
r

r
r

r
I

Thus, even where the new debtor's secured party has perfected its security interest
by filing before the original debtor's secured party perfected, the original debtor's
secured party will prevail with regard to the transferred collatera1. 287

Revised § 9-203 (d).
The Ne\v Article 9, at 51 (expla.ining Revised § 9-203 (d) (emphasis .added); Official Comment 7 to
Revised § 9-203; "Acquiring Collater:al 'llnder Revised Article 9," at 6-7.
28S UAcquiri~g Collateral Under Revised Article 9," at 6.
.
. 286 Re\rised §.9-316 (a) (3); The.New Article 9, at .52.
287 Revised § 9-325; The ne\v Article 9, at 52.
283
284
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XI. CONCLUSION.
In conclusion, Article 9 has undergone extensive changes to achieve the goal_of
simplicity, unifonnity and consistency with current technology. The changes to

Article

9 impact attachment, perfection, and priority of security interests, as well as expand .•C'
scope of Article 9 in tenns of collateral, definitions, parties and transactioQ.S.
Preparations for these changes now will avoid missteps under the Revised Article,as itt·s
effective date quickly approaches.
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I.

Filing Rules Under Revised Article 9 Part 5
A.

r

Place to file
KRS 355.9-501(1) establishes the Office of the Secretary of State as the
place to file financing statements for all collateral except as-extracted
collateral or timber to be cut or if the financing statement is filed as a
fixture filing.

r
i

r

r
r
r
r
r

r

r

B.

Infonnation Required for Effective Financing Statements
Revised Article 9 retains the concept of notice filing. What is required to
be filed is only a record providing the name of the debtor, the name of the
secured party and an indication of collateral. A debtor signature is no
longer required. This facilitates electronic filing. KRS 355.9-502 and
Official Comment 2 to 9-502.

C.

Name of Debtor and Secured Party
Revised Article 9 explains what a debtor's name is for purposes of a
financing statement. If a debtor is a registered organization, then the
debtor's name is the name that appears on tIle records of the debtor's
jurisdiction of organization. Trade name only is insufficient. If an
unregistered organization has a name, that name is the correct name to put
on a financing statement. If the unregistered organization does not have a
name, then the financing statement should include the names of
individuals or entities that comprise that organization. If a debtor is a
decedent's estate, the financing statement must provide tIle name of the
decedent and indicate that the debtor is an estate. If the debtor is a trust or
a trustee, the financing statement must provide the name specified for the
trust in its documents or if no name is specified provide the name of the
settlor or indicate in the debtor's name or otherwise that the debtor is a
trust. KRS 355.9-503(1).

r
r

r
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D.

Effect of Errors
1. A financing statement that substantially complies \vith Part 5 is
effective even if it contains minor errors provided the errors do not
make the financing statement seriously misleading. KRS 355.9-506(1).
2. Errors in Debtor's Name
A financing statement that fails sufficiently to provide the name of the
debtor in accordance with 9-503(name in articles of incorporation) is
seriously misleading as a matter of law. There is one exception: if the
financing statement nevertheless would be discovered under the
debtor's correct name using the filing office's standard search logic,
tllen as a matter of law the incorrect name does not make the financing
statement seriously misleading. A financing statement that is seriously
misleading is ineffective even if it disclosed by using search logic
other than that of the filing office. KRS 355.9-506 and Official
Comment 2.
3.

Standard Search Logic
The Secretary of State will adopt the search logic of the model rules
promulgated by the International Association of Corporation
Administrators ("IACA"). This search logic only allows full name
searches. No partial name searches are permitted under the standard
search logic adopted by the IACA. Kentucky will certify only full
name searches, but will continue to permit partial name searches over
the \veb.
The following rules apply to standardized searches. Standardized
search results are produced by the application of standardized search
logic to the name presented to tIle filing officer. Human judgment
does not playa role in determining the results of the search.
a.
There is no limit to the number of matches.
b.
No distinction is made between upper and lower
case letters.
c.
Punctuation marks and accents are disregarded.
d.
Words and abbreviations at the end of a name that
indicate the existence or nature of an organization
are disregarded.
e.
The word "the" at the beginning of the search
criteria is disregarded.
f.
All spaces are disregarded.
g.
For first and middle names of individuals, initials
are treated as tIle logical equivalent of all names
that begin \vith such initials.
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E.

Exclusive Grounds for Refusal of vee Record
Revised Article 9 sets forth exclusive grounds upon which a filing office
can reject a record. The filing office must reject on these grounds only
and no others. KRS 355.9-516.
1. Means of Communication. The record is not communicated by a
method authorized by the office.
2. Debtor name and address. An initial financing statement or an
amendment that adds a debtor shall be refused if tIle record fails to
include the name and address for a debtor.
3. Fee. An amount equal to or greater
than the filing fee is not tendered.
4. Additional debtor information. An initial financing statement or an
amendment adding a debtor shall be refused if the record fails to
identify whetiler each debtor is an individual or organization, if the last
name of each individual is not identified, or if, for each debtor
identified as an organization, the record does not include the
organization's type, state of organization or organization number, or a
statement that it does not have one.
5. Secured party name and address. An initial financing statement, an
amendment adding a secured party or an assignment will be refused if
the record fails to include a secured party or assignee name and
address.
6. Lack of identification number. A vec record other than an initial
financing statement will be refused if the record does not provide a file
nUluber of a financing statement.
7. Identifying information. A vec record that does not identify itself as
an amendment or identify an initial financing statement to which it
relates is an initial financing statement.
8. Timeliness of continuation. A continuation \vill be refused if it is not
received during the six-month period prior to lapse.

r
r
r
r

K· 3

F.

Grounds Not Warranting Refusal
1. Errors. The vee record contains a misspelling or other erroneous
infonnation.
2. Incorrect names. The vee record appears to identify a debtor
incorrectly or the VCC record identifies a secured party incorrectly.
3. Collateral description. The vee incorrectly identifies collateral, or
contains an illegible description of collateral or appears to contain no
such description.
4.

G.

Excessive fee. The record is accompanied by funds in excess of the
filing fee.

Refusal Errors
If a secured party demonstrates that a vee record that was refused should
not have been refused, the Secretary of State will file the vee record with
a filing date and time assigned when the filing occurs. The Secretary of
State :will also file a statement that states that the effective date and time of
filing is the date and time that the vec record \vas originally tendered for
filing and sets forth such date and time. KRS 355.9-516(4) and 355.9520(2).

H.

Correction Statement
Revised Article 9 provides a means for a debtor to correct a financing
statement or other record that was inaccurate or wrongfully filed by filing
a correction statement. A correction statement becomes part of the
financing statement file, but the filing does not affect the effectiveness of
the initial financing statement or any other filed record. KRS 355.9-518.

I.

Duties of Filing Office
1. Indexing Records
The filing office must assign a unique file number that consists of a
check digit. This ensures against transposition errors. The filing office
must be able to retrieve the records by debtor name and file number.
Additionally, the infonnation management system must associate an
initial financing statement and each filed record relating to the initial
financing statement. KRS 355.9-519(1), (2), (3). This contemplates
that the searchers and not the filing office will determine the
effectiveness of filed records. The filing office is pro11ibited from
deleting name~ 'from the index until one year after lapse. KRS 355.9-
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519(4) If there is no timely filing of a continuation statement, tIle
financing statement lapses on its lapse date but no action is then taken
by the filing office. On the first anniversary of such lapse date, tIle
information management system renders the financing statement
inactive and the financing statement will no longer be available to a
searcher unless the searcher requests inactive statements.
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2. Time of Filing

vee records may be t~ndered for filing to the Secretary of State as
follows:

a.

b.
c.

r
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d.

J.

Personal delivery at the filing office's street
address-filing time is when tile VCC record is
accepted by the filing office.
Courier delivery at the filing office's street addressfiling time is 5:00 on the day of delivery.
Postal service delivery to tIle filing office's mailing
address-filing time is 5:00 on the day of delivery.
Electronic delivery- vee records excluding
correction statements may be transmitted
electronically using XML tecilniques or on-line
entry-filing time is time that tIle Secretary of State's
system analyzes the relevant transnlission and
determines all required elements of the transmission
have been received in a required fonnat and are
machine-readabIe.

Performance Standard
Revised Article 9 requires the filing office to file a record within 2 days
and to reject a record within 2 days. KRS 355.9-519(8) and KRS 355.9520(2).

K.

Refusal to Accept
Revised Article 9 requires the filing office when it refuses to file a record
to provide to the filer the date and time the record would have been filed if
the filing office accepted it. KRS 355.9-520(2). If the filing office
wrongfully rejects a record, the filer officer must the vee record \vith a
filing date and time assigned when the filing occurs. The filing officer
shall also file a filing officer statement that states the effective date and
time of filing which shall be the date and time the vee record was
originally tendered for filing. The record is effective except as to a
purchaser in good faith who relies on a search of the index.

r
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L.

Approved Fonns
1. Kentucky adopted the national forms in Revised Article 9. KRS 355.9521. The Secretary of State will require the use of the national fonn
because it designates separate fields for individual and organization
names and separate fields for first, middle and last names and suffixes.
The use of the national form diminishes the possibility of filing office
error and helps assure that filers' expectations are met.
2. Data Entry Procedures
The administrative regulations will require that organization names be
entered into the uee information management system exactly as set
forth on the vee record, even if it appears that multiple names are set
forth or it appears that the name of an individual has been included in
the field designated for an organization name. Individual names are
entered exactly as forth on the' record. Inclusion of names in an
incorrect field or failure to transmit names accurately may cause the
filing to be ineffective.

M.

Acknowledgements
Under Revised Article 9, the filing office is only required to acknowledge
the filing of a written record upon request of the filer. The filing office
must acknowledge the filing of an electronic filing even in the absence of
a request. KRS 355.9-523.

N.

Fees
1. The filing fees set forth in Revised Article 9 are as follows.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

$10.00 for all written financing statement and
amendments
5.00 for all electronic financing statements and
amendments
20.00 for all written financing statements and
amendments over two pages
$5 for certified search results
The fee for copies of vec records is $.10 per page.
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2. Methods of Payment
Filing fees and fees for copies may be paid by the following methods:
a.
Cash
b.
Checks made payable to the Kentucky State
Treasurer·
c.
Electronic Funds Transfer- while not yet available
the Secretary of State has specified this method in
the rules to allow it when it becomes available for
the state in the future.
d.
Prepaid accounts- a remitter may open an account
by submitting an application and prepaying a
minimum of $250. The Secretary of State will issue
an account ~umber to the applicant and to each
authorized representative of the applicant.
e.
Debit and credit cards-The Secretary of State will
accept payment by debit cards and credit cards
issued by approved issuers.
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3. Overpayment and Underpayment policies
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a.

r

b.
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O.

Overpayment- the Secretary of State will refund the
amount of an overpayment exceeding $10 to the
remitter. The Secretary of State will refund an
overpayment of $10 or less only upon the written
request of the remitter.
Underpayment-the Secretary of State can return the
filing or can contact the filer and give them 10 days
to send the full fee.

Model Rules
Revised Article 9 requires the Secretary of State to promulgate rules to
implement Article 9. KRS 355.9-526. The Secretary of State is required
to consult with other filing offices and the model rules promulgated by the
International Association of Corporation Administrators in adopting the
filing office rules.
The administrative regulations drafted to implement Revised Article 9 in
Kentucky will be filed on July 2, 2001. A draft of the rules will be on the
Secretary of State's web site. The address is W\V\v.sos.state.ky.usl
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P.

Electronic Filing
1. XML Records
An "XML" record means a DCC record transmitted from a remitter to
the Secretary of State by XML techniques. The XML format as
adopted by the International Association of Corporation Administrators
is adopted for use in Kentucky for electronic transmission ofUCC
records except correction statements. At the request of an authorized
XML remitter, the Secretary of State must identify which versions and
releases of the XML are acceptable to the filing office. A remitter may
be authorized for XML transmission upon authorization from the
Secretary of State.

2. Direct On-line Data Entry Procedures
A VCC record except correction statements may be filed electronically
by accessing the Secretary of State's web site. A financing statement
or amendment filed electronically on-line may contain only one
secured party and a maximum of two debtors. A filing is made by
completing a web based DCC financing statement form or amendment
form and charging the fee either to a prepaid account or an approved
credit or debit card.

II. Kentucky Lien Information System
The Kentucky legislature repealed KRS 355.9-401A effective July 14, 2000.
This was the section that required secured parties to send copies of the Dee
filings made at the county to the Secretary of State for inclusion on the
Kentucky Lien Information System. A person can still request a copy of the
data indexed on the Kentucky Lien Information System by contacting the IT
section of the Secretary of State's Office. The requirement \vas repealed to
allow the Secretary of State sufficient time to implement central filing in
Kentucky by July 1, 2001.
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Frost Brown Todd Professor of Law
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Introduction: Revised Article 9 includes a number of changes intended to make more
types of transactions involving intangible collateral subject to the provisions of the
V.C.C. The revisions expand the scope of Article 9, introducing several new types of
intangible collateral. The revisions also provide detailed provisions which overcome the
effect of anti-assignment provisions and govern the rights of account debtors and other
third parties to intangible collateral.

A.

Intangible Collateral: As used in this outline, "intangible collateral" refers to
collateral other than goods. Current Article 9 categories of intangible collateral
include accounts, instruments, documents, chattel paper, investment property and
general intangibles.

B.

Reasonfor Changes: In large part, tllese changes are intellded to provide certainty
in asset securitization transactions. Asset securitization refers to a transaction
structured as a sale by the originator of the assets of intangible assets (the
borrower in a traditional financing arrangement) to a separate entity (a "special
purpose vehicle" or "SPV"). The Spy raises the purchase price of the assets
through a sale of debt or equity instruments ill the market. Like a traditional
factoring agreement, asset securitization enables the company seeking financing to
liquidate its receivables ratller than simply grant a security interest in them. The
deals are structured as sales rather than security illterests in an effort to insure that
the assets do not become property of the estate in a bankruptcy of the originator.
See Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72
TULANE L. REv. 101 (1997); Healthcare Financing In Bankruptcy: Sales or Liens?
Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit, 24 CAL. BANKR. J. 185 (1998).

r

r
r
r

r
r

r
r
r

The popularity of asset securitization has expanded the ability to finance nontraditional types of collateral. Examples include, health care insurance
receivables, royalty agreements, and payment obligations under franchise
agreements. The inapplicability of Article 9 to sales of these types of obligations
created confusion among lending attorneys regarding the appropriate methods of
perfecting interests in these assets.
II.

Scope ofRevised Article 9 : The revisions substantially expand the types of transactions
in intangible collateral that are subject to the provisions of Article 9.
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A.

Current Article 9: Current Article 9 applies to security interests in all types of
intangible collateral. In addition, 9-1 02(1)(b) provides that Article 9 applies to
sales of accounts or chattel paper. The application of the sale provisions in
current Article 9 recognize that sales of accounts and chattel paper, in reality,
operate as financing transactions. Therefore, the current code requires filing'to
perfect the buyer's interest in this type of asset.

B.

Revised Article 9: Revised Article 9 continues to apply to security interests in all
types of intangible collateral. The change in scope relates to the types of sale
transactions that are subject to the provisions of Revised Article 9. RUCC 9109(a)(3) provides that in addition to sales ,of accounts and chattel paper, the
article applies to sales of "payment intangibles" and "promissory notes." In
addition, Revised Article 9 expands the definition of "accounts."

1.

Royalty Agreements: RVCC 9-1 02(a)(2) expands tIle definition of
"accounts" to include monetary obligatiolls for property "sold, leased,
licensed, assigned or otherwise disposed of." This broadens the definition
of accounts to encompass rights to payment arising from intellectual
property licensing agreements, for example. Current Article 9 would
categorize such rights as "general intangibles." See RVCC 9-102,
comment 5.a. The effect of this change is that a buyer of such intangible
rights to receive payment must file to perfect its interest.

2.

Health-Care-Insurance Receivables: TIle definition of accounts under
Revised article 9 also includes "Ilealth-care-insurance receivables," a new
type of collateral. RVCC 9-102(a)(46) defines health-care-insurance
receivables as rights to payment under a policy of insurance for health-care
goods or services provided. This change enables llospitals and other
health care providers to use their rights to reimbursenlent from third- party
payors (Blue Cross, Medicare, Medicaid, and the like) as collateral for
loans.

3.

Payment Intangibles: Current Article 9 does not apply to sales of general
intangibles, but does apply to the grant of a security interest in such
collateral. Revised Article 9 subdivides general intangibles through a new
definition of "payment intangible." RUCC 9-1 02(a)(61) defines payment
intangible as "a general intangible under wllich the account debtor's
principal obligation is a monetary obligation." The reason for this change
is to include sales of loan repayment obligations (which would not fall
within the definition of accounts) within the scope of Article 9.

4.

Promissory Notes: For the reasons described in connection with payment
intangibles, Revised Article 9 subdivides tIle definition of instruments
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tlrrough a new definition of "promissory notes." RUCC 9-1 02(a)(65)
defines promissory notes as "an instrument tllat evidences a promise to pay
a nl0netary obligation..." Sales of promissory notes now fall within the
scope of Revised Article 9.
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5.

Effect on Loan Participations: The new definitions of payment intangibles
and promissory notes, described above, coupled with the expansion of the
scope of Revised Article 9 to cover sales of these types of assets, subject
loan participations to the provisions of Revised Article 9. RUCC 9-309(3)
and (4) provide for automatic perfection of tIle buyer's interest in these
types of assets, however. Thus filing is not necessary for traditional loan
participations.

6.

A Note on Deposit Accounts: One expansion to Article 9's scope that is
not directly related to the rise of asset securitization, but is nonetheless
important, is the inclusion of deposit accounts as original collateral subject
to Revised Article 9. Under Current Article 9, deposit accounts could
serve as collateral only if the deposits constituted identifiable proceeds of
Article 9 collateral. This limitatiol1 created concerns tl1at cO-lningling of
proceeds in a deposit account \vith non-proceeds could destroy the interest
of the lender in the entire account. See vec 9-306(4) (limiting tile
security illterest in proceeds in a co-mingled deposit accoullt where the
debtor has instituted insolvency proceedings).
By permitting deposit accounts to serve as original collateral, Revised
Article 9 has substantially alleviated this concerll. If an accounts
receivable lender wants to assure tllat its security illterest in tile accounts
continues in proceeds, the lender may take a security interest in the deposit
accounts into whicll the account debtors' paynlents will be deposited.

III.

Effectiveness ofSale: One of the most important questions in any asset securitization is
whether the asset securitization effectively severs tIle accounts frolll the originator. If tIle
asset transfer has tIle attributes of a sale, the transfer will extinguish the originator's
interest in the assets -- insulating them from the originator's bankruptcy. In Octagon Gas
v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948 (loth eire 1993), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 554 (1993), the court
held that Current VCC 9-102(1)(b) effectively converts all sales of accounts and chattel
paper into secured loans. Tl1is ruling created a furor in the asset securitization industry
because it seelned to prevel1t the separatioll of accounts fi·onl the origillator tl1at is so
central to the concept of asset securitization.

r
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Although, the Octagon result was not followed by any other courts, tIle drafters· of
Revised Article 9 included a provision that is designed to make clear that the application
of Article 9 to sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment obligatiol1s and promissory notes
does not mean that the transaction should be treated as a sale treatment for all purposes.
RUCC 9-318 provides, "A debtor that has sold an account, cllattel paper, payment
intangible, or promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the collateral
sold." This section effectively overrules the Octagon result.
IV.

Rights ofAccount Debtors and other Third Parties: Part 4 of Revised Article 9 collects
in one location all of the Article 9 rules dealing with rights of third parties. In general,
the provisions are designed to address the effect of security interests on tIle rights of nondebtor parties to payment obligations (accounts, payment intangibles, illstruments, etc.)
or general intangibles that might be pledged as collateral.

A.

Discharge ofAccount Debtor: Revised Article 9 continues subst':lntially
unchanged Current Article 9's treatnlent of discllarge of tIle account debtor. In
general, RUCC 9-406 permits the account debtor to continue to pay the assignor
of the accounts until tIle assignor or the assignee notifies tIle account debtor of the
assignment. 1 UpOll notification, the aCCoullt debtor lnust pay tIle assignee to
obtain a discharge of its obligations under the account. 2

B.

Claims and Defenses of Account Debtor Against Assignee: Here again, Revised
Article 9 does not impose any radical cllanges to the structure created by current
Article 9. RUCC 9-404 provides tl1at tIle rigllts of the assignee against the
account debtor are subject to claillls arising fronl allY agreeillellt relating to the
account. TilUS, a bank that Ilas takell a security interest ill, or purcilased, an
account arising from the sale of goods would be subject to a breach of warranty
defense by the account debtor if the breacil relates to tIle goods giving rise to the
account. In addition, RUCC 9-404 provides tilat tIle assignee of an account is
subject to claims or defenses tIlat do not relate to tIle transactioll giving rise to the
account if the clailll or defense accrues before the account debtor receives
notification of the assignment.

C.

Contract Modifications: Revised Article 9 provides in RUCC 9-405, that a
modification of a contract giving rise to an assigned account is effective against
the assignee if the modification is made before the assignor's right to payment has

As used in both Revised and Current Article 9, assignor refers to the borrower or
seller of the accounts, and assignee refers to the lender or buyer of the accounts.
2
For simplicity, this section refers only to accounts. In reality, tIle sections relating
to ~ccount deb~ors also cover obligatio~s under accounts, cllattel paper and general intangibles.
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been earned by performance. If tIle assignor's obligations to the account debtor
have been fully performed, the modification will still be effective if it occurs
before notification of the assignment.
D.

Restrictions on Anti-Assignment Provisions: Part 4 of Revised Article 9 increases
the types of property that may serve as collateral while, at the saIne time,
protecting the rights of the non-debtor party obligated under the contract giving
rise to the intangible. It accomplishes this by limiting the effect of antiassignment provisions in most types of contracts and licenses. Often, licensors of
intellectual property, governmental agencies and lessors will try to maintain
control over tIle property or governmental grant by prollibiting the licensee,
grantee or lessee from transferring its interest. To the extent these types of
restrictions affect the ability of the debtor to grant a security interest, Revised Part
4 renders the provisions unenforceable.
1.

r
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This section provided protection to secured lenders OIlly wIlen tIle
collateral could be clearly cllaracterized as an accoullt or a general
intangible for money due. In additioll, debtor's attorneys were often
concerned that the language ofUCe 9-318(4) would not be sufficient to
protect the debtor from a breach of contract claim if an accoullt were
assigned in violation of a prohibition against such assignment.
2.

Revised Article 9: In a series of provisions, Revised Article 9 renders
ineffective such contractual restrictions for all types of intangible collateral
to the extent tilat tIle restrictions prohibit the assiglllTIent of, or grant of a
security interest in, tIle debtor's rigllts in the intallgible property. In
addition, these provisions also clearly render ineffective any term that
provides that an assignment or grant of a security interest will constitute a
breach of the agreement giving rise to the intangible right.

3.

An Example: To use an example from the revised comments, assume that
the debtor is a licensee of software under a licence agreement that
prohibits the debtor/licensee from transferring or assigning any of its
rights under the agreement. Under Current UCC 9-318(4), the licensee
could not grant a security interest in its rigllt to nlaintain possession and
use the software since that right is not a "general intangible for lTIOney due

r
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Current Article 9: Current Article 9 rendered some types of antiassignment provisions enforceable. VCC 9-318(4) provides, "A term in
any contract between an account debtor and an assignor is ineffective if it
prohibits assignment of an account or prollibits creation of a security
interest in a general intangible for money due or to become due or requires
the account debtor's consent to such assignment or security interest."
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or to become due." RUCC 9-408(a)(l) provides that tIle term is
ineffective to the extent that it would impair tIle creation of a security
interest in the debtor's rights under the licensing agreement.
4.

Legal Restrictions on Assignability: RUCC 9-408 also renders provisions
of law that restrict the assignability of promissory notes, health care
insurance receivables or general intangibles ineffective to the extent that
they prohibit the creation or perfection of a security interest. This may
permit the lender to obtain a security interest in governmental licenses
notwithstanding statutory provisions that prohibit assignment. For
example, Kentucky law prohibits the transfer of a liquor license by the
licensee without prior authorization by the appropriate state administrator.
K.R.S.243.630. The section defines transfer to mean the transfer of 10%
or more "ownership interest." It is unclear whetiler tilis section would
preclude the grant of a security illterest. Assunling that it does, RUCC 9408 would eliminate the prollibition.

5.

Limitations on the Rights Obtained by the Secured Party: While Revised
Article 9 provides a virtually unlimited right to take a security interest or
assignment of tllese types of rigllts, the revision severely limits tIle lender's
ability to fully realize tIle debtor's rights under the license or contract.
RUCC 9-408(d) provides that wllere Revised Article 9 has rendered an
anti-assignnlent provision ineffective, the security interest:
a. is not enforceable against tIle person obligated on the
promissory note or tIle account debtor;
b. does not impose a duty or obligation on tIle person obligated on
the promissory note or tIle account debtor;
c. does not require the person obligated on the pronlissory note or
the account debtor to recognize the security interest, payor render
perfornlance to the secured party, or accept payment or
performance from tIle secured part)';
d. does not entitle the secured party to use or assign the debtor's
rights under the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable,
or general intangible, including any related information or
materials furnished to tIle debtor in the transaction giving rise to
the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general
intangible;
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e. does not entitle the secured party to use, assigll, possess, or have
access to any trade secrets or confidential informatioll of tIle person
obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor; and

r

f. does not entitle the secured party to enforce the security interest
in the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general
intangible.

r

These limitations are intended to protect the non-debtor party from any
change in its transaction with the debtor tilat might otherwise be caused by
the presence of a secured creditor. In tIle software example discussed
above, under RUCC 9-408(d) our secured party could not enforce tIle
software license agreement, nor would tIle security interest entitle the
secured party to take possession or dispose of the software or impose any
obligation or duty on the licensor. In essence, the licensor will be
protected against any ill-effects of tile security interest.

r

r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r

The substantiallimitatio'n on the secured creditor's enforcement rights in
such collateral obviously diminishes tIle utility of such a security interest.
The only advantage that a secured creditor might gain from takillg the
security interest is tIle assurance tIlat if tIle general intangible were sold or
assigned during tile debtor's bankruptcy, tile secured creditor would have a
claim to tIle pro~eeds of tile collateral. See RUCC 9-408 comnlent 7.
6.

A Cautionary Note: The dramatic expansion of Revised Article 9's
limitations on anti-assignment provisiollS lnay Ilave effects tilat were not
anticipated by the drafters. For example, on the eve of Kentucky's
enactment of tIle provision, it was discovered that tIle limitation threatened
to impair tIle beneficial tax treatnlent of structured settlements of workers
compensation awards and "special needs medicaid trusts." This late
discovery required an amendment to make clear that SUCll arrangements
were outside of tile scope of Revised Article 9. Given tIle sweeping
changes in this area, it is impossible to determine \Vlletller sinlilar
problems may arise.

r
r

r
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TRANSITION RULES FOR REVISED ARTICLE 9
(What To Do Before And After July 1, 2001)
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[ KRS 355.9-702 - 9-709 ]
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TRANSITION RULES FOR REVISED ARTICLE 9
(What To Do Before And After July 1, 2001)
1.

r

r
r

2.

r
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3.

Security Interest Perfected By A Financing Statement Filed Before
July 1, 2001 .......•..........••......•.............................. M-l
A.

What Happens To Perfection On July 1,2001 - KRS 355.9-705(3)

M-1

B.

Continuing Perfection, After Revised 9 Takes Effect, Of Security
Interest Perfected By Filing Under Old 9 - KRS 355.9-706 & 9-705(4) ..... M-2

c.

Amendment OfPED Filing - KRS 355.9-707

M-3

Security Interest Enforceable And Perfected Under Revised 9 And Old 9 KRS 355.9-703(1)

M-4

Security Interest Enforceable And Perfected Under Old 9 Other Than By
Filing, But Not Perfected Under Revised 9 - KRS 355.9-703(2)

M-5

Security Interest Enforceable But Not Perfected Before Effective Date Of
Revised 9 - KRS 355.9-704

M-6

Applicability Of Revised 9 Over Pre-Effective Date (PED) Transactions KRS 355.9-702

M-7

Priority Of Security Interest - KRS 355.9-709

M-8
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4.

5.

6.

CHECKLIST OF SECURED PARTY'S ANTICIPATORY ACTION
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1. Security interest perfected by a financing statement filed before July 1,
2001
A. What happens to perfection on July 1, 2001-KRS 355.9-705(3)
• Security interest is perfected by a pre-affective-date (PED) filing which is
effective to perfect the security interest under old 9; PED filing is not
effective to perfect the security interest under Kentucky revised 9
because revised 9 requires filing with the secretary of state;
nevertheless SECURITY INTEREST REMAINS PERFECTED until
earlier of remaining period of perfection under old 9 or June 30, 2006
EXAMPLE-SP perfects a security interest in debtor's
equipment by filing financing statement on August 1, 2000, in
the Kentucky county clerk's office of the county of debtor's
residence; revised 9 takes effect on July 1, 2001; under
revised 9, financing statement in equipment would be filed in
secretary of state's office, thus filing is not effective under
revised 9; security interest re:mains perfected until July 31,
2005, (the earlier of normal lapse date under old 9 or June 30,
2006) regardless of lack of post-effective-date filing

r

!

r
r
r

r
r
!

r
r

r
r
r

PRACTICAL EFFECT-SP can do nothing and security interest
perfected by PED filing remains perfected
•

Perfection remains effective even if the PED financing statement has
been continued by a PED continuation statement
EXAMPLE-PED financing statement filed in January, 1996;
continuation statement filed in January 2001; security interest
remains perfected, without action, until January 2006 (the
earlier of normal lapse date under old 9 or June 30, 2006)
ACTION-before July 1, 2001, file continuation statements
locally for security interests w.hose six month continuation
statement window opens before July 1, 2001; security interest
remains perfected until June 30, 2006

M· 1

•

PED perfection is effective for collateral acquired after July 1, 2001,
attached through an after-acquired property clause in a PED security
agreement
EXAMPLE-Security interest in equipment and after-acquired
equipment perfected by filing in November 2000; debtor
acquires additional equipment in November 2001; perfection is
valid for all equipment until November 2005; no action requ'ired
before November 2005

B. Continuing perfection, after revised 9 takes effect, of security interest
perfected by filing under old 9-KRS 355.9-706 & 9-705(4)
•

Security interest perfected by PED filing cannot be continued beyond
lapse date by filing revised 9 continuation statement-9-705(4)
EXCEPTION-PED filing can be continued by timely filing a
revised 9 continuation statement if PED filing was in the filing
office designated by revised 9; the continuation statement and the
PED financing statement must satisfy revised 9 requirements for
an initial financing statement-9-705(4) & (6)
PRACTICAL EFFECT-exception is of little value to security
interests perfected by filing in Kentucky because PED filing
typically is a county clerk's office filing and effective revised 9fiHng
is a secretary of state's office filing, thus effective filings would ,not
be made in the same office; exception applicable to multi-state
secured transactions where choice of law rules of both old 9 and
revised 9 specify same jurisdiction and same office

•

Continuing effectiveness of PED filing is accomplished by filing an initial
financing statement "in lieu" of filing a continuation statement-9-706
EXAMPLE-SP perfects a security interest in Kentucky debtor's
equipment by filing a PED financing statement in county of
debtor's residence on August 1, 2000; revised 9 takes effect on
July 1, 2001 and thereunder the Kentucky secretary of state's
offi·ceis the proper Tiling ~'office; on November 11, 2004, -SPfl.les,oi·n
J
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the Kentucky secretary of state's office, an initial financing
statement (KRS 355.9-502) that satisfies the requirements of 9706(3) to continue the PED filing; SP's PED filing is continued for
five years from November 11, 2004, and SP's priority date relates
back to the original priority date
WHERE TO FILE-In Kentucky the "in lieu" statement is filed in the
secretary of state's office, the filing office designated by revised 9
WHEN TO FILE-The "in lieu" statement can be filed any time prior to
lapse of effectiveness of PED financing statement; this filing is not
restricted to the normal six month window for filing continuation
statements
• The "in lieu" statement continues the effectiveness of the PED
financing statement for five years from the date of filing the "in lieu"
statement, not five years from the normal lapse date of the PED filing

r
r
r

WHAT TO FILE-The "in lieu" statement must: 1) satisfy the revised 9
requirements for an initial financing statement (names, addresses,
description; KRS 355.9-502); 2) identify the PED filing by filing office,
date of filing, and file numbers of the PED filing and most recent
continuation statement (if any); and 3) indicate that the PED filing
remains effective

r
r
r

r
r
r
r
r
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• The "in lieu" statement can continue the effectiveness of more than
one PED filing against the same debtor provided the "in lieu"
statement properly identifies all the affected filings

c.

Amendment of PED filing-KRS 355.9-707

• Amendment, under the revised 9 definition, includes any filings made to
a financing statement after filing the initial financing statement, e.g., add
or delete collateral, continue or terminate the financing statement, add or
delete debtors/secured parties
WHERE TO FILE-File amendment in office and jurisdiction specified
by revised 9 (in Kentucky, the secretary of state's office) regardl~ss of
place ot" PED f i l i n g '

M· 3

EXAMPLES-PED financing statement filed locally in
Kentucky, post-revised 9-effective-date amendment can be filed
only in Kentucky secretary of state's office; in multi-state
secured transaction-PED filing made, for example, in Ohio
under old 9's choice of law rules; revised 9's choice of la~,
rules designate Kentucky as the proper jurisdiction; posteffective-date amendment can be filed only in Kentucky
secretary of state's office
EXCEPTION-can terminate effectiveness, Le., a termination
statement, of PED filing in accordance with law of jurisdiction
where PED filing is made-9-707(2) & (5); effect of exception
is that locally filed financing statement can be terminated by, a
local filing; termination Ilexception" is not available if SP has
filed a post-effective-date initial financing statement in office
designated by revised 9
WHAT TO FILE-File an initial financing statement (names, addresses,
and description) that provides the amended information and also thE)
information required in an "in lieu" statement (9-706(3)); can also
amend by filing two documents: the initial financing statement that'also
includes the "in lieu" information, and the amendment;
EXCEPTION-If the PED financing statement and the
amendment are filed in the same office specified by revised 9,
then amendment is only filing required; this exception is hot
generally applicable in Kentucky since PED filing is local,and
the post-effective-date amendment filing is central; possible in
multi-state secured transactions where PED filing office is same
as revised 9 filing office

2. Security interest enforceable and perfected under revised 9 and
old 9-KRS 355.9-703(1)

.

• A security interest that was enforceable and perfected under old 9,
or other applicable law 9, e.9:, PED transaction is outside the'
. scope of old 9, is a perfected security interest under revised~,~"
when revised 9 becomes effective, the aPRlJcable requiremetlts·"for
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enforceability and perfection under revised 9 are satisfied without
further action
EXAMPLES-purchase money security interest in debtor's
consumer goods automatically perfected upon attachment under
old 9 and revised 9; security interest in non-inventory motor
vehicle perfected by notation on certificate of title under old 9 and
revised 9; security interest in debtor's instruments perfected by
possession under old 9 and revised 9; security interest in debtor's
securities account perfected by control under old 9 and revised 9

3. Security interest enforceable and perfected under old 9 other than by
filing, but not perfected under revised 9-KRS 355.9-703(2)
EXAMPLES-Sale of a promissory note was not covered by old
article 9, but is covered by revised 9; assignment of a deposit account
was not covered by old 9, but is by revised 9

r

• Security interest that is enforceable and perfected under old 9 but
does not satisfy the revised 9 requirements for perfection remains
perfected for one year after revised 9 takes effect

,.

• Security interest remains enforceable thereafter if security interest
becomes enforceable under revised 9 requirements before the
year expires

r
r

• Security interest remains perfected thereafter if security interest
becomes perfected under revised 9 requirements before the year
expires

I

r
r
r

EXAMPLE-SP takes a security interest in debtor's right to
proceeds of a written letter of credit; SP perfects by possession of
the letter of credit (effective under old 9-305); revised 9 becomes
effective; possession of letter of credit does not perfect such
security interest under revised 9 requirements; security interest
remains perfected until June 30, 2002; perfection lapses on June
30, 2002, unless effective perfection action taken between July 1,
2001, and June 30, 2002

r

r

M· 5

4. Security interest enforceable but not perfected before effective date of
revised 9-KRS 355.9-704
• Security interest is enforceable under old 9 but is not perfected
under old 9 when revised 9 becomes effective; security interest
remains enforceable for one year after revised 9 becomes
effective regardless of whether security interest satisfies
enforcement requirements of revised 9
• Security interest remains enforceable thereafter if revised 9
enforceability requirements are satisfied during the year; if
requirements not satisfied during the year, security interest lapses
• Security interest becomes perfected under revised 9 when revised
9 perfection requirements are satisfied, with or without action by
the secured party
EXAMPLE-SP takes a security interest in debtor's instruments
under a security agreement signed by debtor describing the
collateral as "debtor's instruments"; SP fails to take possession of
the instruments and is not perfected under old 9; when revised 9
takes effect the security remains enforceable for one year and
thereafter since the authenticated security agreement satisfies the
enforceability requirements under both old 9 and revised 9; SP
can perfect under revised 9 either by taking possession of the
instruments or by filing a financing statement covering instruments;
if, prior to revised 9 effective date, SP takes action that is
ineffective to perfect the security interest under old 9, but effective
under revised 9, e.g., files a financing statement that satisfies
revised 9's requirements, the security interest becomes perfected
immediately upon revised 9 becoming effective; this possibility is
less likely in Kentucky since Kentucky filing office will change from
local filing under old 9 to central filing under revised 9

M·6
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5. Applicability of revised 9 over pre-effective-date (PED)
transactions-KRS 355.9-702
•

r
!'

r

EXCEPTION TO APPLICABILITY OF REVISED 9-9-702(3)
revised 9 does not affect an action, case, or proceeding, Le.,
litigation, commenced before revised 9 takes effect; if litigation
involving a security interest is commenced before July 1, 2001,
the requirements of old 9 for enforceability, perfection, priority,
enforcement, etc., apply in the proceeding regardless of
whether revised 9 changes those requirements

r
r
f

•

r
t~

r

r
r
r

r

On July 1, 2001, revised 9 immediately applies to PED
transactions and liens within scope of revised 9 regardless of
whether the transaction was covered by old article 9

Effect is that secured party must comply with revised 9
requirements to insure continued validity of PED transaction
SAVING CLAUSE-9-702(2) except as otherwise provided by
the transition rules (these "otherwise provided" rules include
preservation of perfection, and continuation of perfection,
discussed supra), transactions and liens not governed by old 9
remain valid without the necessity of action; they can be
terminated, completed, consummated and enforced under
either revised 9 or law applicable otherwise, at option of
secured party
EXAMPLE-agriculture liens are not covered by old 9 but are
within scope of revised 9; on July 1, 2001, a PED agriculture
lien is governed by the requirements of revised 9, thus
necessitating the lienholder's compliance with revised 9;
saving clause effect is that the lien remains valid under revised
9 without any action by the lienholder, and lienholder can
choose to enforce lien under either revised 9 or PED applicable
law; however, lienholder must, to maintain perfection, comply
with revised 9 perfection requirements before June 30,2002

r
r
r
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6. Priority of security interest-KRS 355.9-709
•

Revised 9 priority rules determine the priority of conflicting
claims regardless of whether the claim arises before or after the
effective date of revised 9
EXAMPLE-SP 1 takes a security interest in debtor's
equipment that attaches on May 1,2000, but never perfects it;
revised 9 takes effect; SP 2 takes a security interest in the
same equipment on August 1', 2001, and perfects it on August
5,2001; the priority rules of revised 9 determine the priority of
the competing claims; SP 2 has priority
EXCEPTION-9-709(1) if the relative priorities of the claims
are established before the effective date of revised 9, then old 9
determines the priorities; revised 9 does not define when
"relative priorities" are "established," but the official comments
to 9-709 indicate that relative priorities are established
whenever two or more entities have an interest in the same
collateral; priorities are established regardless of whether or
when an actual conflict over the collateral arises
EXAMPLE-SP 1 takes a security interest in debtor's
equipment on May 1,2000, and perfects it on May 7,2000; SP
2 takes a security interest in the same equipment on August 1,
2000, and perfects it on August 5, 2000; these priorities are
established before the effective date of revised 9 and are
determined by the priority rules of old 9; SP 1 has priority

• Claimant's action taken after the effective date of revised 9 can
change relative priorities established under old 9 resulting in
revised 9 determining the relative priorities
EXAMPLE-SP 1 and SP 2 have unperfected security interests
in debtor's equipment prior to effective date of revised 9; old 9
determines the priorities because the relative priorities are
established prior to revised 9; SP 1 has priority; after effective
date of revised 9, SP 2 perfects its security interest by filing a
. fi[1.ancing .stater:nent; the p.ost-effective~date action of SP 2
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changes the relative priorities which are now determined by the
priority rules of revised 9; SP 2 has priority
• The mere taking effect of revised 9 cannot change relative
priorities established under old 9; in a situation where PED
action of the claimant is not effective to perfect a security
interest under old 9, but is effective to perfect a security interest
under revised 9, the relative priorities are not reestablished
upon the effective date of revised 9; priority is determined
under old 9
EXAMPLE-in March 2000, SP 1 takes a security interest in
debtor's right to payment for lottery winnings, a general
intangible under old 9, but files a financing statement describing
the collateral as "accounts" and is not perfected under old 9; in
August 2000, SP 2 takes a security interest in the same
collateral and files a financing statement describing the
collateral as "accounts and general intangibles" and is
perfected under old 9; the relative priorities are established and
SP 2 has priority; under the accounts definition of revised 9 (9102(2», a right to payment for lottery winnings is an account;
when revised 9 becomes effective, SP 1's financing statement
is effective to perfect its security interest under revised 9
(assuming all other revised 9 perfection requirements are
satisfied; this is unlikely in Kentucky because revised 9 requires
filing with secretary of state); if revised 9 were to govern
priority, the first to file or perfect rule would award priority to SP
1 since it was the first to file, and SP 1 is now perfected;
however, the relative priorities are not reestablished and SP 2
has priority
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CHECKLIST OF SECURED PARTY'S ANTICIPATORY ACTION
Existing Security Interests
1. Check perfected status of existing security interests; if not perfected,
perfect under rules of old article 9-local filing.
2. Check calendar system to insure lapse dates of filed financing
statements are noted.
3. Continue effectiveness of filed financing statements lapsing before July
1, 2001, or whose six month continuation statement window opens before
July 1, 2001, by filing a continuation statement under rules of old article
9-local filing.
4. Amend, release, or terminate filed financing statement before July 1,
2001, under rules of old article 9.
5. Prepare or obtain form for "in lieu" initial financing statement to be used
to continue effectiveness of filed financing statements lapsing after July 1,
2001.

Security Interests Created Between Now and July 1, 2001
1. Perfect security interest under rules of old article 9-file financing
statement with appropriate county clerk.

r

2. Secured party gains no advantage by also filing financing statement
under rules of revised article 9.
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REVISED ARTICLE 9: PARTS 5 & 6
&
CHANGES IN THE TITLE LIEN SYSTEM

r

JOllIl T. McGarvey
Morgall & Pottillger, P.S.C.
LOllisville, Kelltucky
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PART 5 - PERFECTION BY FILING
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PART 5 - PERFECTION BY FILING
A.
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WHERE TO FILE ..........•...................................... N(a)-l
1. National Changes
2. Real Estate Related Collatere:tl
3. Kentucky Changes

N(a)-I
N(a)-2
N(a)-2

B.

WHAT TO FILE

N(a)-2

r

c.

WHEN TO FILE

N(a)-3
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D.

IDENTITY OF THE DEBTOR

N(a)-4

E.

NAME OF THE SECURED PARTY

N(a)-4

F.

DESCRIPTION OF COLLATERAL

N(a)-4

G.

OTHER PARTIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. N(a)-5

H.

MINOR ERRORS RULE

N(a)-5

I.

CHANGE IN THE DEBTOR'S NAME

N(a)-6

J.

PERSONS ENTITLED TO FILE A FINANCING STATEMENT

N(a)-6

K.

AMENDMENT OF FINANCING STATEMENTS

N(a)-7

L.

TERMINATION OF FINANCING STATEMENT

N(a)-7

M.

DURATION OF FINANCING STATEMENTS

N(a)-7

N.

DUTIES OF THE FILING OFFICER .......•......................... N(a)-7

o.

INACCURATE OR WRONGFULLY FILED RECORDS
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P.

ACCEPTANCE AND REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A RECORD

N(a)-9

Q.

SAFE HARBOR WRITTEN FORMS .•............................... N(a)-9

R.

INFORMATION FROM FILING OFFICE

s.
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PART 5 - PERFECTION BY FILING.
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JOHN T. McGARVEY
Morgan & Po~inger, P.S.C.
601 West Main Street
.Louisville, Kentucky 40202
(502) 560-6759
jtmrmmorganandpottinger.com
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A.

WHERE TO FILE.

The rules on where to file undergo minor changes at the national level and major
changes at the local level. A prinlary change is the switch from Part 4 to Part 5.

r
r
~.

r
,r

r

r
r
r
r
r

r
r

1.

National Changes

Under existing Article 9, except mobile goods and intangibles, a secured
creditor must follow its debtor and file in all jurisdictions in which collateral is located. Not
only must the secured party track its collateral, it must familiarize itself and subject itself to
the multiple variations of filing laws, fees, and forms.
Revised Article 9 replaces the multiple filing requirement with a single filing
in the jurisdiction ofthe debtor's place ofbusiness, or its chief executive office if it has more
tIlan one place of business. A debtor that is a "registered organization" is deemed to be
located in the state of its original registration. Revised Article 9 simplifies filing in many
respects, however, when a Kentucky company, that is a Delaware corporation, grants a
security interest to a Kentucky bank, the bank must perfect tIle security interest by filing with
the Delaware Secretary of State. The drafters selected the state of registration in order to
provide certainty and to prevent arguments over where a principal place of business or chief
executive office is located. If a debtor changes its state of incorporation, or registration, the
four month rule for a new filing applies.
Organizations created under federal law are deemed to be a resident of the
state designated in their charter document, or, if none is designated, they are deemed to be
located in the District ofColumbia. Foreign corporations (non-U.S. debtors) that are located
in a foreign jurisdiction without a public filing system are deemed to be located in the
District of Columbia.

o

N(a) · 1

Individuals are located at their principal place of residence. Make sure you
know the principal place of residence of your debtor. More than a few "Kentuckians"
principally reside in Tennessee or Florida.
2.

Real Estate Related Collateral

A security interest in fixtures, "as extracted collateral," or timber to be cut
is perfected by filing a financing statement in the office of the county clerk ofthe county in
which a mortgage on the related real estate would be filed. Timber, once cut, is no longer
"to be cut" and requires filing in the office of the secretary of state (possibly another state if
a registered organization of that state). For as extracted collateral, because the security
interest does not attach until extraction, the filing in the county clerk's office continuesto be
effective after extraction. A filing on goods that are or are to become fixtures is one of the
few filings that a prudent creditor will make twice. The financing statement filed as a
"fixture filing" is filed in the office ofthe county clerk where the real estates for the property
are located. However, fixtures are also goods, and the belt and suspenders approach dictates
a second filing with the secretary of state.

3.

Kentucky Changes

Except for the real estate related collateral discussed above, if the law of
Kentucky governs perfection of a security interest, the office in wllich to file a financing
statement to perfect the security interest is the office oftIle Secretary of State. This includes
a financing statement covering fixtures if the financing statement is not filed as a fixture
filing. The change in Kentucky's filing system is the greatest in tIle nation because Kentucky
is the only state that now permits only local filing.

B.

WHAT TO FILE.

The requirements for a financing statement, or another document, such as a mortgage,
that may substitute for a financing statement, are found at KRS 355.9-502. A financing
statement is sufficient only if it:
(1)

provides the name of the debtor;

(2)

provides the name of the secured party or a representative of the
secured party; and

(3)

indicates the collateral covered by the financing statement.

N(a) · 2
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Ifthe financing statement covers as extracted collateral or timber to be cut, or is filed
as a fixture filing and covers goods that are or are to become fixtures it must also:
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indicate it covers this type of collateral;

(2)

indicate that it is to be filed in the real property records;

(3)

provide a "description of the real property to which the collateral is
related (does not require a meets and bounds description); and

(4)

if the debtor does not have an interest of record in the real property,
provide the name of a record owner.

A mortgage may be effective as a fixture filing or a financing statement covering as
extracted collateral or timber to be cut if:

r
r
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(1)

(1)

the instrument indicates the goods or accounts that it covers;

(2)

the goods are to become fixtures related to the real property, or the
collateral is related to the real property, or is as extracted collateral or
timber to be cut;

(3)

the instrument satisfies tIle other requirements for a financing
statement and

(4)

the instrument is recorded.

However, the bare bones requirements set out in 9-502 may result in rejection by a
filing officer under the standards of 9-516 which require such additional information as
addresses for the debtor and secured party. The model form financing statement set out at
9-521 requires even more information, such as a T.I.N. and an organizational number. The
secured party will be best served to completely fill out the model form and put "N/A" in any
section that does not apply to that debtor.

c.

WHEN TO FILE.

As under the prior law, a secured party may file a financing statement before its
debtor authenticates a security agreement, or a security interest otherwise attaches to the
collateral. However, because the debtor's signature is no longer necessary on a financing
statement, the secured party must ensure that if it files the financing statement before the
debtor authenticates the security agreement, that it obtains the written authority ofthe debtor
to file a financing statement.

r
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D.

IDENTITY OF THE DEBTOR.

If the debtor is a registered organization, the financing statement must provide the
name ofthe debtor "indicated on the public record ofthe debtor's jurisdiction oforganization
which shows the debtor to have been organized; ..." A financing statement that provides
only the debtor's trade name does NOT sufficiently provide the name of the debtor. This
change in statutory law effectively overrules some court decisions that have allowed trade
name filing. In other cases the financing statement is sufficient if it provides the individual
or organizational name ofthe debtor. A fina~cing statement may provide the name ofmore
than one debtor.
The section on the debtor's identity does not require the debtor's address, however,
a filing officer can reject an initial financing statement on which the debtor's mailing address
does not appear.
A debtor may be identified by taxpayer identification number (employer identification
number or social security number). However, the new statute does not require, the
identification number. Kentucky's current requirement for taxpayer identification numbers
on financing statements, effective July 15, 1998, is repealed effective July 1,2001.
If the debtor's name is incorrect, it is deemed seriously misleading if it cannot be
found with the filing officer's "standard search logic."

E.

NAME OF THE SECURED PARTY.

KRS 355.9-502 requires only the name of the secured party, 110wever, KRS 355.9516 authorizes a filing officer to reject a record that does not provide the secured party's
address. Ifthe transaction involves multiple secured parties (e.g., a syndicated or participated
credit) the financing statement must disclose only a representative secured party.

F.

DESCRIPTION OF COLLATERAL.

A major change permits what is known as "super generic" descriptions ofcollateraL
An indication that the financing statement covers all assets or all personal property is
sufficient. Otherwise, a description of collateral is sufficient if it lists the collateral by:

N(a) . 4
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

specific listing;
category;
type of collateral defined by the VCC; and
quantity.

The super generic description is permitted only through the concept of notice filing.
Super generic descriptions are ~OT sufficient to grant a security interest.
Types ofcollateral that must be specifically identified include commercial tort claims,
consumer goods or other collateral taken in consumer transactions, securities entitlements,
securities accounts, and commodity accounts. Neither super generic nor category
descriptions pick up these forms of collateral.

G.

OTHER PARTIES.

Where appropriate, financing statements may use the terms consignor, consignee,
lessor, lessee, bailor, bailee, licensor, licensee, owner, registered owner, buyer, seller, or
words of similar import.

H.

MINOR ERRORS RULE.

Not only is the minor errors rule carried over from tIle old Code, Revised Article 9
expands it. A financing statement has always been deemed to satisfy the requirements ofthe
section on filing, even if it has minor errors or omissions, unless the minor errors or
omissions make the financing statement seriously misleading. This concept remains. Under
the prior Code the minor errors exceptions applied only to the UCC-l document. However,
Revised Article 9 defines "financing statement" as "any filed record relating to the initial
financing statement." Thus, Revised Article 9 brings continuation statements, amendments,
and other UCC filings under the protection of the minor errors exception.
KRS 355.9-506(3) specifically deals with minor errors in the debtor's name: "If a
search of the records of the filing office under the debtor's correct name, using the filing
office's standard search logic, if any, would disclose a financing statement that fails
sufficiently to provide the name of the debtor in accordance with KRS 355.9-503(1), the
name provided does not make the financing statement seriously misleading."

r
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I.

CHANGE IN THE DEBTOR'S NAME.

If a debtor's name changes such that it becomes seriously misleading, the financing
statement will not be effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the
debtor more than four months after the name change. This is a change from current
Kentucky law. Under Revised Article 9 the four-month period will begin to run on the date
of the name change. Under current Kentucky law (non-uniform) the four-month period
begins to run when the secured party is put on written notice ofthe name change. House Bill
133, introduced by Rep. Bruce in the 2001 session of the Kentucky Legislature,
amended KRS 355.9-507 to change the model language and return the Kentucky rule
to the standard that has been in place since 1987, the four-month period to amend the
debtor's name follo,ving a name change will begin to run ,vhen the debtor notifies the
secured party in ,vriting of the name change. Secured parties must still be diligent in
policing their debtors because a trustee or competing secured party will argue that a change
in stationary, a copy of the year end financial statement, or any other document bearing the
new name, is written notice of the name change. Overall, the language of the pending
amendment probably best protects Kentucky'S bankers.

J.

PERSONS ENTITLED TO FILE A FINANCING STATEMENT.

A person may file an initial financing statement, or an amendment that adds collateral
or another debtor, if authorized by the debtor "in an authenticated record." The single
sentence above represents two significant changes in the law: (1) a debtor's signature is no
longer required on a financing statement and (2) the "record" authorizing the filing must only
be "authenticated." "Authenticate" means signed or "to execute or otherwise adopt a
symbol, or encrypt or similarly process a record in whole or in part, with the present intent
of the authenticating person to identify the person and adopt or accept a record."

If you have the status of a secured party, by virtue of a security agreement, you have
the right to file a financing statement. To pre-file a financing statement you should obtain
specific authority. The key in Revised Article 9 is an authorized filing. Rather than require
the debtor's signature, Article 9 approaches the issue from tIle other side and prohibits and
penalizes unauthorized filings.
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K.

AMENDMENT OF FINANCING STATEMENTS.

Any person entitled to file a financing statement may add or delete collateral covered
by the financing statement, continue or terminate the effectiveness oftIle financing statement,
or otherwise amend information in the financing statement through filing an amendment.
The amendment must identify, by its file number, the initial financing to which the
amendment relates.
An amendment that either adds collateral or adds a debtor is only effective from the
date of the amendment. Amendments do not extend the effective period of a financing
statement.
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L.

TERMINATION OF

FINA~CING STATEMENT.

If the financing statement covers consumer goods, the secured party must terminate
wIlen there is no obligation secured by the collateral and no commitment to an additional
obligation. The termination must be within one month after tIle payoff or, if earlier, within
20 days after an authenticated demand from the debtor.
In other cases the financing statement must provide the debtor with a termination
statement (or file the termination statement) within 20 days after an authenticated demand
from the debtor if there is no longer an obligation secured by tIle collateral and no
commitment to make additional advances.

M.

DURATION OF FINANCING STATEMENTS.

Financing statements remain effective for five years after the date of filing. A
secured party may file a continuation statement ollly witllin six months before the expiratioll
of the five-year period. The continuation statement extends the effectiveness for five years
commencing on the date the financing statement would otherwise have expired. There is no
change from existing law.
A mortgage that meets the standards for a financing statement, and is used for a
fixture filing, remains effective until it is terminated.

N.

DUTIES OF THE FILING OFFICER.

A filing officer must accept a record, and a record is filed, once it is communicated
to the filing office and a fee equal to or greater than the amount required for the filing is
tendered.
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Revised Article 9 adopts a set of objective standards for rejection of records by a
filing officer. Filing officers may refuse to accept a record for the following reasons:
(1)

the record has not been communicated by an authorized method or
medium;

(2)

an amount equal to or greater than the applicable fee is not tendered;

(3)

the filing officer is unable to index the record because: (a) the record
does not provide the name of the debtor; (b) in the case of an
amendment the record does not properly identify the initial financing
statement to which it relates; or identifies an initial financing
statement whose effectiveness has lapsed; (c) the record does not
sufficiently describe real property to which it relates;

(4)

a name and address are not provided for the secured party;

(5)

as to the debtor the financing statement does not (a) provid~ a mailing
address, (b) indicate whether the debtor is an individual or
organization; or (c) if the financing statement indicates the debtor is
an organization it does not provide the type of organization,
jurisdiction of organization of the debtor, or an organizational
identification number for the debtor or indicate that the de.btor has
one.

(6)

in the case of an assigiunent does not provide a name and mailing
address for the assignee; or

(7)

in the case of a continuation statement is not filed within the sixmonth period.

As a matter of law, a record does not provide sufficient information if a filing office
is unable to read or decipher the information.
A record that is communicated to the filing office with the proper fee, but which the
filing office refuses to accept for a reason other than those specified, is effective as a filed
record except as against a purchaser of the collateral who gives valuable in reasonable
reliance upon the absence of the record from the files. However, the failure of the filing
office to index a record correctly does not affect the effectiveness of the filed record.
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A person may file a correction statement with respect to a record indexed under the
person's name if the person believes the record is inaccurate or wrongfully filed. The
correction must identify the record to which it relates by file number, indicate that it is a
correction statement, and provide the basis for the persons belief that it is inaccurate. This
section was adopted primarily in reaction to the bogus financing statements filed against
public officials by extremist organizations.

P.

r
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ACCEPTANCE AND REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A RECORD.

A filing office may refuse to accept a record for filing for any ofthe reasons set forth
in section 526, conversely, it may ollly refuse to accept a record for filing for one of those
reasons. Ifthe filing office refuses to accept a record, it is required to communicate with the
person who presented the record and inform them of the reason for the refusal and the date
and time the record would have been filed ifnot for the deficiency. Notice to the filer must
be no more than two business days after the filing office receives the record.

Q.

r

INACCURATE OR WRONGFULLY FILED RECORDS.

SAFE HARBOR WRITTEN FORMS.

Although sections 516 and 520 limit the basis on which a filing office can refuse to
accept records, the drafters of Revised Article 9 also provide sample written forms tilat a
filing office must accept. The following model forms are adopted as a matter of Kentucky
law:
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)

R.

vee Financing Statement;
vee Financing Statement Addendum;

uee Financing Statement Amendment; and
uee Financing Statement Amendment Addendum.

INFORMATION FROM 'FILING OFFICE.

Upon request, a filing office must provide an acknowledgment of a filing and an
image of the record showing the number assigned and the date and time of filing or, in
substitution, simply note upon a copy of the record the number assigned and the date and
time of filing. If the filing is electronic, the filing office must communicate similar
information to the filer. The fee for issuing a certificate showing whether there is on file any
financing statement naming a particular debtor is $5.
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The filing office shall also communicate whether there is on file, on a date and time
specified, but no earlier than three business days prior to the request, any financing statement
that designates a particular debtor.

S.

FEES.

The filing fee structure is set to discourage lengthy filings and encourage electronic
filings. The Kentucky Secretary'of State is authorized to charge $10 if the record to be filed
is in writing and consists of no more than two pages, $20 for a written record of more than
two pages, but only $5 if a record is communicated by other than written media.

T.

FILING OFFICE RULES..

The Kentucky version charges the Secretary of State with promulgating
administrative regulations to implement Revised Article 9 as it relates to the Secretary of
State. Revised Article 9 further directs the Secretary of State to adopt such regulations and
practices that are harmonious with those of other jurisdictions and to keep the technology
used by its office compatible with the technology used by filing offices in otherjurisdictions.
The rules adopted by the Kentucky Secretary of State will closely track model filing rules
adopted nationally and will soon appear on that office's web site.
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PART 6 - DEFAULT, REMEDIES AND ENFORCEMENT
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JolIn T. McGarvey
Morgan & Pottillger, P.S.C.
Louisville, Kelltllcky
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Copyright 7001, John T. McGarvey
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PART 6 - DEFAULT, REMEDIES AND ENFORCEMENT.
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JOHN T. McGARVEY
Morgan & Pottinger, P.S.C.
601 West Main Street
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Existing Part 5, now Part 6 of Revised Article 9, has been a major source of
controversy and litigation. Terms such as "breach of the peace" and "commercially
reasonable" were practically made for lawyer arguments. Revised Article 9 does not tackle
all of the existing subjects of disputes but attempts to resolve many matters that have arisen
in Dee litigation.
Part 6 on default, enforcement, and remedies will be retroactive to all transactions.
Security interests taken and perfected under the old law, ifenforced after June 30, 2001, will
be subject to tIle new law. With a small change regarding repossession titles for motor
vehicles, Kentucky enacted the model version ofPart 6. Uniformity is important because the
law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located will govern enforcement rights.
A.

DEFAULT.

Default triggers a secured party's rights under Part 6. However, Revised Article 9
does not define default. What constitutes default remains a matter of contract between the
parties.

B.

DEBTORS, OBLIGORS AND GUARANTORS.

All parties to a secured transaction are placed on equal status in terms of their rights
after default. For the purpose of Part 6, a "debtor" is the person who owns or has an interest
in the collateral, not necessarily the person who owes the debt. An "obligor" is the person
who owes the payment obligation and may be the same person as the debtor. A "secondal)'
obligor" is one whose obligation is secondary, primarily a guarantor. Each of these parties
is clearly entitled to post default and repossession rights, including a notice ofsale. Revised
Article 9 prohibits clauses in guaranty agreements that waive the right to a notice of sale or
a secured party's duty to conduct a sale in a commercially reasonable manner.

r
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C.

AGREEMENT ON STANDARDS CONCERNING RIGHTS AND
DUTIES.

To the extent that Revised Article 9 places duties on a secured party, or gives debtors
and obligors rights, a security agreement may set the standards and determine fulfillment of
those rights and duties as long as the standards are not manifestly unreasonable. The lone
exception is that secured parties and debtors cannot form an agreement relating to the secured
party's duty to refrain from breaching the peace in the act of self-help repossession.

D.

COLLECTION AND ENFORCEMENT BY SECURED PARTY.
1.

Collection and Enforcement of Accounts

Revised Article 9 adds to the secured party's arsenal by specifically giving the
secured party the right to enforce the obligations of an account debtor or other person
obligated on collateral, and to exercise the rights of the debtor with respect to enforcement
of an account including the right to act against property that secures the obligations of the
account debtor to the secured party. The secured party is required to proceed in a
commercially reasonable manner if it undertakes to collect from or enforce an obligation of
an account debtor. The new sections recognize the emergence ofasset based lending and the
importance of accounts as collateral.
2.

Self-Help Repossession is Alive and Well

A secured party may, after default, take possession of its collateral, or render
equipment unuseable, pursuant to judicial process, or without judicial process, ifthe secured
party proceeds without breach of the peace. Except for rewording, the rights of a secured
party under KRS 355.9-609 are identical to the existing rights under KRS 355.9-503.
Unfortunately, the drafters struggled with but failed to define "breach of the peace."
3.

Security Consisting of Real Property or Fixtures

A secured party may proceed under Part 6 regarding personal property of
mixed real estate without affecting any of its rights with respect to the real property.
Alternatively, the secured party may elect to proceed as to both the personal property and real
property in accordance with its rights with respect to the real property.

N(b) . 2
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E.

DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL AFTER DEFAULT.
1.

Commercially Reasonable Disposition

Every aspect of a disposition of collateral, including the method, manner,
time, place, and other terms must be commercially reasonable.
2.

Preparation of Collateral for Sale

Courts have taken various positions on \vhether a secured party is required to
clean up or fix collateral prior to sale. The new statute specifically authorizes disposition
ofthe collateral "in its present condition or following any commercial reasonable preparation
or processing." However, Official Comment 4 to KRS 355.9-610(1) takes back part of that
right and holds that a secured party may not dispose of collateral "in its then condition"
when, taking into account the costs and probable benefits of preparation or processing and
the fact that the secured party would be advancing tIle costs at its risk, it would be
commercially unreasonable to dispose of the collateral in that condition. E.g., for want of
a battery, prospective purchasers cannot start the engine ofa car or construction equipment.
Secured parties should document their decision on whether to invest in clean-up/fix-up
expenses.
3.

Purchase by Secured Party

A secured party may continue to bid on its own collateral at any public
disposition and now, at a private disposition ifthe collateral is of a kind customarily sold on
a recognized market or the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations.
4.

Sale Warranties by the Secured Party

The sale of collateral by a secured party includes all warranties relating to
title, possession, and quite enjoyment unless they are specifically disclaimed by the secured
party. Specific requirements and methods of warranty disclaimers are found at KRS 355.9610(5)and (6).

5.

Repossession Title is Not a Disposition

A nonuniform section, KRS 355.9-610(7) provides: "The acquisition of a
repossession title by a secured party shall not be deemed a disposition ofcollateral under this

I
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section." The purchaser of a motor vehicle at a wholesale auction expects to receive
immediate title. To maximize the price repossessed vehicles bring at auction sale, most
secured parties obtain a repossession title in their own name prior to the auction. Imaginative
debtors' la'W)'ers have argued that the repossession title constitutes a disposition without
notice or is a de facto strict foreclosure. Subsection (7) is a legislative fix for that problem.

F.

NOTICE OF SALE.

The notice ofsale provisions, formerly contained in KRS 355.9-504 (Article 9 § 504)
are now found at KRS 355.9-611. Watch for references to the old statute in existing forms.
The new statute governs all foreclosure sales after June 30, 2001.
A secured party that disposes of collateral must notify:
(1)

the debtor;

(2)

any secondary obligor; and

(3)

ifthe collateral is other than consumer goods, any other secured party
that 10 days before the date ofthe notice ofsale had a security interest
perfected by filing a financing statement that reasonably identified the
collateral, was indexed under the debtor's name, and was filed in the
proper office; or a security interest perfected under other state or
federal statute (title liens, aircraft liens, etc.).

This is a major change in Article 9. The original article on secured transactions
required a notice to other creditors, however, tIle 1972 revisions (adopted in Kentucky
effective 1987) removed this requirement. Revised Article 9 returns to the original version.
Thus, the foreclosing creditor, regardless of lien position, must notify other secured parties.
The drafters hope this will limit post-foreclosure disputes between secured parties and will
be facilitated by the greater certainty in where to file and the availability of computer search
systems.
Most secured creditors believe that a notice of sale is timely if sent ten days or more
before the earliest time of disposition. However, Article 9 and case law interpreting Article
9 are devoid of any reference to a ten-day notice being per se commercially reasonable. For
commercial transactions, Revised Article 9 adopts the ten-day standard. Unfortunately, for
other transactions, the statute holds that whether a notification is sent within a reasonable
time is a question of fact. See KRS 355.9-612.
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G.

SAFE HARBOR NOTICES OF SALE.

1.
355.9-613 Contents and Form of Notification Before Disposition of
Collateral: General. (Effective July 1, 2001)

Except in a consumer-goods transaction, the following rules apply:
(1)

The contents of a notification of disposition are sufficient if the
notification:

r

(a)

describes the debtor and the secured party;

(b)

r

describes the collateral that is the subject of the intended
disposition;

(c)

states the method of intended disposition;

(d)

states that the debtor is entitled to an accounting ofthe unpaid
indebtedness and states the charge, if any, for an accounting;
and

(e)

states the time and place of a public disposition or the time
after w11ich any other disposition is to be made.

r
r
r
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(2)

Whether the contents of a notification that lacks any of the
information specified in subsection (1) ofthis section are nevertheless
sufficient is a question of fact.

(3)

The contents ofa notification providing substantially the information
specified in subsection (1) of this section are sufficient, even if the
notification includes:

r
r

(4)

(a)

information not specified by that subsection; or

(b)

minor errors that are not seriously misleading.

A particular phrasing of the notification is not required.

r
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(5)

The following form of notification and the form appearing in KRS
355.9-614(3), when completed, each provides sufficient infonnation:
"NOTIFICATION OF DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL
~r

To:
sent>

.•...<Name of debtor, obligor,

other person to \vhich the notification is

From:

.•...<Name, address, and telephone number of secured party>

Name of Debtor(s): ..... <Include only if debtor(s) are not an addressee>
<For a public disposition:>
We will sell <or lease or license, as applicable> the <describe collateral> <to the
highest qualified bidder> in public as follo\vs:
Day and Date:
Time:
Place:
<For a private disposition:>
We \vill sell <or lease or license, as applicable> the <describe collateral> privately
sometime after .....<day and date>.
You are entitled to an accounting of the unpaid indebtedness secured by the property
that we intend to sell <or lease or license, as applicable> <for a charge ofS...•.>. You
may request an accounting by calling us at .....<telephone number>."

2.
355.9-614 Contents and form of Notification Before Disposition of
Collateral: Consumer-Goods Transaction (Effective July 1, 2001)

In a consumer-goods transaction, the following rules apply:
(1)

A notification ofdisposition must provide the following information:
(a)

the information specified in KRS 355.9-613(1);

(b)

a description of any liability for a deficiency of the person to
which the notification is sent;
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(c)

a telephone number from which the amount that must be paid
to the secured party to redeem the collateral under KRS
355.9-623 is available; and

(d)

a telephone number or mailing address from which additional
information concerning the disposition and the obligation
secured is available.

(2)

A particular phrasing of the notification is not required.

(3)

The following form of notification, when completed, provides
sufficient information:

" ..•.•<Name and address of secured party>
.....<Date>

NOTICE OF OUR PLAN TO SELL PROPERTY
<Name and address of any obligor ,vho is also a debtor>
Subject:

<Identification of Transaction>

We have your . . . . .<describe collateral>, because you broke promises in our
agreement.
<For a public disposition:>
We will sell ..... <describe collateral> at public sale. A sale could include a lease or
license. The sale ,viII be held as follo,vs:
Date:
Time:
Place:
You may attend the sale and bring bidders if you ,vant.
<For a private disposition:>
We will sell ••.•.<describe collateral> at private sale sometime after .•... <date>.
A sale could include a lease or license.

r
r
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The money that we get from the sale (after paying our costs) "Till reduce the amount
you owe. Ifwe get less money than you o,ve, you ..... <,viii or "'ill not, as applicable>
still owe us the difference. Ifwe get more money than you o,ve, you ,viII get the extra
money, unless \\Te must pay it to someone else.
You can get the property back at any time before we sell it by paying us the full
amount you owe (not just the past due payments), including our expenses. To learn the
exact amount you must pay~ call us at •••..<telephone number>.
If you ,vant us to explain to you in writing ho,v we have figured the amount that you
o"Te us, you may call us at •.... <telephone number> <or ,vrite us at .....<secured
party's address» and request a ,vritten explanation. <We ,viII charge you $••••• for
the explanation if we sent you another ,vritten explanation of the amount you o,ve us
\vithin the last six (6) moths.>
If you need more information about the sale call us at ..... <telephone number> <or
\vrite us at .....<secured party's address».
We are sending this notice to the follo,ving other people who have an interest in .•••
. <describe collateral> or ,,'ho o,ve money under your agreement:
.....<names of all other debtors and obligors, if any>"

H.

(4)

A notification in tIle form of subsection (3) of this section is
sufficient, even if additional information appears at the end of the
form.

(5)

A notification in tIle form of subsection (3) of this section is
sufficient, even if it includes errors in information not required by
subsection (1) of this section, unless the error is misleading with
respect to rights arising under this article.

(6)

Ifa notification under this section is not in the form of subsection (3)
of this section, law other than this article determines the effect of
including information not required by subsection (1) of this section.

NOTICE OF SURPLUS OR DEFICIENCY.

If in a consumer goods transaction the debtor is entitled to a surplus, or is liable for
a deficiency, Revised Article 9 requires the secured party to send its customer an explanation.
The explanation must be sent no later than the time that the secured party
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accounts for and pays a surplus, or the time of its first written attempt to collect the
deficiency. If the debtor or consumer obligor requests an explanation, it must be sent within
14 days of receipt.
The explanation to which the custorJ;ler is entitled must be in writing and must
provide the following information in the following order:
(1)

the aggregate amount of obligations secured by the security interest,
and, if the amount reflects a rebate of unearned interest or credit
service charge calculated on a day not more than 35 days before the
secured party takes possession of the collateral;

(2)

the amount of proceeds of the disposition;

(3)

the amount ofthe obligations after deducting the amount ofproceeds;

(4)

the amount in the aggregate or by type, and types of expenses,
including expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for disposition,
processing, and disposing ofthe collateral, and attorneys' fees secured
by the collateral which are known to the secured party and relate to
the disposition;

(5)

the amount, in the aggregate or by type, and types of credits,
including rebates of interest or credit service charges, to which the
obligor is known to be entitled and which are not reflected in the
aggregate amount of obligations secured by the collateral; and

(6)

the amount of the surplus or deficiency.

Specific wording is not required, and an explanation complying substantially with tIle
requirements of KRS 355.9-616 is sufficient, even if it includes minor errors that are not
seriously misleading.
If a debtor or consumer obligor has requested and received an explanation of surplus
or deficiency within the prior six months, and sends a second request, the secured party nlay
assess a charge not exceeding $25 for the response.

r
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I.

THE RIGHT OF STRICT FORECLOSURE IS STRENGTHENED.

Strict foreclosure, the ability of a secured party to accept its collateral in lieu ofdebt,
provided for under former KRS 355.9-505, is expanded under Revised Article 9. Secured
parties may choose to use the remedy if it is unlikely that a deficiency claim can be collected
or if attempting to collect a deficiency would result in excessive legal expense or ri~k.
Current Article 9 allows only acceptance of collateral in complete satisfaction of a
debt. The Revised Article allows a secured party, in a commercial claim, to offer to accept
collateral in partial satisfaction. Revised Article 9 also eliminates tIle requirement for
possession of the collateral subject to strict foreclosure. This expands the right of strict
foreclosure to the area of intangible collateral.
Strict foreclosure is not available for consumer collateral wilere 60% ofthe cash price
has been paid in the case of a purchase money security interest, or 60% of the principal
amount ofthe obligation secured has been paid in the case ofa non-purChase money security
interest in consumer goods. In these instances, the secured party must act to properly dispose
of the consumer collateral within 90 days of taking possession or \vithin any longer period
to which the debtor and all secondary obligors have agreed.

J.

NOTIFICATION OF PROPOSAL TO ACCEPT COLLATERAL.

A secured party that chooses to use the remedy of strict foreclosure, and accept the
collateral in full or partial satisfaction of an obligation, must send its proposal to:
(1)

any person from which the secured party has received notice of a
claim in the collateral;

(2)

any other secured party that held a secured interest or lien on the
collateral perfected by filing a financing statement that identified the
collateral, was indexed under the debtor's name, and filed· in the
proper office; and

(3)

any secured party that held a security interest perfected by compliance
with another state or federal statute.

Debtors, obligors, and secondary obligors are all entitled to a notice. No safe harbor .
notice has been promulgated.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I

N(b) · 10

I
I
I

r
f;

r
r

If no one entitled to notice objects to the secured party's proposal of acceptance of
collateral in lieu of debt, the acceptance of the collateral:
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K.

discharges the obligation to the extent consented to by the debtor;

(2)

transfers to the secured party all of a debtor's rights in the collateral;
and

(3)

discharges the security interest of any subordinate secured party.

PENALTIES ON THE SECURED PARTY FOR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH ARTICLE 9.

Remedies available to the debtor include:

r
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(1)

L.

(1)

seeking a court order to restrain collection and enforcement or
disposition of collateral;

(2)

a claim for damages caused by the secured party's failure to comply
witll Article 9 including any loss resulting from the debtor's inability
to obtain, or increase costs of alternative financing; and

(3)

in the case of consumer transactions, a person that was a debtor or
secondary obligor, may recover actual damages plus an amount not
less than the credit service charge plus 10% of the principal amount
of the obligation for the time price differential plus 10% of the cash
price.

DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS
PRESUMPTION RULE.

THE

REBUTABLE

Revised Article 9 adopts the "rebutable presumption rule" for non-consunler
transactions and leaves consumer transactions to the law ofthe state. Kentucky adopted the
rebutable presumption rule for all classes of transactions in the Kentucky Supreme Court
decision of Peoples Bank ofMt. Washington v. Holt. The rebutable presunlption rule means
that in the event of any non-compliance with sale procedure, a presumption is created that
the collateral is equal to the unpaid balance of the debt. However, the secured party 11as the·

r

r
r

AND

N(b) · 11

opportunity to rebut the presumption and prove that a technical deficiency in sale procedure
did not harm the debtor or other obligor and that the secured party is entitled to recover a
deficiency. The rebutable presumption rule in Kentucky replaced an absolute bar rule.
Revised Article 9, in other states, eliminates the absolute bar rule in commercial transactions
and leaves it to the case law of the state for consumer transactions.

M.

WHAT IS COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE?

The fact that a greater amount could have been obtained by disposition of collateral
at a different time or in a different manner from that used by tIle secured party does not
preclude the secured party from establishing a deficiency. As a matter of law,Revised
Article 9 holds that a disposition is commercially reasonable if it is made:
(1)

in the usual manner on any recognized market;

(2)

at the price current in any recognized market at the time of
disposition; or

(3)

otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among.
dealers in the type of property that was the subject ofthe disposition.

A proposed disposition may also be approved in a judicial proceeding or by a
creditors' committee or representative of creditors.

If a secured party, or an entity related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor
acquires collateral at foreclosure sale, and the amount of sale proceeds of the disposition is
significantly below the range of proceeds that disposition to another person might have
brought, a surplus or deficiency will be calculated based on the amount of proceeds that
would have been realized in a disposition that properly complied with Part 6.
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A.

HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE TITLE LIEN.

Until July 1, 1987, security interests in titled property, primarily motor vehicles, were
perfected through filing a UCC-I Financing Statement. Titled property was removed from
the vce system as part of the last major amendment to Article 9. The Title Lien Statement
(formerly known as the Motor Vehicle Lien Statement) was adopted as the means by which
a secured party transmitted information to a county clerk for inclusion in the Automated
Vehicle Information System and to appear on the face of the Kentucky title. There is no
requirement that county clerks file or keep a permanent record ofTitle Lien Statements. The
test for perfection is not whether the Title Lien Statement was tendered to the clerk, but
whether the lien appears on the Certificate of Title.

B.

FEE INCREASE.

To keep the changes brought about by Revised Article 9 from adversely impacting
Kentucky's county clerks (revenue neutral in legislative parlance), and to pay for the clerks'
additional duties under the title lien system, and continued duties regarding vee records
already on file in the clerk's offices, the fee for noting a security interest on a Kentucky
Certificate of Title is increased from $8 to $12. The $3 state tax, and advance collection of
the $5 release fee remain unchanged for a total of $20 to be paid to the county clerk at the
initiation of a title lien. As noted by the clerks, this is the first fee increase for title liens
since the 1986 Legislature established the fee.

c.

WHERE TO FILE TITLE LIENS.

KRS 186A.190 simply referenced the filing location rules of existing Article 9
Section 401. However, the change to Secretary of State filing for VCC liens required the
wholesale movement ofthose rules into Chapter 186A. The complete rules are found at KRS
186A.190(2). If the debtor is a natural person, the title lien is tendered to the county clerk
ofthe county in which the debtor resides. A corporation is deemed a resident of the county
in which its registered office is located. (Because the real test for perfection is whether the
lien appears on the title, this rule will not be the proble~ tilat it was for filing fillallcing
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statements.) Where to file instructions for various other forms of organizations are found at
subsections (a) through 0) of the statute. The debtor location rules of Revised Article 9 do
NOT apply.

D.

CONTENTS OF THE TITLE LIEN STATEMENT.

A Title Lien Statement must list the name and address of the debtor, the name and
address of the secured party, describe the co.llateral, and, where applicable, list the year,
make, and identification number of the collateral.

E.

TIME TO FILE TITLE LIEN (PROPERTY PREVIOUSLYTITLED
IN THE NAME OF THE DEBTOR).

KRS 186A.200 currently requires a secured party to, within 15 days, after execution
ofa security agreement, obtain the Certificate of Title in the name of the debtor andpres~nt
the certificate to the county clerk, together with a Title Lien Statement, to recordthe lien on
the title. Senate Bill 11 amends the IS-day period to 20 days to make the period~onsistent
with other sections of the law.

F.

ASSIGNMENT OF A SECURITY INTEREST IN TITLED PROPERTY.

KRS 186.045(1) is repealed. That statute requires that whenever a perfected security
interest in titled property is assigned, the assignor must within 30 days present acdpyofthe
assignment to the county clerk in whose office the security interest was noted on the
Certificate of Title and pay a $10 fee for entry of the assignment into the AVIS system. For
practical purposes, this statute prevents the securitization of automobile retail paper in
Kentucky. Without the required $10 fee, and the burdensome paperwork, it is anticipated
that portfolios of Kentucky retail paper will be more readily saleable.

G.

THE SUNSET RULE.

Under current law a title lien remains effective until it is discharged by the secured
party. Kentucky consumers and county clerks have encountered problems with evergreen
title liens when the secured party has gone out of business or merged and 'itpstreamed
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through multiple layers so that it is difficult to locate. Under existing law, the only way to
remove the title lien is through an action in Kentucky's courts. To remedy this problem, a
sunset provision is enacted.
1.

Duration of Title Liens

Title liens on all forms of property other than manufactured homes, remain
effective for seven years from -the date on which the security interest is noted on the
Certificate ofTitle. For manufactured homes, the initial period is 14 years from the notation
date. House Bill 133, passed by the 2001 session of the Kentucky Legislature, amends
KRS 186A.190 to provide that the notation of a security interest on a ~ertificate of title
for a manufactured home shall remain effective for a period of30 years rather than the
14 years in Senate Bill 11 in the 2000 Legislature. The change ,viii correspond to the
perfection period for manufactured homes that is contained in the Model Act.
2.

Continuation of Title Lien

A secured party may file a continuation statement with the county clerk that
noted the title lien on the Certificate of Title within the six months preceding the expiration
ofthe initial period ofthe title lien. A continuation statement extends the expiration date for
seven additional years. The continuation period is seven years no matter what form of
property is involved.
3.

Transition Rule for Title Lien

In a non-codified transition rule, S.B. 11 provides that the sections on title
liens are retroactive in nature and apply to notations on Certificates of Title already in
existence on the effective date of the new law. The effectiveness of existing title liens that
would otherwise expire on the effective date, or within the first six months thereafter, is
extended through December 31, 2001. Secured parties may file continuation statements
between July 1, 2001, and December 31 , 2001, to extend the effective date of a title lien for
seven additional years from the date on which it would have otherwise expired (NOT
SEVEN YEARS FROM JULY 1, 2001, OR THE DATE THE CONTINUATION
STATEMENT IS FILED). This provision primarily affects title liens on property other than
manufactured homes because of the 14-year effective period for title liens on manufactured
homes. Only title liens perfected on manufactured homes during the first six months of the
title lien statute (July 1, 1987, through December 31, 1987) will fall under the terms of this
statute.
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4.

Administrative Regulations

The Transportation Cabinet is developing administrative regulations for
continuation statements in the title lien system. The administrative regulations will be
promulgated before July 1, 2001, but are not yet available.
5.

Alternative Perfection for Boats

If a secured party is taking b~ats as collateral on financial obligations that
exceed seven years, an alternative to a title lien is to use a First Preferred Ship Mortgage
administered by the United States Coast Guard through the National Vessel Doeumentation
Center. Many banks that finance boats on Kentucky lakes use this system that'"does not
require a tickler to remind the secured party that a continuation statement is due.
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